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LETTERS 



ON 




THE LIBRARY 
lor CONGRESS 

WASHINGTON 



THE LATEST FORM OF INFIDELITY, 



A VIEW OF THE OPINIONS 



SPINOZA, SCHLEIERMACHER, AND DE WETTE. 
By GEORGE RIPLEY. 



BOSTON: 
JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY. 

MD CCC XL. 



NCLUDING 



O F 



"THE LATEST FORM OF INFIDELITY" EXAMINED. 



A 

LETTER 

TO 



Mr. ANDREWS NORTON, 

OCCASIONED BY HIS 

"DISCOURSE BEFORE THE ASSOCIATION OF THE ALUMNI OF THE 
CAMBRIDGE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL," 

ON THE 19th OF JULY, 1839. 



By AN ALUMNUS OF THAT SCHOOL. 



Our guides must direct us, and yet if they fail, God hath not so left us to them, but he 
hath given us enough to ourselves, to discover their failings and our own duties. It is best 
to follow our guides, if we know nothing better ; but if we do, it is better to follow the 
pillar of fire, than a pillar of cloud, though both possibly may lead to Canaan 5 — but then 
also it is possible that it may be otherwise. — Jeremy Taylor. 



BOSTON: 
JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY 

MDCCC XXXIX. 



CAMBRIDGE PRESS : 
METCALF, TORRY, AND BALLOU. 



LETTER. 



Dear Sir, 

The occasion, as you justly observe, which 
called forth your Discourse before the 4 4 Alumni 
of the Cambridge Theological School," was one 
of more than common interest. It was the first 
anniversary of an Association, composed of min- 
isters whose principal bond of union is personal 
respect and friendship; who are united by the 
sympathies of education and of devotion to similar 
pursuits; but who neither claim authority over 
each others' faith, nor profess to regard unifor- 
mity of speculative opinion, as desirable, even if 
it were possible. Many of them have been fel- 
low-students at the same school ; a common in- 
terest in theology first brought them together, and 
has not since divided them ; others are connected 
by habits of social and professional intercourse ; 
and all, it is to be presumed, are engaged in the 
investigation of truth, without being restrained by 
a creed which they have agreed to support. 



4 



The relation, existing between the clergymen 
who were assembled on that day, has often been 
remarked as being of a rare and delightful char- 
acter. It has been supposed that there were few 
bodies of men in the habit of meeting together, 
who combined more firmness of individual opinion 
with more guarded and delicate respect for every 
sincere expression of thought; who were more 
attached to the principle of perfect tolerance in 
matters of intellectual inquiry, or more consistent 
in its practical application ; and who had more 
thoroughly learned the great lesson of wisdom, 
" in our own strivings after truth to give deserved 
honor to the strivings of our neighbor." In conse- 
quence of this, their mutual intercourse has been 
agreeable and salutary ; they have shed light on 
each others' minds; they have warmed each 
others' hearts; the progress of truth has been 
advanced by their mutual endeavors ; and it is 
seldom, indeed, that the widest differences of 
opinion have produced any interruption in the 
perfect bond of charity by which they are united. 
It is to be expected, of course, that men whose 
education, whose habits of mind, whose con- 
dition and pursuits in life, are, in many re- 
spects very similar, should arrive at certain com- 
mon conclusions, in their independent researches 
after truth. This has, undoubtedly, been the case. 



5 



They agree in the rejection of many articles of 
faith, which have usually been held sacred in the 
Church ; a traditional theology has taken no 
strong hold of their minds ; they deem the simple 
truths of Christianity more important than the 
mysteries which have been combined with them ; 
but the principle of their union has never been 
made to consist in any speculative belief ; no 
test has been required as a condition of fellow- 
ship ; the mere suggestion of such a course would 
be met only with a smile of derision. It is not as 
Unitarians, that they are united in friendly rela- 
tions ; those relations existed before the name of 
Unitarian was prevalent among us ; and it is now 
disclaimed by many whom we can never think of 
but with sentiments of profoundest veneration and 
love. The common tie which holds them together 
is attachment to liberal Christianity ; they value 
this, because it connects the enjoyment of religion 
with independence of mind, and enables them to 
search for truth, free from human dictation. 

It must always be a beautiful spectacle to wit- 
ness the union of a numerous body of men, whose 
relation with each other is so disinterested and 
holy. When we remember those disastrous ages 
of the Church, — so full of instruction and warn- 
ing to the thoughtful student ot history, — in which 
councils assembled for the punishment of heresy, 



6 



in which the questioner of prevailing opinions was 
doomed to expiate his crime by the fires of mar- 
tyrdom, or to drag out a death-like existence 
under the ban of the hierarchy, — it cannot but 
be grateful to meet with an assembly of clergy- 
men, who, in the consciousness that they are 
ecclesiastics, do not forget that they are men ; who 
are more anxious to maintain a true liberty of 
thought, than any uniformity of creed ; and who 
labor for the regeneration of society and the 
blessedness of the world, by the diffusion of the 
essential spirit of Christianity, rather than by the 
inculcation of the doctrines of a sect. 

The Association, moreover, which you were 
called to address, is composed of the Alumni of 
a Theological School, which has always claimed 
the favor of the community, on account of its 
freedom from an exclusive spirit, its confidence in 
the safety and utility of thorough inquiry in all 
matters of faith, its attachment to the principles 
of a liberal theology, and its renunciation of the 
desire to impose articles of belief on the minds of 
its pupils. The strongest plea, on which it has relied 
for patronage has been expressed in language like 
the following. "It is not the variety of opinions 
which have been drawn from the same records of 
faith, nor the number of sects into which the 
Church universal has been partitioned, which have 



7 



been injurious to the Christian cause, so much as 
the manner in which those opinions have been 
maintained, and the outrageous pretensions which 
those sects have, with hardly an exception, ad- 
vanced. The lovers of a free or liberal theology, 
feel it impossible that they could submit to any 
such dominion. They know it to be not in the 
nature of things, that any man can be worthy of 
all this deference, or can be entitled to have all 
his opinions respected and adopted as infallible 
interpretations of an infallible law. They know 
of no mere man who ever lived by whose name 
they would be willing to be called, or whose im- 
plicit disciples they would be willing to be con- 
sidered. They refuse the name of Socinus with 
as much promptness as they would the name of 
Calvin; not because they are afraid of being 
thought to hold those opinions of Socinus which 
have been generally accounted obnoxious, but 
because they conceive no man to be worthy of 
the honor which they render to Christ alone, and 
because they will not bind themselves, nor suffer 
themselves to be bound by the adoption of any 
man's name, to become in any degree responsible 
for his character or sentiments, subservient to his 
views, or obedient to his dictates. The submis- 
sion which they will not yield to one man, they 
will not yield to any one body of men. They 



8 



feel that they cannot and must not surrender the 
birth-right of their mental and religious freedom 
to one or to many, to a name, or a church, or a 
catechism, but that they must keep their minds 
open at all hours to receive fresh air and new 
light, and in a position to profit readily and unre- 
strainedly by the result of any examination. En- 
tertaining such views as these of the sacredness 
of religious freedom, they would never call on the 
instructers of a school of theology to subscribe 
allegiance to a long list of doctrines, but would 
rather select those men for teachers, who, wise, 
honest, and competent, would refuse bondage, 
even as they themselves would refuse it. A lib- 
eral theology is generous as well as free. It will 
no more attempt to enslave, than it will submit to 
be enslaved. It allows all Christian privileges to 
all Christian men, and it acknowledges as Christ- 
ian men all who seriously take the name of Christ, 
hearken to his instructions, and consider them- 
selves amenable to his laws. It does not take a 
particular form of doctrine, and place it on a pe- 
destal, and proclaim, ' This is the golden image ; 
fall down and worship it, or be cast into the fiery 
furnace. 5 It reveres truth ; it entertains its own 
views of what truth is, and it would have all men 
come to the knowledge of it ; but it would effect 
this by invitation, and not by denunciation ; by 



9 



persuading men to examine, leaving them free to 
choose, and granting to each one his perfect right 
to his own determination, and his perfect safety in 
it, if he has come to it in a proper temper, and 
by a just use of all his means. It regards spirit- 
ual pride and arrogance as worse than false doc- 
trine, and as the prolific seed of heresies and 
schisms and infidelity. Exclusiveness is its utter 
aversion. Exclusive Christianity is its unspeaka- 
ble wonder. It regards exclusive religion as quite 
as great a contradiction as an exclusive God. — 
I believe that in the whole of the Western Con- 
tinent, from its southernmost cape to the northern 
circle, there is but one spot, a green spot, in which 
such a theology is publicly taught. I believe that 
in one theological seminary only, in this hemi- 
sphere, the Divinity School at Cambridge, do re- 
ligious liberality and charitableness, conjointly 
with seriousness, form the spirit of theological in- 
struction." * 

In the hope, that the Cambridge Theological 
School would be true to these momentous obliga- 
tions, would answer to the piercing cry of our 
country and age for a free and generous theology, 
would be a tower of safety and strength against 

* Greenwood's TJieology of the Cambridge Divinity School, 
pp. 5 -7, 14. 

2 



10 



every foe of mental liberty, we have loved it with 
an exceeding love. Her name has been written 
on the very palms of our hands ; they would soon- 
er forget their cunning, than we could forget her 
welfare ; she had taught us to search boldly, though 
meekly and reverently, into the mysteries of God 
and the mind of Christ ; we took pleasure in her 
stones and even honored her dust ; we valued her 
reputation, her influence, her usefulness, as if it 
had been our own ; we looked to her, perhaps 
with exaggerated, yet with pardonable confidence, 
as the great hope of a progressive theology in our 
native land, as the fountain from which a bright 
and benignant light would radiate beyond the 
mountains of New England, and shine upon the 
broad and pleasant meadows of the West. This 
feeling has been shared in common with almost 
all our clergymen. We have endeavored to dif- 
fuse it in our societies ; it has kindled the enthu- 
siasm of our most noble-minded young men ; our 
opulent citizens have not escaped its influence ; 
and nearly the whole of our religious community 
have regarded the School at Cambridge as their 
favorite child. 

It must be a privilege, under any circumstances, 
to address an audience composed in this manner. 
The occasion, it would seem, could not but lift 
one above the region of vulgar trivialities, awak- 



11 



en thoughts of a deep and solemn character, 
cleanse the mind from every taint of prejudice, 
and suppress all consciousness of self in devotion 
to truth and freedom. I do not wonder that the 
interest of the occasion was deeply and widely 
felt, that it called together a numerous company 
of brothers and friends, such as seldom honors the 
festive assemblages of our University. This in- 
terest was still further enhanced by the fact, that 
in accordance with their character as liberal min- 
isters, they had arrived at different conclusions in 
regard to several important topics of theology. 
In our happy state of society, as there is no very 
broad line of distinction between the clergy and 
the rest of the community, they had shared in the 
influences, which, within the last few years, have 
acted so strongly on the public mind ; with in- 
telligent and reflecting men of every pursuit and 
persuasion, many of them had been led to feel 
the necessity of a more thorough reform in the- 
ology ; they /were not satisfied that the denial of 
the Trinity and its kindred doctrines gave them 
possession of all spiritual truth ; they wished to 
press forward in the course which they had begun, 
to ascend to higher views, to gain a deeper insight 
into Christianity, to imbibe more fully its divine 
spirit, and to apply the truths of revelation to the 
wants of society and the progress of man. 



12 



Their experience as pastors had brought them 
into contact with a great variety of minds ; some 
of which were dissatisfied with the traditions they 
had been taught ; the religion of the day seemed 
too cold, too lifeless, too mechanical for many of 
their flock ; they were called to settle difficulties 
in theology of which they had not been advised in 
the school ; objections were presented by men of 
discernment and acuteness, which could not be 
set aside by the learning of books ; it was discov- 
ered that many had become unable to rest their 
religious faith on the foundation of a material 
philosophy ; and that a new direction must be 
given to their ideas, or they would be lost to 
Christianity, and possibly to virtue. The wants 
of such minds could not be concealed ; they were 
known to the ministers, if not to the world ; to 
neglect them would have been a sin ; the wander- 
ing sheep in the wilderness excited more interest 
than the ninety and nine which were safe in the 
fold, and to restore them to the good shepherd 
was counted a paramount duty. 

In the course of the inquiries which they had 
entered into, for their own satisfaction and the 
good of their people, they had become convinced 
of the superiority of the testimony of the soul to 
the evidence of the external senses ; the essential 
character of Christianity, as a principle of spirit- 



13 



ual faith, of reliance on the Universal Father, 
and of the intrinsic equality and brotherhood of 
man, was made more prominent than the histori- 
cal circumstances with which it was surrounded, 
at its introduction into the world ; and the signa- 
tures of truth and divinity which it bore on its 
front were deemed stronger proofs of its origin 
with God, than even the works of might which 
were wrought by its Author for the benefit of man. 
They cherished a firm and sincere conviction of 
the importance of these views, and their adapta- 
tion to the peculiar wants and highest interests of 
the community. They never disguised the results 
to which they had come ; they gave them a due 
proportion of attention in their public services ; 
they rejoiced in their discussion, even when it was 
called forth by rude attacks ; though sometimes 
misunderstood, they were not discouraged ; they 
knew the community they lived in, which will 
not suffer a good man to be put down ; and 
with a calm confidence in truth, they were con- 
tent to wait for the prevalence of their views. 
They regarded them as the natural result of liberal 
inquiry in theology, chastened and purified by the 
influence of religious sentiment, and guided by 
the lights of an elevated spiritual philosophy. In 
the exercise of their ministry, they had been con- 
firmed in the soundness of their ideas ; their be- 



14 

nign effects were visible among the people of their 
charge ; and these effects were thought to be 
in harmony with the spirit of Christ, nay, the 
necessary product of the religion which he an- 
nounced. They saw their opinions rapidly spread- 
ing among the younger members of the profes- 
sion, while they were regarded with charity, if not 
with approbation, by those whom they most hon- 
ored among their seniors. No difference of spec- 
ulation had estranged them from the hearts of 
their brethren ; no breach had been made in the 
sympathy which was the pervading principle of 
their association ; the understanding had been sa- 
credly observed, if not formally expressed, that a 
profession of faith in Christ, and a sincere and 
virtuous character were the conditions of fellow- 
ship, rather than any agreement in theological 
opinion. 

Such were the circumstances in which the 
Alumni assembled to hear the first annual Dis- 
course before their Association. It was to be 
expected that the speaker on such an occasion 
would either confine himself to those topics which 
were of equal interest to all, on which there was 
no prominent diversity of opinion ; or that if he 
chose to select a subject of controversy, he would 
discuss it, not merely with a semblance of calm- 
ness and moderation, but with a manly adherence 



15 



to the great principles of liberal Christianity, and 
a scrupulous sense of justice towards the senti- 
ments and character of his brethren. 

In this respect, the Discourse, which was pro- 
nounced, appears to me not only at variance 
with the spirit of the occasion, but adapted to 
mislead the public mind, on subjects which deeply 
interest it. A temperate, though firm and decided 
examination of its statements is called for by the 
claims of truth and justice, the cause of mental 
freedom, and a regard to the progress of liberal 
theology and enlightened religion in our commu- 
nity. 

I am impelled by these considerations to sub- 
mit your Discourse to the test of an impartial 
criticism ; and in the discharge of this duty, you 
will pardon me if I speak with great frankness, 
if I endeavor to be as faithful in pointing out 
your errors, as I am sure you would have been 
towards another in similar circumstances. I shall 
avoid all harshness of expression ; for my object 
is not triumph, but truth ; still I am aware that 
you cannot read my remarks without pain ; and I 
therefore protest, in the outset, against the se- 
verity with which I shall handle your assertions 
being construed into discourtesy towards yourself. 
It is unpleasant to speak as I shall be forced to ; 
but it will be remembered, that the subject of 



16 



controversy is not merely a speculative opinion, 
but involves a vindication from the charge of a 
grave moral offence. 

Before proceeding to the discussion of the lead- 
ing topic of your Discourse, you will allow me to 
express my disapprobation of the peculiar form, 
which you were pleased to adopt for the commu- 
nication of your sentiments. I object to it, not 
merely as a matter of taste, — though much might 
be said in that regard, — but as adapted to make 
a false impression, which it is more difficult to set 
right, than if your manner of treating the subject 
had been simple and direct. The point I allude 
to will appear in a moment. 

You commence with the assertion, (p. 4.) that, 
" our religion is very imperfectly understood : and 
received by comparatively a small number with 
intelligent faith." You then announce as the 
theme of your Discourse (p. 5.) " the character- 
istics of the times and some of those opinions now 
prevalent, which are at war with a belief in 
Christianity." 

This, certainly, was a judicious opening, and 
I only speak the sentiments of your whole 
audience, when I say that it was heard with 
universal pleasure. It at once brought up a 
subject of the highest importance, of no small 



17 



difficulty, and of singular interest to our commu- 
nity at the present moment. It gave the promise 
that you would discuss the character and tendency 
of opinions now prevalent in the midst of us ; 
that you would meet some of the objections which 
have been advanced to popular theological ideas ; 
that you would come directly to the great ques- 
tions that are at issue between different portions 
of the audience which you addressed. There 
was reason to hope that you would oppose certain 
substantial obstacles to the current of thought 
which threatens in the view of some individuals to 
endanger our most valuable institutions; so that 
they who were inclined to this direction might find 
their difficulties removed, their ignorance enlight- 
ened, their love of vague and visionary specula- 
tions corrected, and the truth presented in so clear 
and attractive a light, that they could not fail to 
receive it ; while those who were attached to the 
contrary mode of thinking would be furnished 
with arguments sufficient to repel every alarming 
encroachment. 

But, instead of this mode of proceeding, you 
adopted one which could not have been expected 
from your statement of the subject, and which I 
conceive to have been singularly irrelevant to the 
demands of your audience, and the nature of the 

occasion. Instead of meeting face to face the 
3 



18 



opinions which have found favor with many theo- 
logians in this country, which are publicly main- 
tained from the pulpit and the press in our own 
immediate community, which form the cardinal 
points on which speculation is divided among us, 
you appear studiously to refrain from all mention 
of them ; no one could infer from your remarks, 
that any novel ideas had been broached in our 
theological world, excepting those whose origin 
can be traced back to the skeptical reasonings of 
Spinoza and Hume, and a comparatively small 
class of the modern theologians of Germany. 
You argue with considerable strength against their 
assumptions ; but even if you had succeeded in 
their complete demolition, no progress would thus 
have been gained towards your main object ; for, 
I venture to say, not ten copies of Spinoza's 
Works can be found in our vicinity ; I greatly 
doubt whether there are ten persons among us, 
who have ever read as many pages of his writ- 
ings ; and as for Hume's " famous Essay on Mir- 
acles," no one deems it worth while to disturb its 
repose in the dust of the library ; at least, it is so 
seldom that we hear its name alluded to, that we 
may justly regard it as having gone to sleep. The 
case is the same with the German theologians, to 
whom you refer in the body of your Discourse. 
They have no weight with our theological inqui- 



19 



rers ; their day is fast declining in their own conn- 
try ; and no man acquainted with the progress of 
opinion in Germany could allude to the peculiar 
speculations of Paulus, for example, as exerting 
any perceptible influence on its present condition. 
The whole course of your reasoning in regard to 
the objections of Spinoza and Hume had no more 
connexion with your subject, than a refutation of 
the astrologers and alchemists of the middle ages. 
You undertook to speak of prevailing opinions ; 
you were understood to have in view errors that 
have made their appearance among ourselves ; 
but the doctrine which you oppose of the impos- 
sibility of miracles, on which you labor throughout 
a great part of your Discourse, and the annihilation 
of which you deem to be of such vital importance, 
is not known to have an advocate among our 
theologians. If there be one, I am sure, I never 
heard of him. The questions at issue in the new 
movement, as it is called, relate to a different sub- 
ject. Your reasonings, accordingly, on the topic 
you chose, were thrown away. They excited no 
opposition, and therefore, little interest. You 
failed to argue the points on which there is much 
solicitude ; and confined yourself to one, which 
nobody conversant with the actual state of inquiry 
cares any thing about. 

But although you devoted yourself to the exami- 



20 



nation of past errors, of doctrines, which, however 
formidable in another age, have no immediate 
effect on the present condition of thought, the 
circumstances in which you spoke, and the 
relations which you sustain to our theological 
community, could not fail to produce the im- 
pression that you had reference to existing opin- 
ions, that you were attacking ideas which were 
not only cherished in past centuries, and in 
foreign countries, but which were beginning to 
make progress, to exert a disastrous influence 
on the interests of sound thought and pure relig- 
ion, in our own land. It is this ambiguity that I 
complain of. A want of openness is never favor- 
able to the cause of truth. The effect on those 
who now read your Discourse, as it was on most 
of your audience, unless they exercise a more 
than ordinary discrimination and independence of 
thought, unless they possess facilities for correct 
information, which of course were in your power, 
but which few are able to command, will be pre- 
cisely the same as if you had charged the opin- 
ions you opposed on those who are understood to 
differ from you, in your general views of theology. 
On former occasions, you had assumed the attitude 
of a chastiser of the heresies of your brethren ; 
you had made yourself " the talk of the day " in 
our social circles by your zealous limitation of the 



21 



rights of free inquiry, on account of the danger- 
ous results to which it led ; you were selected as 
the anniversary speaker in order that you might 
have a fair opportunity to do justice to your own 
views and practices in this respect, and sustain 
your position against your opponents ; many came 
from far and near to be present on the occasion, 
at no small inconvenience to themselves; and 
not a man among them could doubt for a moment 
that you would express yourself with freedom, 
with clearness, with power, on the views of your 
brethren which were at war with your own. 

Such being the case, it appears to me, that pe- 
culiar caution and delicacy were requisite, in or- 
der to avoid even the possibility of misapprehen- 
sion. A sincere love of truth always leads us to 
be as circumspect in stating the opinions of an 
adversary, as our own ; and to exercise a scrupu- 
lous care, that he be not placed in a false po- 
sition, made responsible for errors which he dis- 
claims, and confounded with men with whom he 
has no affinity. I should expect this rule to be 
violated by an excited controversialist in his 
passion for victory ; but from a candid and in- 
genuous spirit, I should look for its most fas- 
tidious observance. The practical effect of this 
ambiguity, in other respects, is somewhat singular. 
It places your readers at liberty to apply your 



22 



remarks to the views of those whom you are 
accustomed to denounce ; they would be perfect- 
ly justified in doing so, for aught that appears 
in your Discourse; and to suppose that they 
do not would be affectation or folly. At the 
same time, a person not familiar with the present 
relations of our theological community, a stran- 
ger who did not perceive that more was signi- 
fied than said, might feel surprised that any body 
should take the trouble to reply to your assertions. 
You have given yourself the advantage, such as 
it is, of making an indirect attack through the 
medium of obsolete opinions ; and if those to 
whom it is applied, think it necessary to vindicate 
themselves, you can maintain that you had no 
such reference in view, and that the supposition, 
on their part, that you had is entirely gratuitous. 

But the advantage you thus gain is momentary. 
It soon presents another aspect. I hardly need 
to state the dilemma to which you are reduced. 
If you meant to say that the opinions of Spi- 
noza and Hume on the doctrine of miracles were 
adopted by that portion of your audience which 
differed from yourself, your Discourse was unjust ; 
if you did not mean to say this, it was nugatory. 
And in either case, you were bound to express 
yourself so that one should not be left in the dark 
as to what you did mean. Or, if you took it for 



j 



23 



granted, that those opinions were held by your op- 
ponents, you advanced an invidious charge, while 
you were ignorant of the facts. If you persist in 
saying that they are held, I call for the proof. 

I do not intend, however, to dwell on these 
points. They relate to personal ethics, rather to 
questions in theology ; the cause of truth, in gen- 
eral, is not essentially affected, by the mode which 
an individual adopts for the expression of his 
views ; and I accordingly hasten to the discussion 
of the chief topic which I conceive worthy of 
attention in the statements of your Discourse. I 
refer to your adoption and defence of the exclu- 
sive principle in an Address before an assembly of 
liberal clergymen. By the exclusive principle, I 
mean the assumption of the right for an individ- 
ual, or for any body of individuals, to make their 
own private opinions the measure of what is 
fundamental in the Christian faith. As liberal 
Christians, we have long contended against this 
principle, as contrary to the very essence of Prot- 
estantism ; we have claimed the inherent right of 
private judgment, as essential to Christian free- 
dom ; we have resisted, to the uttermost, every 
attempt to impose controverted points of opinion 
on the universal belief of the Church. We have 
welcomed every man as a brother, who acknowl- 



24 



edged Christ as his Master ; we have not pre- 
sumed to sit in judgment on any Christian's claim 
to discipleship ; we have refused to entertain the 
question, whether he were entitled to the Chris- 
tian name ; we have felt that it was not ours to 
give or to withhold ; and that the decision in all 
cases, must rest with himself. It was not because 
our exclusive brethren made a belief in the Trin- 
ity, a test of allegiance to Christ, that we accused 
them of inconsistency with the liberty of the Gos- 
pel ; but because they presumed to erect any 
standard whatever, according to which the faith of 
individuals should be made to conform to the 
judgment of others. It was not any special ap- 
plication of the principle, that we objected to ; it 
was the principle itself; and assuredly, the exer- 
cise of this principle does not change its charac- 
ter, by reason of the source from which it pro- 
ceeds. Nay, is it not aggravated by the fact, that 
it is sustained, not by those with whom it forms a 
part of their religion, but by those whose religion 
is identified with hostility to it ? 

But the doctrine which lies at the foundation of 
your whole Discourse is a signal manifestation of 
the exclusive principle. You propose your own 
convictions, — and convictions, which it will ap- 
pear in the sequel of this letter, are directly at 
war with the prevailing faith of the Church, — 



25 



as the criterion of genuine Christian belief. You 
maintain that the truth of Christianity can be sup- 
ported by no other evidence than that which ap- 
pears satisfactory to yourself; that unless we are 
persuaded of the divine origin of our religion by 
the arguments which you deem valid, we cannot 
be persuaded at all ; and that to speak of faith in 
the revelations of the Gospel, unless that faith be 
built on the only basis which you pronounce to be 
good, is, in itself, a proof of delusion or insincer- 
ity. You make no allowance for the immeasura- 
ble variety of mind which is found everywhere, 
for the different direction which early education, 
natural temperament, and peculiar associations 
impart to men's habits of thinking, for the shifting 
lights which the same evidence presents, accord- 
ing to the circumstances in which it arrests the 
attention, or for the changes acquired by language 
and the ideas which it conveys, in the progress of 
ages ; but you advance your principle, with the 
same want of reserve or qualification that a teach- 
er of the Infallible Church would have exhibited 
before the Reformation ; you declare that a cer- 
tain kind of evidence, in your view, establishes 
the truth of Christianity, and that he who rests his 
faith on any other is an infidel, notwithstanding 
his earnest and open professions to the contrary. 
You thus, in fact, denied the name of Christian to 
4 



26 



not a few individuals in your audience, although 
you avoid discussing the grounds by which their 
opinions are supported. For it is perfectly well 
known that many of our most eminent clergymen, 
— I will not refrain from speaking of them as 
they deserve, on account of my personal sympa- 
thy with their views, — repose their belief in the 
divine origin of Christianity on a different founda- 
tion from that which you approve as the only 
tenable one. Men whose names are almost a 
passport to the opinions they adopt, whose lives 
are a guaranty against all suspicion of guile, whose 
fervent devotion to every cause that promises the 
extension of religion or the good of man has be- 
come proverbial, whose candor and transparency 
of character is a constant memorial of the sim- 
plicity of Christ, are inclined to rest their convic- 
tions of the divinity of the Gospel on evidence 
which commends itself to their minds, although 
you may pronounce it to be valueless and decep- 
tive. Among those who adopt this view of 
Christianity are clergymen who have never en- 
joyed the benefit of your instructions, but whose 
minds have been kept open to every fresh access 
of light, as well as their younger brethren who are 
deeply indebted to your counsels and example in 
the pursuit of truth, and who have obtained from 
your influence in former years, something of that 



27 



spirit of freedom, for which they are now con- 
demned. 

But according to the doctrine of your Discourse, 
their faith in Christianity is either a self-deception 
or a pretence ; the divine glory which they recog- 
nise in Christ is a vain chimera ; they are disqual- 
ified for the office of Christian teachers ; their 
very profession of Christianity is a blot on their 
characters ; it calls in question either their intel- 
lect or their conscience, or both ; they are exhorted 
to abandon a calling which they have no right to 
pursue ; and since they do not receive your con- 
struction of the evidences of Christianity, to de- 
clare to the world that they repudiate the Savior, 
and regard the glorious Gospel of the blessed God 
as the invention of man. 

This application of the exclusive principle is 
the more remarkable, when we consider the vehe- 
mence with which you have opposed it, in refer- 
ence to your own opinions. Within a few years, 
you have appeared as the public advocate of 
mental freedom ; you have spurned, with sovereign 
displeasure, every restraint upon your indepen- 
dence ; you have claimed and exercised the right 
of every man to form his own opinions on the 
doctrines of Christianity, without incurring the 
reproach of skepticism or insincerity ; and no one 
has exhibited a more indignant eloquence than 



28 



yourself at the introduction of personalities into 
religious discussions, at the substitution of denun- 
ciation for argument, and at an appeal to the 
prejudices and timidity of men, rather than to their 
good sense and love of truth. So long as your 
own right to free investigation was called in ques- 
tion, you displayed a singular zeal in its defence ; 
you rejected with just scorn, the charge of infi- 
delity, because you cherished conceptions of 
Christianity at war with the faith of the great ma- 
jority of Christians ; and you could hardly, if at 
all, admit the idea that any but a narrow and vul- 
gar mind was capable of bringing such a charge. 
But you now present the same accusation against 
a portion of your fellow Christians, for rejecting 
opinions which you adopt. Instead of answering 
their arguments, you attack their characters. You 
attempt to silence them not by persuasion, but by 
reproach. You refuse to meet them on equal 
grounds ; you would first make them infidels in 
the eyes of the public ; and then, if ever, examine 
their ideas. 

The first avowed advocacy and exercise of the 
exclusive principle among liberal Christians, as 
far as I know, has been by yourself. Hitherto it 
has been confined to Christians of a different 
faith. They have had reasons for their proceed- 
ing which do not exist in your case. They con- 



29 



demned those who claimed the Christian name, for 
the rejection of doctrines that had the sanction of 
the Church ; you condemn them, for not receiving 
opinions which are almost peculiar to yourself. 
They urged the necessity of doctrines which the 
testimony of religious consciousness had pro- 
nounced to be true ; you denounce the opinion 
that divine truth can be perceived by the intuitions 
of consciousness. They insisted on the belief of 
doctrines which they held essential to the salvation 
of the soul ; you insist on hypotheses which you 
confess have only a strong probability in their 
favor. They contended for doctrines which were 
supposed to form the very substance of Christian- 
ity ; you contend for a method of establishing its 
evidence.* 

* I cannot but refer the candid reader to some more complete dis- 
cussions of the exclusive system than I am able to give in this place. 
The times demand a recurrence to first principles, if we would not 
forget the essential grounds of our existence as a distinct Christian 
denomination. If any one will read the " Discourse on the Exclu- 
sive System," by Dr. Walker, and the " Essay on the System of Ex- 
clusion and Denunciation," by Dr. Channing, not to mention other 
productions of the last named writer, he will perceive, I think, that 
their reasonings against exclusiveness are no less applicable to the 
present case, than to those which they had immediately in view. It 
cannot be repeated too often, that it is the intrinsic character of the 
exclusive principle, which we condemn, not its special application. 
Dr. Walker very pertinently remarks, (Discourse, p. 4. 1st Ed.) "Men 
have always been willing that every one should think as he pleases, 



30 



I have thus far confined my remarks to your 
adoption of the exclusive principle, without a 
direct consideration of the doctrine, in support 
of which you have given that principle the sanc- 
tion of your authority. It would be a glaring 
inconsistency with all our modes of thought, with 
all our practical usages, as liberal Christians, for an 
individual to make any speculative opinion the 
standard of Christian faith, however true and im- 
portant the opinion might be in itself. But the 
inconsistency is aggravated, when the doctrine 
which is maintained on exclusive grounds can 
easily be shown to be almost peculiar to the indi- 
vidual by whom it is announced, at variance with 
the general belief of Christians in every age, 
incapable of support from the teachings of Scrip- 
ture and right reason, and involving consequences 
of an irreligious and alarming character. 

so long as he will please to think as they do ; and this, especially 
when the clergy have been called in to decide the question, has 
commonly been the extent of their notions of religious liberty. 
Every sect has preached up just enough of liberality to answer its 
own purpose, that is to say, just enough to secure an indulgence to 
its own deviations from the traditionary faith. But further than this, 
almost every one has agreed, that liberality must be a very dan- 
gerous thing. All have allowed a certain latitude of thinking, with- 
in which liberty may be enjoyed ; but if any one should go beyond 
this, though in the exercise of the same liberty, he is to be regarded 
and treated as an apostate from the religion." 



31 



I sincerely regret that I am obliged by fidelity 
to my subject to show that this is the case with 
the leading doctrine of your Discourse. The 
leading doctrine, I say, for although you merely 
declare it, without advancing any considerations 
in its favor, without noticing the objections which 
press it on all sides, the manner in which you 
apply it to the defence of your views, evinces that 
it occupied the most prominent place in your mind, 
and that you intended it should form the strongest 
impression produced by your Discourse. 

The doctrine to which I allude, and which I 
now mean to discuss, is that the miracles re- 
corded in the New Testament are the ON- 
LY PROOF OF THE DIVINE ORIGIN OF CHRIST- 
IANITY. 

You assert, (p. 5.) " that the divine authority of 
him whom God commissioned to speak to us in 
his name was attested, in the only mode in which 
it could be, by miraculous displays of his power." 
Christianity offers, (p. 18.) " in attestation of the 
truths of the facts, which it reveals, the only satis- 
factory proof, the authority of God, evidenced by 
miraculous display of his power." (p. 22.) " No 
proof of the divine commission of Christ could be 
afforded but through miraculous displays of God's 
power." But I need not multiply quotations to 
show your advocacy of a doctrine, for which, 



32 



I presume, you will not disclaim being responsi- 
ble. 

The question at issue, therefore, ought to be 
distinctly understood. It is not concerning the 
divine mission of Jesus Christ. The certainty of 
that will be at the foundation of my reasonings ; 
and it is admitted, as far as I know, in all the con- 
troversies to which the subject has given rise in 
our own country. 

Nor is it, whether Jesus Christ performed the 
miracles ascribed to him in the New Testament. 
I shall hereafter allude to the doubts which are 
felt by many excellent Christians on this point ; 
but for my own part, I cannot avoid the conclu- 
sion, that the miracles related in the Gospels were 
actually wrought by Jesus. Without being blind to 
the difficulties of the subject, I receive this view, 
according to my best knowledge and understand- 
ing, on the evidence presented ; and in this belief 
I am joined by a large number of those, against 
whom your charge of infidelity is alleged among 
ourselves. 

Neither does the question, I am about to con- 
sider, relate to any philosophical explanation of 
the miracles of Christ. I believe that he gave 
health to the sick, sight to the blind, and life to 
the dead ; and my explanation of these facts is 
that presented in the New Testament. " No man 



33 



could do the miracles which he did, except God 
were with him." * " God anointed Jesus of Naza- 
reth with the Holy Ghost and with power ; who 
went about doing good ; for God was with him."t 
If you have any different, or any better explana- 
tion to offer of these facts, it would furnish an 
interesting object of examination, but can form 
no part of the present discussion. 

Nor, finally, does the question relate to the 
validity of miracles as the credentials of a divine 
messenger. That question, it is true, forms an 
important topic of theological science; much 
vague and superficial thought is exercised con- 
cerning it ; it is often presented in a manner, 
adapted to awaken the most lively doubts; and 
it demands a wise and thorough revision, before, 
in the present state of opinion, it can receive an 
answer that will satisfy the earnest and reflecting 
Christian inquirer. But this is, by no means, the 
question at issue on the present occasion. 

The point now to be considered is simply this, 
Are miracles the only evidence of the divine origin 
of Christianity? 

Before proceeding to the arguments which 
prove that this position cannot be sustained, I 



John iii. 2. 

5 



t Acts x. 38. 



34 



must notice a palpable error, into which you have 
been led by assuming the truth of the principle in 
question, without examining its foundation. This 
error pervades the whole of your reasoning, and 
must destroy its weight with every logical thinker. 
You confound two propositions which are essen- 
tially distinct ; and you appear to have no suspi- 
cion that a distinction was necessary. This want 
of discrimination is the cause of a certain obscu- 
rity and vagueness in your statements, which make 
one doubtful at times, whether he has rightly ap- 
prehended their meaning. But it is sufficiently 
clear, that you make no distinction in your own 
mind, and express none in your Discourse, between 
a belief in a divine revelation, and in the miracles 
alleged in its support. You utterly confound the 
divine origin of Christianity, and a certain class 
of the proofs of its divine origin. 

Now the truth of the divine origin of Christianity 
is expressed by one proposition ; the reality of the 
miracles of Jesus, by another ; these propositions 
are clearly distinguished in all accurate thought ; 
they are no less clearly distinguished in the history 
of opinions ; and it by no means follows, that 
because a man receives or denies the one, he 
receives or denies the other also. 

There are many Christians who have been con- 
vinced of the divine origin of Christianity not by 



35 



miracles, but by other evidence ; they acknow- 
ledge Jesus of Nazareth as the Savior of the world ; 
they believe that the Divine Word which was in 
the beginning with God was made flesh in the 
Son of Mary, because they have seen his glory, 
full of grace and truth ; they bow to his authority 
as to the authority of God ; they rejoice in the rev- 
elations which he was inspired to make ; but in the 
progress of inquiry, they have become sensible to 
the difficulties which encumber the theory of mir- 
acles ; they know the doubts which have been 
cast on their historical evidence ; they are told by 
the most acute and learned critics, — and you, Sir, 
are among the number,* — that some of the mira- 

* In allusion to the account of the nativity of Christ given by Luke, 
it is said by Mr. Norton, that " the cast of the narrative has some- 
thing of a poetical, and even fabulous character." Norton's Evi- 
dences of the Genuineness of the Gospels, Additional Notes, p. liv. 

" Fictions began early to be propagated, concerning the nativity 
and childhood of Jesus. To these fictions the narrative [in the first 
two chapters of the Gospel of Matthew] appears to belong from its 
intrinsic character. In the story of the Magi, we find represented a 
strange mixture of astrology and miracle." Ibid. p. lix. 

" The narrative of Luke is, as I have said, in a style rather poet- 
ical than historical. With its real miracles, the fictions of oral tradi- 
tion had probably become blended ; and the individual by whom it 
was committed to writing probably added what he regarded as poeti- 
cal embellishments. With our present means of judging, however, 
we cannot draw a precise line between the truth, and what has been 
added to the truth." Ibid. pp. lxi. lxii. 



36 



cles related in the Bible, bear the marks of false- 
hood on their face, that the most probable account 
to be given of them is that they are legendary 
inventions ; and can any one be surprised, that 
though believing in Christ, and in his divine mis- 
sion, they cannot say that they believe in the real- 
ity of the miracles ; at least, they are in doubt ; 

The miracle of the appearing of the saints after the resurrection 
of Christ is spoken of as follows. " Who, it may be asked, were 
these saints ? How long had they lain in their sepulchres ? — After 
Christ's resurrection, it is said, they left their sepulchres and went 
into the holy city. In this extraordinary statement we may recog- 
nise, I think, the fabrication of some relater of the story. If these 
views are correct, the story must be regarded as a fable." Ibid. 
pp. lxviii. lxix. 

The passage, (Luke xxii. 43, 44.) which describes the " agony and 
bloody sweat " of the Redeemer, is thus commented on. " The ob- 
jections which present themselves to the passage, considered in its 
intrinsic character, are the following. The agony of Christ is rep- 
resented as existing after the angel had been sent to strengthen him. 
The bloody sweat described, is such as we have no authority for 
believing was ever produced by mere distress of mind, if it have 
been by any other cause. The account appears at variance with the 
character of Christ, and especially with that calmness, self-posses- 
sion, and firmness, which he manifested during the evening and night 
previous to his apprehension." Ibid. p. Ixxxi. 

Now to a large majority of Christians, this language will appear 
like gross infidelity. It does not alter the case to say, that it was 
not intended as such. Does not the author see that this bandying 
of ungrateful epithets tends directly to silence all calm and impar- 
tial discussion of scientific theology ? I leave it to a candid Christ- 
ian community to judge whether such a writer is authorized to ac- 
cuse his brethren of infidelity. 



and they wish to suspend their judgment until 
further examination. 

Such a state of mind, I well know, is not un- 
common. There are few persons, who are called 
by their inclination or their profession to intimate 
religious communings with their fellow-men, that 
have not met with frequent instances of it. I 
cannot but express my surprise that you should 
not have known any individuals of this character, 
in the course of your experience ; or, if you have 
known such, that you should feel warranted to 
condemn them as you do. I own that I see no 
grounds on which their rigid and peremptory ex- 
clusion from the the name of Christians can be 
justified. In certain cases, this state of mind be- 
comes permanent ; in others, it only forms one 
stage in the religious experience ; the strong 
conviction of the divinity of Christ himself, leads 
to an equally strong conviction of the divinity of 
his works. 

I can hardly suppose that the description I have 
here presented will not be perfectly intelligible to 
yourself as well as to every reflecting reader ; but 
that I may not be misunderstood by those who 
find it difficult to seize a point of view with 
which they are not familiar, it may be well to 
illustrate my statement by a reference to the form 
in which many, at the present day, believe in the 



38 



divine legation of Moses. Indeed I am not sure 
that in regard to the religion of the Old Testa- 
ment, you would not adopt these conceptions 
yourself. The believers I allude to, are persuad- 
ed that God spoke by Moses ; a special divine 
interposition seems necessary to them in order to 
account for the origin of Judaism ; but yet they 
find reason to doubt the literal truth of the Mo- 
saic miracles. These miracles, in their view, ex- 
tend too far into a dark and uncertain period of 
antiquity to impart a strong confidence, as the 
foundation of faith ; if their reception was essential 
to a belief in the inspiration of Moses, this fact 
would fail of reception also ; but from other con- 
siderations, while they are not satisfied as to the 
reality of the Old Testament miracles, they are 
persuaded of the divine origin of the Old Testa- 
ment religion. 

In applying this case to the one already men- 
tioned, the parallel should not be pushed too far. 
I do not mean to compare the inspiration and 
miracles of Moses with the inspiration and mira- 
cles of Christ, in respect to the divine power 
which they displayed, or the evidence by which 
they are supported ; but I maintain that precisely 
as certain individuals believe in the divine lega- 
tion of Moses, before they are satisfied in regard 
to his miracles, so certain individuals may believe 



39 



in the divine mission of Christ, before they are 
satisfied concerning his miracles. 

Let us bear this distinction in mind, while we 
examine one or two passages in the Discourse, 
which relate to this point. It will thus be evident 
that you lost sight of a fundamental difference ; 
and that, accordingly, as your subsequent reason- 
ings are founded on error, they can have nothing 
but error as the consequence. 

" By a belief in Christianity, we mean the be- 
lief that Christianity is a revelation by God of the 
truths of religion ; and that the divine authority 
of him whom God commissioned to speak to us 
in his name was attested, in the only mode in 
which it could be, by miraculous displays of his 
power." (p. 5.) A part of this passage has al- 
ready been quoted in another connexion ; I refer 
to it now, for the purpose of pointing out the 
confusion of thought, of which I have spoken. 

" Christianity is a revelation by God of the 
truths of religion." This is a distinct, independ- 
ent proposition. I may admit it, without being 
obliged to admit any other, which it does not logi- 
cally include ; but that this revelation " is attested 
by miraculous displays of God's power " is a quite 
different proposition ; there is no necessary con- 
nexion between them ; and any argument, which 
you attempt to build on the supposition of such a 



40 



connexion, falls to the ground. The question in 
the first case is, Whether I believe, that Christ- 
ianity is a revelation by God of the truths of re- 
ligion ; how that revelation is attested is another 
question ; and because I do not accept your an- 
swer to the last, you have no right to conclude 
that I give a negative answer to the first. 

You are thus brought to the following alterna- 
tive. If you say, that the first part of your defi- 
nition of a belief in Christianity is incomplete, 
and requires the second part for its complement ; 
you maintain that one can believe " that Christ- 
ianity is a revelation by God of the truths of re- 
ligion," and yet be destitute of the essential 
Christian faith ; or in other words, he can believe 
in the divine revelation of Christianity, and be 
an unbeliever at the same time. If you say that 
the first part of your definition is sufficient of 
itself, you abandon your ground, and confess that 
you have brought the charge of infidelity, without 
cause. If you say, finally, that the first part of 
your definition necessarily involves the second, 
you beg the question in dispute ; and I need not 
tell you, what would be the value of reasoning 
that starts with a fallacy. 

Again, you observe, (p. 21.) that "if it were 
not for the abuse of language that has prevailed, 
it would be idle to say, that in denying the mira- 



41 



cles of Christianity, the truth of Christianity is 
denied." We here find the same unhappy con- 
fusion. You do not perceive that a belief in the 
Christian revelation is one thing, and a belief in 
the miracles which are claimed in its support is 
another. Whether the assertion you allude to 
were idle or not, would depend on two circum- 
stances. First, whether any believer professed to 
receive Christianity as a divine revelation, while 
he doubted the miracles ; the miracles being not 
the revelation itself, but an element in its proof ; 
and secondly, whether you called in question the 
reality of his belief in the revelation, on account 
of his doubt of the miracles. If these circum- 
stances existed, the assertion would not be idle. 
But it would contain a grave accusation, and one 
somewhat difficult of proof ; one, indeed, to which 
it is not easy to attach any definite meaning ; 
namely, that a man who believed the divine ori- 
gin of Christianity, denied the truth of Christ- 
ianity. 

You continue the same train of thought as fol- 
lows. " It is in vain to attempt to strike out what 
relates directly or indirectly to the miraculous au- 
thority and works of Christ, with the expectation 
that any thing consistent or coherent will remain. 
It is as if one were to undertake to cut out 
from a precious agate, the figure which nature 
6 



42 



has inwrought, and to pretend, that by the remo- 
val of this accidental blemish, the stone might be 
left in its original form." (p. 23.) This is a 
beautiful illustration ; but an illustration is not an 
argument ; and it sometimes dazzles the eye, so 
that it cannot perceive the truth. It is so in this 
case. You confound the " divine authority " of 
Christ with his " miraculous works." You thus 
lose the force of your comparison. It would have 
been more pertinent, if you had said, that as he 
who removes the frame in which a precious stone 
is set does not destroy the gem, so he who doubts 
the miraculous accounts which form the outside of 
Christianity, does not necessarily deny the divine 
origin of the religion itself. 

The distinction which is now insisted on can- 
not be set aside by the assertion that the divine 
mission of Christ is itself a miracle. For in that 
case, you change the question at issue, which re- 
lates not to the divine mission of Christ, but to 
the evidence by which it is supported. If you 
say, that a belief in the divine mission of Christ 
is all the belief in miracles you contend for, you 
acknowledge that you have brought a groundless 
charge against your opponents ; for the divine 
mission of Christ they have never denied. But 
if you say, that the divine mission of Christ can- 
not be separated from the miracles, usually al- 



43 



leged as proof, you confound two points, which, 
as we have seen, are essentially distinct ; this con- 
fusion can be justified only by the principle that 
" miracles are the sole proof of a divine revela- 
tion ; n but in assuming this principle, you assume 
what is not yet settled ; and what, I shall show, 
if I do not deceive myself, has no evidence in its 
favor. 

It has been my purpose, in the preceding re- 
marks, to point out the looseness of reasoning, 
with which you attempt to support the exclusive 
doctrine of your Discourse. I have shown, as I 
trust, that a denial of the divine origin of Chris- 
tianity, and a denial of the miracles related in the 
New Testament, are two different things; that 
there is no real or necessary connexion between 
them ; but it will be perceived by every accu- 
rate thinker, that this statement does not affect 
the question concerning the reality of the mira- 
cles. It does not deny them ; it does not bring 
them under suspicion ; it leaves them just where 
they were before ; great problems in the experi- 
ence of man to be resolved by the united aids of 
history and philosophy. 1 have already stated, 
that the evidence by which they are supported, 
on the whole, appears satisfactory to my mind, 
though I have no disposition to force my convic- 
tion on the minds of others. 



I proceed now to an examination of the doc- 
trine of your Discourse, that the evidence of mir- 
acles is the only proof of a divine revelation. 

I. The intelligent reader will at once be struck 
with the boldness, the extravagance, and the nov- 
elty of this doctrine. If he has paid the slightest 
attention to theological inquiries, and is acquaint- 
ed with the manner in which the evidences of 
Christianity have usually been presented, he will 
wonder at the radical innovation which you at- 
tempt to introduce into a familiar and important 
topic of theological science. Heretofore, it has 
been counted a signal excellence of Christianity, 
that it was capable of proof, by a great variety of 
evidence. In this respect, its adaptation to be a 
universal religion has been earnestly set forth ; its 
ablest defenders have supported it on the ground 
that it appealed to a multiplicity of proofs ; and 
its claims to the character of a revelation from 
God have been maintained by manifold conside- 
rations, according to the tendency of the minds, 
to which it was addressed. 

Thus, while the argument from miracles has 
formed a prominent topic of discussion, other 
arguments have been derived from prophecy and 
its fulfilment, from the character of Christ, from 
the excellence of his doctrine, from the wisdom 
and comprehensiveness of his plan, from the rapid 



45 



propagation of Christianity in the most unpropi- 
tious circumstances, from the tendency of the 
Gospel to satisfy the wants of the soul, from the 
actual effects it has produced on the civilization 
and happiness of the world, and from its harmony 
with the suggestions of the higher nature of man. 

Each of these arguments, — and I have not 
attempted to enumerate all that have been alleg- 
ed, — has been regarded as powerful in itself; 
some of them alone sufficient to produce a 
rational faith ; certainly a conviction that Christ- 
ianity is more probably true than false, which, 
according to your Discourse, is all that can be 
sustained on the highest grounds of evidence ; 
and, taken together, they have been supposed to 
form a moral demonstration, impregnable against 
the assaults of infidelity. The process of reason- 
ing has been, to advance directly from these 
proofs to the divine origin of Christianity, to 
make the same inference from them as to the 
mission of Christ, which you derive from the mir- 
acles. 

We find, accordingly, that different writers have 
discussed different branches of the Christian evi- 
dences ; one is distinguished for his masterly expo- 
sition of the argument from prophecy ; another, 
for his admirable illustration of the internal 
characteristics of Christianity ; another, for his 



46 



accurate historical investigation of its effects on 
the social condition of man ; a fourth establishes 
the coincidence between the truths of revelation 
and the testimony of reason ; while another argues 
from the miracles of Christ to the divinity of his 
mission, though he does not maintain with yourself 
that they are the only satisfactory proof. In like 
manner, it is found that the effects of these argu- 
ments vary with the natural disposition and mental 
habits of the individuals to whom they are pre- 
sented. Some are powerfully affected by one 
portion of the Christian evidence ; others, by that 
of a different character ; miracles are conclusive 
to one, prophecy to another, and the intrinsic 
nature of Christianity, to a third ; what appears 
little short of mathematical demonstration to me, 
is lightly esteemed by my neighbor ; while that 
which produces conviction in his mind, fails of 
any perceptible influence on mine. 

Now, if I rightly apprehend your doctrine, you 
maintain that as miracles are the only adequate 
proofs of a divine revelation, all the other branches 
of evidence which have usually been relied on, 
are destitute of independent force ; they are good 
to confirm the probability of miracles ; but for 
nothing else. You observe (p. 21.) that, "it has 
been vaguely alleged, that the internal evidences of 
our religion are sufficient ; but this can be said by 



47 



no one who understands what Christianity is, and 
what its internal evidences are." " The internal 
evidence of Christianity," according to your Dis- 
course, (p. 25.) consists in this circumstance, 
namely, that " the history of Jesus being full of 
accounts of his miracles, every thing in his history, 
what relates to himself and what relates to others, 
is conformed to this fact, and to the conception of 
him as speaking with authority from God." The 
internal evidence, therefore, is no proof in itself 
of the divine authority of Christ ; it is reduced to 
a mere negative element ; nothing but a condition 
for the validity of the external evidence ; the Gos- 
pel is deprived of all inherent marks of truth and 
divinity. You thus deny the strength of the argu- 
ments, by which the faith of a multitude of Chris- 
tians is sustained ; but in so doing, you advance a 
principle, which I will not call " the latest form of 
infidelity," but which is certainly at war with the 
prevailing faith of Christians in every age of the 
Church. 

I do not indeed assert that this doctrine of the 
exclusive validity of miraculous evidence is orig- 
inal with yourself. It may have been advanced 
by theological innovators in former ages ; but it 
has never gained credit with any considerable por- 
tion of the church ; and, until it was broached by 
an eminent Scottish divine of our own day, — 



48 



a writer, in allusion to whose work on the " Evi- 
dences of Christianity," you have pronounced to 
be " thoroughly ignorant of the subject," * — it 
could hardly be said to have received a public 
advocacy as a principle of theology. The honor 
of bringing it forward is shared between yourself 
and Dr. Thomas Chalmers. Differing as you do 
from him on other points, on this, you take pos- 
session of his ground. The identity of doctrine 
produces even a similarity of expression. Dr. 
Chalmers declares, that independent of revelation, 
"of the invisible God, we have no experience 
whatever." f You remark, that the mere fact of 
revelation " introduces God within the sphere of 
human experience." J Dr. Chalmers observes, 
that " in the miracles of Christ, the existence of 
God is laid before us by an evidence altogeth- 
er distinct from the natural argument of the 
schools." ^ You maintain, that " the miraculous 
communication from God to men makes his ex- 
istence a reality to our minds." || Dr. Chalmers 
insists that the only internal evidence which is en- 
titled to credit, is that taken from " the marks of 

* Norton's Statement of Reasons, p. 98. 
f Chalmers' Works, p. 10. 
I Discourse, Note ii. p. 64. 
§ Chalmers, Ibid. p. 58. 
|| Discourse, Note ii. p. 64. 



49 



truth and honesty in the performance itself," " the 
consistency of the particulars with what we al- 
ready know from other sources of information." * 
You contend that the only internal evidence which 
is entitled to credit, is that taken from " the con- 
sistency in the representations given by the differ- 
ent evangelists of the actions and words of Christ, 
as a messenger from God to men,"f and from 
other similar considerations. Dr. Chalmers " dis- 
claims all support, from what is commonly under- 
stood by the internal evidence, consisting of those 
proofs that Christianity is a dispensation from 
heaven, which are founded upon the nature of its 
doctrines and the character of the dispensation 
itself." t You assert that no one who " under- 
stood " the subject would rely upon this evi- 
dence.^ Dr. Chalmers, however, tells us, that in 
this course of reasoning, he deviates from " the 
general example of those who have written on the 
Deistical controversy," || and he assigns some 
plausible arguments in favor of this deviation. 
You do not intimate that your procedure is novel ; 
nor do you present any reasons in its defence. I 
ought to add, in justice to Dr. Chalmers, that, at 
a subsequent period, he retracted his position. 

* Chalmers' Works r p. 48. f Discourse, p. 26. 

t Works, p. 48. § Discourse, p. 21. \\ Works, p. 48. 

7 



50 



The fallacy and dangerous effects of his doctrine 
were ably pointed out ; * and in the preface to a 
new edition of his Work, he modifies his state- 
ments, as follows, — thus virtually abandoning the 
whole ground. " The Author is far from assert- 
ing the study of the historical evidence to be the 
only channel to a faith in the truth of Christ- 
ianity. How could he, in the face of the obvi- 
ous fact, that there are thousands and thousands 
of Christians, who bear the most undeniable marks 
of the truth having come home to their understand- 
ing ' in demonstration of the Spirit and of power ' ? 
They have an evidence within themselves, which 
the world knoweth not, even the promised mani- 
festations of the Savior. This evidence is a 
' sign to them that believe.' " f 

I will now adduce a part of the historical tes- 
timony, which shows that the doctrine of the ex- 
clusive validity of miraculous evidence receives 
no support from the general faith of the Church. 

* See a judicious criticism of Dr. Chalmers' argument, in a valua- 
ble treatise, entitled " Principles of Christian Evidence illustrated, 
by an Examination of Arguments subversive of Natural Theology 
and the Internal Evidence of Christianity, advanced by Dr. T. 
Chalmers." By Duncan Mears, Professor of Theology in King's 
College, Aberdeen. It is said that this little volume was the means 
of convincing Dr. Chalmers of the error of his doctrine. 

f Works, Preface to Evidences of Christianity. 



51 



The early Christian apologists, in their defence 
of the Gospel, did not confine themselves to any 
single branch of the evidences. So far from re- 
garding miracles as the only proof, they laid com- 
paratively small stress on their importance. The 
argument from miracles was slighted, while great 
use was made of that from prophecy.* Whoever 
regarded Jesus as the Son of God was acknowl- 
edged as a disciple, without reference to the foun- 
dation on which his faith was built. I will not 
weary you with a detail of evidence, in illustra- 
tion of this fact. The following passage from one 
of our most learned scholars, whose acquaintance 
with Christian antiquity entitles his statements to 
great weight, contains the substance of the matter 
in a small compass. Speaking of Justin Martyr, 
he observes, " of the evidence from miracles he 
scarcely takes any notice. Perhaps the cause 
may be traced to the popular belief of the age. 
The efficacy of incantations and magic forms 
part of this belief, common alike to Christians 
and Pagans. Miracles were regarded as of 
no rare occurrence, and they were supposed 
to be wrought by magical arts. Christianity 
might then have the support of miracles, but 
this support would be regarded as of trifling 

* See Tzschirner's GeschicJde der Jlpologetik, pp. 148- 152. 



52 



importance by those who were believers in the 
reality of charms and sorcery. The miracle 
might be admitted, but the evidence derived from 
it could be invalidated by ascribing it to the effects 
of magic. That the early Fathers and Apolo- 
gists really felt a difficulty of this kind, there can 
be no doubt. The Jews had set the example by 
attributing the miracles of our Savior to a demo- 
niacal agency. That the heathen trod in their 
steps by ascribing them to magical influences, we 
gather from a hint, Justin himself has incidentally 
dropped, and Origen expressly affirms it as regards 
Celsus. Here then was a grand objection to the 
evidence from miracles, and one which the Fa- 
thers, who were themselves firm believers in the 
powers of magic and demoniacal influences, must 
have found it exceedingly difficult to remove." * 
It does not meet the point, to say that this ob- 
jection was founded on a popular superstition of 
the primitive ages ; it is sufficient that the objec- 
tion was felt ; for, therefore, some other evidence 
was deemed important ; and, therefore, in fine, 
the early apologists did not hold to the modern 
doctrine, that miracles are the only proof of a 
divine revelation. 

* Christian Examiner, vol. vii. p. 156. Art. on Justin Martyr, 
by Alvan Lamson. 



53 



The same view concerning the value of mira- 
cles was held by the original founders of the Prot- 
estant Church. They express themselves in lan- 
guage, which reminds us of the most spiritual 
writers of a later age, in defence of the testimony 
addressed to the soul, compared with that ad- 
dressed to the senses. The miracles of Christ- 
ianity, in their opinion, were, by no means, the 
only foundation of belief in Christ. On the con- 
trary, there were other evidences of a more im- 
pressive and convincing character. They relied 
much on the proof taken from Christian experi- 
ence. The religion, it was argued, which had 
regenerated the soul, must be from God. I will 
quote but one or two passages from the great Re- 
former himself, which are in direct opposition to 
the doctrine of your Discourse. 

" People cry it up as a great miracle, that 
Christ made the blind see, the deaf hear, and the 
lepers clean ; and, it is true, such works are mi- 
raculous signs; but Christ regards his influence 
on the soul as far more important than that on the 
body ; for as the soul excels the body, so do the 
miracles wrought on the former excel those 
wrought on the latter. He distinguishes, there- 
fore, two kinds of miraculous works ; and it still 
continues to be the fact, and it will continue till 
the last day, that Christ daily and always performs 



54 



miraculous works. The former, we admit, he 
rarely performs ; so he did when on earth ; for he 
did not give sight to many blind, he did not heal 
all the sick ; he left many blind and not healed. 
And what if he had given sight or hearing to a 
whole heap of people, nay, had raised them from 
the dead ? For such signs were merely for the 
purpose of founding the Christian Church. Hence, 
such outward signs and miracles are neither eter- 
nal nor common. But the moral signs which 
Christ regards as miracles, never cease." * 

" The miracles, which Christ wrought on the 
body, are small and almost childish, compared 
with the high and true miracles, which he con- 
stantly performs in the Christian world by his 
divine, almighty power. For instance, that Chris- 
tianity is preserved on the earth ; that the w T ord of 
God and faith in him can yet hold out ; yea, that 
a Christian can survive on earth against the devil 
and ail his angels ; also against so many tyrants 
and factions ; yea, against our own flesh and 
blood. The fact that the Gospel remains and im- 
proves the human heart, — this is indeed to cast 
out the devil, and tread on serpents, and speak 
with tongues, for those visible miracles were 
merely signs for the ignorant, unbelieving crowd, 



* Luther's Werke, (Walch's Ed.) vol. xii. p. 1542. 



55 



and for those who were yet to be brought in ; but 
for us, who know and believe, what need is there 
of them ? For the heathen, indeed, Christ must 
needs give external signs, which they could see 
and take hold of ; but Christians must needs have 
far higher signs, compared with which the former 
are earthly. It was necessary to bring over the 
ignorant with external miracles, and to throw out 
such apples and pears to them as to children ; but 
we, on the contrary, should boast of the great 
miracles, which Christ daily performs in his 
church." * 

I come now to a more recent period. Time 
would fail me, if I were to attempt to quote a thou- 
sandth part of what has been written in opposi- 
tion to your principle. I might indeed transcribe 
nearly the whole of modern English Theology, 
with the exception of a few writers, who were led 
by the philosophy of Locke to attach an extrava- 
gant value to external evidence. It everywhere 
recognises the fact, that miracles are not the only 
proof of Christianity, and strongly insists on other 
arguments which furnish a valid defence of its 
divine origin. I will begin with Dr. Barrow, a 
man whose familiarity with mathematical demon- 



* Luther's Werke, (Walch's Ed.) vol. xi. p. 1338. 



56 



stration did not blunt his mind to the finer distinc- 
tions of moral evidence, and who certainly is not 
usually addicted to what, is either novel, or vis- 
ionary, or heretical. 

In the introduction to his admirable Discourse 
on " The Excellency of the Christian Religion," he 
remarks, " it is my intent to endeavor now some 
declaration and proof, by representing briefly some 
peculiar excellencies and perfections of our re- 
ligion ; which may serve to evince the truth, and 
evidence the wisdom thereof ; to make good that 
our religion well deserveth the privilege it doth 
claim of a divine extraction, that it is not an in- 
vention of man, but as Paul calleth it, the wisdom 
of God, proceeding from no other but the God 
of truth and wisdom. It is indeed a common 
subject and so the best ever should be ; it is al- 
ways profitable and now seasonable to inculcate 
it, for the confirmation of ourselves and the con- 
viction of others, in this age of wavering and 
warping towards infidelity." * 

But according to your doctrine, nothing could 
be more injudicious than this course ; for it would 
divert the attention from the only satisfactory evi- 
dence of the truth of Christianity ; and instead 
of putting a stop to infidelity, would favor its 
progress. 

* Barrow's Sermons, vol. iv. p. 350. 



57 



A similar testimony is given by one of the ablest 
defenders of Christianity, that the English Church 
can boast of, Dr. Samuel Clarke. " The practi- 
cal duties, which the Christian religion enjoins, are 
all such, as are most agreeable to our natural 
notions of God, and most perfective of the nature 
and conducive to the happiness and well-being of 
men ; that is, Christianity, even in this single re- 
spect, as containing alone and in one consistent 
system all the wise and good precepts that ever 
were taught singly and scatteredly, and many 
times but very corruptly by the several schools of 
the philosophers, ought to be embraced and prac- 
tised by all rational and considering Deists, as 
highly probable, even though it had no external 
evidence, to be of divine original." * " Let any 
impartial person judge, whether a religion that 
tends manifestly to the recovery of the rational 
part of God's creation, to restore men to the im- 
itation and likeness of God, and to the dignity 
and highest improvement of their nature, has not 
within itself an intrinsic and very powerful 
evidence of its being truly divine. Let any 
man of an honest and sincere mind consider 
whether its practical doctrine has not even in itself 
the greatest marks of a divine original. On this 

* Clarke's Truth and Certainly of the Christian Revelation, p. 213. 

8 



58 



consideration alone, all sincere inquirers must needs 
be strongly inclined to embrace the Christian 
religion ; to believe that it is truly divine ; and to 
entertain it with all cheerfulness, as what in itself 
has those manifold marks of goodness and perfec- 
tion, which are themselves sufficient to satisfy a 
good man, that it cannot be any thing else than 
a revelation from God, even though it had wanted 

all OUTWARD PROOFS, AND DIVINE AND MIRACU- 
LOUS TESTIMONIES."* 

There is no end to citations like these, and I 
will content myself with referring to one more 
foreign writer, who is no less attractive on ac- 
count of the clearness and simplicity of his style, 
than the sobriety and justness of his reasonings. I 
mean Dr. Alexander Gerard, Professor of Divinity 
at Aberdeen. " The external evidences of Chris- 
tianity," says Dr. Gerard, " are miracles and 
prophecy ; these are the directest proofs of its 
divinity. Its internal evidence, however, has like- 
wise considerable force ; much greater force, 
it might easily be shown, than some Christian 
writers have allowed it. This evidence arises 
from its excellence. — Our Savior and his Apos- 
tles were led by the objections of unbelievers to 
assert, not only that the Gospel is excellent, but 



* Clarke's Truth and Certainty, fyc. pp. 216, 217. 



59 



also that its excellence is a real evidence of 
its divinity. Our Savior exhibited this evidence in 
its full strength. He delivered doctrines which 
were really excellent, and bore clear marks of 
truth and divinity. He left his hearers to feel the 
excellence of his religion, and from their feeling 
of its energy to conclude for themselves, that it 
was of heavenly original. It was not by means 
of his encomiums, but by means of their own per- 
ceptions, that great numbers discovered the fea- 
tures of divinity in his discourses." * 

Nor are the opinions of orthodox theologians 
in our own country less at variance with your 
doctrine that miracles are the only evidence of a 
divine revelation. 

" The holiness of the life of Christ," says Pres- 
ident D wight, " is another proof of the divine 
origin of the Gospel ; a proof not less solid than 
the miracles, although, perhaps, less frequently 
allowed its full force."! 

An eminent citizen and scholar, of whom this 
country is justly proud, has devoted a large space 
in a work on the proofs of revealed religion, to a 
consideration of the " arguments for the divine 
origin of Christianity, which may be drawn from 

* Gerard's Genius and Evidence of Christianity, pp. ix. x. 127, 
6,7. 

f Dwight's TJieology, vol. n. p. 235. 



60 



that internal evidence of truth which its doctrines 
contain." * " These internal evidences of Christi- 
anity," says Mr. Verplanck, " are those on which 
it is most generally, and far most sincerely and fer- 
vently, believed ; so that the unlettered Christian, 
who is utterly ignorant of that body of history and 
learning which attests the veracity of the Gospel 
narrative ; and who, so far from being able to 
refute the objections of an ingenious opponent, 
would find it exceedingly difficult to explain the 
reasons of his belief to another, may yet possess 
a ground of confidence in its truth, not resting 
upon logical argument, yet of a strictly rational 
character, which, in his mind, could derive but 
little additional strength from the learned labors of 
Lardner, the ingenuity of Warburton, or the 
sagacity of Paley."t 

" The most convincing evidence of the truth 
of Christianity," says one of our most esteemed 
religious writers, Mr. Jacob Abbott, "is that which 
results from witnessing its moral power over the 
human heart. I have often heard it remarked, by 
men amply qualified to investigate such subjects, 
that the power of the Bible, as they have often 
seen it exerted, has made a far stronger impres- 

# Verplanck's Essay on the Evidences, p. 123. 
f Ibid. p. 121. 



61 



sion upon them, in favor of its divine origin, 
than any examination of the labored arguments 
of learned men." * 

The exclusive doctrine of your Discourse pre- 
sents a striking contrast to the views of the lead- 
ing writers, whom, as liberal Christians, we are 
accustomed to venerate. No class of men have 
dwelt more earnestly or more successfully on the 
proof of the divine origin of Christianity, from 
considerations independent of miracles, than the 
honored theologians whose names are identified 
with mental freedom and religious progress in 
this country. 

I commence with Buckminster, whose gene- 
rous spirit passed away from us too early; in 
whose presence intolerance stood rebuked; 
" whose intrepid mind, nothing could depress ; 
whose vigorous understanding broke so easily the 
little meshes, which were spread to entangle it." 
The character of Christ was the ground on which 
he loved to rest his faith in the Gospel ; like the 
Apostle, he saw the divine glory in the face of 
Jesus. He did not believe, according to the rep- 
resentation of your Discourse, that we can have 
no " perception," or " intuition " of the truth of 

* Abbott's Young Christian, p. 145. 



62 



Christianity; that outward prodigies are essen- 
tial to a living faith within the soul ; though fond 
of historical research, and attached to the evi- 
dence of miracles, so far from deeming them the 
only proof of the divinity of the Gospel, he de- 
clares that there is much evidence beside them, 
and superior to them ; that a constant study of 
Christianity furnishes a constant increase of its 
proofs ; and that having satisfied himself, as far as 
possible, concerning the historical testimony to its 
truth, the learner should direct his attention to the 
internal evidence, the character of Christ, the 
nature of his instructions, and the spirit of the 
Gospel. " In this way," says Buckminster, " if 
he is an inquirer of an ingenuous disposition, and 
of a heart warmed with the love of virtue, he 
will love the Gospel too well to permit any relics 
of doubt to disturb him ; he will be unable to 
reject what appears so divine, and what he finds 
so powerful, or to think it to be any thing else 
than what he wishes it to be, — the word of 
God."* 

This appears to me to be the soundest theology, 
clothed in beautiful and impressive language ; and 
it involves more than is obvious on a hasty peru- 
sal. It comprises almost every thing, on the 

* Buckminster's Sermons, (3d Ed.) pp. 18, 19. 



63 



present subject, which I should be disposed to con- 
tend for. According to this statement, the relics 
of doubt, which are left, after the historical tes- 
timony has produced all the conviction of which 
it is capable, are removed by an intuitive percep- 
tion of the divinity of the Gospel. External evi- 
dence alone can never completely satisfy the 
mind ; but the inherent character of Christianity 
shows the ingenuous inquirer, that it is the word 
of God. 

Mr. Buckminster proceeds to illustrate the su- 
periority of the evidence of a divine interposition, 
taken from the character of Christ, over that de- 
rived from the record of miracles. " There is 
something in the character of Christ, which, to 
an attentive reader of his history, is of more force 
than all the weight of external evidence to 
prove him divine." * After a masterly portrait- 
ure of the character of the Redeemer, showing 
the fulness of Divinity with which it was pervaded, 
proving that Christ himself was the great moral 
miracle, far transcending the outward works 
which he performed, the Discourse concludes 
with an express recognition of the power in hu- 
man nature, to discover the manifestations of 
God, in the presence of moral sublimity and love- 



* Buukminster's Sermons, (3d Ed.) p. 19. 



64 



liness. " Have you caught, my hearers," ex- 
claims this eloquent advocate of Christian truth, 
" have you caught any glimpses of Jesus ? If 
you believe in him as he was, if you love what 
you know of him, and imitate what you love, and 
study to know more and more of his character, 
you will see that he was in the Father and the 
Father in him ; for the more like God, the per- 
fection of all excellence, you become, the more 
will you feel all that is godlike in his Son." * 

I should look in vain for more appropriate or 
forcible language than this, to express the doc- 
trine which I deem of such vital importance to 
the true apprehension of Christianity. 

Of a similar faith, as well as of a kindred spirit, 
with Mr. Buckminster, was his friend and biog- 
rapher, whose name holds a conspicuous rank in 
the annals of the New-England clergy. And there 
have been few, indeed, among the scholars, whose 
memory is cherished by their native land, who 
united such clearness of intellect, such unerring 
good sense, such instinctive delicacy of taste, such 
aversion to whatever is extravagant in opinion or 
conduct, with such genuine modesty and sweetness 
of character, as the late Mr. Thacher. Though 
personally unknown to me, I cannot remember 

# Buckminster's Sermons, (3d Ed.) p. 33. 



65 



the time when I did not regard him as a being 
of superior dignity and holiness ; the reputation 
of his mild virtues are associated with my first 
perception of the moral power of Christianity ; 
the tidings of his decease in a foreign clime threw 
a gloom over my boyish pleasures ; the memory 
of that hour comes over the long interval of years 
in connexion with other venerated forms now no 
more ; and shall 1 ask to be forgiven for this spon- 
taneous tribute to one, whose opinions were at 
the foundation of his character, whose character 
is the best commentary on his opinions ? I might 
refer to his whole Sermon on the " Originality 
of the Christian System," as an illustration of the 
grounds on which he was accustomed to teach the 
divine origin of the Gospel ; but I will only quote 
one or two brief passages, which suffice for the 
purpose that I have in view. " The originality 
of the doctrines of Christ was such, that he could 
not have learned them from any human source. 
This illustrates the divinity of its claims."* 
The preacher then unfolds his subject, by show- 
ing that the idea of a universal religion, the per- 
fect system of human duty, and the originality of 
the Savior's character, present such conclusive 
proofs of the divinity of his mission, independent 

* Thacher's Sermons, p. 132. 

9 



66 



of other evidence, that it is next to impossible not 
to believe, " that the God of benevolence in mercy 
to his children sent his Son on the earth to realize 
such a character, and to teach us by his perfect 
example, how we should live, how we should suf- 
fer, and a still harder lesson, how we should 
die."* 

The same doctrine is maintained by the late 
Dr. Parker, whose singular devotion to the prac- 
tical duties of the ministry did not destroy his 
interest in theological inquiry, nor lead him to neg- 
lect the nicer discriminations of truth and the evi- 
dence on which it rests. " When we look at the 
teachings of Jesus," he says, " it would seem as 
if he had conversed with the spirits of light, and 
were bringing down to earth their radiant concep- 
tions of truth ; as if he had indeed been in the 
bosom of the Father, and were commissioned to 
bring to men his counsels ; as if he needed no other 
testimony than the very lessons which he taught, to 
the truth of his own declaration, 1 My doctrine is 
not mine, but his that sent me.' " t " Even mir- 
acles, though they might convince the mind, yet 
could hardly have reached the character with a 
transforming power, independently of the nature 
of the instructions dispensed. These were 

* Thacher's Sermons, pp. 141, 142. f Parker's Sermons, p. 171. 



67 



such as find an advocate in every unperverted 
mind, and every uncorrupted heart. They come 
with divine power to the conscience. They are 
adapted to the actual wants of man's spiritual 
nature. Herein lies their divine efficacy. They 
suit the necessities alike of the child, and of the 
philosopher." * " They have been found adapted 
to the condition and wants of the most cultiva- 
ted minds ; and let the human race go on for a 
hundred centuries in improvement, yet Christ- 
ianity will be still in advance of them, still the 
pioneer of their onward progress. This is a won- 
derful fact, considering the circumstances under 
which our religion was promulgated, and attests 
with power the divine authority of its founder, 
and his adaptation to his great and godlike 
work." t 

Such were the views of a man, who certainly 
could not be accused of indifference to the moral 
wants of the community ; whose practical good 
sense enabled him to judge what kind of evidence 
was best suited to make a deep impression on the 
majority of minds ; and prevented him from being 
imposed on by the semblance of truth, instead of 
its reality ; he saw that there was other testimony 
to the Gospel beside the works of Jesus ; he was 



* Parker's Sermons, p. 174. 



f Ibid. p. 175. 



68 



alive to the proofs of its divinity from its effects 
on the human soul; for his experience was 
large ; and he was compelled to trace the influ- 
ence he had witnessed to a heavenly source. 

I come now to the evidence, that the doctrine 
of your Discourse is contradictory to the opin- 
ions of those living writers, who have contributed 
in no small degree to the establishment and sup- 
port of a liberal theology in our churches. But 
while I bring forward their testimony in opposition 
to your exclusive doctrine, let me not be under- 
stood to pretend to their countenance in any real 
or supposed errors of my own. I would not claim 
the support even of those I so much esteem for 
any opinions which are looked on with suspicion. 
They may agree with me in the rejection of your 
theory of the Christian evidence, while they agree 
in nothing else. I refer to the public expres- 
sion of their views, merely to show that they do 
not regard the evidence of miracles, as the only 
proof of the divine origin of Christianity. 

44 The internal evidences of Christianity," says a 
writer in the " Christian Examiner," 44 is a subject, 
which is every day growing in importance and 
interest. Without going into the inquiry how far 
the alleged miracles of Christianity are fitted to 
keep alive a veneration for it in future ages, we 
feel no hesitation in saying, that the time has come 



69 



when the attention is to be more and more directed 
to the indication of its origin borne on its features, 
— to the cast of its doctrines and morality, — 
to its tendency, spirit, and object. These are 
evidences, of the force of which all feel capable 
of judging. They are more within our reach, 
fall more immediately under our observation, than 
some other species of evidence. They are not of 
a perishable character, not temporary and fading. 
They multiply and strengthen with age. They 
have a sort of universal presence. They are felt 
wherever Christianity is received. The evidence 
from miracles, however satisfactory, is by its na- 
ture more local and confined. It overpowers the 
understandings of spectators, but time takes some- 
thing from its freshness and strength. For our- 
selves, we are disposed to rely much on the marks 
of a heavenly origin, that Christianity bears on 
the face of it. We think, that we may appeal 
with confidence to its internal evidences. They 
form one of our strong holds, which we do not 
fear ever being compelled to surrender. Should 
it be abandoned, Christianity would be in great 
danger of falling." * 

" Christianity," says another writer in the same 

# Christian Examiner, vol. iii. p. 141. Art. on Jenyns' Internal 
Evidence, by Alvan Lamson. 



70 



Journal, " embodies a collection of moral and 
vital truths, and these truths, apart from all 
history or philosophy, constitute Christianity it- 
self. Instead, therefore, of perplexing and con- 
founding the young with what are called the evi- 
dences of Christianity, give them Christianity 
itself. Begin by giving them Christianity itself, 
as exhibited in the life and character of the Lord 
Jesus, as illustrated by his simple, beautiful, and 
touching parables, and as it breathes through all his 
discourses. They will feel it to be true. De- 
pend upon it, paradoxical as it may sound, chil- 
dren will be much more likely to believe Christi- 
anity without what are called the evidences, than 
with them ; and the remark applies to some who 
are not children. Why talk to one about the 
argument from prophecy, or the argument /rom 
miracles, when these are the very points and the 
only points on which his mind, from some pe- 
culiarity in its original constitution, or from limit- 
ed information, chiefly labors. Give him Chris- 
tianity itself, by which we mean the body of 
moral and vital truths which constitutes Christiani- 
ty. Observe it when you will, you will find that 
the doubts and difficulties, suggested by children, 
relate almost exclusively to the history of Chris- 
tianity, or to what are called the external evi- 
dences of Christianity, and not to the truth of 



71 



Christianity itself. Give them Christianity itself ; 
for if they believe in that, it is enough. Nothing 
can be more injudicious than to persist in urging 
the argument from miracles on a mind, that 
from any cause has thus become indifferent, and 
perhaps impatient of it. How idle to think to 
convince a person of Christianity by miracles, 
when it is these very miracles, and not Christian- 
ity, that he doubts. The instances, we suspect, 
are not rare, even of adults, who are first converted 
to Christianity itself, and afterwards, through the 
moral and spiritual change which Christianity in- 
duces, are brought to believe entirely and devoutly 
in its miraculous origin and history"* 

" There is another evidence of Christianity," 
says Dr. Channing, " still more internal than 
any on which I have yet dwelt, an evidence to be 
felt rather than described, but not less real, be- 
cause founded on feeling. I refer to that convic- 
tion of the divine original of our religion, which 
springs up and continually gains strength in those 
who apply it habitually to their tempers and lives, 
and who imbibe its spirit and hopes. In such 
men, there is a consciousness of the adaptation 
of Christianity to their noblest faculties ; a con- 

* Christian Examiner, vol xiv. pp.192, 193, 197.. Art. on M'll- 
vaine's Evidences, by James Walker. 



72 



sciousness of its exalting and consoling influen- 
ces, of its power to confer the true happiness of 
human nature, to give that peace, which the world 
cannot give ; which assures them that it is not of 
earthly origin, but a ray from the Everlasting 
Light, a stream from the fountain of Heavenly 
Wisdom and Love. This is the evidence which 
sustains the faith of thousands, who never read 
and cannot understand the learned books of 
Christian apologists, who want perhaps words to 
explain the ground of their belief, but whose faith 
is of adamantine firmness, who hold the Gospel 
with a conviction more intimate and unwavering 
than mere arguments ever produced." * 

The last testimony I shall present against the 
doctrine, that miracles are the only evidence of a 
divine revelation, that the external evidence is 
every thing and the internal evidence nothing, is 
from the Reviewer of Verplanck's " Internal Ev- 
idences " in the " Christian Examiner." 

" It seems to be part of the economy of Provi- 
dence in relation to Christianity, that there should 
be some kind of evidence or other adapted to 
the character of every mind. While one rests 
satisfied with the historical, and internal critical 
evidence, and thinks himself an incompetent judge 



* Chanmng's Discourse at the Dudteian Lecture, p. 34. 



73 



of the moral internal evidence, another recurs 
to the latter, as the 4 grander, broader, and more 
powerful.' We rejoice in the power and the con- 
currence of both to establish the same truth. 
The adaptation of Christianity to the nature of 
man, and its conformity with what we know of 
the character of God, is unquestionably, to him 
who will reflect upon it, a very powerful evidence 

Of itS DIVINE ORIGIN." * 

This article I have always heard ascribed to 
your own pen ; and if this be correct, it only 
shows that in some instances, a change of opin- 
ion may not be a u crime ; " and that even wise 
and good " men throw out their opinions rashly, 
reserving to themselves the liberty of correcting 
them, if they are wrong. If you would know for 
what doctrines they hold themselves responsible, 
you must look to their last publication." f 

The doctrine of your Discourse is still more 
forcibly contradicted in the following passage 
from a work which bears your name. " The 
wisdom and the self-restraint, for so it is to be 
considered, of our Savior, in confining his teach- 
ing to the essential truths of religion, and the 
broad distinction which he thus made between 



* Christian Examiner, vol. ii. pp. 131, 132. 
+ Discourse, Note ii. p. 61. 

10 



74 



these and all other doctrines, appear to me among 
the most striking proofs of the divinity of his mis- 
sion. I cannot believe that a merely human 
teacher would have conducted himself with such 
perfect wisdom ; — that he would have succeeded 
in communicating to his disciples those principles, 
which are the foundation of all religion and mo- 
rality, without perplexing their minds by the dis- 
cussion of any topics less important ; and at last, 
have left his doctrine a monument for all future 
time." * 

You will not imagine, I trust, that this array 
of authorities, which might be increased to an in- 
definite extent, is brought forward as a refutation 
of the doctrine of your Discourse. Its truth or 
falsehood is not to be determiued by an appeal to 
distinguished names. It must stand or fall ac- 
cording to its own intrinsic character ; and if you 
can establish it by probable arguments, in a reg- 
ular course of reasoning, I shall not hesitate to 
admit it, although contrary to the opinion of so 
many eminent theologians. No sincere inquirer 
after truth will reject an idea, which has sub- 
stantial evidence in its favor, from the simple fact 
that it is new. Every important discovery in 

* Norton's Statement of Reasons, p. 327. 



75 



morals and science, for a long time, has to bear 
the reproach of novelty. If that were the only 
objection to your theory, I should certainly think 
it idle to call it in question. 

But, when you describe the doctrine opposed 
to your own, as 6 ' the latest form of infidelity " ; 
when you charge those who rest their belief in 
Christianity on its internal evidence, with deny- 
ing their Master ; when you more than intimate 
that all, who do not accept the views which you 
propose, are incapable of sound thinking and un- 
worthy to bear the office of Christian teachers ; 
it becomes important to show that the accusation 
which you bring recoils upon yourself ; that you 
have been guilty of rashness and injustice in 
stigmatizing an opinion as a dangerous innova- 
tion, which has been held by the purest lights of 
the Church, in ancient and modern times. 

II. I proceed now to consider your doctrine, 
that miracles are the only evidence of a divine 
revelation, in another point of view. 

It is contrary to the clear and express teachings 
of the Scriptures, both of the Old and the New 
Testament. Whatever importance they attach 
to the evidence of miracles, in support of the 
claims of divine messengers, — and that is an in- 
teresting topic of theological inquiry, — they give 



76 



no sanction to your doctrine, that miracles are the 
sole and exclusive proof of the interposition of 
God. They appeal to many other considerations ; 
they advance the principle, that the Almighty has 
spoken to his children in " divers manners," as 
well as at " sundry times " ; now in the cool of 
the day, among the trees of the garden, and now 
in the glow of the burning bush; now in the 
visions of the night, when deep sleep falleth on 
man, and now in the smoke and storm of the 
flaming mount ; now in the audible voice which 
made the flesh to quake, and now in the obscure 
monition which sent a thrill through the heart. 
The prophet is watching for the manifestation of 
Jehovah, but he is taught that the Holy One is 
not limited in his access to his creatures. A great 
and strong wind rends the mountains, and divides 
the rocks ; but the Lord was not in the wind ; 
and after the wind an earthquake; but the Lord 
was not in the earthquake ; and after the earth- 
quake a fire ; but the Lord was not in the fire ; 
and after the fire a still, small voice ; and the 
prophet hides his face and stands before the Lord. 
The Pharisees also desired of Jesus a sign from 
Heaven; they could not see his Divinity in his 
deeds of beneficence and might, in the inspira- 
tion that breathed over his soul, and dwelt upon 
his lips, in the celestial wisdom with which he 



77 



uttered the holiest truths, or in the moral perfec- 
tion which proved him to be the beloved Son of 
God ; they demanded some signal and overwhelm- 
ing displays of miraculous power, they insisted 
that the credentials of the Messiah should be writ- 
ten on the sky, they were blind to the most con- 
vincing proofs, when not in accordance with their 
previous conceptions ; but Jesus does not recognise 
the justice of their claim ; an evil and an adul- 
terous generation seeketh after a sign ; when he 
had already told them, that he who doeth the will 
of his Father shall know of the doctrine, whether 
it were trom God, or whether he spake of him- 
self. 

These general considerations are established by 
a more particular examination of the testimony of 
Scripture. We shall find, in the course of our 
inquiry, that the messengers of God never appeal 
to an exclusive kind of evidence in support of 
their mission ; least of all, to that which you pro- 
nounce to be the only infallible criterion. 

1. In the first place, the Scriptures present ex- 
amples of divine messengers, who performed no 
miracles, as the seal of their authority. They 
appear in the name of the Lord ; they speak as 
his vicegerents ; they profess to bear a revelation 
of truth from Heaven to men ; they claim to be 
heard not on their own account, but on account 



78 



of the divine commission with which they were 
charged ; they are received, in that character, by 
the people to whom they are sent ; subsequent 
teachers bear witness to their claims ; Christ him- 
self refers to them as the messengers of God; 
their names have been held sacred in every age 
of the Church ; and the denial of their mission 
has always been reckoned the confession of infi- 
delity. 

Now if the doctrine of your Discourse, that 
miracles are the only credentials of a divine mes- 
senger, be correct, it follows that the prophets, to 
whom I allude, pretended to the authority of God 
without any foundation for their claims. They 
spoke, when they were not commanded ; they ran, 
when they were not sent ; they declared their own 
imaginations, as the oracles of God ; for the only 
seal of their commission was wanting; they 
wrought no miracles, and yet professed to be di- 
vine messengers. 

Is it necessary to bring specific instances, with 
which the Bible abounds, in support of my argu- 
ment ? I begin with Samuel. The Lord called 
him when a child. He spoke to him in visions of 
the night. The soul of the youthful Hebrew was 
visited with the spirit from on high. He was 
established to be the prophet of the Lord. A 
revelation of divine truth was made to him in 



79 



Shiloh.* His whole life was passed in direct com- 
munications with God, and in announcing the 
divine messages to the people. No stronger lan- 
guage is used in the Bible concerning the divine 
mission of any one, than of this prophet. Yet 
he performed no miracle in proof of his claims. 
He gave no outward sign of his authority. The 
assurance of his inspiration was in the truth 
which he announced. 

Will you admit that Samuel was a divine mes- 
senger ? Then you abandon the ground you have 
taken, and acknowledge that there is evidence of 
a divine commission other than miracle. Do you 
deny that Samuel was a divine messenger ? Then 
you contradict the express assertion of the Bible, 
the universal opinion of the Church, and expose 
yourself to an accusation, which I trust you do 
not deserve, and which I will not bring. 

I next refer to the prophet Jeremiah. He was 
consecrated from his birth to be the messenger of 
God ; the Lord ordained him a prophet to the 
nations ; he was anointed with the Holy Spirit, so 
that his soul was filled with a higher strength than 
his own ; the timidity of childhood was overcome ; 
and while the dew of his youth was fresh upon 
him, he became as an iron pillar and a brazen 



* 1 Sam. iii.4-10, 15, 20, 21. 



80 



wall, against the kings, and the princes, and the 
priests of the land.* He was so fully conscious 
of acting under a divine commission, that he not 
only announced his message with the authority of 
God, but detected the false pretensions of those 
who claimed a similar commission, without being 
divinely sent. He was able to separate between 
the chaff and the wheat, between the dreams of 
the fancy and the words of Jehovah ; but he made 
use of no outward criterion ; he presented none 
himself ; he judged the false prophets by the in- 
herent character of their message ; he rested his 
own authority on the same evidence ; he wrought 
no miracle, yet he declared the word of God ; 
and the proof of its divinity was in its effects ; 
the fire which melted the obdurate spirit, the ham- 
mer which brake in pieces the rocky heart, were 
no invention of man, but the work of God.f 

I need not go through the " goodly fellowship 
of the prophets " for further examples of the fact, 
that divine messengers were sent, whose mission 
was not confirmed by the testimony of miracles. 
Your doctrine would disperse that glorious com- 
pany, dim the light that crowned their heads, rob 
their word of the divinity which it claimed, steal 
away the inspiration which rested on their souls, 



* Jer. i. 5, 7, 18. 



t Jer. xxiii. 28, 29. 



81 



and reduce them from the sublime distinction of 
prophets of Jehovah to the level of Jewish enthu- 
siasts. 

I will close this part of the discussion with the 
example of John the Baptist, the forerunner and 
friend of the Messiah. He was declared by the 
highest authority to be a prophet, whom no one 
born of woman could surpass.* Yet John wrought 
no miracle. f What is your view of the mission 
of John ? Was it from Heaven, or of men ? If 
you say, from Heaven, you take back your doc- 
trine. If you say, of men, you oppose the de- 
claration of Christ. 

2. In the second place, the Scriptures present 
examples of divine messengers, who, although they 
performed miracles, did not appeal to them as the 
sole evidence of their mission. If they some- 
times referred to their miracles as proofs that they 
were commissioned from Heaven, it is far from 
being the case, that they never referred to any 
thing else. An examination of the mode in which 
they pre ented their claims to dvine authority 
will show you that your exclusive ground cannot 
be maintained. 

We need only consider some passages in the 
history of our Savior himself. 



Luke vii. 28. 

11 



f John x. 41. 



32 



When John the Baptist sent from the prison to 
inquire of Jesus, whether he were indeed the Mes- 
siah, or whether the coming of another were still 
to be expected, Jesus, in the first place, directs 
the attention of the messengers to the works 
which he performed. They were the acknow- 
ledged credentials of the Messiah. But this was 
not all. He does not confine himself to the men- 
tion of the miracles. He does not speak of them 
in a way which would lead one to suppose that 
he regarded them as the exclusive testimony to 
his mission. He connects them with another fact, 
not miraculous in its character, to which, for 
aught that appears in the narrative, he attaches 
equal importance, as to the miracles themselves. 
While he bids the disciples declare to John, that 
" the blind receive their sight, the lame walk, the 
lepers are cleansed, and the dead are raised up," 
he adds, " and the poor have the gospel preached 
to them." * This latter circumstance was the ful- 
filment of prophecy ; the Gospel, the doctrine of 
truth, of holiness, and love, was now proclaimed ; 
it was announced to the poor ; the great idea of 
human brotherhood received a practical illustra- 
tion ; and this fact, no less than the miraculous 
display of power, was declared to John as a proof 
that the Messiah had come. 



Matt. xi. 2-7. 



83 



On another memorable occasion, — and one 
which brings the character of Jesus and the nature 
of his doctrine into a strong light, — our Savior 
enjoins the importance of a spiritual faith on those 
who had just witnessed an external miracle of a 
very impressive kind. They had eaten of the 
loaves which he had multiplied by his miraculous 
power ; but the wonder failed to produce any relig- 
ious effect on their minds ; they came to Christ with 
views of a grossly selfish and material character ; 
and upon his speaking to them of the duty of belief 
in him as the messenger of God, they immediately 
asked for an outward sign, as a foundation of their 
faith ; they wished to see something still more 
extraordinary than what they had yet witnessed ; 
Moses had fed their fathers with manna in the 
desert ; and they demanded a similar or a greater 
miracle. Jesus gave no countenance to these vain 
wishes. He virtually tells them, that his character 
and doctrine bear their own evidence with them ; 
that they need no outward signs in confirmation 
of their divinity ; that the true bread of God is 
that which cometh down from Heaven, and giveth 
life to the world, in his person. He expresses his 
surprise, that though they have seen him, they do 
not believe ; intimating that they are without 
excuse, that they have plenary evidence in the 
character of his doctrine of its divine origin, and 



84 



that all who were " drawn of the Father, 55 who 
possessed a spirit kindred with his own, would re- 
cognise the truth which he taught, and receive 
spiritual life from its influence.* It appears that 
this was a hard saying to not a few ; it gave great * 
offence ; many of his disciples from that time 
walked with him no more ; f the materialists of 
Galilee must needs have the visible manna from 
the sky ; to them " there was no intuition, no di- 
rect perception, of the truth of Christianity. 55 1 

Once more, we find the same doctrine an- 
nounced in the sublime conversation between our 
Savior and Pilate, previous to his crucifixion. 
u Art thou a king then ? 55 asks the Roman Gov- 
ernor. " Jesus answered, Thou say est truth ; for 
I am a king. To this end was I born ; and for 
this cause did I come into the world, that I 
should bear witness to the truth. 55 Now if the 
mind of Jesus had ever admitted the idea, that 
miraculous evidence was essential to the confirma- 
tion of truth ; that nothing but external signs could 
attest his~ Divinity ; it is plain that he could not 
have uttered the declaration, which follows, "Ev- 
ery one that is of the truth, heareth my voice. 55 ^ 
Is there not here an express recognition of the 
power of the soul to perceive spiritual truth ? Is 

* John vi. 25 - 59. f John vi. 66. } Discourse, p. 32. 

§ John xviii. 37. 



85 



there not a faculty in the spirit of man, when true 
to its birth of the Spirit of God, to commune with 
the Infinite Mind, to behold the Divinity in the 
manifestations of truth ? Hath not man an ear to 
hear the voice of the Son of God ? And without 
reference to this primary fact in human nature, 
what rational construction can be put on such lan- 
guage, so often uttered by Christ ? 

It is unnecessary to multiply examples, in which 
Jesus refers to the testimony of the soul, with no 
less confidence than to the evidence of miracles. 
The distinctness, the power, the earnest convic- 
tion with which he does this, in the midst of a 
sensual and idolatrous age, the calm and clear 
insight into the invisible nature of man, which he 
ever displayed, the anticipation of spiritual truth 
as the common patrimony of the race, which he 
cherished when all experience was against him, 
but which subsequent experience tends to confirm, 
are, I own, to my mind, among the strongest 
proofs of his divine mission. They seem to me 
to reveal the peculiar presence of God in the 
Spirit of Christ. They are signs of a divine in- 
spiration more forcible to me, than a visible sign 
from Heaven. 

I will conclude the discussion of this topic 
with a brief reference to the manner in which 
the Apostle Paul presents the evidence of the 



86 



religion, of which he was so powerful an advo- 
cate. He did not limit himself to the proof 
from miracles. He allowed every important con- 
sideration in favor of Christianity its due place. 
Now he spoke of the resurrection of Christ ; now 
of the fulfilment of prophecy ; now of the exter- 
nal signs which had been wrought by him ; and 
now of the intrinsic divinity of the Gospel itself. 
While the Jews demanded a new miracle ; while 
the Greeks sought after wisdom ; while the sages 
of the schools, and the disputers of the world, saw 
nothing but foolishness in the doctrine of Christ ; 
Paul persisted in preaching it ; he knew that it 
was filled with a divine life ; and that they who 
were called to its enjoyment, they whose souls 
were in unison with its spirit, would intuitively 
perceive that it was the wisdom of God, and the 
power of God.* 

Still further, Paul declares in the account of his 
ministry, which he gives to the Corinthians, that he 
relied for success on the sincerity of his purpose, 
and on the clearness and energy with which he 
proclaimed Christianity as the revelation of God. 
He has renounced, as he tells them, the hidden 
things of dishonesty ; he exhibits the word of God 
without craft or deceit ; and appeals to the con- 

* 1 Cor. i.20-24. 



87 



science by the manifestation of truth. There 
could hardly be a more distinct statement of the 
principle, that moral truth is addressed to the 
moral nature of man, and finds its strongest sup- 
port in the testimony of the soul. It was the 
opinion of Paul, that beside the miraculous dis- 
plays of power, which he had witnessed and of 
which he had been the subject, there was another 
evidence of the divinity of the Gospel ; for it 
commended itself to the human consciousness ; 
it was in accordance with the divine law written 
upon the heart ; and none but they who were lost 
to their better nature, could fail to perceive in it 
the revelation of God.* 

The Apostle continues to speak of the light 
which had been granted, enabling him to see the 
glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.f His 
meaning cannot be better illustrated, than by the 
following admirable remarks from the most pro- 
found theologian, whom this country has produced. 
" If a sight of Christ's outward glory might give a 
rational assurance of his divinity, why may not 
an apprehension of his spiritual glory do so too ? 
Doubtless Christ's spiritual glory is in itself as dis- 
tinguishing, and as plainly showing his divinity, as 
his outward glory , # and a great deal more. For 



* 2 Cor. iv. 1 - 4. 



f 2 Cor. iv. (>. 



88 



his spiritual glory is that wherein his divinity con- 
sists ; and the outward glory of his transfiguration 
showed him to be divine, only as it was a remark- 
able image or representation of that spiritual glo- 
ry. Doubtless, therefore, he that has had a clear 
sight of the spiritual glory of Christ may say, 
e 1 have not followed cunningly devised fables, 
but have been an eye witness of his majesty,' 
upon as good grounds as the Apostle, when he 
had respect to the outward glory of Christ that he 
had seen. A true sense of the divine excellency 
of the things of God's word doth more directly 
and immediately convince of the truth of them ; 
and that because the excellency of these things is 
so superlative. There is a beauty in them that is 
so divine and Godlike, that is greatly and evi- 
dently distinguishing of them from things merely 
human, or that men are the inventors and authors 
of; a glory, that is so high and great, that when 
clearly seen, commands assent to their divinity 
and reality. The evidence, which they who are 
spiritually enlightened have of the truth of the 
things of religion, is a kind of intuition and 
immediate evidence. They believe the doctrines 
of God's word to be divine, because they see di- 
vinity in them. That is, they^ see a divine and 
transcendent and most evidently distinguishing 
glory in them ; such a glory, as, if clearly seen, 



89 

does not leave room to doubt of their being of 
God, and not of men." * 

III. In the third place, we find express pas- 
sages in the Scriptures, which prove that miracles 
are not the only evidence of divine revelation. 
The instances, which we have already considered, 
are sufficient to authorize the conclusion, that the 
exclusive doctrine of your Discourse is in oppo- 
sition to the Bible ; but I am unwilling to dismiss 
this branch of the subject, without a more imme- 
diate reference to certain scriptural declarations, 
which imply the necessity of various kinds of evi- 
dence, as proof of a divine commission. 

In the instructions of Moses, of the Prophets, 
of the Apostles, of Christ himself, we often meet 
with allusions to the danger of deception, of 
receiving a mere pretender to divine authority, as 
the messenger of God. We are told that false 
prophets will appear ; that they will advance such 
plausible claims as will impose on the unwary ; 
that they will work miracles in support of their 
mission, similar in outward appearance to those 
which are truly divine ; and accordingly there 
must be some standard other than that of mira- 
cles, by which to judge of the truth of their pre- 
tensions. If miracles be the sole evidence of a 

* Edwards' Works, vol. viii. pp. 300, 305, 306. 

12 



90 



divine~commission, and if apparent miracles be 
performed, it is impossible to preserve any logical 
strictness, and to avoid the conclusion that the 
miracle-worker is from God. Is it said that these 
miracles are false, while those of the divine mes- 
senger are true ? But how do we know that ? 
In external appearance, a false miracle is the same 
as a true one ; both are extraordinary changes 
in the physical world ; they differ only in their 
hidden causality ; and that is a matter of infer- 
ence ; we ascribe the one to divine power, and the 
other to human art, because we have some grounds, 
beside the extraordinary character of the event, 
for believing the interposition of God, in the one 
case, while, in the other, we have no such grounds. 
It follows, accordingly, from the declarations of 
the Bible, that, if there be no evidence of a divine 
mission but miracles, even the evidence of mira- 
cles itself is destroyed. I will briefly consider a 
few passages which relate to this point. 

Among the counsels, which the Hebrew Lawgiv- 
er imparts to his people, he takes occasion to speak 
of the case of a pretended prophet. Many such 
cases would probably occur. " If there arise 
among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and 
giveth thee a sign or a wonder, [performs a visible 
miracle,] and the sign or the wonder come to pass, 
thou shaft not hearken unto the words of that 



91 



prophet or that dreamer of dreams; if he say, 
Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not 
known. And that prophet, or that dreamer of 
dreams, shall be put to death, because he hath 
spoken to turn you away from the Lord your 
God." * 

The principle involved in these directions is so 
evident, that it can scarcely escape the notice of 
the most inattentive reader. A prophet is sup- 
posed to make his appearance among the people 
of the land ; he claims a divine commission from 
his god, though not from Jehovah ; he works a 
miracle in proof of his claims ; he gives a sign, 
and the sign comes to pass ; but yet he is to be 
rejected, and put to death. His apparent mira- 
cle is to be judged by a higher standard ; it is to 
be brought to the test of the doctrine advanced ; 
that decides it to be false, though it had every 
external proof in its favor; and to reverse the 
case, and apply the principle here stated to the 
evidences of Christianity, it is the divinity of the 
Christian doctrine, which substantiates the divini- 
ty of the Christian miracles. 

Again, Jesus declares in the most solemn man- 
ner, that the power of working miracles was so far 
from being the only evidence of a divine com- 



* Deut. xiii. 1 - 5. 



92 



mission, that it was not even a proof of a good 
character. A man, he asserts, may perform mir- 
acles in his name, may utter prophecies, may cast 
out devils, and, at the same time, be a worthless 
man, and rejected, at the day of judgment, from 
the kingdom of Heaven.* Now if miracles alone 
cannot substantiate a claim to the favor of God, 
and a good moral character, it is clear that mira- 
eles alone cannot form the credentials of a divine 
messenger; for the supposition that the Deity 
would commission a bad man to make a revela- 
tion of his will is blasphemy. Our Savior himself 
presents the criterion. When he warns his hear- 
ers " to beware of false prophets," he immedi- 
ately adds, 4 1 ye shall know them by their fruits." f 
Just as you see that a cluster of grapes on the 
vine is not a bunch of thistles, you can perceive 
the presence of the Divinity in the moral glory 
of the divine messenger. 

Again, in the description of the dangers to 
which his disciples would be exposed in the peri- 
lous times that were to succeed his death, Jesus 
predicts, " that there shall arise false Christs and 
false prophets," with such specious pretensions, 
" that if it were possible they would deceive the 
very elect." J Now in what manner was the fal- 



* Matt. vii. 21 - 23. f Matt. vii. 15 - 20. t Matt. xxiv. 24. 



93 



lacy of their pretensions to be detected ? Not 
by bringing them to the test of miracles. For 
these they were able to perform, as far as the ex- 
ternal appearance was concerned. " They would 
show great signs and wonders." These would 
deceive many ; for every extraordinary event was 
thought to indicate a peculiar manifestation of 
God. But the elect would not be deluded by 
their pretensions. They who had understood the 
mind of Christ, who had received the essential 
spirit of his instructions, would look for a deeper 
meaning in every alleged divine commission, than 
was signified by outward wonders ; they would 
make the character of the revelation the test of 
its truth ; and finding no inward signs of divinity, 
would reject its claims. 

Again, the same principle is expressed in the 
direction of the Apostle Paul to the Galatians, in 
regard to their treatment of those who were 
thought to pervert the doctrine of Christ. " For 
though an angel from Heaven preach any other 
Gospel to you than that which we have preached, 
let him be accursed." * According to the doc- 
trine of your Discourse, the preaching of an angel 
would be a signal proof of a divine revelation. 
It would be a conspicuous miracle, of which no 



* Galatians i. 8. 



94 

one could stand in doubt. What need, you would 
say, of further evidence ? Not so Paul. He ex- 
pressly commands the disciples to receive nothing 
on the authority of an angel, unless it was ap- 
proved by a higher standard. A miracle alone in 
his view was not sufficient ; the character of the 
doctrine must determine the weight of the miracle ; 
the internal evidence of divinity must be added to 
the external testimony of miracle, or even the 
latter would lose its force. 

In like manner, Paul alludes to the coming of 
a " wicked one," who should exhibit " all power, 
and signs, and lying wonders " ; * who would 
deceive many ; but because they cherished no 
" love of the truth," no taste for its revelation 
as made by the messengers of God. A pure love 
of truth, " a sense of divine things," would lead 
its possessor to reject the falsehood, notwithstand- 
ing the apparent miracles with which it was prop- 
ped up. According to Paul, a certain criterion 
of truth is to be found in the intrinsic character 
of the doctrine ; according to your Discourse, this 
criterion is of no value whatever ; for " there can 
be no intuition, no direct perception of the truth 
of Christianity."! 



* 1 Thess. ii. 9, 10. 



f Discourse, p. 32. 



95 



I have thus shown, as I trust, that the position 
which you assume is at variance with the general 
belief of the Christian Church, and with the ex- 
press testimony of the Scriptures. I might now 
proceed to point out the philosophical objections 
which it labors under, and which adapt it rather 
to increase the difficulties of unbelievers, than to 
diminish any form of infidelity. But these have 
been recently stated in such an able manner, that 
I need not pursue the subject in this place.* 

There are several objections, however, of a 
practical character that apply to the doctrine of 
your Discourse, and the connexion in which it 
is presented, which I cannot pass over without 
notice. 

I. The doctrine, that miracles are the only evi- 
dence of a divine revelation, if generally admitted, 
would impair the religious influence of the Chris- 
tian ministry. It would separate the pastor of a 
church from the sympathies of his people, confine 
him in a sphere of thought remote from their 
usual interests, and give an abstract and scholas- 
tic character to his services in the pulpit. The 
great object of his endeavors would be to demon- 
strate the truth of the Christian history; the 

# See Boston Quarterly Review, Jan. 1839. 



96 



weapons of his warfare would be carnal, and not 
spiritual; drawn from grammars, and lexicons, 
and mouldy traditions, not from the treasures of 
the human heart. The miracles being established 
to the satisfaction of an inquisitive generation, 
nothing would remain but to announce the truth 
on their authority ; for as all other evidence is 
without value, and this alone sufficient, it would 
be a waste of time to direct the attention to the 
divine glory of Christ and his revelation ; this is 
beyond the reach of human " perception " ; none 
but enthusiasts can make use of it. The minister 
would rely for success on his skill in argument, 
rather than on his sympathy with man ; on the 
knowledge he gains within the walls of the Uni- 
versity, rather than on the experience which may 
be learned in the homes of his people. He would 
trust more to his logical demonstration of the evi- 
dences of Christianity, than to the faithful exhibi- 
tion of Christian truth to the naked human heart. 
But, I believe, not a wise and experienced pastor 
can be found, who will not say that, as a general 
rule, the discussion of the historical evidence is 
ill adapted to the pulpit, and that the effects 
of such preaching on society at large, or on the 
individual conscience, are too minute to be esti- 
mated. 



97 



It is not surprising, however, that with only 
a theoretical acquaintance with the duties of the 
pastor, an undue stress should be laid on the prac- 
tical value of arguments derived from historical 
learning. We bring this prejudice with us from the 
schools. We suppose that what was effectual in 
the exercises of the class, will be equally effectual 
in the instructions of the church. We imagine 
that the busy men and women of our congrega- 
tions, " careful and troubled about many things," 
will be deeply interested in questions that deeply 
interest ourselves. Thus, it is well if we do not 
spend many years in proving that the Gospels 
were written by the persons whose names they 
bear, while we have no insight into the divine 
truth which beams from their pages, and which 
needs only to be sincerely set forth, to find access 
to the soul of man, and, by the might of the Holy 
Ghost, from which it came, to purify and regene- 
rate society. In this way, to a considerable ex- 
tent, we almost unconsciously pursue the course 
which you recommend, of presenting miracles as 
the sole evidence of Christianity. But, I cannot 
say, that my experience or observation at all con- 
firms your ideas. I am not aware, that bad men 
have been made good, or good men better, to so 
great a degree, by the method which you advise, 
as to encourage a repetition of the experiment. 
13 



98 



On the contrary, I have known great and bene- 
ficial effects to arise from the simple exhibition 
of the truth of the Gospel to the heart and con- 
science, by earnest men, who trusted to the in- 
tuitive power of the soul, for the perception of 
its divinity. The revelation of Christ is addressed 
to the better nature of man ; " my sheep," said 
he, " hear my voice, and follow me, and I give 
unto them eternal life " ; " the light shines in 
darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it 
not," but the " children of light " look upward 
and are blest ; it meets with a cordial reception 
from those who are burdened with the conscious- 
ness of sin, who are seeking for higher things, 
who are " feeling after God, if haply they may 
find him " ; and this fact is the foundation of the 
minister's success. If you confine him to the 
demonstration of the miracles ; if you deny him 
intimate access to the soul, by the truth which he 
bears ; if you virtually tell him that the internal evi- 
dence of Christianity is a delusion, that our personal 
experience of its power is no proof of its divinity, 
and that the glorious Gospel of the blessed God 
is to be believed only because learned men vouch- 
safe to assure the humble Christian of its truth ; 
you deprive the minister of all inward force ; you 
make him little better than a logical machine ; 
and much as I value a sound logic in its proper 



99 



place, 1 am sure it is not the instrument which is 
mighty through God to the pulling down of the 
strong holds of sin. It may detect error ; but it 
cannot give so much as a glimpse of the glory of 
Christ. It may refute fallacies ; but it cannot 
bind the heart to the love of holiness. A higher 
power is necessary for this purpose ; and such a 
power God has granted to man in the divine gift 
of Christianity, which corresponds to his inmost 
wants, and bears the pledge of its truth in its ef- 
fects on the soul. 

II. I object again to your exclusive principle, 
on account of its injurious bearing on the char- 
acter of a large portion of the most sincere be- 
lievers in Christ. We have already seen, that, 
pressed to its logical consequences, it denies the 
Christian name to all who do not receive Christi- 
anity in the method which you prescribe. For it 
is clear, that if Christianity be founded only on 
its historical evidence, he, who does not receive it 
on that evidence, cannot strictly be said to receive 
it at all. But I will not believe that you intend to 
enforce this conclusion on the great mass of 
Christians who differ from you, — for whose dul- 
ness and ignorance you may find some excuse, — 
although you do not hesitate to apply it to those 
whose studies and profession ought to have fur- 
nished them with better information. 



100 



Still it is not a " sweet and pleasant thing," * 
for an unlearned believer in Christ to be told that 
he is building on an imperfect foundation, and 
that the temple of his faith is but " wood, hay, 
and stubble," though he " may be saved, yet so 
as by fire." For, at all events, it calls in ques- 
tion either his honesty or his judgment. It im- 
plies that he either knows the foundation is bad, 

* " Surely it is a sweet and pleasant thing to tell and to hear to- 
gether of the great things which God has done for our souls," ob- 
serves the Reverend Fielding Ould of Liverpool, when he invites 
the liberal Christians of that city to come to his church, and hear 
themselves proved to be infidels. 

The answer of the ministers, whose congregations he thus appealed 
to, is equally manly, and applicable to those similarly circumstanced, 
on both sides of the water. " When good men differ from each other, 
it is 4 sweet and pleasant,' to reason together, and prove all things, 
and whatsoever things are pure, and true, and lovely, to think on 
these things, provided that both parties are conscious of their liabil- 
ity to error, and are anxious to learn as well as to teach ; that each 
confides in the integrity, ingenuousness, and ability of the other ; 
that each applies himself with reasons to the understanding, not 
with terrors to the will. But such conference is not ' sweet and 
pleasant,' where, fallibility being confessed on one side, infallibility 
is assumed on the other ; where one has nothing to learn and every 
thing to teach ; where the arguments of an equal are propounded 
as a message of inspiration." 

For an interesting account of the controversy thus stated, see the 
" Christian Examiner," for September, 1839. The great principles, 
which are so ably set forth in the pamphlets already come to hand, 
are welcomed by many hearts here. They must be cheering to the 
friends of mental freedom everywhere. 



101 



and is therefore insincere ; or he does not know 
it, and is therefore imposed upon. His integrity 
can be preserved only at the expense of his in- 
sight. He may be deluded ; if not, he is a hypo- 
crite. Either supposition is any thing but agree- 
able. I should not like to use such language to a 
man for whose soul it was my duty to watch. 

I know not a few individuals, — neither very 
wise, nor very unwise, compared with the average 
of men, — certainly not persons qualified by the 
" knowledge of which extensive learning com- 
monly makes a part," to express an opinion on 
the subject, who still venture, with a modest confi- 
dence, to assume the name of Christians. They 
inform me that they obtain no satisfaction from 
such works as Paley's " Evidences of Christiani- 
ty," or Lardner's " Credibility of the Gospel His- 
tory." Books of this character do not speak to 
their condition ; their minds are so constructed 
as to be little affected by such reasonings ; but 
yet the truth of Christianity commends itself to 
their souls ; and they believe in Christ, because 
they behold his glory. They do not even question 
the divine origin of Christianity; they would as 
soon think of asking whether the sun shines at 
noon ; and cheerful and contented in their faith, 
they leave the problems, which require curious 
historical research, to scholars, whose business it is 
to deal with them. 



102 



1 have known many persons of this description ; 
indeed, if I am not greatly deceived, they are to be 
found in all our congregations ; I have witnessed 
their unobtrusive piety in the daily walks of life ; 
I have visited them in scenes of deepest sorrow ; 
I have stood at the side of their death-beds ; and 
I could no more doubt their genuine Christian 
faith, because it was not the product of historical 
evidence, than I could deny the skill of one of our 
native artists, because it did not grow up from 
the study of classic models. 

This experience is confirmed by the testimony 
of an eminent man, already quoted, who, what- 
ever portion of truth he might have failed to per- 
ceive, it would be extreme folly to doubt, was 
conversant with the workings of the soul, in the 
affairs of religion, as few have ever been, in our 
country, or in any other. " If the evidence of the 
Gospel depended only on history, and such rea- 
sonings as learned men only are capable of, it 
would be above the reach of far the greatest part 
of mankind. But persons with but an ordinary 
degree of knowledge are capable, without a long 
and subtile train of reasoning, to see the divine 
excellency of the things of religion. They are 
capable of being taught by the Spirit of God, as 
well as learned men. The evidence, that is this 
way obtained, is vastly better and more satisfy- 



103 



ing, than all that can be obtained by the arguings 
of those that are the most learned, and the great- 
est masters of reason. And babes are as capa- 
ble of knowing these things, as the wise and pru- 
dent ; and they are often hid from these when 
they are revealed to those." * 

III. The preceding views suggest another fatal 
objection to the doctrine of your Discourse. It 
removes Christianity from its strong hold in the 
common mind, and puts it into the keeping of 
scholars and antiquaries. I have already hinted 
at this objection, but it deserves a more particular 
consideration. It follows, as the necessary conse- 
quence of your exclusive hypothesis. For if the 
truth of Christianity rests entirely on the founda- 
tion of historical evidence ; if there be nothing 
in its intrinsic character to commend it to the 
soul, as the revelation of God ; if the uneducated 
inquirer must make up his mind, either from his 
own investigations or from the testimony of others, 
in regard to the subtlest questions of literary crit- 
icism, before he can cherish a vital faith in the 
doctrines of Christ, of course, he resigns his opin- 
ions to the guidance of the learned. He must 
give up his birth-right as a man, before he can 
establish his faith as a Christian. For he cannot 



* Edwards' Works, vol. viii. p. 310. 



104 



enter into such investigations himself; he has 
neither the ability, the leisure, nor the apparatus, 
that is requisite ; he must sue at the feet of the 
scholar for the light which he needs for the salva- 
tion of the soul. The " grace and truth " re- 
vealed by the Savior become " as the words of 
a book that is sealed ; the book is delivered to 
him that is not learned, saying, Read this, I pray 
thee ; and he saith, I cannot, for I am not learned." 
The dark hour of God's displeasure has come 
back; we hear the prophetic denunciation re- 
peated ; " forasmuch as this people have removed 
their heart far from me, and their fear toward 
me is taught by the precept of men; therefore, 
behold, I will proceed to do a marvellous work 
among this people, even a marvellous work and a 
wonder ; for the wisdom of their wise men shall 
perish, and the understanding of their prudent 
men shall be hid." 

It may appear incredible to many, that you 
should fully admit this consequence, although it 
is the inevitable result of your reasonings. There 
are few minds, at the present day, however wed- 
ded to prescription and form, however great their 
distrust of the mass of the people, that would not 
shrink from the distinct avowal of such an opin- 
ion, even though it were privately cherished. 1 
honor the frankness with which you express it, — 



105 



contrasted, as it is, with the ambiguity I have be- 
fore lamented ; a more ingenious defence of the 
principle, perhaps, cannot be made, than that con- 
tained in the Note which you devote to the sub- 
ject. At all events, we shall look in vain for a 
clearer statement of the opinion objected to, than 
the following words. " The full comprehension 
of the character and evidence of Christianity is 
the result of studies which are pursued only by 
few, and the many want capacity or opportunity 
to satisfy themselves on the subject by their inde- 
pendent, unassisted exertions." (p. 57.) " It is 
said, that a great majority of men are not capable 
of investigating for themselves the evidences and 
character of Christianity, and therefore can have 
no reasonable foundation for their belief in Christ- 
ianity. The direct answer is, that trust in the 
information, judgment, and integrity of others, to 
a greater or less extent, as it is a universal and 
necessary, is also a rational principle of belief." 
(p. 63.) 

The great majority of people, accordingly, hav- 
ing no power to perceive the intrinsic divinity 
of Christian truth, to behold the glory of God in 
the character of Christ, are doomed, by the very 
nature of the case, to dependence on the learned 
class, for the foundation of their faith. 

The first astonishing circumstance connected 
14 



106 



with this declaration is, that it was addressed to a 
body of Christians, whose prominent characteristic 
is the defence of freedom of mind, — of not only 
the right, but the duty, and of course, the power 
of private judgment, to the most unlimited extent. 
We have claimed to be the very Protestants of 
the Protestants ; our watchword has been, " The 
people, and not the priests ; " we have taken our 
stand on the broad foundation of the universal 
mind ; we have fought for the inherent privileges 
of humanity ; and if we have, in any degree, se- 
cured a hold on the affections of the community ; 
if the term " liberal Christian " is sacred and 
dear to any hearts among the breathing multi- 
tudes around us ; it is because we have discarded 
the lifeless formulas of the schools ; because we 
have sought to make Christianity a vital senti- 
ment, instead of a ; barren tradition ; because we 
have endeavored to bring the Bible out of the 
" dusty corners " in which learned speculations 
had placed it ; and boldly appealed to the sense 
of truth in every man, to see and judge for him- 
self what is right. 

Again, I cannot but be surprised at the re- 
markable confusion of the statement, in which 
you recognise no distinction between the evidence 
of the truth of physical science and that of moral 
and religious truth. You assert that " religious 



107 



knowledge has the character common to all our 
higher knowledge, that it requires labor, thought, 
and learning to attain it." (p. 54.) The truth 
of Christianity is to be received on the same 
ground, on which we admit, that " all the motions 
of the bodies of the solar system in relation to 
each other are to be referred to the one law of 
gravity." (p. 58.) The spiritual truths of Christ- 
ianity are to be ascertained by the same method 
as the physical truths of astronomy. The growth 
in the " knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ," 
which is demanded of the most unlearned believer, 
is made to depend on the same conditions as the 
increase of our knowledge of " all subjects, lying 
beyond the sphere of personal experience." 
(p. 59.) Our faith no longer proceeds from the 
" demonstration of the Spirit ; " it stands not " in 
the power of God," but " in the wisdom of men." 

But if this theory be true, it npt only makes a 
large proportion of unlettered Christians depend- 
ent on scholars for their knowledge of Christ, but 
actually deprives them of all religious knowledge 
whatever. They have not the requisite culture 
even to understand the results of critical investi- 
gation ; they do not feel sufficient interest in the 
subject to make any inquiries concerning them ; 
still, they " know " in whom they believe ; they 
have a faith, no less rational, no less enlightened, no 



103 



less fervent, than that of the most profound anti- 
quary ; for they have the witness in their own 
hearts; the truths of the Gospels are the very 
life of their souls ; they have seen, and tasted, 
and been nourished by the bread of God, which 
came down out of Heaven ; and it is in vain to 
tell them, that they are ignorant of the truth of 
Christianity, that they have no solid foundation 
for their faith, because they have not besieged 
the libraries of the learned, to ask them whether 
they might believe in Christ or no. 

Yon cottager, who weaves at her own door, 
Pillow and bobbins all her little store, 
Content though mean, and cheerful if not gay, 
Shuffling her threads about the livelong day, 
Just earns a scanty pittance, and at night 
Lies down secure, her heart and pocket light ; 
She, for her humble sphere by nature fit, 
Has little understanding, and no wit, 
Receives no praise, but though her lot be such, 
(Toilsome and indigent,) she renders much ; 
Just knows, and knows no more, her Bible true — 
And in that charter reads with sparkling eyes 
Her title to a treasure in the skies. 

Nor is it merely those whom we speak of in 
our pride, as the less favored classes, to whom the 
supply of their daily wants seems like a daily 
miracle, that are obliged to found their convic- 
tions of the truth of Christianity on more direct 



109 



evidence, than is furnished by the investigations of 
science for the truths of astronomy. The learned 
themselves are often so absorbed in their favorite 
studies, that they can give little attention to 
the critical researches of the theologian. Yet, if 
they are religious men, they feel that their faith 
is built on stronger evidence than he could supply 
them with. They do not need to solicit his ad- 
vice before they can believe in Christianity. They 
have settled their faith for themselves ; and seen, 
from the intrinsic divinity of the Gospel, that it is 
the gift of God. They know that different branch- 
es of inquiry demand different kinds of evidence ; 
a scholastic logic, with them, is not the only organ 
of truth ; they have confidence in the inward eye, 
which penetrates where the telescope cannot 
reach ; they do not confound the truths of re- 
ligion with the discoveries of astronomy, in regard 
to their manner of proof ; and, like our late emi- 
nent mathematician, who was a no less sincere 
Christian than sound philosopher, while they es- 
tablish the facts of physical science by learned 
research and subtile calculations, they perceive 
the truths of the Gospel by the intuitions of the 
soul. That distinguished man, as we are inform- 
ed in the beautiful tribute which filial piety has 
recently offered to his memory, was accustomed 
to dwell upon " the fitness of the Gospel to purify 



110 



the heart and elevate the soul ; and preferred to 
rest its authority upon these views, rather than 
upon any other ; " while the doctrine, that " a be- 
lief in miracles is not essential to a belief in 
Christianity, received his approbation."* A short 
time before his death, he told a friend, who has 
since stated the conversation in a public Eulogy, f 
worthy of the subject and the author, " I cannot 
remember when I had not the feeling of religious 
truth and accountability, and when I did not act 
from it, or endeavor to. In my boyish days, when 
some of my companions, who had become infect- 
ed with Tom Paine's infidelity, broached their 
notions in conversation with me, I battled it with 
them stoutly, not exactly with the logic you would 
get from Locke, but with the logic I found here, 
(pointing to his breast ;) and here it has always 
been my guide and support; it is my support 
still"! 

Still further, the course which you recommend 
is directly at variance with that pursued by our 

# Memoir of Nathaniel Bowditch, by his Son, Nathaniel Inger- 

SOLL BOWDITCH, p. 152. 

f See Eulogy on the Life and Character of Nathaniel Bowditch, 
by the Hon. Daniel Appleton White, p. 53. 
| See Memoir, p. 161. 

See also Discourse on the Life and Character of Dr. Bowditch, 
by the Rev. Alexander Young, pp. 91, 92. 



Ill 

Savior himself. You maintain, that " extensive 
learning " is usually requisite for those who would 
influence their fellow-men on religious subjects. 
But Jesus certainly did not take this into conside- 
ration in the selection of the twelve from the mass 
of the disciples ; he committed the promulgation 
of his religion to " unlearned and ignorant " 
men ; the sublimest truths were entrusted to the 
most common minds ; and, in this way, " God 
made foolish the wisdom of the world." You 
may say, that the choice of instruments was not at 
the command of Christ ; but, I cannot doubt, that, 
if " extensive learning " had been indispensable, 
he would have found means to avail himself of its 
power. You will not maintain that the possession 
of inspiration removed the necessity of learning, 
for you inform us, " that neither the teaching of 
our Savior, nor the influences of God's spirit in 
enlightening the minds of the apostles, preserved 
them from all the errors of the age, from the in- 
fluence of all human prejudices and feelings, from 
all inconclusive reasoning, or from all ambiguity, 
impropriety, and insufficiency in the use of lan- 
guage."* In short, notwithstanding the miracu- 
lous relations they sustained to God, they were 
singularly destitute of the qualifications, which, 

* Christian Examiner, vol. vi. pp. 344, 345. Art. Authorship of 
the Epistle to the Hebrews. 



112 



in your view, are essential to the teacher of re- 
ligion. 

He, who " knew what was in man," however, 
made a far different estimate of the value of 
artificial culture, compared with the spontaneous 
wisdom of the healthy, religious soul, when en- 
lightened by the spirit of God, the spirit of truth 
and goodness. His interview with the doctors in 
the temple, at twelve years of age, was probably 
not adapted to increase his confidence in the 
learned by profession ; and his subsequent ac- 
quaintance with such minds as produced the Gos- 
pel of John and the Epistles of Peter would have 
proved, if proof were needed, that the soul of 
man is fitted to perceive the truths of religion, 
without the aid of extensive erudition. Christ 
honored man. He felt the worth of the soul. 
He knew its intimate connexion with God. He 
believed in the omnipresence of the Deity; but 
taught, that of all temples the " upright heart 
and pure " was most acceptable. He saw that 
the parade of wisdom, which books impart, was 
as nothing before " the light that enlighteneth 
every human mind." The whole course of his 
nation's history was an illustration of the fact, 
" that poor mechanics are wont to be God's great 
ambassadors to mankind." Hence, he gave no 
preference to Nicodemus, that master in Israel, or 



113 



to the wealthy Joseph of Arimathea, who, we 
may presume, had devoted his leisure to the cul- 
tivation of his mind, over Matthew the publican, 
or the sons of the fisherman Zebedee ; and while 
the former were hesitating between their convic- 
tions and their comforts at home, the latter were 
going barefoot from city to city to preach the 
kingdom of God. Christ established no college 
of Apostles ; he did not revive the school of the 
prophets which had died out; he paid no distin- 
guished respect to the pride of learning ; indeed, 
he sometimes intimates that it is an obstacle to 
the perception of truth ; and thanks God, that 
while he has hid the mysteries of the kingdom of 
Heaven from the wise and prudent, he has made 
them known to men as ignorant as babes of the 
lore of the schools. Instead of selecting the 
scribes from the temple, the wise disputers of this 
world, the cautious Gamaliels who could balance 
probabilities to a hair, and who knew that no 
" future investigations would lead them to change 
their opinions,"* as the depositaries of his doc- 
trine he planted it deep in the minds of Jewish 
peasants ; and while " other teachers have com- 
mitted their wisdom to writing, lest, being entrust- 
ed to words, which are but breath, it should be dis- 



* Discourse, p. 61. 

15 



114 



persed and lost, Jesus confided in the divine ener- 
gy of his doctrine, and with an unconcern truly 
sublime, cast it abroad to make its own way, and 
perpetuate its own existence, — sufficient proof 
that he knew it to be from God."* He was con- 
tent to entrust the record of his history with un- 
lettered disciples, who were drawn to the cross by 
the Spirit of the Father, without desiring it to be 
accompanied with the annotations of " a philoso- 
pher of a mind as enlarged as that of Cicero." t 

Once more, I am obliged to differ from your con- 
clusions with regard to the practical importance 
of scholars to the interests of religion. Perhaps 
I may venture to hope, that I am not likely to be 
accused of indifference to human learning. But 
I cannot fall in with the extravagant pretensions 
that you urge in its favor. I deny that it entitles 
its possessor to the claim of infallibility. True 
learning, in my opinion, is as modest as it is in- 
quisitive ; it searches for truth with a lowly and 
reverent aspect ; it never counts itself to have yet 

* Sermon at the Ordination of Rev. W. H. Furness, by Henry 
Ware, Jr., p. 9. 

f See Christian Examiner, vol. vi. p. 344. Art. Authorship of the 
Epistle to the Hebrews. 

See also Spirit of the Pilgrims, vol. ii. pp. 543, 551-553, where 
the above sentiment is animadverted on, as " the latest form of in- 
fidelity." 



115 



attained ; it never presumes to assert that it can 
gain no further light on any subject ; conscious of 
frailty, it communes with all wise teachers ; and 
in meek self-dependence, compares the lessons 
they announce with the oracles of God. Such 
learning blesses both its disciples and those to 
whom they are sent ; the former obtain from the 
latter no less instruction than they give ; their 
reverence for man is too deep to permit the exer- 
cise of scorn ; and in free and trusting intercourse 
with all varieties of their fellow men, they feel that 
they are living to learn ; they are growing old in 
the pursuit of wisdom, with the freshness of child- 
ren, y7]gaaxov(jt dcdaaxofxevoi ; and the thought, 
that no clearer views of truth were yet to visit 
their minds, would almost bring them to the grave 
before their time. 

A more sincere veneration for human beings I 
cannot feel, than for scholars of this character. 
I honor the learned, when they devote their at- 
tainments to the service of society; when they 
cherish a stronger interest in the welfare of their 
brethren, than in the luxury of their books ; when 
they bring the researches of science to the illus- 
tration of truth, the correction of abuses, and the 
aid of the sufferer ; but if they do not acknow- 
ledge a higher light than that which comes from 
the printed page ; if they confound the posses- 



116 



sion of erudition with the gift of wisdom; and 
above all, if they presume to interfere in the com- 
munion of the soul with God, and limit the uni- 
versal bounty of Heaven within their " smoky 
cells," I can only utter my amazement. 

Christian truth has always been addressed to 
the " intuitive perceptions " of the common mind. 
The Gospel was first preached to the poor ; and 
with the " poor in spirit," those w T ho renounced 
the pride of learning, who " loved to lie low in 
God's power," and listen to his secret voice with- 
in the heart, it has always found its most faithful 
friends. A shallow and presumptuous philoso- 
phy, — presumptuous, because shallow, — usurps 
the place of the simplicity of Christ, and 
would fain smother the breathing life of heavenly 
truth. Creeds came into the Church with the 
dreams of speculation ; they have been handed 
down through the dust of the schools ; they have 
sought their principal defence in the subtile, 
shadowy, and artificial distinctions of the learned ; 
and the most vigorous attacks they have received 
have come from the unarmed strength of plebeian 
sects. The sword of the Spirit is not wielded 
after the tactics of a University ; and even a 
shepherd's sling has often proved more powerful 
than the spear of a giant. 



117 



I rejoice to find the confirmation of these sen- 
timents in the following noble language from a 
friend of Christian liberty abroad. " Though no 
one honors scholarship more, or has a profounder 
veneration for its functions, I yet declare, that 
Christianity is a religion for the people ; that 
Christ is manifested to the heart and soul of every 
man whom he attracts by heavenly sympathy ; 
that when not many wise, not many learned were 
called, the lowly, but honest in heart, recognised 
the divine brightness, and sat at the feet of Jesus, 
docile and rejoicing ; and I protest altogether 
against any learned aristocracy, any literary hie- 
rarchy, any priestly mediators having more of 
the true light that lighteth every man, than the 
humblest of their brethren, who has taken to his 
heart the free gift of God, and loves the Lord Je- 
sus with sincerity. — The rightful privileges of 
critics and scholars are large enough, and let no 
man disown them ; but I do disown this literary 
hierarchy arrogating to themselves sole access to 
the oracles of God, and limiting Christ's free ap- 
proach to the souls of the people to long pro- 
cesses of inferential reasonings, and the winding 
ways of a syllogism. I entreat them to stand aside, 
and let the living Jesus come into communication 
with the living heart, and not place themselves, 
like the multitude who threatened the blind beside 



118 



the way, between the ready mercy of the Heavenly 
Teacher and the humblest follower who seeks his 
face, that a ray of the light that shineth there may 
fall upon eager and wistful, though dimmed and 
earth-stained, eyes."* 

1 am admonished by the length of this letter, 
that it is time to bring my examination of your 
Discourse to a close, although there are several 
points on which I should gladly comment, that I 
have left untouched. I have probably said enough, 
however, to show that the exclusive doctrine 
which you advance is incapable of support ; and 
that the charge of infidelity against those Christ- 
ians, whose belief in revelation is not founded on 
evidence which you approve, was made without 
due consideration. I trust, also, that my remarks 
may tend to produce a deeper conviction of the 
value and power of the internal evidence of our 
religion; to satisfy the unlearned believer es- 
pecially, that the doubts cast by critical scholars 
on the foundation of his faith are unworthy of 
attention; that he is not following a " cunningly 
devised fable," when he holds to the divine origin 

# Christianity not the Property of Critics and Scholars, but the Gift 
of God to all Men. A Lecture, delivered in Paradise Street Chapel, 
Liverpool, by Rev. John Hamilton Thom. pp. 17, 20. 



119 



of the Gospel ; since he is an " eye-witness " of 
the " majesty " of Christ, and hears a voice from 
the " excellent glory " of his character, " This is 
my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." 

I might, accordingly, leave the subject in this 
place, trusting to the ingenuousness and good 
sense, which shall be brought to the perusal of 
my letter, for the formation of a correct judgment 
on the question that has been discussed. 

There are one or two topics, however, of a lit- 
erary and historical character, — which, though 
not immediately connected with the subject, are 
interesting not only to scholars, but to all who 
desire accurate information in regard to the pro- 
gress of opinion, — that I could not be excused 
for neglecting. 

You undertake to give some account of the 
religious opinions of Spinoza, Schleiermacher, 
and De Wette ; in this account you have fallen 
into several errors, which it is my duty to cor- 
rect. 

I commence with Spinoza, whom, in accord- 
ance with a traditional prejudice, you speak of 
as " a celebrated atheist." (p. 9.) This preju- 
dice was early circulated against Spinoza, as well 
as against his master, Descartes, on account of the 
freedom with which they examined received opin- 



120 



ions; it was cherished by bigoted and ignorant 
theologians ; the skeptic Bayle, in one of his fits 
of caprice, zealously upheld it ; mainly, I think, 
through his influence, has it come down to mod- 
ern times ; but there are few scholars, conversant, 
even in a slight degree, with philosophical stud- 
ies, that would now give it their sanction. 

You assert that ".to deny the atheism of Spi- 
noza, is merely to contend, that the word is not 
to be used in its common and established sense." 
(p. 45.) Now the very reverse of this statement, 
as I shall show, would express the truth. Spi- 
noza cannot be called an atheist, unless a mean- 
ing be given to the word which it does not 
usually bear. If you say that it is atheism, to 
call in question certain prevailing conceptions of 
the Deity, which agree with your own views, then 
was Spinoza an atheist ; otherwise, he was not. 
But this is not the sense attached to the word 
in common language. No usage will justify the 
application of the term atheist to a man, who be- 
lieves in the existence of God, though his notions 
of the Deity may differ from popular opinions, 
and though they be really defective and errone- 
ous. The Jewish nation certainly were not athe- 
ists, because they had not reached the Christian 
doctrine of a paternal God ; still less was the 
Jewish Spinoza an atheist, because he sought for 



121 



more elevated ideas of the Supreme Cause, than 
were taught by the sensual Rabbis in the syna- 
gogue of Amsterdam. 

According to the established use of language, 
in ordinary discourse, particularly in this coun- 
try, Spinoza was neither an atheist nor a pan- 
theist. 

By an atheist, is understood one who denies 
the existence of an Infinite, Original Cause, on 
whose power all finite beings depend. A man 
who admits this can, with no propriety, be called 
an atheist, whatever be his errors in other re- 
spects. Now the doctrine which lies at the foun- 
dation of Spinoza's system is the existence of an 
infinite, first cause ; not identical with visible na- 
ture, but superior to it, by the whole difference 
between the infinite and the finite ; who possesses 
intelligence and love ; whose nature is perfect, 
capable of being understood, so far as revealed to 
man, but in its infinite attributes, incomprehen- 
sible ; whose exhaustless energy is the ground of 
all finite existence ; who is manifested in the Uni- 
verse everywhere ; and in adoring and loving 
whom, man finds the highest blessedness of his 
soul. 

" I understand by God," says Spinoza, " the 
Infinite and Absolute Being, independent and self- 
existent, possessing infinite attributes, each one 
16 



122 



of which expresses his eternal and infinite es- 
sence." * 

" Whatever exists, exists in God, and without 
God nothing can exist, or be conceived of." f 

" God acts solely from the laws of his own na- 
ture, free from all external restraints." J 

" God is the permanent and indwelling cause 
of all things; not the transient and temporary 
cause." ^ 

" God is the efficient cause not only of the ex- 
istence of the Universe, but of its essence." || 

We thus see by quotations from his own writ- 
ings, that Spinoza, by no fair construction, can 
be liable to the accusation of atheism. It may be 
said, however, that if he maintains the existence 
of God, he deprives him of his essential attri- 
butes ; that if he be not an atheist, he is a pan- 
theist. 

By pantheism, in the sense in which that word 
is commonly used, though very improperly, is un- 
derstood the confounding of the Deity with the 
material universe. This doctrine represents God 
as a being devoid of intelligence, acting by me- 
chanical laws, and differing, in no respect, from 
the manifold whole which we call visible nature. 



# Opera, Ethica, pars i. def. 6. f Ibid. prop. xv. 

i Ibid. prop. xvii. § Ibid. prop, xviii. || Ibid. prop. xxv. 



123 



This is the view, I am told, that is held by some 
individuals who are regarded as atheists anions 
ourselves. It is a view which is vulgarly ascribed 
to Spinoza ; but without the slightest reason. In 
this sense, he was not a pantheist. The idle story 
which you quote from Le Clerc, that Meyer [not 
Mayer] induced Spinoza to substitute the word 
God for Nature, where the former now appears, 
is without foundation. Even if it had more satis- 
factory external evidence for its support, it would 
be contradicted by the whole spirit of Spinoza's 
writings. The substitution of the word Nature 
for God could not now be made without destroy- 
ing his system. You will perceive this from the 
following passages, which I cannot but think have 
escaped your notice. 

" My ideas of Nature and of God are indeed 
widely different from those defended by modern 
Christians. I maintain that God is the perma- 
nent and indwelling cause of all things, not the 
transient and temporary cause. All things, I say, 
are in God, and move in God ; this I affirm with 
Paul, and perhaps also with all the ancient philos- 
ophers, although not in their sense ; and I might 
even say, with all the ancient Hebrews, as far as 
can be conjectured from certain traditions, although 
variously corrupted. But as to the opinion of some 
persons, who think I have maintained the doc- 



124 



trine that God and Nature, (by which they un- 
derstand a certain mass, or corporeal matter,) are 
one and the same, — they are entirely out of the 
way, (tota errant via")* 

"Thought is one of the infinite attributes of 
God, which expresses his eternal and infinite es- 
sence, or God is a thinking being. This propo- 
sition is evident from the fact, that we can con- 
ceive of an infinite thinking being. For the 
more objects of thought are possessed by a think- 
ing being, the more reality and perfection do we 
conceive that being to possess ; the being, there- 
fore, who possesses infinite objects of thought, is 
necessarily infinite in the power of thinking. 
Since, then, by attending to thought alone, we 
conceive of an infinite being, thought is necessa- 
rily one of the infinite attributes of God."f 

" The intelligence and will which we should 
regard as constituting the essence of God, must 
differ entirely from human intelligence and will. 
The intelligence of God, so far as it is conceived 
as constituting the essence of God, is indeed the 
cause both of the essence and of the existence of 
the Universe. The intelligence of God, then, is 
the cause both of the essence and the existence 
of our intelligence; and must therefore differ 



* Opera, Epistola xxi. 



f Ethica, pars ii. prop. i. 



125 



from it, as that which is caused differs from its 
cause, namely, in that which it receives from its 
cause." * 

" God necessarily has the idea both of his own 
essence, and of every thing which necessarily fol- 
lows from his essence. The vulgar understand 
by the power of God an arbitrary will [liberam 
voluntatem, a will free from the everlasting laws 
of wisdom and justice], but we have shown that 
God acts with the same necessity [the same 
adherence to the laws of his own infinite nature] 
with which he knows himself ; that is, as it fol- 
lows from the necessity of the divine nature, that 
God should know himself, by the same necessity, 
it follows that he should act in an infinite variety 
of modes." f 

You will now perceive that Spinoza was not an 
atheist, in any sense ; nor a pantheist, in the 
sense in which that word is commonly used. He 
was a pantheist, in the philosophical sense only ; 
by this is meant, that he denied real, substantial 
existence to finite objects ; all apparent life is in 
truth the divine life ; " the fulness of Him, who 
filleth all in all " ; the spirit of his system is ex- 
pressed in the sublime Hebrew ascription, " Thou 
art, and beside thee there is none else." But no 



* Ethica, pars i. prop. xvii. 



f Ibid, pars i. prop. iii. 



126 



one, who understands the subject, will accuse this 
doctrine of an irreligious tendency. It is religious 
even to mysticism ; on that account, as well as 
for certain philosophical objections, it labors un- 
der, I cannot adopt it, as a theory of the Universe ; 
but I trust I shall never cease to venerate the holy 
and exalted spirit of its author, who, in the meek 
simplicity of his life, the transparent beauty of his 
character, and the pure devotion with which he 
wooed truth, even as a bride, stands almost " alone 
and unapproached " among men. 

You may possibly imagine that my respect for 
the personal virtues of Spinoza has betrayed me 
into an erroneous view of the character of his 
system. It may be worth while, therefore, to for- 
tify my statements by a reference to some of the 
principal authorities in the authentic history of 
opinions. 

" That Spinoza was no atheist," says Herder, 
" appears from every page of his writings. The 
idea of God is to him the first and the last ; nay, 
the single idea, with which he connects the know- 
ledge of Nature and of the Universe, the con- 
sciousness of himself and of every thing around 
him, and his system of Ethics and Politics. With- 
out the conception of God, his soul is nothing, 
and can do nothing, not even conceive of itself. 
It seems strange and almost incomprehensible to 



127 



him, how men could have regarded God, only as 
a consequence, as it were, of other truths, nay, 
of sensible observation, since all truth, no less 
than all existence, is derived from an eternal, self- 
subsisting truth, from the Infinite and Eternal ex- 
istence of God. This conception is cherished by 
Spinoza, with such an inward and vital earnest- 
ness, that I should esteem him rather an enthusiast 
for the existence of God, than a doubter or de- 
nier of it. In the knowledge and love of God, 
he places all the perfection, virtue, and happiness 
of man ; and that this is no mask, but the convic- 
tion of the philosopher, is shown by his letters, I 
might indeed say, by the smallest fragment of his 
philosophical system, by every line that he has 
written. He may, it is true, have erred in his 
idea of God ; but how readers of his works could 
say, that he has denied the idea of God, and 
maintained atheism, is utterly incomprehensi- 
ble." * 

" The system of Spinoza," says Tennemann, 
one of the soundest thinkers that ever wrote on 
the history of philosophy, " according to the spirit 
and purpose of its author, is not atheism, although 
at first it was regarded as such by most of his ad- 

* Herder's Gott, Werke, vol. ix. pp. 132, 133. 



128 



versaries, rather from personal hatred than from 
insight into his character."* 

" That Spinoza's system," says Rixner, a later 
writer of a different school, " according to the 
peculiar view of its author, is not a system of 
atheism, is evident." f 

" The system of Spinoza," says Francke, one 
of his ablest critics, " cannot be called atheism. 
The atheist denies an intelligent cause of the 
Universe. Spinoza asserts the existence of an 
indwelling cause of the Universe, to whom he 
attributes infinite thought." J 

" With all the defects of his system," says 
Krause, " Spinoza cannot be designated as an 
atheist, a teacher of no God, nor as a pantheist, 
(if by pantheism, we mean the doctrine that the 
world itself, considered as the sum total of finite 
things is God) ; besause God is to him the princi- 
ple and the only substantial ground of all science ; 
and absolutely nothing finite is God."^ 

" It is clear," says Krug, a writer who never 
hesitates to give a hard name where there is just 
occasion, " that Spinoza cannot be numbered 

# Tennemann's Grundriss, (Wendt's Ed.) p. 379. 
f Rixner's Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 79. 
J Franc ke's Versuch uber die neuern Schicksale des Spinozismus, 
p. 22. 

§ Krause's Grundwahrheilen der Wissenschqft, p. 339. 



129 



among atheists, either practical or theoretical. 
For he does not deny the existence of God, but, 
on the contrary, expressly acknowledges God as 
an intelligent being, and the cause of all things. 
The question between him and his adversaries, 
many of whom were far below him both intellec- 
tually and morally, turns on a speculative point, 
namely, Is God the permanent and indwelling 
cause, or the transient and temporary cause of the 
universe ? Every answer given to this question 
involves our limited understanding in inextricable 
difficulties. In a practical point of view, accord- 
ingly, we may prefer one answer to another. But 
because a man has a different opinion from our- 
selves on this question, we ought not to call him 
an atheist. This is always uncharitable, and indi- 
cates a heart which itself is not yet penetrated 
with the spirit of true religion."* 

The authority of the most eminent living 
French writers on the history of philosophy is on 
the same side. 

" Instead of accusing Spinoza of atheism," 
says Cousin, " we ought rather to bring the con- 
trary reproach ; " namely, that of allowing sub- 
stantial and real existence to God alone, and " re- 
garding man and nature as mere phenomena."! 



# Krug's Encyklopddisch-philosophisches Lexicon, vol. iii. p. 836. 
f Cousin, Histoire de la Philosophies vol. i. pp. 465, 466. 

17 



130 



" So far from being an atheist, as has been 
pretended, Spinoza has such a deep sense of the 
existence of God, that he loses all sense of the 
existence of man. This temporary and limited 
existence, like every thing finite, appeared to him 
unworthy the name of existence ; and in his sight 
there is no true, substantial being, but the Eter- 
nal Being. His book, all bristling as it is with 
geometrical formulas, so dry and repulsive in its 
style, is, in fact, a mystic hyrnn, an ejaculation of 
the soul towards the Being, who alone is author- 
ized to say I am that I am. Spinoza is a Persian 
Sufi, an enthusiastic monk ; and the author whom 
this reputed atheist most resembles is the unknown 
author of ' The Imitation of Jesus Christ.' " * 

" It may be supposed," says Jouffroy, " that it 
follows from the first principles of this system, 
that the Universe is God, or that God is the 
aggregate of existing things. Not so. Spinoza 
decidedly rejects this idea. The thought of God 
has the property not only of representing all his 
other attributes and their modes, but also of rep- 
resenting itself. God, in other words, has, for the 
object of thought, not only his own essence, and 
every thing which proceeds from it, but also his 

* Cousin, Fragments PhiLosophiques, (3d Edit.) vol. ii. pp. 164, 
165, 166. 



131 



thought itself. Otherwise his ideas would be less 
comprehensive than his nature, and he would be 
ignorant of one of his own attributes, namely, in- 
telligence. The divine thought, accordingly, is 
conscious of itself, and its modifications, as it 
knows all the other attributes of God."* 

We thus see to what extent your account of 
Spinoza can be relied on. Let us now pass to 
your remarks concerning Schleiermacher. 

You represent Schleiermacher, as one of " the 
most noted of the modern German school of infi- 
delity," as a pantheist, as a denier of the immor- 
tality of the soul, and as an admirer of Spinoza, 
(pp. 43, 44.) The latter charge need not be set 
aside, for the disinterested tribute of one original 
man to another is always gratifying, and speaks 
well for the character of both. You attempt to 
support your allegations by the citation of detach- 
ed passages from one of Schleiermacher's earli- 
est writings, without the qualifications which 
guard them where they stand, and without any 
reference to his subsequent productions, in which 
his theological views are more fully and distinctly 
expressed. In this way, you have presented an 
erroneous idea of his position as a theologian, 

# JouFFRoy, Droit Naiarel, vol. i. pp. 170, 172. 



132 



and treated with injustice the character of one of 
the most sincere and exemplary men, who have 
ever devoted their lives to the service of truth. 

In the first place, you speak of the work to 
which you refer, as containing " an elaborate sys- 
tem," " drawn out " for the purpose of exhibiting 
the conceptions of the author in regard to Chris- 
tianity. This is a misapprehension of the design 
of the book. An accurate knowledge of the lite- 
rary history of the period, in which it was written, 
would have prevented the mistake. The " Dis- 
courses on Religion 99 were not intended to pre- 
sent a system of theology. They are highly rhe- 
torical in their manner, filled with bursts of im- 
passioned eloquence, always intense and some- 
times extravagant, addressed to the feelings, not 
to speculation, and expressly disclaiming all pre- 
tensions to an exposition of doctrine. They 
were published at a time when hostility to reli- 
gion, and especially to Christianity as a divine 
revelation, was deemed a proof of talent and re- 
finement. The influence of the church was near- 
ly exhausted ; the highest efforts of thought were 
of a destructive character ; a frivolous spirit per- 
vaded society; religion was deprived of its su- 
premacy ; and a " starveling theology " was 
exalted in the place of the living word. Schlei- 
ermacher could not contemplate the wretched 



133 



meagerness and degradation of his age, without 
being moved as by " a heavenly impulse." His 
spirit was stirred within him as he saw men turn- 
ing from the true God to base idols. He felt him- 
self impelled to go forth, with the power of a 
fresh and youthful enthusiasm, for the restoration 
of religion ; to present it in its most sublime as- 
pect, free from its perversions, disentangled from 
human speculation, as founded in the essential 
nature of man, and indispensable to the complete 
unfolding of his inward being. In order to re- 
cognise every thing which is really religion among 
men, and to admit even the lowest degrees of it 
into the idea of religion, he wished to make this 
as broad and comprehensive in its character as 
possible.* " Religion," says Coleridge, " in its 
widest sense, signifies the act and habit of rever- 
encing the Invisible, as the highest both in our- 
selves and in nature." It is in this sense that the 
word religion is used throughout the " Discour- 
ses ; " and nothing, accordingly, could have been 
further from the author's intention, than to pre- 
sent any thing like an elaborate or complete sys- 
tem of speculative doctrine. He addresses him- 
self to the educated men of Germany, not with a 

# See Lucre's Erinnerungen, translated in the Christian Exami- 
ner, vol. xx. pp. 17, 18. 



134 



view to gain their assent to a theological creed, 
but to touch the springs of their better nature, 
to rebuke their proud disdain of divine things, 
and, like the great moral poet of England, 

To arouse the sensual from their sleep 
Of Death, and win the vacant and the vain 
To noble raptures. 

" I know," says he, " that it is quite as little 
your custom to honor the Deity in the holy still- 
ness of retirement, as to frequent his deserted 
temples. I know that in your decorated dwell- 
ings no other sacred things are to be found, than 
the wise oracles . of our sages, and the glorious 
creations of our artists ; that society and humani- 
ty, science and art, so far as you deem them 
worthy of your attention, have so completely en- 
grossed your minds, as to leave no room for the 
Eternal and Infinite One, who exists for you be- 
yond the limits of the visible world. I know how 
admirably you have succeeded in giving such a 
rich and comprehensive culture to the present 
earthly life, that you appear to have no need of 
Eternity ; that having created a Universe for your- 
selves, you are now absolved from thinking of him 
who created you. Of all these things I am per- 
fectly sensible. And yet, commanded by an in- 
ward and irresistible necessity, I feel constrained 



to speak, as by an impulse from on high. I can- 
not take back my request, that you above all oth- 
ers should hear what I have to say." * "I main- 
tain that piety is the necessary and spontaneous 
product of the depths of every elevated nature ; 
that it possesses a rightful claim to a peculiar 
province in the soul, over which it may exercise 
an unlimited sovereignty ; that it is worthy, by its 
intrinsic power, to be a source of life to the most 
noble and exalted minds ; and that, from its essen- 
tial character, it deserves to be known and re- 
ceived by them. These are the points which I 
defend, and which I would fain establish. I 
leave it with you to decide, whether it be worth 
your while to listen to me, before you are still 
more strengthened in your contempt for relig- 
ion."! 

Such an undertaking would almost of necessity 
preclude all systematic theological discussion. 
We find, accordingly, that this is the case. Still, 
you charge the author with denying the doctrine 
both of a personal God and of personal immor- 
tality. You were probably led into this error by 
failing to notice the object of the work, which 
was not to examine the truth or falsehood of any 
abstract conceptions, but to show that so far as 



* Reden uber die Religion, pp. 1, 2. 



t Ibid. p. 25. 



136 



they were merely speculative, limited to the 
sphere of science, without influence on the feel- 
ings, they were not essential to the life of re- 
ligion within the soul. The popular representa- 
tions of God and of immortality present difficul- 
ties to every reflecting mind ; they are founded, to 
a great extent, on the analogy of human rela- 
tions ; it has always been an important problem 
to separate between the true and the false in these 
representations ; for my own part, I cannot con- 
ceive of a thoughtful, religious man, in our day, 
whom this problem has not exercised ; nor can I 
believe that one who comprehends the subject will 
make any specific solution indispensable to true 
piety. This is a prominent view in Schleierma- 
cher's " Discourse." It was his aim to show that 
the essence of religion is independent of specula- 
tion ; that the heart is its seat, not the head ; that 
we need not by " searching to find out God, to 
understand the Almighty to perfection," before 
we can " worship him in spirit and truth." " The 
accusation of pantheism," says Liicke, " has been 
urged against Schleiermacher principally on ac- 
count of these c Discourses,' often in a thought- 
less spirit, but sometimes with reflection and se- 
riousness. The appearance, nay, here and there 
a decided expression, is certainly against him. 
But he only, who overlooks the peculiar object and 



137 



position of the " Discourses " in relation to their 
times, and confounds their merely external and 
adventitious details with their central principles ; 
who regards as pantheism every profound and 
inward apprehension of the indissoluble connex- 
ion between God and the Universe, which exists 
in the religious nature, and prefers every chilling 
and mechanical view of the world as destitute of 
the agency of the living God to any softening and 
enlargement of his rigid and exclusive notions, 
can believe that pantheism was Schleiermacher's 
genuine and permanent opinion. At least, after 
what he has said himself in explanation of this 
subject in the third edition, it is impossible to 
repeat the charge without wilful unkindness." * 

I regret that the explanations referred to are 
of such a length as to forbid their insertion in 
this place. It may be seen, however, from the 
following extract, that the conceptions which 
Schleiermacher renounces as essential to religion, 
are only those which are taken from human and 
earthly relations, and which consequently pervert 
every spiritual idea of God and immortality. " As 
the conception of the human personality of God 
usually presupposes a consciousness that is not 

* Erinnerungen, translated in the Christian Examiner, vol. xx. 
p. 18. 

18 



138 



morally pure, the same thing may be assumed in 
the conception of immortality, which represents 
it after the manner of the Elysian fields, only as a 
new earth of greater beauty and extent. And as 
we must admit an essential difference between the 
inability to form such a human and personal 
conception of God, and the denial of the exist- 
ence of a Living God, — which last alone can be 
designated as atheism ; in like manner, he who 
does not incline to such a material conception 
of immortality, is very far from discarding the 
genuine hope of immortality. And as we may 
call every man religious, who believes in a Living 
God, we may also call every one religious, who 
believes in the Everlasting Life of the Soul, 
without wishing to define the way or the manner, 
in which it must be conceived." * 

We come now to a still more extraordinary 
error, which arose probably from the habit, too 
prevalent among us, of grouping , together theolo- 
gians who have scarce any thing in common, but 
the language in which they write. You class 
Schleiermacher with the modern German school, 
whose disciples are called Rationalists or Natural- 
ists, (pp. 43, 45.) Now although Schleiermacher 
attempted to modify the old Lutheran theology, 



* Reden, p. 141. 



139 



on several important points, he was a strenuous 
advocate of the supernatural origin of Christiani- 
ty ; his whole life was a controversy against the 
Rationalist school; and his works are supposed 
to have contributed more than any thing else to 
its decline. If a foreign writer were to describe 
the celebrated Dr. Beecher, as one of " the most 
noted " of the Unitarian school in New-England, 
because he has been thought to question some of 
the principles of the prevailing orthodoxy, it would 
not be a more whimsical mistake, than to place 
Schleiermacher among the leaders of a party with 
which he sustained only the relation of uncom- 
promising hostility. "It is perfectly easy," says 
Rohr, the most distinguished Rationalist preach- 
er now living, " to comprehend the hatred of 
Schleiermacher and his school to Rationalism, the 
hereditary enemy of such a system as his." * "If 
the deistical Rationalism of the earlier schools of 
theology," says the orthodox Lucke, " has ever 
suffered prostration, it has suffered it from the 
great work of Schleiermacher, entitled ' Doctrines 
of the Christian Faith.' Much that professes to 
be a decided victory over it, it could have over- 
come, but it will never recover from the deadly 
wound, which has been inflicted on it, by the 



* Krit. Prcd. Bib., vol. xix. p. 852. 



140 



truly rational, but not rationalistic Dogmatics of 
Schleiermacher." * 

The theological views of Schleiermacher are 
little known in this country. His writings present 
no attractions for the superficial reader; they 
cannot be understood without profound reflection ; 
but they are well worth the attention of our stu- 
dious young men. If any are inclined to German 
Rationalism, they will here find a corrective ; and 
it was probably with these convictions, that so 
much importance has been attached to the opin- 
ions of Schleiermacher by Professor Stuart of 
Andover, and by Dr. Leonard Woods, jr., late 
Professor at Bangor, now President of Bowdoin 
College. Those eminent scholars and theologians 
are, perhaps, better qualified to pronounce a cor- 
rect judgment on the character and tendencies of 
German theology, than any other individuals in 
this country. They have made it the object of ex- 
tensive and systematic study ; their knowledge of 
it is not confined to imperfect information ob- 
tained from Encyclopaedias and Reviews; and 
their ability to survey it as a whole leads them to 
form an accurate estimate of its separate portions. 
No one can suspect them of attachment to Ration- 

* Erinnerungen, translated in the Christian Examiner, vol. xx. 
p. 31. 



141 



alism ; on the contrary, they have been faithful 
and earnest in pointing out its character, and op- 
posing its influence ; but it is through their means 
chiefly, that Schleiermacher has been brought be- 
before the notice of the community ; they have 
found in his opinions a support of the orthodox 
faith. At the same time, they have encouraged 
an acquaintance with German theological writers 
of different schools ; no idle terrors have scared 
them away from the pursuit of truth ; and their 
hearty and scholarlike liberality in this respect 
may rebuke those of us, who, with greater pre- 
tensions to freedom, have been less consistent in 
its exercise. The same spirit prevails at the 
Theological Seminary, which has long borne the 
reproach of being firmly anchored to a stationary 
theology. Widely as 1 dissent from the doctrinal 
creeds of that Institution, I cannot but recognise, 
with joy and honor, the spirit of Christian liberty, 
which suggested such language as follows. " We 
believe," say two of the Andover Professors in a 
recent publication, " that some among us are 
troubled over much about the speculative notions 
of the day. It is well to be cautious, — not so 
well to be in a fright. It is a good thing to give 
heed lest the spirit of our religion be circum- 
scribed or expelled ; but it is needless to raise a 
panic because one man prefers this mode and 



142 



another that of explaining the one faith. Let not 
the grasshopper become a burden to us, while we 
are so young a people. — Let us see how men 
good and true are now speculating in foreign 
climes, and we shall be convinced that the sky- 
does not close in with the earth four or five miles 
from the spot where we happen to stand, however 
central that spot may be. There are things in the 
world that we have never yet heard of." * 

According to Schleiermacher, the revelation of 
God in nature, and in the human soul, is only a 
preparation for a perfect revelation through Christ. 
The purpose of God in the creation of man is 
completed in the Christian revelation. This is a 
new, original communication of divine truth, a 
fresh manifestation of the divine life in the per- 
son and works of Jesus Christ. He is appointed 
by God to be the Redeemer of the world ; hence 
he needed not redemption himself; and, agree- 
ably to the universal doctrine of the Church, was 
originally distinguished from all other men, and 
endowed with divine power from his birth.f 

The opinions of the school founded by Schleier- 
macher concerning Rationalism and Supernatural- 

* Selections from German Literature, by B. B. Edwards and E. A. 
Park, pp. 11, 12. 
f See Christliche Glaube, vol. i. chap. i. sect. ii. 
See also Ratze's Erlduterungen, pp. 113-118. 



143 



ism can hardly be better expressed than in the 
following passage from Ullmann.* 

* Ullmann, one of the most independent, moderate, and discrimina- 
ting followers of Schleiermacher, I rejoice to perceive, is beginning 
to attract the attention of theologians in this country. He richly 
deserves to be studied, and cannot but exert a purifying influence 
on every mind conversant with his writings. The views, which he 
maintains with admirable clearness and strength in the Treatise 
entitled " The Sinless Character of Jesus," (translated in the " Se- 
lections from German Literature," by Professors Edwards and Park,) 
are adapted to convince many of the truth of Christianity, whom 
the external evidences, so called, have no power to affect. I can- 
not resist the temptation to introduce here, though somewhat out of 
place, the following exposition of the value of the argument from 
miracles, as held by the school of Schleiermacher. " The nature 
of the case and the necessities of their contemporaries fully justified 
the Apostles in proving the divine mission and the Messiahship of 
Jesus by the argument from miracles and prophecy. But the ne- 
cessity of the times and of individuals may in this respect vary ; and 
although the Gospel in its essence always remains the same, and 
contains eternal, unchangeable truth, yet in a different age, a differ- 
ent method of proof may lead more immediately to the acknowledg- 
ment of this truth. In our own time, it seems proper to fix our 
eyes especially on the spiritual character of Jesus, in order to obtain 
satisfactory proof of the divinity of his mission and instructions ; 
not because the Apostolical mode of proof has become untenable, 
but because this other mode has a more vital efficacy on account 
of the style of education prevalent, at the present day. We live 
among contemporaries to whom miracles are more a ground of doubt 
than of faith ; we should not forget that the proof from miracles exerts 
its full power, properly speaking, on none but the eye-witnesses of 
them, and conducts us to the desired conclusion only by a circuitous 
path. On the other hand, a vivid apprehension of the inward char- 
acter of Jesus brings us nearer to the operative centre of Christi- 



144 



" Supernaturalism in its exclusive character, 
particularly as it has heretofore been exhibited, 
regards revelation as an isolated, historical fact, 
attested by prophecies and miracles, contained in 

anity, and at the same time, makes us feel the influence of the 
moral power, which goes forth from that centre. Here faith in 
Jesus rests immediately on himself; it is free, spiritual confidence 
in his person." Professor Park's Translation, pp. 39], 392. 

I subjoin the remarks of the Translator, to which I would invite 
the reader's special attention. It is gratifying, I confess, to find 
so decided a confirmation of the doctrine, which has been reproach- 
ed as infidelity, from a source which, I presume, labors under no 
such suspicion. 

" The argument from miracles," says Professor Park, " is not the 
kind of proof to which the majority of cordial believers in the Bible 
are, at the present day, most attached. They have neither the time 
nor the ability to form an estimate of the historical evidence, that 
favors or opposes the actual occurrence of miracles. They know 
the Bible to be true, because they feel it to be so. The excellence 
of its morality, like a magnet, attracts their souls ; and sophistry, 
which they cannot refute, will not weaken their faith, resulting as it 
does from the accordance of their higher nature with the 
spirit of the Bible. The internal argument in favor of Chris- 
tianity is also recommended by its moral influence. The full ex- 
hibition of it is a melting appeal to the heart; and as the heart 
becomes the more susceptible, the argument becomes the more con- 
vincing. With the unlettered Christian, then, the moral evidence 
for the Bible is the more effectual, because the more simple ; with 
the educated Christian it is so, because the more dignified. It may 
be questioned, indeed, whether the argument from miracles is not 
logically dependent, for its complete force, on its CONNEXION 
with the argument from the moral nature of Christianity" — Se- 
lections from German Literature, p. 454. 



145 



an infallible form, in the Scriptures, from which 
its truths are to be derived, merely by the appli- 
cation of historical and grammatical interpreta- 
tion and the rules of logic. Its defect is, that it 
teaches a revelation, which was made merely as 
a mechanical system, (Deus ex machina,) desti- 
tute of any vital connexion with nature and his- 
tory, nay, in decided opposition to both ; which 
contradicts reason, or at least is so foreign to it, 
that the province of reason in the appropriation 
and working up of its truths is merely formal; 
that reason at most can establish the reality of 
inspiration and revelation, but can by no means 
make out the inward truth of that which is re- 
vealed, or which proceeds from inspiration. 

" Rationalism, on the other hand, in its exclu- 
sive character, rejects the belief in an immediate, 
divine revelation in general ; and substitutes rea- 
son in its place, as the only essential source of 
knowledge; but allows to historical revelation, 
so far as it admits the name, the only merit of 
introducing the most important truths of reason, 
and collecting an ecclesiastical community for 
their support. Its defect is, that it knows noth- 
ing of a divine revelation, in the full sense of the 
word ; that regarding Christianity only as an his- 
torical, human, natural phenomenon, it denies its 
divine origin, and strips it of its highest dignity ; 
19 



146 

that, taking for granted, without just grounds, the 
perfect soundness and absolute sufficiency of rea- 
son, in its present state, and often confounding 
it with the lower faculty of the understanding, it 
makes it the only source of divine knowledge, and 
the ultimate arbiter in matters of faith. 

" Both systems, in this form, have evidently pro- 
duced injurious effects ; the former has reduced 
theology to an external and unscientific charac- 
ter, and converted the examination of doctrines 
into the criticism of words; the latter has de- 
prived Christianity of its intrinsic character, treat- 
ed its history in an arbitrary manner, and failed 
to satisfy the wants of faith and of the deeper 
religious feelings. But we must also allow to 
each system its peculiar merits. Supernatural- 
ism has guarded the essential truths of Christ- 
ianity ; Rationalism has maintained the rights of 
scientific investigation ; we owe to the former, 
that, without a total interruption of scientific pro- 
gress, we are returning to a more complete recog- 
nition of the characteristic truths of Christianity, 
and of the historical elements of religion in gen- 
eral ; we owe to the latter, that the faith in reve- 
lation, which is now forming in theology, must 
necessarily be scientific, conscious of the internal 
truth of the doctrines which it accepts. 

" But we must make a broad distinction be- 



147 



tween Rationalism, as a merely temporary system, 
and rationality, as the subjection to reason, and 
the constitutive essence of science. In like man- 
ner, we must make a broad distinction between 
Supernaturalism, as a temporary form, and the 
faith in revelation which is essential to Christian- 
ity, and which cannot be separated from it, but 
with the loss of its fundamental characteristics." 

A sound theology, according to Schleiermacher 
and Ullmann, must combine all that is valuable 
in both systems, reject their exclusive and extrav- 
agant tendencies of each, and thus obtain a higher 
view of divine truth, than was presented by either 
doctrine in itself. The manner in which this is 
to be accomplished will appear from what fol- 
lows. "The true medium, which results from 
the process of reconciliation, is not merely the 
general negation of error, or a spectral indiffer- 
ence between the extremes ; not ? any thing ab- 
stract or barren ; but a positive reception of the 
whole truth, and the most complete development 
of it on every side. The highest and most com- 
prehensive truth of the divine life in the soul of 
man reposes in Christ. He in his complete per- 
sonality, divine and human at once, in the un- 
troubled, undiminished fulness of his being, is, in 
the highest sense, the true medium, the mediator 
between Divinity and Humanity, the central point 



148 



of the world's history, the exhaustless fountain of 
all progressive spiritual life ; he, who is made to 
us not only redemption, but wisdom ; in whom 
God not only was, and reconciled the world to 
himself, but who also, revealing the divine light 
and life, could say of himself, 1 1 am the truth, 
which maketh free ; I am the light of the world, 
and he that followeth me shall not walk in dark- 
ness.' " * 

Such is the design and endeavor of what may 
be called the leading school in modern German 
theology. The impression of the powerful genius 
of Schleiermacher is every where visible on its 
character ; but it includes no servile disciples ; it 
combines men of free minds, who respect each 
other's efforts, whatever may be their individual 
conclusions ; and the central point at which they 
meet is the acknowledgment of the divine char- 
acter of Christ, the divine origin of his religion, 
and its adaptation to be the faith of the world, 
when presented in a form corresponding with its 
inherent spirit, and with the scientific culture of 
the present age. There are few persons who 
would venture to charge such a school with the 
promulgation of infidelity; there are many, I 

* See Ullmann's Vber Partei and Schide, in Stud, und Krit. 
vol. i. 1836. 



149 



doubt not, who will welcome its principles, as 
soon as they are understood, as the vital, profound, 
and ennobling theology, which they have earnest- 
ly sought for, but hitherto sought in vain. 

I would gladly pass over, without comment, the 
notices you have given of De Wette. They need 
no critical exposure to show to every German 
scholar the propriety of the authoritative tone, 
in which you speak of German theology. And 
never is it a grateful task to diminish the confi- 
dence which may be reposed in a teacher, by 
those with whom the expression of his opinion 
has the weight of an oracle. The accuracy and 
fairness of a scholar are too tender points to be 
even lightly touched, though they may be subject 
to well-founded suspicion, unless there be an im- 
perative reason, almost amounting to necessity, 
to forego the scruples of delicacy, and sacrifice 
reserve to justice. If, therefore, I consulted my 
own feelings alone, I should leave those notices in 
silence. If they were merely the errors of frailty, 
and not sins of presumption, I could not prevail 
on myself to point out their character. 

But when you discuss elaborate works in a few 
lines, with the pretension of superior knowledge ; 
when you charge those, who find " meaning " 
and sense in favorite writers, with u vague and in- 



150 



consistent conceptions ; " when you accuse one 
of the most illustrious theologians of the age with 
" unformed notions " and " incoherent ideas ; " 
when you venture to intimate that one of the 
noblest and purest of men is guilty of deception 
and folly ; it is necessary to remind you that by 
such personalities you injure yourself; and that 
the absurdities, which you present as the opinions 
of De Wette, are due not to the author, but to 
his translator. 

Your quotations from De Wette contain nearly 
twenty-one lines ; your translation of those twenty- 
one lines contains fourteen errors. Some of these 
errors pervert the sense of the original ; others are 
merely ludicrous ; all, such as even a superficial 
acquaintance with the language might have pre- 
vented. A knowledge of German is no merit ; but 
the want of it in those who undertake to expound 
German theology is an inconvenience. Your 
decisions on this subject will, no doubt, be respect- 
ed by the community, according to their value. 

I need not go over these errors individually ; 
philology is not my present subject ; I will allude 
to those only which make De Wette assert what 
he would himself disclaim. 

According to your translation, De Wette says, 
" that the main business of his theological life has 
been the establishment of the idea, that the es- 



151 



sence of what is proposed for religious faith is 
not in propositions which are objects of knowledge, 
but in a pious apprehension of things, purified and 
enlightened by knowledge." 

It is not surprising, that " the shadowy meaning 
of this sentence should escape in any attempt to 
grasp it." 

De Wette, however, who, for a German, is a 
singularly perspicuous writer, expresses himself 
with sufficient clearness in the original. He says 
that theology has been too much under the influ- 
ence of scholastic metaphysics; that it has been 
made to consist in abstract systems of philosophy, 
rather than in the exposition of religious ideas ; 
and that " its essence is not in scientific proposi- 
tions (wissenschaftlichen Satzen,) but in the pious 
consciousness, purified and enlightened by the in- 
fluence of science, (in dem wissenschaftlich gere- 
inigten und erleuchteten frommen Bewusstseyn.") 

To assert that a sound theology should express, 
in a systematic form, the ideas which are at the 
foundation of personal religious experience, is 
very different from saying, " that its essence is 
not in propositions which are objects of know- 
ledge" 

You make De Wette say, that " we should not 
rest the truth of Christian faith, as if it were a 
duty to do so, on common, naked, historical 
truth." 



152 



De Wette actually says, that " we should not 
rest the truth of Christian faith on common, naked, 
historical truth, as if it were a legal title, (etwa 
wie ein Recht ; ") or as he had said a few pages 
before, " the historical faith of Christians, accord- 
ing to the old system, rests on the Bible, as its 
source, very much as the common civil law is 
founded on the Corpora Juris." He opposes this 
literal, mechanical adherence to the words of his- 
tory, as if they were to be construed with the 
formal precision of a legal code ; and no critical 
student of the New Testament, I presume, will 
differ from him in this opinion. 

You make De Wette say, that " theology should 
renounce, what has hitherto been customary, the 
poor and unscientific appeal to miraculous evi- 
dence." 

De Wette actually says, that " theology should 
renounce the miserable and unscientific mode of 
conducting the argument from miracles, that has 
hitherto been usual, (die bisher gewohnliche so 
kleinliche und unwissenschaftliche Fuhrung des 
Wunderbeweises.") 

You make him say, that the argument from 
miracles should be renounced ; he actually says, 
that it should not be conducted in the miserable 
and unscientific mode that has been usual. The 
importance of this is deeply felt by many theolo- 



153 



gians beside De Wette. Still they value the 
miracles, when presented in their true light. They 
would not renounce all appeal to the evidence 
derived from them. Neither would De Wette. 
His writings are full of examples to show the 
power with which the Divinity of Christ is illus- 
trated by his miracles. 

You make De Wette say, that " the last office 
of an improved theology is to make the might 
of the community of Christians again effective, 
and to plant faith in living power in the living 
life." 

De Wette actually says, that " an improved 
theology should restore the importance of Christian 
communion, (mache wieder Wichtigkeit der christ- 
lichen Gemeinschaft geltend,) and plant faith in 
its vital power in actual life, (in lebendiger Kraft 
in das lebendige Leben.") 

The ordinances of the Church have fallen into 
unmerited neglect ; an improved theology would 
give them a new significance ; excite a deeper 
interest in their observance ; and restore them to 
their place in the concerns of life, and the affec- 
tions of Christians. This is a favorite idea with 
De Wette, and one surely which calls for no very 
severe condemnation. 

I ought not, perhaps, to leave this topic, with- 
out showing the injustice you have been guilty of, 
20 



154 



in classing De Wette with the Naturalist School. 
To do this, I should need only to adduce passages 
from almost any one of his writings ; but I am 
spared the task, by the careful and discriminating 
account of De Wette's theology, which is already 
before the public in one of our religious Jour- 
nals.* 

I have now expressed some of the thoughts and 
feelings, which the perusal of your Discourse has 
awakened. I have used great plainness of speech, 
for I knew that it was demanded by the cause 
which 1 have at heart. If, in any of my remarks, 
I have been betrayed into a vehemence unsuited 
to the grave importance of the subject, I beg that 
it may be ascribed not to zeal for any private 
opinions, but to a wakeful jealousy for the honor 
of liberal Christianity, for the rights of Protestant 
freedom, and for the interests of good learning 
and a progressive theology. I need not say that 
I have no desire to impart my own speculative 
convictions to your mind, or to any other, except 
so far as they shall appear to be true in the light 

* See Christian Examiner, vol. xxiv. pp. 137 - 171 ; vol. xxv. pp. 
1-23. The author despatches the part of the subject alluded to 
above with commendable brevity. " Some writers persist in calling 
De Wette a Naturalist. There is no doctrine that he more strongly 
opposes than Naturalism." 



155 



of the fullest, freest, and most independent in- 
quiry. A dead level of uniform opinions must be 
dreaded by every earnest seeker of truth ; no 
man has the whole, but each a part, of reality ; 
and a friendly comparison of ideas from different 
points of observation, as it is the most delightful 
mental exercise, is also the most certain means of 
avoiding error, and of building up a comprehen- 
sive faith on a strong foundation. If your Dis- 
course had contained nothing but a manly and 
temperate defence of your peculiar opinions, how- 
ever exceptionable they may be, I should not have 
felt called upon to question their truth ; they 
might safely have been submitted to the judg- 
ment of an intelligent community, which is more 
disposed to examine ideas, than to take them on 
trust ; but when, in your attachment to an uncer- 
tain theory, you lose sight of the basis of our 
Christian union, and advance principles which 
have been repudiated by our churches, which are 
at war with the spirit of society among us, and 
which threaten, if carried into effect, to dis- 
organize and confound our dearest religious in- 
stitutions, I have found it impossible to keep 
silence. It seemed to me that, if even the hum- 
blest friend of religious freedom should hold his 
peace, the very stones would cry out. 



156 



In regard to the denunciation, towards the 
close of your Discourse, which you have skilfully 
couched in the form of a solemn warning or ap- 
peal, there is but one opinion, I am sure, which 
any just mind, that understands its import and 
application, can cherish. I have only a single re- 
mark to offer concerning it. It was out of place. 
It should have been addressed to the congrega- 
tions of those " treacherous," " pretended Christ- 
ian teachers, who disbelieve the divine origin and 
authority of Christianity, and would undermine 
the belief of others," since they do not receive 
Christianity on the evidence which you prescribe 
as " probable." Sir, those teachers do not ac- 
knowledge your authority. If, as you broadly 
intimate, " the fear of God and the awful realities 
of the future world " have no influence over them, 
they cannot be expected " to stop short in their 
course " at your bidding. They will not obey 
your commands. You cannot succeed with them. 
You must go to their congregations. You must 
appeal to those among whom they live, who know 
them and who are known of them. You must 
tell those, in the service of whose souls they have 
grown gray, that the pastor, who breaks to them 
the bread of life, is an infidel ; that the friend, 
who has wept with them in their grief, and re- 
joiced in their joy, is a hypocrite ; that the teach- 



157 



er, who has directed their inquiries, resolved their 
doubts, quickened their intellect, given a new im- 
pulse to their moral nature, and ever pointed 
them to the cross of Christ as the hope of the 
world, is a blind guide, believing nothing himself, 
and destroying the faith of his flock. If you can 
persuade their congregations that your exclusive 
doctrine is correct, they are bound to sever the 
ties which unite them to their pastors ; to surren- 
der the freedom which they have long enjoyed ; 
to return to the old order of things ; to cease to 
judge for themselves the qualifications of their 
teachers ; and to establish a hierarchy, whose 
parcumeiit and ribbons shall form the credentials 
of the minister, instead of the " anointing of the 
Holy Ghost." 

Sir, our community of liberal Christians are 
not prepared for this. I know that individuals 
may have felt alarm at the progress of thought, 
and on hearing the utterance of novel opinions 
have sometimes wondered " whereunto these 
things would grow." The great body of our people, 
however, have never been disturbed. They attach 
little importance to the outcry either of agitators 
or alarmists. They have no fear of heresy, where 
thought is left free. They believe that the dis- 
cussion of opinions is the best antidote to error. 
Above all, they have an instinctive aversion to the 



158 



denouncing of a man's character, on account of 
his sober and honest convictions. They judge 
the tree by its fruits. They have long been taught 
" that goodness consists in being good." It is a 
doctrine which they approve, and on which they 
will practise. You will find it hard to persuade 
them, that a doubtful speculation in theology is 
essential to the character of the Christian, " that 
where the pulse of virtue beats in the life, the 
power of religion is dead at the heart." 

I have said, that they do not wish for restric- 
tions on freedom of speech. But this is not all. 
They desire its actual exercise. They have no 
respect for the man, who hides his thought. They 
know too well the value of liberty, lightly to re- 
nounce it, for themselves or for their pastors. 
They wish for no slaves in the pulpit; for no 
cowards, or sluggards to stand on the watch- 
tower, and look for light. In the general fermen- 
tation of modern times, they are aware of the 
danger of artificial restraints. They know " that 
the best way to keep things safe is to give them 
vent." With few exceptions, this is the universal 
feeling. I have the strongest confidence in the 
attachment of our community to the first princi- 
ples of liberal Christianity. When the question is 
made concerning those principles, almost every 
man among us, ministers and people, will be found 



159 



in his place. They may greatly differ in specu- 
lative opinions ; but when the controversy comes 
to the right of utterance, without fear of denun- 
ciation, they are true as steel to this cardinal 
point. Often have they been tried ; never long 
found wanting. In the words of one, whom I 
may not speak of here as the feelings of personal 
friendship would prompt, they will ever declare, 
when warned of the peril of freedom of mind and 
of progress in religion, " our prayer to God is, 
that it may never stop. We have too much confi- 
dence in Providence and in human nature to 
sympathize with those who 

grow pale 

Lest their own judgments should become too bright, 
And their free thoughts be crimes, and earth have too 
much light. 

A spirit is abroad, free, bold, uncompromising, 
and terrible as an army with banners, which is 
trying the opinions and institutions of the world as 
by fire. It is the duty of the wise and good to en- 
deavor to guide this spirit, to restrain its excesses, 
and above all to imbue it with a sincere and earnest 
love of truth, humanity, and God. But we fear 
not the issue. We believe that every occasion of 
new light and intelligence will be found to illus- 
trate and enforce the evidences of the Christian 



160 



revelation, and give mankind a deeper and more 
living sense of its truth and reality." 

I am, &c, 

An Alumnus of the 

Cambridge Theological School. 

Boston, September 5, 1839. 



DEFENCE OF " THE LATEST FORM OF INFIDELITY" EXAMINED. 



A 

SECOND LETTER 

TO 

Mr. ANDREWS NORTON, 

OCCASIONED BY HIS DEFENCE OF 

A DISCOURSE ON " THE LATEST FORM OF INFIDELITY." 
By GEORGE RIPLEY. 



BOSTON: 

JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY. 
M DCCC XL. 



BOSTON : 
PRINTED BY FREEMAN AND B0LLE9, 
WASHINGTON STREET. 



SPINOZA. 



LETTER. 



Dear Sir, 

In a former letter which I addressed to you, I 
submitted your Discourse on " the latest form of in- 
fidelity " to a critical examination. I pointed out 
the inconsistency of adopting the exclusive principle, 
in a Discourse before an assembly of liberal clergy- 
men, and maintained the right, which they have 
always claimed, for each man to decide for himself 
the speculative belief, which entitles him to bear the 
name of Christ I presented a series of arguments 
from history and scripture, against your assumption 
that miracles are the only proof of the divine origin of 
Christianity, and stated several practical objections, 
under which that theory was # believed to labor. In 
conclusion, I briefly discussed one or two topics of 
a literary and historical character, and exposed the 
errors, into which you had fallen, in your notices of 
Spinoza, Schleiermacher, and De Wette. 

In the reply to my letter which you have lately 
published, you attach the principal importance to 



■ 



6 

the literary questions that I incidentally touched 
on, and observe that "had the writer confined 
himself to an examination of your reasoning, you 
should not have thought that there was any call 
upon you to take notice of it." (p. 3.) But as " a 
considerable portion is expressly occupied in charg- 
ing you with grave errors," " it has seemed to you 
due to your friends, and to all who may think and 
feel with you on the great question at issue," " to 
enter into some explanations." (pp. 3, 4.) 

If I were to pass over, without comment, the 
reasons which you thus advance for continuing the 
present discussion, I might be understood to ac- 
quiesce in their correctness. An individual, un- 
doubtedly, has a perfect right to be governed by 
those considerations which seem most forcible to 
his own mind ; provided they do not infringe any 
rules of moral or social propriety ; no one may pre- 
sume to call on him for an exposition of his private 
motives ; but, when he brings them forward, of his 
own accord, the case is altered, and they become 
the legitimate subjects of examination and remark. 

I must, accordingly, express my dissent from the 
principle that the defence of personal reputation is 
more important than the discussion of opinions. It 
appears to me that our success, as individuals, 
hardly deserves to be mentioned in comparison 
with the illustration of a general idea ; the interests 



7 



of truth should be made paramount ; our own name 
subordinate. I do not, of course, object to the re- 
pelling of attacks on private character. A delicate 
sense of honor feels even the breath of suspicion as 
a stain ; it cannot bear the mere appearance of an un- 
worthy imputation ; and though sure that its bright- 
ness cannot be sullied, it condescends to wipe 
away reproach. But the cause of truth has far 
higher claims on our best services, than the defence 
of ourselves, under any circumstances. It is better 
that we should suffer, than that error should pre- 
vail. We owe it to our convictions of truth to make 
them intelligible to the common mind, to present, 
without weariness or impatience, the grounds on 
which they repose, to meet the objections that are 
alleged against them by the humblest inquirer, and 
to court the freest scrutiny into their character, as 
the best means of their support. The opinions 
which we hold dear should be brought into the 
clearest light of day ; every argument in relation to 
them fully considered and sifted ; every sedate and 
earnest investigation of their claims met with re- 
spectful attention ; and no attempt made to hush 
the voice of objection or doubt, by the exercise of 
authority. The great topics, which I discussed, in 
my letter, are worthy the most serious and dispas- 
sionate consideration of which our minds are capa- 
ble. Compared with their solemn and vital impor- 



8 



tance, all personal interests are as chaff and dust. 
They are closely connected with the most valuable 
hopes of the human soul ; they form an essential 
portion of the influences by which society is affected ; 
the progress of mental culture and the condition of the 
age depend, in no small measure, on the views that 
are cherished concerning them ; and imperfectly as 
I may have succeeded in treating them, I am 
conscious that the most earnest convictions, the 
most sincere desires for light and truth were 
brought to their discussion. It would have been a 
more appropriate course, therefore, it seems to me, 
if you had distinctly answered the arguments which 
I brought forward, instead of confining yourself to 
a consideration of personal charges, as you call 
them ; but which were personal only, so far as they 
might affect your literary reputation, not as directed 
against your private character. 

Neither can I believe that our duty on a subject 
of such general and momentous interest as this, is 
limited "to our friends and those who think with us 
on the question at issue." Much, no doubt, is due 
to the claims of sympathy and personal friendship ; 
something, perhaps, to those with whom our prin- 
cipal tie is agreement of opinion ; but these claims 
include but a small part of our obligations. On a 
subject, which w r e have brought before the public, 
I conceive that we are bound to enlighten the 



9 



public, as to its merits. We are not authorized to 
advance opinions, and then pass by the objections 
they meet with, in silence. We owe it to the com- 
munity in which we live, — a community that cher- 
ishes an hereditary interest in questions relating 
either to speculative or practical theology, — to stand 
by our words, and give them the fullest explanation 
and defence, of which they are susceptible. We 
have no right to circulate opinions, which agitate 
many, grieve some, and deeply interest all, and 
then shrink from their discussion. The attention 
of our religious public, in particular, within a few 
years past, has been turned with no ordinary solici- 
tude to the subject treated of in your discourse. 
The views there presented have been felt to be, 
in the last degree, untenable ; a more profound 
conception of the christian revelation, as it seemed, 
has been embraced by numerous minds ; a strong 
interest is cherished in the comparison of ideas ; 
scarcely at any former period have abstract specu- 
lations been able to excite such general thought ; 
and every word spoken from a true and free spirit 
is sure to meet with an audible response. I can 
hardly think of the present state of things, without 
being reminded of the words of Milton. W T ould 
that they were still more applicable to us than they 
are ! " Behold now this city ; a city of refuge, the 
mansion house of liberty, encompassed and sur- 
2 



10 



rounded with his protection ; the shop of war hath 
not there more anvils and hammers waking, to 
fashion out the plates and instruments of armed 
justice in defence of beleagured truth, than there 
be pens and heads there, sitting by their studious 
lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and 
ideas wherewith to present, as with their homage and 
their fealty, the approaching reformation ; others as 
fast reading, trying all things, assenting to the force 
of reason and convincement." In a condition of 
society, to which such a description, even by the 
most remote allusion, is appropriate, the wisest 
endeavors of every scholar, or thinker, by profes- 
sion, are constantly due. They are called on for 
the most gracious sympathies with the whole com- 
munity. They should freely give of all the light 
which they have freely received. This cannot be 
done by diverting public attention from general 
topics to personal interests. These topics must be 
met, with manliness, and with temperate zeal. 
There must be no disguise, no timidity, no bitter- 
ness, no exclusiveness. Even those of us, who 
are deeply sensible of having no claim on the 
attention of the public, and who would gladly 
exchange the field of dispute "for the still and 
quiet air of delightful studies," or the more attrac- 
tive walks of practical usefulness, are bound to 
utter the word which it may be given us to speak. 



11 



The circle of our friends should be made to em- 
brace every devoted seeker of truth ; we should 
have regard for those who are at the widest dis- 
tance from our opinion ; we should seek to save 
those whom we believe to be wanderers ; we 
should strive to remove every stumbling-block from 
the way of the people, to make straight paths for 
all feet, and thus to prepare the coming of the 
Lord. 

With these views, I cannot but regret, moreover, 
that you have given a new direction to this contro- 
versy, in your remarks on my letter. You have 
taken it from the people, and given it to scholars. 
You have confined it to points, in which few take 
an interest, and neglected those on which the public 
mind is awake. You have passed by the great 
theological question, and given your attention to a 
subordinate literary question. 

In pursuing this course, you have shown no 
small degree of controversial adroitness, — a quality 
to which I can lay no claim. For, you have re- 
moved me from the ground, which we might be 
supposed to hold with equal advantage, to that on 
which all the circumstances may be presumed to 
be in your favor. An individual, whose time is for 
the most part absorbed in the duties of an en- 
grossing practical occupation, may be expected to 
wage an unequal contest, on a purely literary sub- 



12 



ject, with a scholar by profession. I do not, how- 
ever, shrink from your call. If I must speak to 
scholars, rather than to those whom I daily meet, I 
will not decline the attempt. An appeal to books, 
as well as to the heart, may not be without fruit ; 
and if I am enabled to gain any advantage in this 
discussion, it will be owing less to the skill of the 
advocate, than to the justice of the cause. 

The question then turns on the correctness of 
the account which you have given of the opinions 
of Spinoza, Schleiermacher, and De Wette. This 
question I am now to consider. I begin with 
Spinoza. 

You spoke of Spinoza as " a celebrated atheist," 
and asserted that " to deny his atheism is merely to 
contend that the word is not to be used in its com- 
mon and established sense." This statement I 
called in question. I described the system of Spi- 
noza, in the briefest manner, as maintaining the ex- 
istence of God, the Original and Supreme Cause of 
the Universe, who, possessing the attribute of intelli- 
gence, is not to be confounded with material nature. 

In your " Remarks " you observe that " this 
system has been talked of by many, who apparently 
have known little concerning it, and mistaken its 
character." You then say that you shall " endeavor 
to give a correct account of what alone concerns 



13 



us at present, or, indeed, is in itself of much in- 
terest, — his conceptions respecting God." (p. 11.) 

This account, which claims to be " correct," (if 
not exclusively so,) commences with a statement, 
in your own words, of the principles contained in 
the first fifteen propositions of the First Part of his 
Ethics, according to your construction of their sense. 
As I shall be obliged to subject this account to a 
rigid analysis, in order to test and exhibit the accu- 
racy, to which it pretends, I will copy such portions 
of it as demand a special consideration. 

"According to Spinoza," you assert, "there is but 
one substance existing. This is possessed of in- 
finite attributes. All the phenomena of what we 
call the created universe, that is, all finite beings, 
with their properties, acts, and affections ; with their 
moral qualities, good or bad ; with their joys and 
sufferings, are but modifications of the attributes of 
this sole substance, or, in other words, of this sub- 
stance itself. This substance has existed from eter- 
nity. It could be produced by no other ; for one 
. substance cannot produce another ; — creation is 
impossible." * 

The fundamental defect in this part of your ac- 
count, is the use of the word " substance," without 
an explanation of the technical sense which it always 

* Remarks, pp. 11, 12. 



14 



bears in the writings of Spinoza. This is essen- 
tially distinct from the meaning attached to it in 
common discourse. The true signification of this 
term in the nomenclature of Spinoza is the key to 
his whole system ; and the want of philosophical 
discrimination which confounds its sense as em- 
ployed by him, with its sense as employed in popu- 
lar language, is one of the principal causes, that his 
conceptions of the Deity have been so often mis- 
understood. It is the occasion of errors hardly less 
gross, than would arise from confounding the chem- 
ical meaning of the word " spirit," with that which 
it bears in the Epistles of Paul. 

The first definition of the term " substance," as 
given by Johnson, is " being ; something existing ; 
something of which we can say that it is." This 
expresses, with sufficient accuracy, its common, 
popular meaning. If used without explanation, it 
would always be understood in this sense. The 
most general idea, then, which is attached to the 
word in ordinary discourse, is " that which exists." 
Thus we speak of a bright substance, a hard sub- 
stance, a cold substance, to denote existing things, 
which possess, respectively, the qualities that are 
predicated of them. We give the name of " sub- 
stance " to the matter, which we regard as com- 
posing the visible universe. And the idea of matter 
is so intimately connected with the idea of substance 



15 



in the generality of minds, not accustomed to phi- 
losophical reasoning, that the expression " immaterial 
substance " strikes them as a contradiction. Now, 
if it be stated that, according to a certain system of 
ontology, one substance only exists, it would be 
immediately supposed that it admitted the existence 
of only one thing or object, regarded as constituting 
the whole of being ; and almost every person would 
infer that by this one substance was meant the 
material universe. This is the representation which 
is given by many English writers of the theory of 
Spinoza. Its correctness is taken for granted by 
those who have not looked into the subject for them- 
selves. It has been assumed as a point which did 
not admit of debate ; the atheism of Spinoza, 
grounded on his views of the unity of substance, 
has long been suggested by the mention of his 
name ; no one, in England or in this country, until 
recently, has thought of questioning it; and the 
mere expression of a doubt has been deemed a 
proof of presumption or eccentricity. The pre- 
vailing conception with the partially informed among 
ourselves, I believe to be, that the one substance 
which Spinoza considered as God, is the material 
universe, taken as an unlimited whole, with its in- 
finite variety of phenomena and laws. The sound, 
and the ordinary signification of the words em- 
ployed by Spinoza, with the associations which they 



16 



call forth, undoubtedly favor this supposition ; else 
the misconception could not have prevailed to so 
wide an extent. But if we penetrate to the sense 
of his system, and confine the meaning of his terms 
to the definitions which he expressly gives, we shall 
perceive that nothing can be further from the truth, 
than the popular traditional opinion concerning its 
character. 

In order, therefore, to obtain a just idea of the 
meaning of the word " substance," as used by Spi- 
noza, we must comprehend the point of view, from 
which he started in his inquiries. This was the 
perception of the limited and dependent character 
of all finite objects. Every thing, with which the 
senses are conversant, every thing which we 
are conscious of within ourselves, bears the stamp 
of frailty and imperfection. The life of man is a 
vapor ; the elements of nature are constantly chang- 
ing their form ; the whole universe is subject to 
perpetual decay and renovation. Experience makes 
us acquainted with nothing but transient phenom- 
ena ; neither we, nor the objects around us contain 
an inherent ground of existence ; our frail and finite 
being does not present its own explanation ; we 
did not produce ourselves, nor do we depend upon 
ourselves ; we are exposed to innumerable contin- 
gencies, over which we have no control ; like all 
things in nature, as soon as born, we begin to die ; 



17 



our appearance in the transitory forms of space and 
time was not at our own bidding ; our departure 
will not be at our own choice. 

But this is not all. The results of experience do 
not exhaust the knowledge of man. He possesses 
the attribute of reason, which puts him in possession 
of certain and absolute truth. The inward eye 
reveals to him an Infinite Being, as the outward eye 
reveals the finite phenomena of sense. Beyond the 
changing and dependent existences in time and 
space, there is an Immutable and Uncaused One, 
of whom every thing which appears, within the 
sphere of experience, is an obscure and imperfect 
manifestation. The worlds, both of matter and of 
mind, the phenomena both of extension and of 
thought, are the faint reflections of the Eternal Es- 
sence. They correspond to attributes in him which 
express a portion of the Infinite Perfections of his 
nature. This Eternal Being, of whose existence 
we are made certain by the necessity of our reason, 
and on whom all finite being depends ; the Infinite 
Cause, which contains the grounds of its existence, 
within itself; the Unconditional Reality, which 
would be, w T ere the universe destroyed, and without 
which the universe could not exist, or be conceived 
of, is the God of Spinoza. The term " substance " 
is applied to this Being, to express his substantial, 
absolute, independent existence. The term " mode" 
3 



18 



is applied to all finite beings, to express their pheno- 
menal, relative, dependent existence, considered as 
manifestations of the attributes of the Divine Essence. 
This use of language is not in accordance with its or- 
dinary use. Unless we are capable of laying aside 
the impressions, which familiar terms produce in our 
minds, and looking alone at the technical sense in 
which they are employed, we shall inevitably be led 
astray. If we construe the peculiar phraseology of 
Spinoza, in which he labors to express the most sub- 
lime, and at the same time, the most abstract concep- 
tions which the human mind can form, into the com- 
mon language of the market, or even of the schools, 
we shall not obtain the most distant conception of 
his lofty reasonings on the universe and on God. 

The signification of the word " substance," how- 
ever, as used by Spinoza, is perfectly plain and easy 
to be understood. When once apprehended, if dis- 
tinctly kept in view, it can occasion no difficulty. 
He adopts the highest meaning attached to it in the 
philosophy of Descartes, of which he was the pupil ; 
and limits himself to that meaning. " By substance," 
says Descartes, " we can understand only the thing 
which exists in such a manner, that it needs no 
other thing for its existence." " To speak properly, 
God only is such a being. No created being can 
exist a single moment without being sustained and 
preserved by his power. And therefore the word 



19 



substance cannot be applied to God and to creatures 
in the same sense." * 

It appears, then, from what I have now said, that 
the word " substance," in the language of Spinoza, 
means the Self-Existent, Independent Being, that 
possesses infinite attributes, the ground and the 
cause of all finite existence ; that the Infinite Being is 
called " substance " to express his self-existence and 
independence ; while the word " mode " is applied 
to every thing relative and dependent, considered as 
an antithesis, to the Infinite, Self-Existent and Ne- 
cessary Cause. 

This statement may be verified by referring to 
the following passages. 

" I understand by substance that which is in itself 
and is conceived of by means of itself; that is, that 
of which a conception may be formed without the 
conception of any other thing." f 

# " Lorsque nous concevons la substance, nous concevons seule- 
ment une chose qui existe en telle facon qu'elle n'a besoin que de soi- 
meme pour exister. En quoi il peut y avoir de l'obscurite touchant 
l'explication de ce mot, r£ avoir besoin que de soi-meme ; car, a propre- 
ment parler, il n'y a que Dieu qui soit tel, et il n'y a aucune chose 
creee qui puisse exister un seul moment sans 6tre soutenue et con- 
servee par sa puissance. C'est pourquoi on a raison dans l'ecole de 
dire que le nom de substance n'est pas univoque au regard de Dieu 
et des creatures." Descartes, les Principes de la Philosophic, 
(Euvres, vol. iii. p. 95, Ed. Cousin. 

t " Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est et per se concipi- 
tur ; hoc est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a 
quo formari debet." Ethica, pars i., def. iii. 



20 

"I understand by mode the affections of sub- 
stance, or that which is in another, by means of 
which also it is conceived." * 

" Substance is prior by nature to its affections." f 

"Two or more substances of the same nature or 
attribute cannot exist in the nature of things." J 

" One substance cannot be produced by another 
substance." ^ 

A word of explanation may be required here. 
The reasoning of Spinoza goes to prove not that 
the infinite, self-existent being cannot produce 
finite and dependent beings ; for this he presently 
shows is not only possible, but necessary ; but that 
the infinite, self-existent being does not and cannot 
derive his existence from another previous infinite 
and self-existent being ; or in other words, the 
purpose of the argument is to demonstrate the 
absolute unity of God, — a principle to which great 
importance is attached in his system. This is evi- 
dent from the next two propositions. 

" It belongs to the nature of substance to exist." 

"Demonstr. Substance cannot be produced 

# "Per modum intelligo substantia affectiones, sive id, quod in 
alio est, per quod etiam concipitur." Ibid., def. v. 

f " Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus." Ibid., prop. i. 

$ " In rerum natura non possunt dari duse, aut plures substantias 
ejusdem naturae, sive attributi." Ibid., prop. v. 

§ " Una Substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia." Ibid., 
prop. vi. 



21 



by any thing else. It is therefore self-caused; 
that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, 
or it pertains to its nature to exist." * 

"Every substance is necessarily infinite." f 

"God, or the substance" (self-existent being) 
" consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which 
expresses the eternal and infinite essence, necessa- 
rily exists." t 

" Besides God, no substance " (no self-existent 
being) " can exist or can be conceived of." § 

" Hence it follows most clearly that God is one 
alone, that is, in the nature of things, there is only 
one substance " (one self-existent being) and " that 
one absolutely infinite." 

"It follows, secondly, that all things of which 

* "Ad naturam substantia? pertinet existere." Ibid., prop. vii. 

"Demonstr. Substantia non potest produci ab alio; erit itaque 
causa sui, id est, ipsius essentia involvit necessario existentiam, 
sive ad ejus naturam pertinet existere." 

t "Omnis substantia est necessario infinita." Ibid., prop. viii. 

t " Deus, sive substantia constans infinitis attributis, quorum 
unumquodque seternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit, necessa- 
rio existit." Ibid., prop. xi. 

§ " Prseter Deum nulla dari, neque concipi potest substantia." 
Ibid., prop. xiv. 

" Coroll. I. Hinc clarissime sequitur, Deum esse unicum, hoc est, 
in rerum natura non, nisi unam substantiam, dari, eamque abso- 
lute infinitam esse. 

" Coroll. II. Sequitur rem extensam et rem cogitantem, vel Dei 
attributa esse, vel affectiones attributorum Dei." 



22 



extension and thought can be predicated, are 
either attributes of God, or affections of his attri- 
butes." 

By an attribute of God, Spinoza understands, 
any thing which expresses the eternal essence of 
God, and by the affection or mode of an attribute, 
that which depends upon the attribute, for its ex- 
istence and conception. Thought and extension, 
therefore, or mind and matter, are both manifesta- 
tions of the eternal essence of God ; the reflection 
of the invisible, infinite nature. 

" Whatever is, is in God, and without God, no- 
thing can be or can be conceived of." * 

" God is the efficient cause of every thing which 
can fall under the infinite intelligence." t 

" God is a cause by himself, and not by contin- 
gence." t 

" God is the absolutely first cause." § 

" There is no cause, intrinsic or extrinsic, which 

* " Quicquid est, in Deo est et nihil sine Deo esse, neque concipi 
potest." Ibid., prop. xv. 

f " Sequitur, Deum omnium rerum, quae sub intellectum infini- 
tum cadere possunt, esse causam efficientem." Ibid., prop, xvi., 
coroll. i. 

X " Sequitur Deum causam esse per se, non vero per accidens." 
Ibid., coroll. ii. 

§ " Sequitur Deum esse absolute causam primam." Ibid., co- 
roll, iii. 



23 



can excite God to action, except the perfection of 
his own nature." * 

"God alone is a free cause. For God alone 
exists from the sole necessity of his nature and acts 
from the sole necessity of his nature." t 

"The essence of things produced by God does 
not involve existence." t 

"Hence it follows that God is not only the cause 
that things may begin to exist, but also that they 
may continue in existence." § 

From these quotations, it is evident, in what 
sense Spinoza uses the word " substance f and 
that so far from implying that God does not pro- 
duce finite objects, " that creation is impossible," he 
places this idea at the foundation of his system. 
With many wise metaphysicians of ancient and 
modern times, he does not understand by creation 
the production of "something out of nothing;" 

* " Sequitur nullam dari causam, quae Deum extrinsece, vel in- 
trinsece, praeter ipsius naturae perfectionem, incitet ad agendum." 
Ibid., prop, xvii., coroll. i. 

t " Sequitur solum Deum esse causam liberam. Deus enim 
solus ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit, et ex sola suae natures 
necessitate agit." Ibid., coroll. ii. 

$ "Rerum a Deo productarum essentia non involvit existentiam." 
Ibid., prop. xxiv. 

§ "Hinc sequitur Deum non tantum esse causam, ut res incipiant 
existere ; sed etiam, ut in existendo perseverent." Ibid., coroll. 



24 



but the production of the universe, from the infinite 
fulness of God. 

I proceed with the analysis of your account. 
You continue, "it" (the one substance) " is 'the 
immanent cause of all things, not a transitive cause.' 
These terms are technical and require explanation. 
An immanent cause is that which produces effects 
only in or upon itself. A transitive cause is that 
which passes out of itself, as it were, to produce or 
to act on, something else." (p. 12.) 

You propose this explanation, solely upon your 
own authority ; you do not attempt to justify it by 
referring to a single passage of Spinoza; and it 
cannot be justified from his writings. 

You assert that " an immanent cause is that 
which produces effects only in and upon itself." 
Spinoza, on the contrary, maintains that God, the 
absolute cause, produces effects that are essentially 
distinct from himself, considered as the absolute 
cause. These effects, as we have seen, he calls 
" modes " of the divine attributes ; denoting by this 
expression the dependence of the effects on the 
attributes; the divine attributes constituting the 
essence of God ; and the " modes," comprising all 
the phenomena of finite being, receiving their 
existence and essence from God. "Mode," he 
says, "exists in another (modus in alio est) by 



25 



means of which it must be conceived of ; that is, it 
exists in God alone (in solo Deo est) and can be 
conceived of by means of God alone." * 

The same statement may be presented in a 
shorter, and perhaps, a more distinct form. Ac- 
cording to Spinoza, the infinite substance, (the self- 
existent God,) is the immanent cause of all things. 
But there is something beside this infinite sub- 
stance ; namely, its modes ; or the effects, which it 
produces. These modes depend on the infinite 
substance, as their cause ; hence, they are other 
than the infinite substance ; therefore, the infinite 
substance, or the immanent cause produces some- 
thing not itself; that is, "all the phenomena of 
what we call the created universe," or, to use the 
words of Spinoza, "all that can fall under the 
cognizance of the infinite intelligence." 

Your explanation of the word immanent is thus 
shown to be incorrect, inasmuch as it recognises 
no distinction between God and the effects which 
he produces. "But a more total distinction of 
things" (of the created universe) " from God," as 
Schelling justly observes, "than is found in Spinoza 
can scarcely be imagined." God is that one, who 
exists in himself, and can alone be conceived of by 
means of himself; but the Finite, is what necessa- 

* Ethica, pars i. prop, xxiii. Demonstr. 

4 



26 



rily exists in another, and can be conceived of only 
by means of that other. According to this distinc- 
tion, things are not merely in degree, or through 
their limitations different from God, but toto genere. 
Whatever, in other respects, be their relation to 
God, they are absolutely distinguished from him by 
this circumstance, namely, that they only can be in 
and after another, that is to say, himself; that the 
conception of them is derivative, and utterly im- 
possible, without the conception of God ; while this 
on the other hand, is alone self-existent and 
original, and the ground of every thing else.* 

The same reasoning, of course, shows the in- 
correctness of your explanation of the term transi- 
tive cause, as you erroneously translate the Latin 
expression of Spinoza, causa transiens, used by 
him as an antithesis to causa immanens. You 
assert that " a transitive cause is that which passes 
out of itself, as it were, to produce, or to act on 
something else." But, according to Spinoza, the 
infinite substance does produce something beside 
itself ; namely, its modes ; which depend on it ; and 
therefore are other than it ; that is, all the phe- 
nomena of finite being. 

I will now give the true explanation of these 
terms, as used in the writings of Spinoza. It was 

* See Schelling-'s Philosophische Untersuchungen uber Freiheit, 
in Philosophische Schriften, p. 404, 405. 



27 



his purpose to show the intimate and indissoluble 
union which exists between God and the universe. 
To express this idea, he says, " that God is the 
immanent cause, but not the transient cause of all 
things." By an "immanent cause," he means that 
which remains within the effect it produces. By a 
" transient cause," he means that which passes out 
from the effect it produces. This idea is sufficiently 
obvious, but it may be worth while to illustrate 
it by a familiar example. The torch, which kindles 
a fire, produces its effect, and then its agency 
ceases. It is a transient cause. The sun, which 
produces a bright reflection in a mirror, continues 
its agency on the effect. It is an immanent cause. 

The correctness of this explanation is evident 
from the passage in which the proposition is de- 
monstrated. 

" God is the immanent cause of all things, not 
the transient cause." 

"Demonstr. All things which are, are in God, 
and must be conceived of by means of God, and 
therefore, God is the cause of things which are 
in him. Which is the first point. Then, no sub- 
stance" (no self-existent being) "can exist out of 
God, that is, nothing which is in itself out of God. 
Which was the second." * 

* "Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens; non vero tran- 
siens." 



28 



The same idea is illustrated by the passage in 
the Epistles, in which the expression occurs. Re- 
plying to the objection that he regarded God and 
nature as one and the same, and showing that this 
was not the fact, Spinoza says, "I maintain that 
God is the immanent and not the transient cause of 
all things. All things are in God and move in 
God ; this I affirm with Paul, and perhaps also 
with all the ancient philosophers, although not in 
their sense ; and I might even say, with all the an- 
cient Hebrews, as far as can be conjectured from 
certain traditions, although variously corrupted." * 

It is hardly necessary that I should present the 
only sense, as it appears to me, in which an in- 
telligent student of Spinoza can understand these 
passages. Still, as some may be misled by the 
brevity, and perhaps also, by a slight verbal am- 
biguity in the reasoning, it may be well to state, 
what I consider the correct construction. 

" Demonstr. Omnia, quae sunt, in Deo sunt et per Deum con- 
cipi debent, adeoque Deus rerum, quse in ipso sunt est causa ; quod 
est primum. Deinde extra Deum nulla potest dari substantia, 
hoc est, res, quse extra Deum in se sit. Quod erat secundum." 
Ethica, pars i. prop, xviii. 

* " Deum enim rerum omnium causam immanentem, ut ajunt, 
non vero transeuntem statuo. Omnia, inquam, in Deo esse et in 
Deo moveri cum Paulo affirmo et forte etiam cum omnibus anti- 
quis Philosophis, licet alio modo ; et auderem etiam dicere cum 
antiquis omnibus Hebrseis, quantum ex quibusdam traditionibus, 
tametsi multis modis adulteratis, conjicere licet." Epistola xxi. 



29 



According to Spinoza, God is the Infinite Being 
who filleth and sustaineth all things. They de- 
pend on him for their essence and their existence ; 
they cannot even be conceived of without him ; 
they dwell in him and he in them. Hence he is 
the causa immanens, the indwelling and per- 
manent cause. But further, out of God, there 
is no self-existent object; nothing but God has 
or can have life or being in itself; therefore the 
agency which first produced all things ever per- 
vades and preserves them ; hence, God is not the 
causa transiens, the transient and temporary cause. 

Having thus shown the incorrectness of your 
explanation of these terms, I may as properly here 
as in any other place, notice your remarks on my 
translation. The rendering, w r hich you propose, is 
no more intelligible than the original, without a com- 
mentary. The commentary, which you furnish, as 
has been seen, is erroneous. The translation of 
transiens by " transitive " is open to criticism, on the 
score of philology, but I do not wish to be detained 
by small verbal niceties. I proceed to your objec- 
tions. 

I translate the passage, " Deus est omnium rerum 
causa immanens ; non vero transiens," as follows. 
" God is the permanent and indwelling cause of all 
things ; not the transient and temporary cause." 

You assert, 1. that I have "inserted two epithets 



30 



in my translation, not in the original ;" 2. that "by 
translating immanens, 'indwelling,' its essential 
meaning is changed ;" 3. that "a common acquaint- 
ance with the Latin language, as one would think, 
might have prevented my giving 6 transient,' as the 
meaning of transiens ;" 4. "that these additional epi- 
thets are as little to be found in the 21st of Spinoza's 
Epistles, from which also I profess to quote them ;" 
and 5. " that the same fundamental error appears 
not only in my professed rendering from the Latin 
of Spinoza, but in a professed translation from the 
German ;" which last circumstance, you add, "you 
cannot account for." * 

I will consider these assertions in their order. 

1 and 2. The Latin word immanens is composed 
of the preposition in and the participle manens. It 
means literally, "remaining in," or, "indwelling." 
As used by Spinoza, in its application to the 
Supreme Cause of the universe, it means that which 
remains within its effect and does not pass away 
from it. It includes the two ideas of inherence and 
of permanence. I know of no one English word 
which fully expresses these two ideas. The words 
"permanent" and "indwelling" do express them 
both ; they exhaust the meaning of immanens, as 
used by Spinoza ; and at the same time, they ex- 



* Remarks, pp. 21, 22. 



31 

plain it to those not familiar with his philosophical 
terms. Accordingly, I considered, and still consider 
this the best translation that can be made of the 
word. There is no principle of criticism which for- 
bids the translation of one foreign word into two or 
more equivalent English words. On the contrary, 
we are bound to do so, whenever, as in the present 
case, the occasion requires it. To speak of this as 
an " interpolation," is an incorrect use of language. 

3. The word transiens means literally "passing 
over," or "passing away." As used by Spinoza, 
denying its application to the Supreme Cause of the 
universe, it means that which passes away from the 
effect it produces. It includes the two ideas of 
passing from, and of temporary duration. No Eng- 
lish word occurs to me which so distinctly expresses 
these ideas, as not to make another epithet neces- 
sary when one aims at perspicuity on an obscure 
subject. The words " transient " and " temporary " 
are the most suitable that I know of to express the 
sense of the original ; although they are too nearly 
synonymous to be used together, except when very 
delicate shades of thought are to be discriminated, 
and great precision is essential. 

Taking into view the antithetical character of the 
sentence ; having established the meaning of im- 
manens as " permanent and indwelling ;" I cannot 
satisfy myself that the opposite idea of transiens 



32 



can be better exhibited than by the words " tran- 
sient and temporary " which I have used. 

4. The original expressions in the twenty-first of 
Spinoza's epistles are the same with those in the 
Ethics which I translated. I, accordingly, gave 
them the same translation. 

5. The German writer, Krug, from whom I quote, 
introduces the Latin words of Spinoza, in a German 
form, — a very common transaction in that language. 
"1st Gott die immanente oder die transeunte Ur- 
sache der Welt ?" Is God the immanent or the 
transient cause of the universe? Believing the cor- 
rect translation of these technical terms to be that 
which I had already given, of course, I must have 
translated them in what I considered the only cor- 
rect way wherever they occurred. Had I done 
otherwise, I should not have been able " to account 
for it " myself. 

In the above remarks, I have vindicated the cor- 
rectness of my translation, by pointing out its 
agreement with the meaning of Spinoza, as inferred 
from his own statements of his philosophical sys- 
tem. 

It remains to say a very few words, in regard to 
your philological strictures. "A common acquaint- 
ance with the Latin language," you remark, "might 
not have prevented the writer from rendering im- 
manens by 'indwelling.'" So it might be sup- 



33 



posed; "indwelling" being the most literal trans- 
lation of immanens, that our language is capable 
of; your remark is perfectly just. 

But you continue, "a common acquaintance with 
the Latin language, might, one would think, have 
prevented his giving 6 transient ' as the meaning of 
transiens" This I am not prepared to admit with- 
out a little consideration. At present, I cannot but 
think it must be " an uncommon " acquaintance 
with the Latin language, which would lead one to 
deny the exactness of the translation in question. 

The word " transient," according to the first two 
definitions of Johnson, who also gives transiens as 
the original term from which it is derived, means, 
"soon past; soon passing." It was in this sense 
that I made use of it. The question is whether 
the Latin word transiens admits of this rendering. 
You do not inform us on what grounds you deny 
this. I cannot conjecture the reason, except that 
you may suppose that transeo in Latin is used ex- 
clusively as an active verb. It is true, that it often 
bears an active signification, and in "Ainsworth's 
Abridgment" is represented as exclusively an ac- 
tive verb. This is an error which might easily be 
corrected even from the references there made. 
The following passages contain examples of its use 
in the sense of " passing away." I submit them, 
with diffidence, as I know not whether you will 
5 



34 



allow Cicero and Seneca to be any better authori- 
ties on a question of Latin philology, than are, in 
your opinion, Tennemann, Krug, Cousin, and oth- 
ers, whom I quoted, on the history of philosophy. 

"Cum legis dies transient" Cicero, Att. Epist. 
lib. vii. 7. 

" When the day of the law shall have passed by" 
"At si tardus eris, errabis; transiit aetas 
Quam cito." Tibullus, lib. i. eleg. iv. v. 27. 
"But if you delay, you will err; how quickly 
passes away the season of life." 
" Sic cum transierint mei 
Nullo cum strepitu dies 

Plebeius moriar senex." Seneca, Thyest., 398. 

" So when my days shall have passed away with- 
out noise, I shall die a plebeian old man." 

" Fratrem juvat videre ; complexus mihi 

Redde expetitos, quidquid irarum fuit, 

Transient" Seneca, ibid., 509. 

" It pleases me to see my brother ; give me the 
desired embrace, and whatever anger was felt will 
have passed away" 

In the above statements, I have vindicated the 
correctness of my translation, by pointing out its 
agreement with the meaning of Spinoza, as inferred 
from his writings, and its support from authentic 
classical usage. 

It is almost superfluous to add, that the usual 



35 



translations of the phrase, which I have happened 
to meet with, are at variance with the explanation 
that you propose ; and express the same sense, 
with that which I have given, — an act which you 
have ventured to brand as a moral offence. 

A few examples which I have turned to, since I 
read your criticism, — and some of which having 
been long familiar, no doubt, influenced my choice 
of epithets, — may perhaps serve to relieve the 
tediousness of this discussion. 

Mr. Hallam. This author, in the fourth vol- 
ume of his " History of Literature," which has just 
come into my hands, translates the phrase as 
follows. " God is the permanent, but not the tran- 
sient cause of all things." * 

It will be perceived that Mr. Hallam, as well as 
myself, has " inserted the epithet ' permanent ' 
which is not in the original," and that " a common 
acquaintance with the Latin language did not pre- 
vent him from giving ' transient ' as the meaning of 
transiens" This is the more remarkable, as he 
bears as distinguished a reputation for classical 
learning as almost any man in England, and is 
certainly not liable to be misled by any prejudice in 
favor of Spinoza.f 

* Hallam's Introduction to the Literature of Europe, vol. iv. p. 
248. 

t In quoting Mr. Hallam's translation of this passage, in defence 



36 



As the Germans, however, more than any other 
scholars have made Spinoza an object of study, it 
is to their writings that we must look for the most 
frequent translations of the passage. I will give 
some instances from works which chance to be at 
hand. 

Rixner. " God is the permanent, not the tran- 
sient cause of all things ; because all things, not 
only in their existence, but also in their essence are 
determined through his own divine existence and 
essence." * 

of my own, I shall not be understood as admitting the correctness 
of his account of Spinoza's system. It is the exposition of an 
accomplished man of letters, rather than of a sagacious metaphysi- 
cian. The following example may serve as an illustration of the 
danger of trusting to literary research on subjects which cannot be 
comprehended without the most subtile thought, and a natural turn 
for abstract speculation. 

Mr. Hallam, in giving Spinoza's definition of " mode," says, " the 
mode of a substance is its accident or affection, by means of which 
it is conceived ;" thus making the conception of substance depend 
on its accident ; whereas the contrary doctrine is the foundation of 
the system. Mr. Hallam's error arose from a slight verbal ambi- 
guity in Spinoza's Latin, which could not mislead, for a moment, 
one familiar with his principles. Spinoza's words are " per modum 
intelligo substantias affectiones, sive id, quod in alio est, per quod 
etiam concipitur." "By mode, I understand the affections of sub- 
stance, or that which exists in another, by means of which also it is 
conceived." See vol. iv. p. 245. 

* " Er est also die immerwahrende (immanente), nicht voiiiberge- 
hende Ursache aller Dinge ; weil alle Dinge nicht nur in ihrer Exist- 



37 



Tiedemanjst. " The cause dwelling in things." * 

Herder. " Spinoza calls the self-subsistent 
Being, a not transient, but the permanent, imma- 
nent cause of all things." t 

Krause. " God is the absolutely first cause, 
which subsists in and for itself, the indwelling not 
the transient" (literally, not the passing over and 
through) " ground of all finite things." X 

Francke. " Spinoza asserts the existence of 
an indwelling cause of the world." § 

Heydenreich. " The cause of the world, not 
as transient, but as indwelling" \\ 

enz, sondern auch ihrer Wesenheit nach durch seine eigne gbttliche 
Ex'stenz und Wesenheit beslimmt sind." Rixner's Geschichtc der 
Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 62. 

* " Die in den Dingen wohnende Ursache." Tiedemann's Geist 
der spekulativen Philosophie, vol. vi. p. 234. 

t " Spinoza das selbstandige Wesen eine mohi-voriibergehende, 
sondern die bleibende immanente Ursache aller Dinge nennet." 
Herder's Gesprdche iiber Spinoza's Si/stem, Werke, vol. ix. p. 137. 

X u Gott ist die absolute erste, an und fiir sich bestehende Ur- 
sache, der innenbleibende (immanente) nicht der iiber-und hindurch- 
gehende (transiente) Grund aller endlichen Dinge." Krause's 
Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaft, p. 333. 

§ "Spinoza behauptet das Daseyn einer inwohnenden Weltur- 
sache." Francke, ueber die Schicksale des Spinozismus, p. 22. 

II " Die Ursache der Welt nicht als voriibergehend, sondern als 
inwohnend." Heydenreich's Natur und Gott nach Spinoza, vol. i. 
p. 44. 



38 



J as che. " God is the immanent, but not the 
external, transient cause of all things." * f 

I will add the only example of a French transla- 
tion that I can call to mind. 

Lerminier, (Professor in the College de France.) 
" Nothing exists but in God, or can be conceived 
of without God ; therefore God, is the permanent 
and not the transient cause of all things. God the 
ever present cause of the world, dwells in his work 
as in a tabernacle." t 

* " Gott is die immanente, nicht aber die aussere vorubergehende 
Ursache aller Dingen." Jasche's Der Pantheismus, vol. ii. p. 224. 

f I do not apprehend that any one will deny that "transient" is 
the correct translation of the German word, vonibergehend. Neither 
did I apprehend that any one would maintain that " transitive " was 
a more correct translation than "transient" of the Latin word 
transiens. I therefore make these references to the dictionaries. 

" Transient, {transiens,) vorubergehend, verganglich," &c. 

" Transitive, ubergehend." Bailey-Fahrenkruger's English 
and German Dictionary. 

" Transient, vorubergehend" &c. 

" Transitive, ubergehend," &c. FlugeVs English and German 
Dictionary. 

" Vorubergehen, to pass by, to go on, to go forward." Kuttner 
and Nicholson's deutsch-englisches Worterbuch. 

$ " Rien n'existe que dans Dieu et ne peut etre concu sans Dieu ; 
(et nihil sine Deo esse, neque concipi potest ;) done Dieu est la cause 
permanente et non passagere de toutes choses. (Deus est omnium 
rerum causa immanens, nec vero transiens.) Dieu, cause toujours 
presente du monde, habite dans son ouvrage comme dans un taber- 
nacle." Lerminier, Philosophic du Droit, vol. ii. p. 147. 



39 



If the defence of my translation be sound, — and 
I have endeavored to give every reader the materi- 
als for deciding whether it be so or not, — it will be 
seen, by your own admission, that the charge of 
atheism against Spinoza cannot be sustained. For 
you observe, that the proposition which I have 
quoted from him, and which forms an essential 
principle in his system, namely, " that God is the 
the permanent and indwelling cause of all things, 
not the transient and temporary cause," is one 
which " no Christian theist will controvert." f 

I proceed with my analysis. "To this sub- 
stance," you observe, " considered in itself, distinct 
from the effects produced by it in itself, and as the 
cause of those effects, he gives the name also of 
JYatura naturans, which may be explained by the 
equivalent term, causal Nature ; while to the modi- 
fications produced by it in itself, that is, to the 
phenomena of the universe, he gives the name of 
JYatura naturata, for which we may substitute phe- 
nomenal Nature. 

" To this substance considered in itself, to his 
JYatura naturans, that is, to his God, regarded as 
the cause of all things, he expressly denies both 
intellect and will, and argues at length against 



f Remarks, p. 21 . 



40 



ascribing them to God. 'I will show' he says, 
' that neither intellect nor will belong to the nature 
of God.' " * 

In order to reconcile this statement, with the fact 
which you admit, that Spinoza " repeatedly speaks 
of the intellect of God," you continue, thus ; " All 
nature, the universe considered as an effect consists 
only of infinite modifications of the one infinite 
substance, the God of Spinoza. But whatever 
may be affirmed of the modifications of any being 
may be affirmed of that being itself. Phenomenal 
nature (Natura naturata) is equally God as causal 
Nature. Now in the infinite universe there is infi- 
nite thought and intellect, and a knowledge or un- 
derstanding of God (for according to Spinoza, 
there is nothing else to be known or understood 
but God ;) and all this may be predicated of God, 
considered not as a cause, but as phenomenal Na- 
ture" 

The considerations which show the incorrect- 
ness of this statement may be made plain, I trust, 
to every clear mind. 

The terms Natura naturans and Natura natura- 
ta are used in the scholastic philosophy to express 
conceptions that are quite foreign to our modern 
habits of thought. According to those conceptions, 



* Remarks, pp. 12, 13. 



41 



all existence was considered as a whole. The idea 
of unity was predominant over that of variety. The 
universe was contemplated in its undivided integ- 
rity ; not as broken into fragments by the power of 
modern analysis. Hence, the term Nature was ap- 
plied to every thing that exists, including both the 
creation and the Creator. But in this view of Na- 
ture, regarded as a whole, a fundamental distinction 
was recognised. God and the universe, as we have 
seen, were comprehended in the general concep- 
tion, expressed by the word Nature. The contrast 
between God and the universe was, therefore, to be 
preserved in thought and indicated by language. 
Hence the terms JYatura naturans were applied to 
God, considered as the Creator of the universe, and 
JYatura naturata to the universe, considered as the 
sum total of created things.* 

Now Spinoza adopts these terms, but with the 
sharpest and most precise limitation of their sense. 

# "Naturare, creare, res naturales condere, iis naturam donare, 
verbum est Theologorum Scholasticorum, quibus Deus dicitur Na- 
tura naturans, non Natura naturata, id est, auctor naturae seu omni- 
um in rerum natura constantium, non Natura naturata, seu res cre- 
ata, ab alio condita, constituta." Du Cange, Glossariumad Scriptores 
MedicB et Infimai Latinitatis. 

" Naturare, to create, to establish natural things, to give a na- 
ture to them, is a word of the scholastic theologians, by whom God 
is called Natura naturans, that is, the author ofi nature, or of all 
things existing in the nature of things, not Natura naturata, or a 
created thing, established, constituted by another." 
6 



42 



" By JYatura naturans" says he, " we should un- 
derstand that which exists in itself and is conceived 
of by means of itself, or such attributes of substance" 
(of the self-existent being) " as express the eternal 
and infinite essence, that is, God so far as he is 
considered as a free cause. But by naturatam, I 
understand every thing which proceeds from the 
necessity of the nature of God, or of any one of 
the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the 
attributes of God, so far as they are considered as 
things, which exist in God, and which without God 
can neither exist, nor be conceived of." * 

The correct translation of these terms, according 
to the explanation of Spinoza, is absolute Nature, 
and relative Mature. 

Absolute Nature is God, considered as the inde- 
pendent cause of all things ; or those attributes of 
God, which may be conceived of in themselves, 
without involving the idea of any thing back of them 
as their ground. 

Relative Nature is any modification of a divine 
attribute, which cannot be conceived of in itself, but 
involves the idea of something back of it as its 
ground. 

Thus, causality in God belongs to absolute Na- 
ture, because it can be conceived of without refer- 

* Ethica, pars i. prop. xxix. scholium. The Latin of Spinoza is 
quoted in the Remarks, p. 13. but not translated. 



43 

ence to any thing back of it, but expresses his infi- 
nite and eternal essence. Every act of causality 
belongs to relative Nature, because it cannot be con- 
ceived of, without reference to something back of it ; 
namely, the absolute causality which belongs to the 
infinite and eternal essence of God. 

The same idea may be illustrated by reference to 
more familiar conceptions. As Christian theists, we 
suppose that justice belongs to the infinite and eter- 
nal essence of God, and that it is manifested in par- 
ticular acts of justice towards the universe. This 
conception would be expressed in the phraseology 
of Spinoza as follows. Justice belongs to absolute 
Nature, because it can be conceived of without re- 
ference to any thing back of it, but expresses the 
infinite and eternal essence of God. Every partic- 
ular act of justice belongs to relative Nature, because 
it cannot be conceived of without reference to some- 
thing back of it ; namely, the absolute justice which 
belongs to the infinite and eternal essence of God. 
If we wished to unfold the conception still further, 
and to express the idea that every act of justice, 
whether in God or man, whether infinite or finite, 
presupposed the existence of absolute justice, we 
should say, that justice, considered as an act, whe- 
ther infinite or finite, belonged to relative Nature, 
not to absolute Nature ; since there can be no con- 
ception of an act of justice, without the previous con- 



44 



ception of justice in itself. The existence of abso- 
lute justice is implied in the existence of every act 
of justice, but absolute justice belongs only to the 
infinite and eternal essence of God ; and is therefore 
to be referred to absolute Nature ; while every act 
of justice, which implies absolute justice back of it, 
is, of course, to be referred to relative Nature. 

A similar analysis might be applied to other 
common conceptions of the attributes of God. We 
might say, in the phraseology of Spinoza, that 
love, w 7 isdom, and goodness, considered as acts, 
whether in the infinite or the finite intelligence, 
belonged to relative Nature, not to absolute Nature. 
For we can conceive of absolute love, absolute 
wisdom, or absolute goodness, in itself, without 
reference to any thing back of it, as expressing the 
infinite and eternal essence of God. But we can- 
not conceive of any act of love, wisdom, or good- 
ness, without the previous conception of love, wis- 
dom, or goodness, in itself. The existence of any 
act of love, wisdom, or goodness, implies the exist- 
ence of absolute love, wisdom, or goodness, and 
therefore is to be referred to relative Nature. 

Now applying this mode of reasoning to his 
own conceptions, Spinoza maintains that absolute 
thought in God belongs to absolute Nature, because 
it can be conceived of without reference to any 
thing back of it, but expresses his infinite and 



45 



eternal essence. Every act of intelligence, on the 
other hand, belongs to relative Nature, because it 
can neither exist, nor be conceived of without im- 
plying the existence of something back of it ; 
namely, the absolute thought, which belongs to the 
infinite and eternal essence of God. Spinoza, 
moreover, maintains that every act of intelligence, 
whether in the infinite or the finite mind implies 
the existence of something back of it ; namely, the 
absolute thought which belongs to the infinite and 
eternal essence of God. 

This statement is contained in the following 
proposition. 

" Intelligence as an act, whether it be finite or 
infinite, as also, will, desire, love, and so forth, must 
be referred to relative Nature, not to absolute Na- 
ture. 

" Demonstr. For by intelligence, as is evident 
of itself, we do not understand absolute thought, 
but only a certain mode of thinking, which mode 
differs from other modes, as desire, love, and so 
forth, and therefore must be conceived of by means 
of absolute thought ; that is to say, it must be so 
conceived of, by means of some attribute of 
God, which expresses the eternal and infinite 
essence of thought, that without it, it can 
neither exist, nor be conceived of ; and therefore, 



46 



must be referred to relative Nature, not to absolute 
Nature, as also other modes of thinking." * 

We thus perceive that the very proposition which 
is brought to show that Spinoza denied intelligence 
to God, expressly asserts that fact ; that he main- 
tained the dependence of every act of intelligence 
on the absolute thought of God ; that no mode of 
thinking could exist or be conceived of, except on 
the supposition of the eternal and infinite thought, 
which is an essential attribute of the divine nature ; 
and therefore, intelligence considered as an act, not 
the absolute thought of God, must be referred to 
relative Nature, not to absolute Nature. 

The assertion that intelligence is denied to God, . 
considered as a cause, is, if possible, still more 
clearly set aside by the following statements of 
Spinoza. 

* " Intellectus actu, sive is finitus sit, sive infinitus, ut et volun- 
tas, cupiditas, amor, etc. ad Naturam naturatam; non vero ad 
naturantem referri debet, 

" Demonstr. Per intellectura enim (ut per se notum) non intel- 
ligimus absoltjtam cogitationem, sed certum tantum modum 
cogitandi, qui modus ab aliis, scilicet cupiditate, amore, etc. differt, 
adeoque per absolutam cogitationem concipi debet, nempe per 
aliquod Dei attrieutum, quod jeternam et infinitam cogitationis 
esssentiam exprirnit, ita concipi debet, ut sine ipso nec esse, nec 
concipi possit ; ac propterea ad Naturam naturatam, non vero na- 
turantem referri debet, ut etiam reliqui modi cogitandi." Ethica, 
pars. i. prop. xxxi. 



47 



" The formal being of ideas has " (agnoscit, 
literally, oicns) " God for its cause, so far only as he 
is considered as a thinking being, and not so far as 
he is manifested by another attribute. That is, the 
ideas of the attributes of God, as well as of in- 
dividual things, have not the objects of the ideas, or 
the things perceived for their efficient cause ; but 
God himself, so far as he is a thinking being." * 

" In God, the idea necessarily exists, both of his 
own essence and of all things which necessarily pro- 
ceed from his essence. 

" Demonstr. For God can think of infinite ob- 
jects in infinite modes, or form the idea of his own 
essence and of all things which necessarily proceed 
from it." t 

I cannot easily imagine a more explicit assertion 
of the self-consciousness, and of course, the intelli- 
gence of God, considered as the cause of all things. 

* " Esse formale idearum Deum, quatenus tantum ut res cogitans 
consideratur, pro causa agnoscit et non, quatenus alio attributo ex- 
plicatur. Hoc est, tarn Dei attributorum, quam rerum singularium 
idea? non ipsa ideata, sive res perceptas pro causa efficiente agno- 
scunt ; sed ipsum Deum, quatenus est res cogitans." Ethica, pars 
ii. prop. v. 

f " In Deo, datur necessario idea, tarn ejus essentia?, quam 
omnium, quae ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur. 

" Demonstr. Deus enim infinita infinitis modis cogitare, sive 
ideam sua? essentia? et omnium, qua? necessario ex ea sequuntur, 
forraare potest." Ibid., pars ii. prop. iii. 



48 



It is not met by saying that it alludes to the ideas 
of the Infinite, which exist in the aggregate of finite 
minds. For this supposition is contradicted by the 
following passages. 

" The idea of God, from which infinite effects 
proceed in infinite modes can be only one. 

" Demon str. For the infinite intelligence com- 
prehends nothing but the attributes of God, and his 
affections," (modes or manifestations). "But God 
is one. Therefore the idea of God, from which in- 
finite effects proceed in infinite modes, must be 
only one." * 

If the idea which God has of his own essence, be 
merely a compound of the ideas of finite minds, ac- 
cording to Spinoza, it is plain that he could never 
have maintained a proposition like that now quoted. 
But he makes the distinction between the finite 
mind and the infinite mind, still more clear in a 
passage taken from another part of his writings. 

"The mind," (the human mind) "can imagine 
nothing, nor remember past events, except as long 
as the body lasts." 

# " Idea Dei, ex qua infinita infinitis mc-dis sequuntur, unica 
tantum esse potest. 

"Demonstr. Intellectus infinitus nihil, praeter Dei attributa 
ejusque affectiones, comprehendit. Atqui Deus est unicus. Ergo 
idea Dei, ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum 
esse potest." Ibid., par ii. prop. iv. 



49 



" But in God the idea necessarily exists, which 
expresses the essence of this or that human body 
in an eternal form. 

" Demonstr. God is not only the cause of the 
existence of this or that human body, but also of its 
essence ; which therefore must necessarily be con- 
ceived of by means of the essence of God ; and 
that by a certain eternal necessity ; which concep- 
tion must necessarily exist in God/' * 

I have thus shown that the limitation of thought 
to the aggregate of thinking beings, considered as 
phenomenal Nature, to use your expression, is con- 
tradicted by specific passages in the writings of 
Spinoza. 

I will now sum up what has been said, in the 
form of a general demonstration. 

According to Spinoza, the attributes of God ex- 
press or manifest his infinite and eternal essence. 
But that pertains to the essence of any thing, which 
being given, the thing is necessarily supposed, and 

* " Mens nihil iraaginari potest, neque rerum pra:teritarum re- 
cordari, nisi durante corpore." Ibid., pars v. prop. xxi. 

" In Deo tamen datur necessario idea, quas hujus et illius cor- 
poris humani essentiam sub seternitatis specie exprimit. 

" Demonstr. Deus non tantum est causa hujus et illius corporis 
humani existentise, sed etiam essentia?, qua? propterea per ipsam 
Dei essentiam necessario debet concipi, idque seterna quadam 
necessitate, qui quidem conceptus necessario in Deo dari debet." 
Ibid., pars v. prop. xxii. 

7 



50 



which being taken away the thing is necessarily 
destroyed ; or that, without which the thing, and 
vice versa, which without the thing, can neither exist, 
nor be conceived of. But thought is an attribute 
of God, or God is a thinking being. Hence, thought 
is an attribute which pertains to the infinite and 
eternal essence of God ; but the infinite and eternal 
essence of God is the cause of the universe, and 
therefore thought which pertains to the essence of 
God, pertains to him considered as the cause of the 
universe. 

After the explanation, which I have now given, 
the errors in this portion of your account of Spinoza's 
system will be obvious to every attentive reader. 
Perhaps, however, I might fail of being universally 
understood, if I neglected to briefly indicate them. 
1 will accordingly point them out in a body, and 
close the discussion of this topic. 

1. You assert, (p. 15.) that according to Spinoza, 
" whatever may be affirmed of the modifications of 
any being may be affirmed of that being itself." 
This is not correct. Spinoza affirms that the mod- 
ifications of the infinite, self-existent being are rela- 
tive, depending for their essence and their existence 
on something back of them, without which they 
cannot even be conceived of. He affirms, on the 
contrary, that the infinite self-existent being is ab- 



51 



solute, the cause of the essence and the existence 
of all things, and necessary to their being con- 
ceived of. 

2. You assert (ib.) that according to Spinoza, 
" phenominal Nature (Natura naturata) is equally 
God as causal Nature." This is not correct. Causal 
Nature, (to adopt your translation for a moment,) 
according to Spinoza, is the absolute self-existent 
God, the sole cause of the universe, on which all 
things ever depend. Phenomenal Nature is relative, 
depending for existence on God, and cannot be 
conceived of without him. 

3. You assert (ib.) that according to Spinoza, 
" there is infinite thought and intellect in the infinite 
universe, and a knowledge or understanding of 
God ; and that all this may be predicated of God, 
considered not as a cause, but as phenomenal 
Nature." This is not correct. Spinoza declares 
in the demonstration of the very proposition which 
you quote, that every act of intellect which is pre- 
dicated of phenomenal Nature, presupposes the 
eternal and infinite essence of thought, as an attri- 
bute of God, considered as causal Nature. 

4. You assert, (ib.) that according to Spinoza, 
"actual intellect must be referred to phenomenal 
Nature, not to causal Nature." This is not correct. 
Spinoza maintains that intellect, considered as an 
act, must be referred to phenomenal Nature, not to 



52 



causal Nature. The meaning of this statement we 
have already seen. Your error proceeds from a 
mistranslation of the words intellectus actu, which 
you render "actual intellect;" while they signify 
" intellect as an act." If the original Latin had been 
quoted here, as it is in many other parts of your ac- 
count, your readers might instantly have detected 
the error for themselves.* f 

* A writer familiar with Spinoza's use of language could not 
have translated the words intellectus actu, by " actual intellect." 
Spinoza often has occasion to express the idea of actual existence, 
but I do not recollect an instance in which he employs the word 
actu, by itself, for that purpose. On the other hand, I could produce 
more examples than would be likely to be read, of other expressions, 
such as actuosus, actualis, actu existentis, which, as far as I know, 
he always uses to signify " actual." I will give a few of them. 

" Dei potentiam nihil esse, praeterquam Dei actuosam essentiam." 
Ethica, pars. ii. prop. iii. schol. 

" The power of God is nothing, beside the actual essence of God." 

" Dei cogitandi potentia sequalis est ipsius actuali agendi poten- 
tise." Ibid., pars. ii. prop. vii. coroll. 

" The power of thinking in God is equal to his actual power of 
acting." 

" Primum, quod actuate mentis humanse esse constituit, nihil 
aliud est, quam idea rei alicujus singularis actu existentis." Ibid., 
pars. ii. prop. xi. 

" The first thing, which constitutes the actual being of the human 
mind, is nothing else than the idea of some individual thing, actu- 
ally existing." 

" Conatus, quae unaquseque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, 
nihil est prseter ipsius rei actualem essentiam." Ibid., pars. iii. 
prop. vii. 



53 



5. You convey the idea, by using the words 
"actual intellect," that Spinoza denies absolute 

" The endeavor, by which each thing strives to continue in its 
being is nothing beside the actual essence of the thing." 

"Mens actualem corporis existentiam involvit." Ibid., pars iii. 
prop. xi. schol. 

" The mind involves the actual existence of the body." 

f The remark of Spinoza " not that I allow the supposition of 
any potential intellect " is brought into the account from a scholium, 
as if it were used in antithesis to " actual intellect." This is an 
error. To ascribe potential intellect to the Deity, is to ascribe to 
hirn the possibility of becoming intelligent at some future time. 
But this is a trifling proposition. Spinoza, surely never was at the 
pains to deny it. His words are, " ratio, cur hie loquar de intellectu 
actu, non est, quia concedo, ullum dari intellectum potentia." 
" The reason why I here speak of intelligence as an act, is not that 
I admit intelligence as a power." 

The meaning of this expression is evident from parallel passages 
in his writings. He regarded power, intelligence, and existence, as 
forming an absolute unity in the infinite essence of God. The in- 
telligence of God, in his view, is not one thing and the power of 
intelligence another, but the power of God and the intelligence of 
God are God himself. " The power of God is the very essence of 
God." " Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia." Pars. i. prop, 
xxxiv. 

In this opinion, Spinoza did not suppose that he differed widely 
from other philosophers. " For all the philosophers," says he, 
"whom I have seen, admit that God has no intelligence as a 
power, but only as an act ; and since his intelligence and will are 
not distinguished from his essence, as even all concede," and so 
forth. " Deinde omnes, quos vidi, philosophi concedunt, nullum in 
Deo dari intellectum potentia, sed tantum actu; cum autem et ejus 
intellectus et ejus voluntas ab ejusdem essentia non distinguantur, 
uti etiam omnes concedunt." Pars. i. prop, xxxiii. schol. ii. 



54 



intelligence to God, considered as the cause of the 
universe, while Spinoza himself in the words which 
immediately follow your quotation, and which make 
an essential part of it, declares that this is not his 
meaning. This is not correct. For, by thus giving 
an erroneous translation of the words which you 
quote, and omitting to quote the passage in which 

This conception may be explained also by referring to Spinoza's 
account of the philosophy of Descartes (Appendix), which, though 
it is not to be taken as a proof of his later opinions, may serve to 
illustrate his mode of reasoning. " Will and power, considered, 
externally, are not distinguished from the intelligence of God, as is 
plain from what has been said ; — from which we clearly perceive 
that the intelligence of God and his power, and the will, with 
which he created, knew, and preserves or loves created things, are 
in no way to be distinguished in themselves, but only in relation to 
our thought." " Voluntas et potentia, quoad extra non distinguun- 
tur a Dei intellectu, ut jam satis ex antecedentibus constat; — ex 
quibus, clare etdistincte percipimus, intellectum Dei, ejusque poten- 
tiam, et voluntatem, qua res creatas creavit, intellexit, et conservat, 
sive amat, nullo modo inter se distingui, sed tantum respectu 
nostrse cogitationis." Opera, vol. i. p. 121. 

The same conception may be found expressed by other writers. 
" The power of God is not any thing different from God, but is the 
Almighty himself." Brown's Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and 
Effect, p. 126. 

" God is infinitely intelligent, infinitely powerful, infinitely good; 
his intelligence, his will, his power, are really but one and the same 
thing ; that which thinks in him is the same which wills ; that 
which acts, which has power, and which does every thing is pre- 
cisely the same which thinks and which wills ; — in a word, in him 
every thing is of a supreme unity." Fenelon, L 'existence de Dieu, 
part. ii. chap. v. p. 235. (Paris, 1822.) 



55 



the words are explained, you make Spinoza assert 
the very doctrine which he denies. You say that, 
according to him, no " actual intellect can be as- 
cribed to God, as the cause of the universe," where- 
as he says, that no act of intellect can be or can be 
conceived of, except on the supposition of absolute 
thought ; that is, the attribute of God which ex- 
presses the eternal and infinite essence of thought. 

It has now been shown, I trust, to the satisfac- 
tion of every mind, accustomed to think with clear- 
ness and candor, that the denial of absolute Intelli- 
gence, to the Infinite Cause of the universe, forms 
no part of the system of Spinoza. 

I perceive nothing in the passages quoted on 
pp. 16. 17. that calls for any remark, after what has 
been already said, except the explanatory words, 
which you have introduced into this sentence. 

" It appears that our mind, considered as intelli- 
gent, is an eternal mode of thought, which is limited 
by another eternal mode of thought, and that again 
by another, and thus to infinity, so that altogether, 
they [that is, human minds, or minds like the hu- 
man] constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of 
God."* (p. 17.) 

* " Apparit, quod mens nostra, quatenus intelligit, ceternus cogi- 
tandi modus sit, qui alio seterno cogitandi modo determinatur et 
hie iterum ab alio et sic in infinitum ; ita ut omnes simul Dei aeter- 



56 



It seems hardly possible that any one should so 
misapprehend Spinoza, as to suppose he maintained 
that "human minds, or minds like the human" 
constitute the infinite intelligence of God. After 
the instances already considered, however, no mis- 
apprehension is very surprising. The doctrine of 
Spinoza is, that the human mind, in its essence and 
its existence, is one of the eternal modes, in which 
the absolute thought of God manifests itself. But 
these modes exist in an infinite variety. The infi- 
nite and eternal intelligence of God is manifested in 
infinite modes of thought, of which our minds and 
minds like them are but one ; which modes taken 
together constitute the infinite and eternal intelli- 
gence of God. 

The idea of Spinoza may be illustrated by re- 
ferring to certain conceptions of modern philosophy. 
Metaphysicians represent the human mind, as con- 
sisting of a variety of powers, will, understanding, 
feeling, and so forth, all of which taken together, 
constitute the human mind. Still they suppose 
something back of these powers, without which 
they could not exist, or be conceived of, that is, the 
human mind itself. 

So too, theologians represent the divine mind as 

num et infinitum intellectum constituant." Ethica, pars. v. prop, 
xl. schol. 



57 



consisting of a variety of attributes, love, wisdom, 
justice, and so forth, all of which taken together 
constitute the divine mind. Still, they suppose 
something back of these attributes, without which 
they could not exist or be conceived of, that is, the 
divine mind itself. 

Now Spinoza, in his conceptions of God, rejected 
the use of the term " power," in the sense of our 
metaphysicians, and of the term " attribute," in the 
sense of our theologians. He opposed the common 
distinctions which are made in the divine nature, as 
implying somewhat of human limitation and imper- 
fection. Power, will, and intelligence were regard- 
ed by him as combined in one absolute principle 
of the divine nature. Hence, he could not speak 
of the infinite intelligence of God, as being constitu- 
ted of several subordinate and limited powers of 
intelligence. But the modes of the divine essence 
correspond, in his phraseology, to the different 
powers which are usually ascribed to God. He, 
therefore, speaks in the passage quoted, of the in- 
finite intelligence of God, as constituted by the 
infinite modes, in which it is manifested, of which 
" the human mind and minds like the human " form 
but one; just as theologians describe the nature of 
God, as constituted by the various divine attributes ; 
but, at the same time, he supposes something back 
of these modes, without which they could not exist 
8 



58 



or be conceived of, that is, the divine intelligence 
itself.* 

I have now noticed every thing in your account 
which I conceive to have a bearing on the main 
question at issue, namely, whether the attribute of 



* The conception of the human mind as a mode of the infinite 
intelligence may suggest to the admirers of Wordsworth, these pro- 
foundly significant lines from the " Excursion." 

" Immutably survive, 

For our support, the measures and the forms 

Which an abstract Intelligence supplies ; 

"Whose kingdom is, where Time and Space are not ; 

Thou, dread Source, 

Prime, self-existing Cause and End of all, 
That in the scale of Being, fill their place, 
Above our human region, or below, 
Set and sustained ; 

Thou, thou alone 

Art everlasting, and the blessed Spirits, 
Which thou includest, as the Sea her waves ; 
For adoration thou endurest ; endure 
For consciousness the motions of thy will; 
For apprehension those transcendent truths 
Of the pure Intellect, that stand as laws 
(Submission constituting strength and power) 
Even to thy Being's infinite majesty ! 
This universe shall pass away— a frame 
Glorious ! because the shadow of thy might, 
A step, or link, for intercourse with Thee." 
Wordsworth's Excursion, book iv. p. 132. (Boston Ed.) 



59 



intelligence is ascribed to God, in the system of 
Spinoza. 

I pass to a consideration of your remarks on the 
following quotation, which I brought forward as a 
proof that, according to Spinoza, the Deity is not to 
be confounded with the material universe. 

"The intelligence and will which we should 
regard as constituting the essence of God, must 
differ entirely from human intelligence and will. 
The intelligence of God, so far as it is conceived as 
constituting the essence of God, is indeed the cause 
both of the essence and of the existence of the 
universe. The intelligence of God, then, is the 
cause both of the essence and the existence of our 
intelligence ; and must therefore differ from it, as 
that which is caused differs from its cause, namely, 
in that which it receives from its cause." 

This passage, you speak of, (pp. 23 — 26.) as 
being " composed of sentences altered from the ori- 
ginal," and " making Spinoza express the direct 
opposite of that for which he is contending." These 
are grave charges, and shall be gravely met. 

1. With regard to the accuracy of the quotation. 
The clause in the passage on which I relied to prove 
that Spinoza made a distinction between the Deity 
and the material universe was the following. " The 
intelligence of God, so far as it is conceived as con- 
stituting the essence of God, is indeed the cause 



60 



both of the essence and of the existence of the 
universe." This sentence alone was amply suffi- 
cient for my purpose ; it expresses, in a few w T ords, 
what I believe to be an essential principle in 
Spinoza's system ; it is to be construed not hypo- 
thetically, but positively, as a declaration of his own 
views ; it is referred to, for this purpose, by some 
of the most judicious expounders of his philosophy ;* 
and, had I advanced it, without any addition, it 
would have conveyed a correct idea of his doctrine 
on the question at issue. But I perceived, that if 
I quoted it, without any qualification, an erroneous 
impression might possibly be produced, in another 
point of view. For although Spinoza asserts that 
" the intelligence of God is indeed the cause of the 
universe," he also declares that the divine intelli- 
gence "must differ entirely from human intelligence." 
It was not consistent with my conceptions of literary 
fidelity, to pass by this fact without notice. Al- 

* Rixner and Herder, for instance, — writers, whom I have usually 
found safe and agreeable guides in the study of Spinoza. The as- 
sertion that they are no authorities on a subject like this can excite 
only a smile. Rixner quotes the sentence, with the succeeding 
clause, to show, what we have before seen, that Spinoza integrates 
will, intelligence, and power in the essence of God. (Geschichte 
der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 64.) Herder brings it forward with 
many other passages, in proof of the point I was maintaining, 
namely, that "intelligence is an attribute of the divine nature." 
(Gesprache uber Spinoza's System, p. 170.) 



61 



though the additional passages might seem to weaken 
my case, I felt bound to produce them. I was un- 
willing to give the impression, by any thing which I 
said, or omitted to say, that when Spinoza declared 
" that the intelligence of God is the cause of the 
universe," he meant to be understood as regarding 
the intelligence which constitutes the essence of 
God, as similar to human intelligence. I therefore 
quoted in addition the two sentences from the same 
paragraph, in which he asserts the essential distinc- 
tion between the divine and the human intelligence, 
with the connecting words, — or " interpolation " as 
you mildly term it, — " which we should regard ;" 
those words, or others equivalent, being essential in 
my view, to the correct understanding of the pas- 
sage. 

So much for " interpolation " and " altering from 
the original." You fail to observe, that the sup- 
posed "alteration" was not to strengthen my own 
view of the case, but to guard against giving a 
stronger impression in its favor, than I believed to 
be just. 

2. With regard to the meaning of the passage. 
In the account which you have given, you have 
been betrayed into errors, no less formidable, than 
those we have already considered; but I do not 
deem it necessary to ascribe them to any other 
cause, than the misapprehension of an obscure 



62 



writer, whose mode of thought is so different from 
popular conceptions. 

You say, that the purpose of the passage, from 
which my quotation is taken, is to show " that 
neither intellect nor will belong to the nature of 
God;" "that we cannot ascribe them to the Deity, 
in any intelligible sense of the words ; that is, that 
we cannot reasonably ascribe them to the Deity at 
all." (pp. 24, 25.) 

The purpose of the passage is not correctly 
stated in this extract. On the contrary, the design 
of Spinoza, as he expressly declares, is to show 
that intelligence and will, so far as they are con- 
ceived as constituting the essence of God, must be 
incomparably superior to those attributes, as they 
are exhibited in man. The correctness of this 
statement will appear from the following explana- 
tion. 

In the sixteenth Proposition, (the Proposition 
immediately preceding that under consideration,) 
Spinoza maintains that " from the necessity of the 
divine nature, infinite effects in infinite modes (that 
is, every thing which can fall under the infinite in- 
telligence) must proceed." Having proved this 
proposition, he states the following corollaries, which 
I have already quoted in another connexion. 

" Hence it follows, that God is the efficient cause 
of all things which can fall under the infinite intelli- 
gence. 



63 



" That God is a cause by himself, but not by 
contingency. 

" God is the absolutely first cause." 

We come then to the seventeenth Proposition, 
to which the passage in question is a scholium. It 
is as follows. 

"God acts from the laws of his own nature 
alone, and compelled by no one." 

"Demonstr. From the necessity of the divine 
nature alone, or (what is the same thing) from the 
laws of that nature alone, we have just shown that 
infinite effects must absolutely proceed ; we have 
also shown that nothing can exist, or can be con- 
ceived of without God ; but all things are in God ; 
therefore, there can be nothing external to him, by 
which he can be determined or compelled to ac- 
tion ; and hence, God acts from the laws of his 
own nature alone, and compelled by no one. 

" Coroll. I. Hence it follows, that there is no 
cause, from without or from within, except the per- 
fection of his own nature, which can incite God to 
action. 

" Coroll. II. Hence it follows that God is the 
sole free cause. For God alone exists by the sole 
necessity of his nature, and acts from the sole ne- 
cessity of his nature. Therefore, God alone is a 
free cause." 

Then follows the scholium, from which the pas- 



64 



sage is taken. The principles, already laid down 
being clearly understood, there will be little difficulty 
in comprehending the argument of Spinoza which I 
am about to present, in a concise form. I will af- 
terwards give it at length in Spinoza's own words. 

Having shown, as I understand him, that creation 
follows from the necessity of the divine nature (in- 
finita sequi debent,) he proceeds to consider those 
views which represent the freedom of God, as con- 
sisting in the power of choice between creating and 
not creating. The power of choice implies an act 
of deliberation, consequently of doubt, consequently 
of imperfection. Intelligence and will in this sense 
cannot be ascribed to the Infinite and Perfect 
Being. This idea is repeated in many forms in 
the writings of Spinoza. " I will show," says he, 
"that neither intelligence nor will belong to the 
nature of God." The meaning which he attaches 
to these terms is evident from the remarks which 
immediately follow. By intelligence and will, as 
here used, he understands the human intelligence 
and will, which are commonly ascribed to God. 
" I know," says he, " that there are many persons, 
who think they can demonstrate that the highest 
intelligence and free will belong to the nature of 
God ; for, say they, they know nothing more per- 
fect which they can attribute to God, than that 
which is the highest perfection in us." He then 



65 



proceeds to assign his objections to their view, that 
God cannot create all things which fall under his 
infinite intelligence ; but is determined to the act of 
creation by some absolute, arbitrary volition. This, 
he maintains is inconsistent with the divine omnipo- 
tence. He then goes on to show that intelligence 
and will, as those qualities exist in man, cannot 
be predicated of God ; but that, so far as they 
are conceived as constituting the divine essence, 
must be as superior to our intelligence and will, as 
the constellation called the Dog is superior to the 
dog, a barking animal. He announces his proposi- 
tion thus. "Moreover, to say something here also 
of the intelligence and will, which we commonly 
attribute to God ; if intelligence and will per- 
tain to the eternal essence of God, something must 
be understood by each attribute, different from 
what men usually understand." This is the point 
to be proved. 

The demonstration is as follows. 1. "If intelli- 
gence pertains to the divine nature, it cannot be, as 
it is regarded by many, like our intelligence, 
naturally posterior to, or simultaneous with the ob- 
jects that fall under it, since God is prior in causal- 
ity to all things ; but, on the contrary, the truth and 
formal essence of things is what it is, because it thus 
objectively exists in the intelligence of God." 2. 
9 



66 



" Hence, the intelligence of God, so far as it is con- 
ceived as constituting the essence of God, is indeed 
the cause both of the essence and of the existence 
of the universe." 3. " Since then the intelligence 
of God is the sole cause of things, that is, as we 
have shown, as well of their essence as of their ex- 
istence, it must necessarily differ from them both in 
regard to essence and existence. For the thing 
caused differs from its cause, precisely in that 
which it receives from its cause." 4. " But the in- 
telligence of God is the cause both of the essence 
and existence of our intelligence." And therefore, 
5. " the intelligence of God, so far as it is conceiv- 
ed as constituting the divine essence, differs from 
our intelligence, both in regard to essence and 
existence ; nor can correspond with it in any thing 
but name ; which we wished to prove." 

" Here," as you observe, (p. 26.) " the argument 
concludes. It was of course the purpose of Spino- 
za to prove the proposition which he had laid down 
at its commencement," and which he repeats at its 
close ; not as you erroneously assert, " that neither 
intellect nor will belong to the divine nature," but 
that " the intelligence of God so far as it is conceiv- 
ed as constituting the divine essence, must differ 
from our intelligence." 

I will now give a literal translation of the whole 



67 



passage, relating to the present question, with the 
original Latin. * 

" Others suppose that God is a free cause, for this 
reason, as they fancy, that he is able to effect, that 
those things which, we have said, proceed from his 
nature, that is, which are in his power, should not 
be, or that they should not be produced by him. 
But this is the same thing as saying, that God can 
effect, that it should not follow from the nature of a 
triangle that its three angles are equal to two right 
angles ; or that from a given cause the effect should 
not proceed, which is absurd. I shall presently show, 
without the aid of this proposition, that neither in- 
telligence nor will pertain to the nature of God. I 
am aware, indeed, that there are many who suppose, 
they can demonstrate that the highest intelligence 
and free will pertain to the nature of God ; for they 
aver that they know nothing more perfect which they 

* "Alii putant, Deum essecausamliberam, propterea quod potest, 
ut putant, efficere, ut ea, quae ex ejus natura sequi diximus, hoc est, 
quae in ejus potestate sunt, non fiant, sive ut ab ipso non produ- 
cantur. Sed hoc idem est, ac si dicerent, quod Deus potest efficere, 
ut ex natura trianguli non sequatur, ejus tres angulos aequales esse 
duobus rectis ; sive ut ex data causa non sequatur effectus, quod est 
absurdum. Porro infra absque ope hujus Propositions ostendam, 
ad Dei naturam neque intellectum, neque voluntatem pertinere. 
Scio equidem plures esse, qui putant, se posse demonstrare, ad Dei 
naturam summum intellectum et liberam voluntatem pertinere ; 
nihil enim perfectius cognoscere sese ajunt, quod Deo tribuere 



68 



can attribute to God, than that which is the highest 

perfection in us. Moreover although they conceive 
of God as actually knowing in the highest degree, 
they do not believe that he can cause all things to 
exist, which he actually knows ; for, in this way they 
think they should destroy the power of God. If, 
say they, he had created all things which are in his 
intelligence, he could then have created nothing 
more, which they deem contrary to the omnipotence 
of God ; and therefore they prefer to represent God 
as indifferent to all things, and creating nothing ex- 
cept that which he decreed to create by a certain 
absolute will. But I think I have shown with suffi- 
cient clearness, that from the supreme power of God, 
or his infinite nature, infinite effects in infinite modes, 

possunt, quam id, quod in nobis sumraa est perfectio. Porro, 
tametsi Deum actu # sumrae intelligentem concipiant, non tamen 
credunt, eum posse omnia, quae actu intelligit, efficere, ut existant; 
nam se eo modo Dei potentiam destruere putant. Si omnia, inqui- 
unt, quse in ejus intellectu sunt, creavisset, nihil turn amplius 
creare potuisset, quod credunt Dei omnipotentiae repugnare ; ideo- 
que maluerunt Deum ad omnia indifferentem statuere, nec aliud 
creantem prseter id, quod absoluta quadam voluntate decrevit 
creare. Verum ego me satis clare ostendisse puto, a summa Dei 
potentia, sive infinita natura, infinita infinitis modis, hoc est, omnia 

* Actu intelligentem, actu intelligit, " actually knowing," " he actu- 
ally knows;" that is "exercising the act of intelligence." This is an- 
other instance, which ought not to be overlooked, of the sense in which 
Spinoza uses the word actu to signify not real existence, but actual ex- 
ercise. 



I 



69 



that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth, or 
always proceed by the same necessity ; in the same 
way, as it eternally follows from the nature of a tri- 
angle that its three angles are equal to two right an- 
gles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God was in 
actual exercise from eternity, and to eternity will re- 
main in the same activity, (in eadem actualitate, 
scholastic Latin, 'the state of being in actual exer- 
cise.') And in this manner the omnipotence of God, 
in my judgment, is far more perfectly represented. 
Nay to speak plainly, my adversaries seem to deny 
the omnipotence of God. For they are compelled 
to confess that God knows an infinite variety of 
things that may be created (infinita creabilia) which 
notwithstanding he can never create. For other- 
wise, if he should create every thing which he knows, 

necessario effluxisse, vel semper eadem necessitate sequi ; eodem 
modo, ac ex natura trianguli ab seternc- et in seternum sequitur, 
ejus tres angulos sequari duobus rectis. Quare Dei omnipotentia 
actu # ab aeterno fuit et in seternum in eadem actualitate manebit. 
Et hoc modo Dei omnipotentia longe, meo quidem judicio, perfec- 
lior statuitur. Imo adversarii Dei omnipotentiam (liceat aperte 
loqui) negare videntur. Coguntur enim fateri, Deum infinita crea- 
bilia intelligere, qua? tamen nunquam creare poterit. Nam alias, 
si scilicet omnia, quse intelligit, crearet, suam, juxta ipsos, exhauri- 
ret omnipotentiam et se imperfectum redderet. Ut igitur Deum 
perfectum statuant, eo rediguntur, ut simul statuere debeant, ipsum 

* This example may be added to those already adduced, as showing 
the meaning of the term actu, in Spinoza's writings. 



70 



according to them, he would exhaust his omnipo- 
tence and make himself imperfect. They are com- 
pelled, therefore, in order to represent God as per- 
fect, to represent, at the same time, that he cannot 
produce all things to which his power extends ; than 
which nothing more absurd, or more contrary to the 
omnipotence of God, it seems to me, can be ima- 
gined. Still further, to say something here also of 
the intelligence and will, which we commonly attri- 
bute to God ; if intelligence and will pertain to the 
eternal essence of God, something different surely 
must be understood by each attribute from what 
men usually understand. For the intelligence and 
will which would constitute the essence of God 
must differ entirely from our intelligence and will, 
nor in any thing, except in name, can they agree ; 
no otherwise, indeed, than as agree the constellation 

non posse omnia efficere, ad qua? ejus potentia se extendit; quo 
absurdius, aut Dei omnipotentiae magis repugnans, non video, quid 
fingi possit. Porro, ut de intelleetu et voluntate, quos Deo com- 
muniter tribuimus, hie etiam aliquid dicam; si ad aeternam Dei 
essentiam, intellectus scilicet et voluntas pertinent, aliud sane per 
utrumque hoc attributum intelligendum est, quam quod vulgo solent 
homines. Nam intellectus et voluntas, qui Dei essentiam consti- 
tuerent, a nostro intelleetu et voluntate, toto coelo differre deberent, 
nec in ulla re, praoterquam in nomine, convenire possent; non 
aliter scilicet, quam inter se conveniunt canis, signum coeleste, et 
canis, animal latrans. Quod sic demonstrabo. Si intellectus ad 
divinam naturam pertinet, non poterit, uti noster intellectus, poste- 
rior, (ut plerisque placet), vel simul natura esse cum rebus intel- 
lects, quandoquidem Deus omnibus rebus prior est causalitate; 



71 



called the Dog and the dog a barking animal.* 
Which I will demonstrate thus. If intelligence per- 
tains to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intelli- 
gence, be naturally posterior to, as many suppose, 
or simultaneous with the objects of intelligence, since 
God is prior in causality to all things ; but, on the 
contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is 
what it is, because it thus objectively exists [not ex- 
isted f ] in the intelligence of God. Therefore, the 
intelligence of God, so far as it is conceived as con- 
stituting the essence of God, is, indeed, the cause 
both of the essence and x>f the existence of the uni- 
verse ; which seems even to have been observed by 
those who have asserted that the intelligence, will, 
and power of God are one and the same. Since, 
therefore, the intelligence of God is the sole cause 

sed contra Veritas et formalis rerum essentia ideo talis est, quia 
talis in Dei intellectu existit objective. Quare Dei intellectus, qua- 
tenus Dei essentiam constituere concipitur, est revera causa rerum, 
tarn earum essentia?, quam earum existential ; quod ab iis videtur 
etiam fuisse animadversum, qui Dei intellectum, voluntatem et 
potentiam unum et idem esse asseruerunt. Cum itaque Dei intel- 
lectus sit unica rerum causa, videlicet (ut ostendimus) tarn earum 
essentia?, quam earum existentise, debet ipse necessario ab iisdem 

* The mind of Spinoza was imbued with the spirit of the He- 
brew Scriptures. "Was not this expression suggested by the sublime 
words of the prophet, " For my thoughts are not your thoughts, 
neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as the 
heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than 
your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts." Isaiah lv. 8, 9. 

t As translated in Remarks, p. 25. 



72 



of things, that is, as we have shown, both of their 
essence, and of their existence, it must necessarily 
differ from them, both in regard to essence and ex- 
istence. For that which is caused differs from its 
cause, precisely in that which it receives from its 
cause." [Then follows the proof of this proposition, 
which, as stated in the " Remarks," is " foreign to 
the purpose," and is therefore omitted.] " But the 
intelligence of God is the cause both of the essence 
and the existence of our intelligence ; therefore the 
intelligence of God, so far as it is conceived as 
constituting the divine essence, differs from our in- 
telligence, both in regard to essence and existence, 
nor can agree with it in any thing but name. Which 
we wished to prove." 

It may not be improper to give some explanation 
of the doctrine of Spinoza, " that the divine intel- 
ligence differs entirely from human intelligence ; 99 
especially as it is stated in the " Remarks " (p. 25.) 
that " Spinoza labors to prove that we cannot 
ascribe intellect and will to the Deity in any intelli- 
gible sense of the words ; that is, that we cannot 
reasonably ascribe them to the Deity at all." A 

differre, tarn ratione essentia?, quam ratione existential. Nam cau- 
satum differt a sua causa precise in eo, quod a causa habet. * # * 
Atqui Dei intellectus est et essentia? et existentia? nostri intellectus 
causa: ergo Dei intellectus, quatenus divinam essentiam consti- 
tuere concipitur, a nostro intellectu, tarn ratione essentia?, quam 
ratione existentiae differt, nec in ulla re, praeterquam in nomine, 
cum eo convenire potest, ut volebamus." 



73 



thorough discussion of this subject, however, would 
demand too much space, for my present purpose. 
I must therefore, content myself here, with referring 
to one or two sources, in which the essential dis- 
tinction between the divine and the human intel- 
ligence, is insisted on, and to a certain degree, 
elucidated. 

The language of Spinoza himself, in a work 
already quoted, which is not to be taken as a proof 
of his final opinions, but which may serve to illus- 
trate their sense, as laid down in his " Ethics," has 
an immediate bearing on this point. 

" Among the attributes of God we have before 
enumerated omniscience, which it is sufficiently evi- 
dent belongs to God ; because knowledge (scientia) 
contains perfection in itself, and God, that is, the 
most perfect Being, can be destitute of no perfec- 
tion ; wherefore, knowledge is to be attributed to 
God in the highest degree, that is, such as presup- 
poses or supposes no ignorance, or privation of 
knowledge ; for, in that case, there would be imper- 
fection in the attribute, or in God. Hence it fol- 
lows that God has never possessed intelligence as 
a power, nor draws conclusions by a process of 
reasoning, (nunquam habuisse intellectum potentia, 
neque per ratiocinium aliquid concludere.)" * 

* " Inter attributa Dei numeravimus antea Omniscentiam, quam 

10 



74 



I may remark, in passing, that this sentence 
shows the difficulty in always seizing the correct 
sense of Spinoza's statements. An incurious or 
preoccupied reader might infer from the last clause, 
that Spinoza denied intelligence to God, " in any 
intelligible sense of the words ; " though his whole 
argument is intended to prove the contrary. 

Mr. Coleridge often presents important sugges- 
tions, explanatory of the distinction maintained by 
Spinoza. 

" The Supreme Reason," says Coleridge, " whose 
knowledge is creative, and antecedent to the things 
known, is distinguished from the understanding, or 
creaturely mind of the individual, the acts of which 
are posterior to the things, it records and arranges."* 

" It is, however, of immediate importance, to the 
point in discussion, that the reader should be made 
to see how altogether incompatible the principle of 
judging by general consequences is with the Idea 

satis constat Deo competere ; quia scientia continet in se perfec- 
tionem, et Deus, ens nempe perfectissimum, nulla perfectione carere 
debet; quare scientia summo gradu Deo erit tribuenda, scilicet 
talis, quae nullam preesupponat vel supponat ignorantiam, sive 
sciential privationem ; nam turn daretur imperfectio in ipso attri- 
bute, sive in Deo. Ex his sequitur Deum nunquam habuisse intel- 
lectum potentia, neque per ratiocinium aliquid concludere." Cogi- 
tata Metaphysica, Opera, vol. i. p. 118. 

* Coleridge's Lay- Sermon, quoted by President Marsh, in the 
Appendix to Aids to Reflection, p. 313. 



75 



of an Eternal, Omnipresent, and Omniscient Being ! 
that he should be made aware of the absurdity of 
attributing any form of Generalization to the all- 
perfect Mind. To generalize is a faculty and func- 
tion of the Human Understanding, and from its 
imperfection and limitation are the use and the 
necessity of generalizing derived. Generalization 
is a substitute for Intuition, for the power of intui- 
tive, (that is, immediate) knowledge. As a substi- 
tute, it is a gift of inestimable value to a finite Intel- 
ligence, such as Man in his present state is endowed 
with and capable of exercising ; but yet a substitute 
only, and an imperfect one, to boot. To attribute 
it to God is the grossest anthropomorphism." * 

Fenelon is perhaps, still more explicit, in regard 
to this distinction ; and often throws light on many 
of Spinoza's conceptions, though he considered 
himself as his antagonist. 

" Whatever is real in intelligence," says Fene- 
lon, " God possesses in a sovereign degree ; it is 
his knowledge {science,) his word, his light. Nev- 
ertheless, to limit this to the idea of spirit, in the 
degree and in the sense in which that term applies 
to us, would be a degradation of the attribute. 
His intelligence is neither successive, nor multi- 
plied ; it is not merely spirit, precisely in the kind 

* Aids to Reflection, Appendix, p. 329, 



76 



and degree of being, which he has communicated 
to us. If we should see his essence unveiled, we 
should find that it differs infinitely from the idea 
which we have of a created spirit. This thought, 
so far from lowering the idea of the incomprehen- 
sible being, is an elevation of this idea to the su- 
preme degree of incomprehensibility." * 

" I perceive a great difference between conceiv- 
ing and comprehending. To conceive of an object, 
is to have such a knowledge of it as suffices to 
distinguish it from every other object, with which it 
could be confounded, and still not to know every 
thing w T hich is in itself, in such a manner, as to be 
assured that we distinctly know all its perfections, 
as far as they are intelligible in themselves. 

"To comprehend, signifies to know distinctly 
and clearly all the perfections of the object, so far 
as they are intelligible. It is only God who knows 
the Infinite to infinity ; we know the Infinite only 
in a finite manner. He must therefore see in him- 
self an infinity of things, which we cannot see in 
him ; and those, which we do see in him, he sees 
with a clearness and a precision, to separate and 
combine them, which infinitely surpasses our own. 

" God who knows himself with this perfect 
knowledge, which I call comprehension, does not 

* Fenelon, Uexistence de Dieu, part. ii. chap. v. pp. 222, 223. 



77 



contemplate himself successively, and by a series 
of reflex thoughts. As God is preeminently one, 
his thought, which is himself, is also preeminently 
one ; as he is infinite, his thought is infinite ; a 
simple, indivisible, and infinite thought, can have no 
succession ; there is, therefore in this thought, 
none of the properties of time, which is a limited, 
divisible and changing existence." * 

I will conclude the discussion of this topic, with 
summing up the points in which I think you have 
misapprehended the meaning of the passage under 
consideration. 

1. You state that the proposition to be proved is 
" that neither intellect nor will belong to the nature 
of God." Spinoza, on the contrary states that the 
proposition to be proved is, " that the intelligence 
of God, so far as it is conceived as constituting the 
divine essence, must differ from our intelligence." 

2. You state, that the proposition, " the intelli- 
gence of God is the cause of our intelligence," is 
asserted hypothetically; "according to the suppo- 
sition that intellect belongs to God;'' whereas, it is 
evident from the connexion of the passage, that it is 
a positive declaration ; to say nothing of its agree- 
ment with other declarations to the same effect. 
For in the proposition which immediately precedes, 

* Ibid., pp. 266, 267, 



78 



Spinoza declares, that "all things must proceed 
from the divine nature, which can fall under the 
divine intelligence ;" he assumes the connexion of 
the divine intelligence with the divine causality ; and 
when on the next page, he says that he shall show 
that " intelligence does not belong to the nature of 
God," he saves himself from the most palpable con- 
tradiction that a writer could be guilty of, by con- 
fining the sense of intelligence, in this expression, 
to a limited and imperfect intelligence like the 
human. 

3. You omit in your quotation the words in 
nobis, "in us ;" " qws Deo communiter tribuimus" 
" which we commonly attribute to God uti noster 
intellectus, "as our intelligence;" which phrases 
explain the sense in which Spinoza denies intelli- 
gence to the Deity. 

I have thus gone over all the statements in your 
" Remarks," which appeared to me to call for atten- 
tion, in relation to the opinions of Spinoza. The 
reader is presented with materials, w T hich will ena- 
ble him to decide, both as to the justice of the 
charges which you have brought against me, and 
the literary questions which are at issue between us. 

In closing these notices of the system of Spinoza, 
it may not be superfluous, perhaps, to repeat the 
declaration which I made in my former letter, that I 



79 



do not adopt his views, as a satisfactory theory of 
the connexion between the universe and God ; I 
believe that he fell into many important errors, both 
as regards his mode of inquiry and the conclusions 
at which he arrived ; his system is liable to the ob- 
jection common to all mystical systems, that it exalts 
the Creator at the expense of the creature ; by de- 
nying free-will to the human mind, it impairs what 
I deem the true foundation of morals, though it 
shares that defect with popular systems, that can 
never be suspected of an irreligious character ; but 
I was unwilling to hear him branded as an atheist 
in unlimited terms, without protesting against the 
impropriety of the charge. His devout, sweet, un- 
selfish, truth-seeking spirit should, at least, protect 
him from the accusation, among those who believe 
that " the pure in heart shall see God." 

I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of introduc- 
ing here, the words of two of the leading minds of 
the present age, who, differing no less widely than 
myself from the speculative views of Spinoza, pos- 
sessed a just insight into the character of his sys- 
tem, and its coincidence with the purest religious 
faith. 

Speaking of the gratitude which he cherished 
towards such writers as George Fox, Jacob Beh- 
men, and William Law, Mr. Coleridge observes, 
" that the system is capable of being converted into 



80 



an irreligious Pantheism, I well know. The Ethics 
of Spinoza may, or may not, be an instance. But 
at no time could I believe that in itself and essen- 
tially it is incompatible with religion, natural or re- 
vealed ; and now, I am most thoroughly persuaded 
of the contrary." * 

" The ready belief which has been yielded to 
the slander of my ' potential infidelity,' I attribute in 
part to the openness with which I have avowed my 
doubts whether the heavy interdict under which 
the name of Benedict Spinoza lies is merited on the 
whole, or to the whole extent. Be this as it may, 
I wish, however, that I could find in the books of 
philosophy, theoretical or moral, which are alone 
recommended to the present students of Theology 
in our established schools a few passages as thor- 
oughly Pauline, as completely accordant with the 
doctrines of the established Church, as the following 
sentences in the concluding page of Spinoza's 
Ethics." f 

I translate Mr. Coleridge's quotation of the origi- 
nal. " In proportion as the mind rejoices in divine 
love or blessedness, its knowledge is increased, it 
gains greater power over the passions, and suffers 
less from those passions which are evil ; and there- 
fore from the fact that the mind rejoices in the di- 

# Coleridge's Biograplua Literaria, p. 93. 
t Ibid., p. 194. 



81 



vine love, 01 blessedness, it has the power of 
restraining unlawful desires ; no man rejoices in 
blessedness because he has restrained his passions, 
but on the other hand the power of restraining 
unlawful desires arises from this blessedness itself." 

The other writer I alluded to is Schleiermacher, 
who, in a passage, a part of which has already been 
quoted in this discussion, combines a beautiful tes- 
timony to the holy and unworldly character of Spi- 
noza with an allusion to the kindred spirit of No- 
valis. " Join with me here in offering a reverent 
tribute to the manes of the holy and proscribed 
Spinoza. The sublime spirit of the universe filled 
and penetrated his soul ; the Infinite with him was 
the beginning and the end ; the universe his only 
and everlasting love ; in holy innocence and pro- 
found humility, he saw himself reflected in the 
eternal world, as his own nature ,was the most 
lovely mirror of that ; he was pervaded with reli- 
gion and a holy spirit, and therefore he stands 
alone and unapproached, a genuine Master in his 
own Art, but elevated above the profane guild, 
without disciples and without the freedom of any 
corporation. 

" Wherefore should I first point out to you, how 
the same holds true with regard to Art ? How you 
have here also a thousand shadows and delusions and 
errors from the same cause ? Only in silence — for 
11 



82 



deep and recent grief has no words — will I refer 
you in place of every thing else to a glorious ex- 
ample, which you all ought to know, to the divine 
youth, who has too early fallen asleep ; to whom, 
every thing which touched his soul, was Art ; 
whose whole contemplation of the world at once 
became a great poem ; whom, although he has 
scarcely done more than utter the first tones of his 
voice, you must number among the richest poets, 
those rare spirits, who possess no less depth than 
clearness and life. Let me ask you to behold in 
him the power of the enthusiasm and the sobriety 
of a pious mind, and acknowledge that when 
philosophers shall be religious and seek for God, 
like Spinoza, and artists shall be pious and love 
Christ, like Novalis, then will the mighty resurrec- 
tion be celebrated for both worlds." * 

The words of Spinoza himself on this subject are 
full of instruction ; they illustrate his character and 
his principles ; and with them I will take leave of 
the present topic. 

Alluding, in a letter to a friend, to a harsh attack, 
which he had received from a critic of one of his 
works, he remarks, "I will briefly show what a 
sinister interpretation he has put upon me, whether 
from malice, or from ignorance, I cannot easily 

* Schleiermacher's Reden, pp. 47, 48. 



83 



say. If he had known my manner of life, he would 
not so readily have persuaded himself that I taught 
atheism. For, atheists are wont to pursue honors 
and riches to excess, which I have ever despised, 
as all know who are acquainted with me. 

" But he says, * that in avoiding the error of the 
superstitious I have laid aside all religion.' What 
he may understand by religion, and what by super- 
stition, I do not know. But, I would fain ask, has 
he laid aside all religion, who thinks that God is to 
be acknowledged as the supreme good, and that, as 
such, he is to be loved with a free mind ? And 
that this alone makes our most perfect happiness 
and liberty ? That the reward of virtue, moreover, 
is virtue itself, and that the punishment of folly and 
weakness is folly itself? And, in fine, that each 
one should love his neighbor, and obey the com- 
mands of the supreme power? But these things I 
have not only expressly declared, but proved by 
the strongest reasons. 

"You may thus see, my friend, that this person 
has evidently departed from the truth ; and never- 
theless I grant that he has done no injury to me, 
but the greatest to himself, when he did not blush 
to assert that with covert and disguised arguments 
I taught atheism." * 



* Epistola xlix. vol. i. pp. 628, 629, 633. 



84 



I intended to consider your account of Schleier- 
macher and De Wette in this letter ; but I have 
already made it too long ; I will, therefore, reserve 
that subject for another occasion ; and discuss it, in 
a separate letter, which will soon follow. 

Meantime, should you deem it "proper to re- 
mark " on what I have now said, notwithstanding 
the previous " improbability " that you allude to, I 
shall give your " remarks " an attentive, and I trust, 
not an uncandid perusal. If I find any thing in 
them that seems to call for special notice, and the 
discussion of which may serve the cause of truth 
and justice, I shall probably continue my examin- 
ation. I do not feel at liberty to retire from a con- 
test, — if that name is to be applied to what should 
be a mutual search for truth, — so long as a word 
spoken may aid a sincere seeker, or increase the 
light and peace of our religious community. 

You once or twice allude to the fact that my let- 
ter was published anonymously. What inference 
you would draw from that circumstance is not ap- 
parent. It certainly does not change the force of 
the arguments, presented in the letter ; but I relied 
on an appeal to arguments, not to personal consid- 
erations ; and as it was of no importance to bring 
an obscure name before the public, it seemed to me 
to be more in accordance with good taste, as well 



85 



as common usage, not to obtrude myself unneces- 
sarily. I surely had no desire for concealment ; this 
was impossible, even had I wished it. I would, 
however, avoid the slightest appearance of shrinking 
from responsibility ; I would not utter under a vail, 
what I should not be ready to proclaim from the 
house-tops ; and therefore I drop the signature of 
" An Alumnus," and 



subscribe myself, 

Yours, &c., &c., 



George Ripley. 



Boston, December 23, 1839. 




\ 



DEFENCE OF "THE LATEST FORM OF INFIDELITY " EXAMINED. 



A 

THIRD LETTER 

TO 

Mr. ANDREWS NORTON, 

OCCASIONED BY HIS DEFENCE OF 

A DISCOURSE ON « THE LATEST FORM OF INFIDELITY." 
By GEORGE RIPLEY. 



BOSTON: 
JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY. 

M DCCC XL. 



BOSTON : 
PRINTED BY FREEMAN AND BOLLES, 

WASHINGTON STREET 



SCHLEIERMACHER 

AND 

DE WETTE. 



LETTER. 



Dear Sir, 

I propose, in this Letter, to consider your ac- 
count of the religious opinions of Schleiermacher 
and De Wette. In the "Notes" to your "Dis- 
course," as well as in your " Remarks" on my first 
Letter, you have presented several statements on 
this subject, which it is my duty to examine, and 
which, as I shall endeavor to show, are adapted to 
produce an erroneous impression concerning the 
character and position of those eminent theologians. 

If it were merely my desire to verify the state- 
ment, which I have previously made, in opposition 
to your own, my task could be despatched in a 
short compass ; but I conceive that it may not be 
without use to exhibit a more complete view of 
the theology in question than has yet been at- 
tempted; and I must, therefore, solicit the indul- 
gence of our common readers, in the demands that 
I shall make on their time and attention. 

It is seldom, I am aware, that the earnest seeker 

4 ■ 



6 

of truth will deem it worth while to engage in an 
elaborate historical discussion of individual opinions ; 
the question w T hich most interests his mind is not, 
What has been thought, but, What is ; he prefers 
to establish his convictions by the comparison of ar- 
guments, rather than by an appeal to authority; 
and provided he has gained a clear insight for him- 
self, he looks with comparative indifference on the 
controversies of the past. 

There are reasons, however, in the present case, 
which impart a more than ordinary interest to the 
question, which has been stated. Among the men 
of genius, whom the literature of Germany presents 
to our notice, few have been more distinguished 
in their respective departments, than Schleiermacher 
and De Wette. They are both, genuine, original 
men ; both have exerted a creative influence on 
the science, to the cultivation of which they have 
devoted their powerful minds ; theology, in their 
hands, has been redeemed from scholastic tradi- 
tions, and inspired with a fresh and vigorous life ; 
with a manly freedom in all relating to the mere 
letter, they combine the profoundest reverence for 
the essential spirit of religion ; and, with a just com- 
prehension of the results of speculation in modern 
times, they cherish a living and earnest faith in di- 
vine revelation, and the mission of Christ for the 
redemption of the world. Their singular intellect- 



7 



ual ability, the wonderful diversity of their gifts, the 
importance and variety of the subjects, to which 
they have directed their attention, their calm and 
balanced appreciation of discordant tendencies, their 
transparent candor of judgment, and the rare learn- 
ing which they bring to the support and illustration 
of their opinions, have given them a conspicuous 
station in the development of thought, and a wide 
influence upon the present theology of Europe. 
They will be certain, accordingly, to become the 
subjects of a liberal curiosity ; and the recent in- 
terest they have awakened among us, I cannot but 
consider as a happy indication of our times. 

It is not as individuals, however, that they chiefly 
concern us at present. We are to regard them as 
exponents of the progress of opinion in German 
theology. They are the two most prominent names 
in the modern history of that science. They mark 
the most interesting epoch in its gradual develop- 
ment. They represent the issue of the great strug- 
gle which has been carried on, since the middle of 
the last century. With their labors, commenced 
the first decided reaction against the Rationalistic 
tendency, which, from the time of Immanuel Kant, 
to the period of the establishment of the University 
at Berlin, may be said to have been predominant in 
the German Lutheran church. 

The character of this movement, it would seem, 



8 



has not been very clearly understood ; and, as will 
appear, in the sequel, had not attracted your atten- 
tion, before the publication of your "Discourse." 
If you had known that the scientific endeavors of 
Schleiermacher and De Wette have had for their 
principal object, to reconcile the belief of the divine 
origin of Christianity with the objections of the Ra- 
tionalists, who denied that doctrine, I presume you 
could not have spoken of either of them as among 
"the most noted in the modern school of infidelity." 
A slight sketch of this movement, therefore, will be 
necessary as an introduction to the detailed exposi- 
tion which I am about to present. 

The theology of the Lutheran creeds is founded 
on the principles of a rigid and exclusive Super- 
naturalism. As carried to the utmost limits, by 
many of its early expounders, it regarded revelation 
as an insulated fact in history, confirmed by prophe- 
cies and miracles, recorded, in an infallible form, in 
the Holy Scriptures, from which its import was to 
be derived merely by the aids of grammatical and 
historical criticism and the rules of logic. It labored 
under the defect of removing revelation from its 
connexion with nature and history ; it thus deprived 
it of its vitality, reduced it to an inexplicable and 
mechanical system ; and disclaimed the attempt to 
establish its inward reasonableness and truth. The 
supernatural element was made prominent and ex- 



9 



elusive ; the rational element was undervalued and 
neglected. 

It was unavoidable, in an inquiring and critical 
age, that the system should have been submitted 
to a bold and unsparing examination. The whole 
theory of revelation was discussed ; the narratives 
of the Gospels made the subject of a fearless scru- 
tiny ; every tradition looked in the face ; every 
doctrine tried for its life; a general fermentation 
ensued ; the Church rocked, as with the explosions 
of an earthquake ; Rationalism began to prevail, 
and religion to go down. 

This system, which resulted from the general 
conflict of thought, in its exclusive character, dis- 
cards the idea of an immediate divine revelation, 
and substitutes reason in its place, as the only 
legitimate source of religious truth. It considers 
Jesus Christ as a wise and good man, the defender 
of many valuable ideas, and the sincere friend of 
the human race ; but denies his claims to Divinity, 
either for his mission, his doctrine, or his person. 
It regards Christianity as an important historical 
phenomenon, but arising in the ordinary course of na- 
ture ; with no valid pretensions to a peculiar divine 
origin ; and no right to authority over the reason of 
man. In short, it makes the rational element in 
religion prominent and exclusive ; while it under- 
values and neglects the supernatural element. 
2 



10 



These systems, accordingly, were in direct an- 
tagonism with each other. Each perceived an 
important element of truth ; but, by each also, an 
important element was overlooked. Neither did 
complete justice to the subject; neither could 
satisfy the rational, religious mind ; the one was 
defective, by its neglect of the reason ; the other, 
by its neglect of revelation. 

A system was necessary, which should combine 
what was true, and reject what was false in both ; 
which should take its stand on a higher ground ; 
which should do equal justice to the supernatural 
element and the rational element in the Christian 
revelation. The problem was to defend the divine 
origin of Christianity, after the attacks it had 
received from the advocates of Rationalism ; to 
reconcile the universal faith of the Church with the 
conclusions of scientific investigation ; and, in the 
solution of this problem, the spirit of Christ was 
made the principal element. It was admitted that 
many objects of reverence had been deprived of 
their sacred character, by the efforts of the Ration- 
alists ; divinity could no longer be seen in the 
external letter; it escaped the researches of the 
critic and the skill of the logician ; but it could not 
be banished from the person of Christ ; the pre- 
sence of God was displayed in the manifestation of 
his Son. 



11 



This system, which attempts to restore the 
original unity between reason and revelation, faith 
and knowledge, to combine all the elements which 
are contained in the history of Christ, with the 
purest light of modern science, and to establish a 
living belief in Christianity on a foundation inac- 
cessible to the assaults of the skeptic, has received 
its most efficient support from Schleiermacher and 
De Wette. It is no less erroneous to class these 
theologians with the Rationalists, who are distin- 
guished by their denial of the divine origin of 
Christianity, than it would be to arrange them with 
the early Lutheran dogmatists, who called in 
question the claims of the human reason.* 

I now proceed to an examination of your ac- 
count of Schleiermacher, reserving what I may 
have to say of De Wette, to the close of my 
Letter. 

* See a complete and interesting account of the principles of this 
movement, by Ullmann, in Studien and Kritiken, for 1836, vol. L 
pp. 5 — 61. A portion of the article referred to may be found trans- 
lated in my first Letter, pp. 144 — 148. It is intimated in the 
"Remarks" (p. 52.) that " the religious character of Ullmann is 
different from that of Schleiermacher." If it is meant by this, that 
the theological opinions of Ullmann are different from those of 
Schleiermacher, on the point concerning which I referred to them, 
the supposition is incorrect. It may easily be set right by the 
article quoted. 



12 



You asserted in one of the "Notes" to your 
" Discourse," that Schleiermacher published a work 
on religion, which contains "a system of panthe- 
ism ;" which declares that " religion has nothing to 
do with belief or action ;" that " it is unconnected 
with morality ;" that " the idea of a personal God 
is pure mythology ;" and that " the belief and 
desire of personal immortality are wholly irreli- 
gious." (p. 44.) You also asserted that "the 
disciples of the new school," of which you had 
just before represented Schleiermacher as " one of 
the most noted," " are in Germany called Ration- 
alists or Naturalists." (pp. 43, 45.) You stated, 
moreover, — though with what intention, it is not 
perfectly clear, — that Schleiermacher "partook of 
the sacrament on his death-bed, as a Christian." 
(p. 44.) 

In my first Letter, I endeavored to show very 
briefly that this representation of the religious 
opinions of Schleiermacher was erroneous. I re- 
marked, that "you attempt to support your allega- 
tions by the citation of detached passages from one 
of his earliest writings, without the qualifications 
w r hich guard them where they stand, and without 
any reference to his subsequent productions, in 
which his theological views are more fully and 
distinctly expressed. In this way, you have pre- 
sented an erroneous idea of his position as a theolo- 



13 



gian, and treated with injustice the character of 
one of the most sincere and exemplary men, who 
have ever devoted their lives to the service of 
truth." (pp. 131, 132.) 

In proof of this, I referred to the purpose of the 
" Discourses on Religion," which was not to present 
"an elaborate or complete system of speculative 
doctrine," not to discuss the truth or falsehood of 
abstract religious conceptions, but to awaken the 
educated men of Germany to a reverence for reli- 
gion, by showing that it is independent of the 
technical creeds of theology ; that it addresses the 
devout affections, rather than the reflective under- 
standing ; that the heart is its seat, not the head ; 
and that " the conceptions which he renounces as 
essential to religion, are only those which are taken 
from human and earthly relations, and which con- 
sequently pervert every spiritual idea of God and 
immortality." (p. 137.) As an illustration of his 
general views on these topics, I produced a quota- 
tion from one of his notes, in which he says, " We 
must admit an essential difference between the 
inability to form such a human and personal con- 
ception of God, and the denial of the existence of 
the Living God, — which last alone can be designa- 
ted as atheism ; in like manner, he who does not 
incline to such a material conception of immortality, 
is very far from discarding the genuine hope of 



14 



immortality. And as we may call every man reli- 
gious, who believes in a Living God, we may also 
call every one religious who believes in the Ever- 
lasting Life of the Soul, without wishing to define 
the way or the manner in which it must be 
conceived." (p. 138.) I then gave a short sketch 
of the opinions held by Schleiermacher, and the 
school which he founded, in regard to the Christian 
revelation. 

In your " Remarks," you contend that your ac- 
count of Schleiermacher is essentially correct ; that 
" language cannot be used more deceptively than it 
is in the passage quoted," which represents him as 
a believer in the Living God, and in Everlasting 
Life; and that "the general account of his opinions 
respecting Christianity is equally deceptive ;" and 
you persist in the assertion that " using the word 
Rationalist in its widest acceptation as equivalent to 
Naturalist ; that is, as denoting one who, rejecting 
revelation, founds his faith on natural religion," (p. 
49.) the term is applicable to Schleiermacher, as 
having " as little belief in the divine authority of our 
religion," " as the earlier German Rationalists." (Ib.) 

I now repeat, that your statements on this sub- 
ject are radically defective and erroneous ; that the 
views presented in my first Letter are confirmed by 
the whole character of Schleiermacher's writings ; 
on this issue, the question is now to be discussed ; 



15 

and I shall bring forward the evidence, with but 
few comments of my own. 

The detached expressions of Schleiermacher, 
which you quote from his "Discourses on Reli- 
gion," are explained from the design and character 
of the work in which they appear. Taken in con- 
nection with the specific purpose, which he had in 
view, they will be found not to justify the inferences 
which you draw from them, and to involve no real 
inconsistency with the pure and elevated religious 
doctrines w T hich he sets forth in his subsequent 
writings. 

It will be necessary, therefore, to give a more 
minute account of the point of view, from which 
the subject is regarded in that celebrated work, 
than was consistent with the plan of my former 
Letter. 

The " Discourses on Religion " are addressed to 
" the educated among its despisers," — a designation 
which, in some degree, indicates their character. 
They were composed at a period when the power 
of Christianity had yielded to the boasted illumina- 
tion of the age ; the culture of the intellect was 
deemed the noblest object of endeavor ; the exer- 
cise of the reflective and critical understanding 
usurped the place of the higher instincts of the 
soul ; logical analysis was regarded as the surest 



16 



and most comprehensive organ of truth ; and reli- 
gion, deprived of its vitality, as an original and 
independent principle of human nature, was re- 
solved into a belief of speculative doctrines, or the 
practice of an artificial and heartless morality. 

The work of Schleiermacher is a bold and im- 
passioned attack on the religious degradation of the 
age. He meets the despisers, whom he addresses, 
on their own ground, carries the war into the pro- 
vince where they felt themselves safe from assault, 
and triumphantly shows that their contempt for reli- 
gion proceeds from ignorance of man ; that there is 
a foundation for piety in every human soul, which 
cannot be touched by their objections, and which 
should command their deepest veneration. 

" As a man," says he, " I would speak to you, 
according to my own convictions, of the holy mys- 
teries of humanity ; of the feelings of my soul, 
when in the gush of youthful enthusiasm, I sought 
after the unknown ; of that sentiment, which, since 
my first consciousness of thought and life, has been 
the most inward and powerful spring of my whole 
being ; and which will never lose its supremacy, 
whatever shocks I may receive from the fluctuations 
of time, and the course of human affairs." * 

In order to accomplish his purpose, Schleierma- 

* Reden ubcr die Religion, (Berlin, 1S31,) p. 3. 



17 



cher declares that it is not his intention to discuss 
the truth or falsehood of any abstract conceptions 
concerning religion, but to point out the essential 
element in human nature, on which all religion 
depends. He thus disclaims the attempt of pre- 
senting a system of speculative dogmas ; his object 
is of a totally different character ; that is, to exhibit 
the general principle which is prior to all systematic 
conceptions, which is common to all religions in 
every age, which constitutes man a being capable 
of religion, and which, existing as a primitive germ 
in the human soul, is manifested in the various reli- 
gious forms that have prevailed in the w r orld. He 
addresses himself, accordingly, to the educated men 
of Germany, who, though cherishing strong preju- 
dices against religion, might be presumed competent 
to understand the subtile and profound distinctions, 
which he was about to propose. 

" I do not seek," says he, " to awaken individual 
emotions which may perhaps belong within the 
sphere of religion ; nor to maintain or controvert 
individual conceptions. It is my purpose rather to 
conduct you into its most secret depths, from which 
all its various manifestations proceed. I would point 
out to you the original elements of Humanity on 
which it depends, and its connexion with that which 
you regard as the highest and most precious. I 
would place you upon the pinnacles of the temple, 
3 



18 



that you may survey the whole extent of the holy 
ground, and unveil its most sacred and hidden 
mysteries." * 

In pursuing this object, Schleiermacher attempts 
to show that the essential spirit of religion is not 
identical with the artificial and elaborate systems 
which human ingenuity has framed for the explana- 
tion of its character. The speculative doctrines of 
theology presuppose an original element in the 
nature of man, from which they proceed ; they do 
not constitute the essence of religion ; but their 
value and importance depend on the fidelity with 
which they represent this essence. " You are un- 
doubtedly well versed in the history of human 
follies, and of course, have run through the various 
systems of religion, from the absurd fables of volup- 
tuous nations to the most refined Deism ; from the 
gross superstition of human sacrifices to that inco- 
herent medley of moral philosophy and metaphysics, 
which is known at present by the name of purified 
Christianity ; and you have found them all untenable 
and contrary to reason. I am by no means dis- 
posed to call in question your conclusion. — 

" For what after all, are those artificial theories, 
in themselves considered, but productions of the cal- 
culating, mechanical understanding, in which every 



* Reden, p. 13. 



19 



separate portion has its place only as it is confined 
and limited by the others ? Do they not appear to 
you in this light, — these systems of theology, these 
hypotheses of the origin and the end of the world, 
these analytical representations of the nature of an 
Incomprehensible Being, — in which every thing 
falls into the tone of frigid argumentation, and even 
what is highest can be treated only in the manner 
of one of the vulgar controversies of the schools. 
But this certainly, — I appeal to your own feelings, — 
is not religion. If then you have only taken re- 
ligious theories and opinions into view, you do not 
jet understand religion, and what you despise is 
not religion/ ' * 

" Religion, by its very nature, is as foreign to the 
precision of systems, as philosophy, on the other 
hand, is inclined to it. Consider only upon whom 
those artificial fabrics rest, whose fragility you 
ridicule, whose false proportions offend your taste, 
and the incongruity of whose pretension with their 
powers awakens your sport. Are they the heroic 
names in religion ? Name to me, among all those 
who have ever introduced a new revelation into the 
world, or have pretended to one, — a single individual 
who has thought it worth the pains to engage in 
such a Sysyphus-like labor. No. It is only in 



* Reden, pp. 16—18. 



20 



those personal manifestations of heavenly emotions, 
when the holy fire must stream forth from enkindled 
and bursting hearts, that the mighty thunder of then- 
word announces that the Godhead reveals himself 
through them. In like manner, verbal conceptions 
and formulas are merely outward exhibitions, neces- 
sary indeed, and inseparable from the inward emo- 
tion ; and as such, intelligible only by means of 
the inward emotion of which they are the symbol. 
But the formal connexion of doctrine with doctrine 
is rarely attempted by them ; and then only, when 
it is required to obviate misunderstanding, or to 
detect pretence. It is from different attempts of 
this kind, that the prevailing systems of theology 
have gradually been composed. You must not 
then give your principal attention to that which is 
only the repeated and broken echo of the original 
voice ; you must place yourself within the hidden 
sphere of a religious mind, and endeavor to com- 
prehend the enthusiasm with which it is inspired ; 
you must seize the production of light and warmth, 
at the moment of their birth, in a soul prostrate be- 
fore the Universe.* If you neglect to do this, you 

# This is one of the expressions, from which the Pantheism of 
Schleiermacher has been inferred. Although not directly connected 
with the present topic, as it throws some light on the general 
question concerning his opinions, I may as well quote here the 
explanation which he gives in a Note to the Discourse. 



21 



will know nothing of religion. You will be in the 
same condition with him, who, with combustible 
materials, seeks too late the fire which the flint has 
struck out of the steel, and finds only a cold and 
insignificant atom of rough metal from which a flame 
can no more be enkindled." * 

Religion, then, according to Schleiermacher, is 
independent of speculative theories ; its essence 
does not consist in any abstract conceptions what- 
ever ; and although he does not maintain, as you 

"If a religious soul, which is unquestionably the object of this 
description, is usually called a soul prostrate before God, but in- 
stead of ' God ' the word ' Universe ' is here employed, then the 
Pantheism of the author in this passage cannot be denied. Such is 
the construction, I will not say the interpretation, which these 
words have not seldom received from superficial and, at the same 
time, suspicious readers, who did not consider that I was here 
speaking of the production of light and warmth in such a soul ; 
that is to say, of the origin of those religious emotions which are 
immediately transformed into religious conceptions and views 
(light), and into a state of mind prostrate before God (warmth), and 
that it was, therefore, appropriate to my design to direct the atten- 
tion to the mode in which such emotions commence. But. they 
arise precisely at the moment when man bows in reverence before 
the universe, and hence they exist habitually in those minds in 
which such reverence is habitual. For not only generally, but 
constantly, do we perceive God and his Eternal Power and God- 
head in the works of creation ; and this not merely in individual 
objects considered in and for themselves, but only in so far as they 
are embraced in the Unity and Universality in which alone God is 
immediately manifested." (pp. 27, 28.) 

* Reden, pp. 19, 20. 



22 



very incautiously assert, that, "it is unconnected 
with morality," (p. 44.) he insists that religion and 
morality are two separate elements in human nature ; 
he would not, with the prevailing philosophy of his 
day, make religion a subordinate appendage to 
morality, or confound the one with the other, but, 
on the contrary, while he defends the reality of 
the moral element as an essential principle of the 
soul, he defends the reality of the religious element 
as an equally essential, distinct, and independent 
principle of the soul. 

" It is contended that religion should be merely 
subservient to morality ; that it should have a pur- 
pose beyond itself; and that it should demonstrate 
its profit and uses. What a miserable degradation ! 
And its defenders should make it their aim to secure 
to it this degradation ! Rather let them, who make 
such a constant reference to utility, and who in the 
end value morality and right for some extrinsic 
advantage, — rather let them be lost sight of them- 
selves, in this eternal circle of a general utility, — in 
which they permit every thing good to disappear, 
and of which no man who desires to have any 
merits of his own can understand a single word of 
sound import, — than that they should venture to set 
themselves up for defenders of religion, whose inter- 
ests they are wholly incompetent to manage. A 
glorious renown, indeed, for this heavenly visitant, — 



23 



that it can minister such tolerable aid to the earthly 
occasions of man ! Peculiar honor for its spirit of 
freedom and self- repose, that it gives such vigilance 
and acuteness to his conscience ! But for such 
purposes, it does not descend on you from Heaven. 
An object, which is loved and valued, on account 
of some advantage that is not essential to its nature, 
may indeed be of service, but it cannot possess an 
independent necessity. A reasonable man will 
measure its worth merely according to that of the 
ultimate end, on account of which it is desired. In 
this way, the claims of religion would be estimated 
at a low rate." * 

We thus see, that in the opinion of Schleiermacher, 
the essence of religion does not consist in specula- 
tive theories or in outward morality. It claims a 
peculiar province in human nature ; it is to be loved 
and honored for its own exceeding and unalterable 
worth ; it stands far above every thing which is 
usually counted most valuable among men. He 
then proceeds to show its positive character, to 
unfold his views of its peculiar essence, and to des- 
ignate the characteristic distinction, which separates 
it from all other objects of human interest. This is 
the sense of the dependence of all created things 
on God. 



■ Rcdcn, p. 24. 



24 



" The measure of knowledge is not the measure 
of piety ; since piety is often manifested in its most 
beautiful, original, and peculiar forms, in him who 
can make no pretensions to an independent know- 
ledge of nature, but who has gathered only indi- 
vidual portions through his connexion with scien- 
tific men. Nay, the religious man will cheerfully 
acknowledge, even when you look down upon him 
in scorn, that as a religious man he does not possess 
this knowledge of which you boast ; for in that case, 
he also must be a philosopher. And I will here in- 
terpret for you in distinct words, that which the 
most of them only obscurely divine, but are unable 
to indicate, namely, that when you place the De- 
ity at the summit of your science, as the ultimate 
ground of all that is or can be known, they indeed 
honor and commend the procedure, but it is not the 
same with their way of knowing and possessing God ; 
from which, as they freely admit, and as is evident 
from their example, scientific knowledge cannot be 
derived. It is true, indeed, that contemplation is es- 
sential to religion, and that you can never call him a 
pious man, whose mind is locked up in dull stupid- 
ity, with no perception of the life of the Universe ; 
but this contemplation, like your knowledge of na- 
ture, is not directed to the essence of one finite ob- 
ject in its connexion and its contrast with others, nor 
like your knowledge of God, — if I may use here for 



25 



a moment the old expressions, — to the essence of 
the Supreme, Original Cause in itself, and in its rela- 
tion to all that which at the same time is both cause 
and effect. 

" The contemplation of the pious man, on the 
contrary, is only the immediate consciousness of 
the universal being of every thing finite in the Infi- 
nite, and through the Infinite, of every thing tempo- 
ral in the Eternal, and through the Eternal. To 
seek this [mode of being] and to find it in all that 
lives and moves, in all production and change, in all 
action and suffering ; to possess and to acknowledge 
life itself in immediate feeling only as this mode of 
existence, — this is religion. When this is found, re- 
ligion is satisfied. When this is concealed, religion 
perceives only limitation and agony, wretchedness 
and death. Religion is, accordingly, a life in the in- 
finite nature of the Universe, in one and all, in God, 
possessing and enjoying all in God and God in all. 
But science and knowledge is it not, neither of the 
world, nor of God. It only recognises these, with- 
out being identical with them. They are a revela- 
tion to it of the Infinite in the finite, which [revela- 
tion] it also sees in God, and God in it." * 

Religion, thus explained, in its primitive charac- 
ter, as a sense of God on the soul, has its seat, 

Reden, pp. 42, 43. 

4 



26 



neither in knowledge, nor in action, but in feeling. 
"This is the peculiar sphere which I would claim 
for religion, and that, without reserve or limitation. 
Your feeling, so far as it expresses your being and 
life, in common with that of the Universe, in the 
manner which has been described, so far as you re- 
gard the individual elements of which it is com- 
posed as an agency of God upon you, imparted 
through the agency of the creation, — this is your 
piety." * 

The general views of Schleiermacher, in regard to 
the distinction between religion, and speculative be- 
lief and morality may be understood from the pas- 
sages now r adduced ; but it may be useful to present 
here the succinct statement of the whole subject, 
which is contained in his great work on the "Christian 
Faith." 

u The piety which constitutes the basis of all church fel- 
lowship, considered in itself alone, is neither knowledge, nor 
action, but a determinate mode of feeling, or of immediate 
self-consciousness. — 

" If then, these three elements being supposed, namely, feel- 
ing, knowledge, and action, it be declared, that of the three, 
piety belongs to feeling, it is not to be understood by this, 
that it is excluded from all connexion with knowledge and ac- 
tion. On the contrary, if immediate self-consciousness al- 
ways forms the medium of transition between the elements 



* Reden, pp. 53, 54. 



27 



in which knowledge, and those in which action predominates, 
so will it also pertain to piety to rouse up knowledge and ac- 
tion, and every moment, in which piety exerts a prevailing 
influence, it will include one or both as a germ within itself. 
But this is the very truth asserted in the proposition, not an 
objection to it ; for if it were otherwise, the pious movements 
could not be combined with the others in one life, but piety 
would be something by itself, without any influence on the 
other modes of spiritual life. But our proposition main- 
tains that a peculiar province should be secured to piety, in 
connexion with every thing else, in opposition to the contrary 
assertions, that piety is either knowledge, or action, or both, 
or a state compounded of feeling, knowledge, and action, and 
in this polemic relation, our proposition is to be still further 
considered. 

" If then we must make piety consist in knowledge, it 
would be preeminently either that knowledge altogether, or the 
essential portion of it, which is set forth as the substance of 
religious doctrine, (Iiihalt der Glaubenslehre,) or it must be 
absolutely false, that we here investigate the essence of piety, 
for the sake of the religious doctrine. If, therefore, piety be 
this knowledge, then must the measure of this knowledge in 
an individual be the measure of his piety. For, whatever in 
its increase or diminution is not the measure of the perfection 
of an object, cannot constitute the perfection of that object. 
Consequently, upon the above supposition, he who best un- 
derstood the Christian doctrine, would be the best Christian. 
And this would no man admit, even if we premised, that he 
only is the best Christian, who holds the most strongly to what 
is essential, and does not lose sight of this in what is merely 
adventitious and external ; but, on the contrary, it would 
be maintained, that very difFerent degrees of piety may be 
found with equal perfection of this knowledge, and also, very 



28 



different degrees of this knowledge, with equal perfection of 
piety. 

" But the statement that piety is knowledge, it may be al- 
leged, does not refer so much to the character of the know- 
ledge, as to the certainty of the conceptions ; so that the 
knowledge of religious doctrines is piety merely on account 
of the certainty which belongs to them, and, accordingly, on 
account of the strength of conviction with which they are 
held, while a reception of this knowledge, without conviction 
is no piety. In that case, the strength of conviction would 
be the measure of piety; and this is no doubt the meaning of 
those who love to define the word " faith," as the truth of con- 
viction. But in ail other more peculiar departments of know- 
ledge, conviction itself has no other measure, than the clear- 
ness and intelligibleness of the thought. Now if this be the 
case with the conviction we are speaking of, we are brought 
back to our former ground, that he who thinks most clearly 
and thoroughly on religious propositions, considered separately 
and in their connexion, must also be the most pious man. If 
then this explanation be rejected, and the supposition still be 
preserved, certainty in this case, must be something different, 
and have a different measure. However closely piety may be 
connected with this certainty, it is not therefore connected in 
the same way with the knowledge which we have in view. 
But if still the knowledge which forms the doctrines of reli- 
gion be related to piety, it is to be explained in this way, that 
piety is certainly the object of that knowledge, but that 
this can be developed only so far as certainty resides in the 
decisions of self-consciousness. 

"But if, on the other hand, piety is to consist in action, it 
is evident that the kind of action which constitutes it, cannot 
be determined by its intrinsic character; for we learn from ex- 
perience, that together with the most excellent conduct, that 



29 



which is most odious, — with the most important acts, those 
which are the most trivial and insignificant, — are performed 
as pious, and from motives of piety. We are, therefore, only 
directed to the form and manner, in which the action takes 
place. But this is to be comprehended only from two oppo- 
site points, namely, the motive lying at its ground, as the point 
of commencement, and the consequence which it had in view, 
as the point of termination. Now no one will call an action more 
or less pious, on account of the greater or less degree of per- 
fection, in which the consequence aimed at is attained. But 
are we referred to the motive ; it is then evident that a deter- 
minate state of self-consciousness, whether it be pleasure or 
the contrary, lies at the ground of every motive ; and that this 
is the purest distinction of one impulse from another. Hence, 
an action will be pious, so far as the determination of self- 
consciousness, the feeling which has become an affection and 
passed into an impulse, is a pious one. Both suppositions 
therefore lead to the same point, namely, that there are know- 
ledge and action belonging to piety, but that neither constitutes 
its essence ; and that they belong to it so far only, as in the one 
case, the feeling excited comes to repose, as an object of 
thought, and, in the other, is manifested in an action expres- 
sive of its character. 

"Finally, no one will deny, that there are states of feeling, 
as repentance, contrition, assurance, joy in God, which we 
call pious in and for themselves, without reference to any 
knowledge or action proceeding from them ; although we cer- 
tainly expect, that they will continue themselves in further re- 
quired actions, as well as be submitted to examination. 1 ' * 

Your assertion that, according to Schleiermacher, 
" religion has nothing to do with action, 5 ' is now 

* Der Christliche Glaube, vol. i. pp. 7 — 14. 



30 



seen to be contradicted by his express declarations. 
In selecting your quotations, it would seem that you 
overlooked the following caution, which might have 
guarded you against the error. "But, I beseech 
vou, do not so egregiously misunderstand me, as if 
I thought that one of these could exist without the 
other ; that one could possess religion and be pious, 
and at the same time be immoral. This is indeed 
impossible." * 

We have thus seen that Schleiermacher regarded 
feeling as the original element of religion, rather than 
speculative knowledge, or outward morality. This 
consideration will explain the statements to which 
you allude in the " Discourses," in regard to the 
doctrines of a personal God, and personal immortal- 
ity. 

I will commence with an explanation of the views 
of Schleiermacher upon the connexion between any 
speculative conceptions of the Deity, and the in- 
ward feeling of absolute dependence on his Infinite 
power and love. 

According to your assertion, to represent Schleier- 
macher as a believer in the Living God, is " the 
most deceptive use of language of which one is ca- 
pable." This is the question, which we are now to 
consider. 



* Reden, p. 44. 



31 



The essence of religion has been shown to con- 
sist in a sense of dependence on God ; but, accord- 
ing to the ideas which then prevailed with many 
in Germany, a definite conception of God, in his 
personal existence, was essential to piety ; no spec- 
ulative conceptions, however, in the opinion of 
Schleiermacher, could do justice to the Infinite Re- 
ality, which is the object of religious feeling ; the 
representation of God, moreover, in a personal form, 
necessarily involves certain human and finite el- 
ements ; to distinguish between what is true and 
essential, and what is limited and imperfect in our 
idea of the Deity, is the great problem of religious 
philosophy ; but, while we feel ourselves dependent 
on the Infinite and Invisible Power, which sustains 
both us and the Universe, we have the primitive es- 
sence of religion in our hearts, although we may not 
have solved the problem alluded to, in a manner 
that satisfies the demands of speculation. 

If this view of the connexion between the spec*- 
ulative intellect, and personal religious experience 
be Pantheism, then was Schleiermacher a Panthe- 
ist ; if it be Atheism, then was he an Atheist ; but 
the accusation can excite little uneasiness ; for, in 
the first place, he must share it in common with the 
most eminent fathers of the church, with the sound- 
est thinkers of modern times, and with a multitude, 
which no man can number, who in every age, have 



32 



felt that God was their sun and shield, their light 
and glory, but when called on to explain their spec- 
ulative conceptions of his nature, have confessed 
that "such knowledge is too wonderful for them, 
that it is high and they could not attain to it ; " 
and, in the second place, if the name of athe- 
ism be applicable to such conceptions of God, as 
were cherished by Schleiermacher, the name loses 
its usual significance, and expresses a deep and vital 
piety, the possession of which would make any man 
the object of veneration and envy. 

The earliest reference which Schleiermacher 
makes to the difficulties in gaining an abstract con- 
ception of the Deity, which shall be free from specu- 
lative contradictions or errors, is found in the Intro- 
duction to the " Discourses on Religion." 

" Let be forgiven," says he, " for speaking in 
this manner of myself. The language of piety, 
you must be aware can never proceed from pride ; 
for true piety is always filled with humility. Piety 
was the motherly bosom in whose holy seclusion 
my youthful life was nourished, and prepared for 
the world which had not yet opened upon it; my 
spirit breathed its atmosphere, before it had found 
its appropriate sphere in science and the experience 
of life ; it aided me when I began to examine the 
faith which I inherited, and to purify my thoughts 
and feelings from the ruins of antiquity ; it remained 



33 



with me when even the God and the immortality of 
my childish days disappeared before the doubting 
eye ; it guided me when I was without fixed pur- 
poses to active life ; it pointed out to me the man- 
ner in which with my advantages and defects, I was 
to maintain the dominion of holiness in my undivid- 
ed being ; and through its influence alone have I 
become acquainted with friendship and love."* 

Now this passage, taken by itself, might seem to 
prove, that the early faith in God and in immortal- 
ity, which the writer cherished in childhood, had 
given place, in maturer years, to the suggestions of 
absolute skepticism ; that he had renounced en- 
tirely the two great doctrines of speculative religion. 
This, however, would be a very erroneous supposi- 
tion. It w T ould indeed be difficult to reconcile the 
supposition with the general spirit and character of 
the passage ; but it is completely set aside by the 
explicit declarations of Schleiermacher himself. 

"The first apprehension of these two ideas [of 
God and immortality], which is always of a very 
material character, at a time when the soul lives only 
in sensible images, by no means vanishes from every 
mind ; but rather, in a majority of cases, is gradu- 
ally elevated and purified ; in such a manner, how- 
ever, that the analogy of the human remains in the 
conception of the Supreme Being, and the analogy 

* Reden, p. 10. 

5 



34 



of the earthly [in the conception of immortality] as 
the means of holding the more profound and less 
obvious reality. But the case is different with them 
who early plunge into the depths of pure contem- 
plation. For as soon as they perceive, by a com- 
parison of their own ideas, (sie sich selbst sagen, 
literally, 6 say to themselves,') that in God there can 
be nothing contradictory, divided, or isolated, and 
consequently, that nothing human can be predicated 
of him ; as soon as they are forced to the conclusion, 
that they have no right to transport any earthly 
conception beyond the limits of the earthly world, 
through which it is generated in our soul ; they feel 
how untenable are both these ideas, in the form in 
which they originally apprehended them ; they are 
no longer able to reproduce them with any vitality 
in this form ; and hence, they disappear from their 
minds. But no positive unbelief, not even positive 
doubt is hereby expressed ; but while the childish 
form vanishes, like the known, sensible coefficient, 
the unknown quantity remains in the soul, like that 
of which the former was the coefficient ; and it now 
becomes the problem to ascertain its value, by com- 
bining it with some new coefficient, and thus to bring 
it to a higher, actual consciousness. But in the work- 
ing of this problem, faith is always supposed, even 
when no solution satisfactory to rigid speculation is 
obtained. For although the unknown quantity is 



35 



not represented by any determinate value, it coop- 
erates in all the mental operations. It was, accor- 
dingly, very far from the intention of the author to 
indicate by these words, that there was ever a time 
when he was an unbeliever or an atheist. And he 
only could have so misunderstood him who never 
felt in his own mind the tendency of scientific spec- 
ulation to destroy all anthropomorphical concep- 
tions of the Supreme Being, — a tendency which the 
writings of the most profound Christian Fathers ex- 
press in very decided terms." * 

The above confession of personal experience suf- 
ficiently explains the views of Schleiermacher, in 
regard to the connexion of speculative conceptions 
with the essential faith of religion. He admits the 
difficulty of reconciling what is human and limited 
in our ideas of God with the results of pure con- 
templation ; he wishes to enlarge the sphere of piety 
to its widest possible extent ; so that no speculative 
embarrassments shall exclude from the province of 
religion, the " pure in heart," who are " seeking 
after God, if haply they may find him " ; but he no 
where controverts the existence of a Living God, or 
intimates that he renounces that conception himself. 

His position, in regard to this subject, will be evi- 
dent to every attentive reader, from the passages 
relating to it in his "Discourses," which I now quote. 

* Reden, p. 26. 



36 



"It here occurs to me, that there may be many among you 
who will not believe that I can be willing to close my present 
undertaking with what I have already said, and that I can 
flatter myself with having completely discussed the essential 
nature of religion, while I have said nothing concerning im- 
mortality, and but little, — and that in an incidental manner, — 
concerning God. They may suppose that I feel absolutely 
obliged to treat of both of these subjects, and to represent to 
you your own unhappiness, if they are not the objects of your 
faith ; since with many religious persons they have been held 
as the cardinal points of piety. But I do not fall in with your 
opinion on either of these topics. For, in the first place, I 
by no means admit the fact, that I have said so little concern- 
ing God, and nothing concerning immortality ; for it is my 
firm belief that they are both involved in all that I have sug- 
gested to you, with regard to the primitive element of religion, 
and that it would have been impossible for me to have ex- 
pressed myself as I have, had I not always presupposed the 
idea of God and of immortality, just as it is only when we 
speak of religion that these ideas are presented to the mind. 
In the second place, I am quite as far from admitting that they 
are in the right, who regard the conception and doctrinal ex- 
hibition of God and of immortality, — as they are usually re- 
ceived, — as the fundamental points of religion. For, accord- 
ing to what I have before shown, neither of these conceptions 
belongs to religion, any further than as it falls within the sphere 
of feeling, and immediate consciousness. But the ideas of 
God and immortality, as they are presented in the doctrinal 
statements to which I allude, are merely speculative notions; 
hence many, nay, perhaps most of you, believe that you have 
a firm conviction of both or at least of one of these notions, 
without on that account, laying claim to the character of reli- 
gious men. These speculative notions, accordingly, in them-. 



37 



selves possess no greater value in religion, than we ascribe to 
other speculative notions in general. But that you may not 
imagine that I am deterred from uttering an express declara- 
tion of my views on this point, through fear of the danger of 
speaking upon it, before a settled definition of the words ' God ' 
and c Existence 1 has been established, and universally admit- 
ted to be valid among our thinking men ; and that you may not 
suppose, on the other hand, that I am playing a part with you, 
and in order to become all things to all men, am willing to 
pass over with apparent indifference, that which, in reality, I 
deem of far greater importance than I am disposed to confess ; 
I will fully explain myself in relation to it, and endeavor to 
show you that my best and deepest convictions are in accord- 
ance with the assertions, which I have just made. 

" I request you to call to mind, in the first place, that no 
feeling can justly be regarded as an element of piety, in which 
we are affected merely by what is individual as such, without 
at the same time being subject to the influence of the Whole, 
considered as the manifestation of God; and consequently it is 
not the individual and the finite, but God himself, in whom 
alone the separate is one and all, that enters into the life of 
our being, — and in like manner, it is not this or that faculty, — 
but our whole nature, with which we oppose ourselves to the 
universe, at the same time that we are in its bosom, and hence 
that which is immediately divine in us, which is awakened by 
feeling and called forth into action. How then can any one 
assert, that I have described a religion without God, when I 
have in fact portrayed nothing else than the immediate and 
original being of God in ourselves through the elementary 
feelings which I have pointed out? Or is not God the Su- 
preme and only Unity 1 Is it not God alone, before whom and 
in whom all that is individual disappears? And when you 
look upon the universe as a whole, as a comprehensive total- 



38 



ity, can you do this otherwise than as in God ? If this is not 
the case, I beg you to show me some other standard accord- 
ing to which the Supreme Being, the Primitive and Eternal 
Existence, can be distinguished from the temporal, the indi- 
vidual, and the secondary ? But in no other way than through 
those emotions which the universe awakens within us, do we 
pretend to attain to a consciousness of God in immediate feel- 
ing, and hence it is in this way only that we have spoken of 
him. Would you therefore call in question the claims of this 
feeling to be a consciousness of God, a possession of the Di- 
vine Being ; I can then impart to you no further instruction 
or explanation ; I can only say, that whoever denies this, — I 
will pass no judgment concerning his intellectual condition, 
for that has nothing to do with our present discussion, — but 
considered in relation to his habitual mode of feeling, I cannot 
but regard him as a godless man. For it has even been 
boasted of science, that it comprises an immediate knowledge 
concerning God, which is the source of all other knowledge, 
but the question which is now before us does not relate to 
science, but to religion. But that mode of obtaining a know- 
ledge of God, to a certain degree, which is boasted of by so 
many, and which I also should commend to your attention, 
is neither the idea of God, which you place at the summit of 
all knowledge, as the absolute unity from which every thing 
proceeds, and on which all being depends, nor is it the feeling 
of God, which we possess in our inward consciousness ; and 
as it certainly falls far short of the demands of science, it also 
holds a subordinate rank in relation to piety, because it is only 
a speculative notion. A speculative notion artificially com- 
pounded of different elements which are called the attributes 
of God, and which, taken together, are nothing else than the 
comprehension and analysis of the various modes in which 
the unity of the individual and the whole is expressed in our 



39 



feeling. For no one will deny that precisely in this manner, 
the different attributes of God correspond to the individual 
feelings, and others of a similar character, the description of 
which has been already given, and is now omitted. Hence, I 
cannot avoid bringing the same objection to this speculative 
notion, which I have before expressed against speculative 
notions in general, in relation to religion, namely, that a great 
degree of piety can exist without them, and that, in fact, they 
are not formed until after piety itself has been made the sub- 
ject of contemplation. The abstract conception of God, to 
be sure, as it is usually formed, is not in the same condition 
with the other speculative notions to which I have referred ; 
since the idea of God is represented as supreme and pre- 
siding over all others, and yet, when it is derived, in too great 
a degree from human relations, and God is conceived of as 
personally exercising thought and volition, it is brought down 
into the sphere of opposition and controversy. Hence, also, 
it appears natural that in proportion as our conception of God 
is founded on human analogies, it is easy for a contrary con- 
ception to be presented in opposition to it, in which the Su- 
preme Being is represented not as personally exercising 
thought and volition, but as the universal necessity, exalted 
above all personal attributes, and producing and combining 
every mode of thought and existence. And nothing seems 
more unwarrantable than for the adherents of the one con- 
ception, to charge those with a godless spirit, who repelled by 
the fear of anthropomorphism, have taken refuge in the other ; 
or for those on the other hand, to accuse their opponents of 
adopting an idolatrous service, and to regard their piety as 
without value, on account of the human character of their 
conceptions of God. A man may be truly religious, whether 
he incline to one of these conceptions or the other ; but his 
religious spirit, the consciousness of God in his inward 



40 



feeling, must be better than the conception which he has 
formed ; and the more he identifies this with the essence of 
religion, the less does he understand himself. Consider only 
with what limitations the Godhead is represented in one of 
these conceptions, and again, how frigid and lifeless in the 
other, and in both cases, to a greater extent, in proportion as 
importance is attached to the letter ; and you will confess, 
that both are defective ; and as neither corresponds to its 
object, so neither can be a proof of personal religion, except 
so far as there is a previous ground for it in the mind itself, 
but compared with which it remains far behind ; and more- 
over, that rightly understood, each of these two represents at 
least one element of feeling, but that neither has any value, 
unless this is at its foundation. Is it not clear, moreover, that 
many take for granted and believe in such a God, but who are 
any thing but pious ; and also that this conception can never 
be the germ from which piety springs up, because it possesses 
no independent life in its own nature, but must obtain a 
quickening influence in the sphere of feeling. Accordingly, 
it cannot be maintained that the admission of one or the other 
of these conceptions in and for itself can be taken as the 
sign of a more or less perfect religion. On the contrary, 
they will both be modified, according to the different degrees 
in which the religious sentiment is cultivated. And this I 
would commend to your attention ; for I know of nothing 
further which I can offer on this point to establish an under- 
standing between us." # 

" I have felt obliged to say thus much in order that you may 
not misunderstand my opinion, with regard to these two con- 
ceptions ; but for a still stronger reason, also, that you and 
others may not be deceived on this subject, and imagine that 



* Reden, pp. 109-113. 



41 



all are despisers of religion who cannot reconcile themselves 
with the personality of the Supreme Being, as it is commonly 
represented. I am persuaded that I have said nothing which 
can weaken the conception of the personality of God, where 
it is already held ; nor will any one reject the almost inev- 
itable necessity of admitting it, because he has been made 
acquainted with the origin of this necessity, There have 
never been among truly religious men, zealots, enthusiasts, or 
fanatics for this notion. And so far, as indeed has often been 
the case, as atheism has been understood to mean nothing but 
hesitation and uncertainty in regard to this conception, the 
sincerely pious will view the existence of this around them 
with great composure ; and there has always been something 
which they deem far more irreligious, as indeed it is, namely — 
the want of an immediate consciousness of the Godhead in 
the feelings of the soul. They will be the slowest to believe 
that any man in fact can be entirely destitute of religion ; for 
before such a person can exist, they know, that he must be 
totally deprived of feeling, and degraded, with the peculiar 
attributes of his being, into a mere animal ; since he only, in 
their opinion, who is so deeply degraded, can lose the con- 
sciousness of God in the universe and in ourselves, of the 
Divine Life and Energy by which all things subsist." * 

Such are the principal passages in the "Dis- 
cburses," on which, I suppose, the accusation of 
Atheism or Pantheism against Schleiermacher has 
been founded. How far this accusation is sustained 
by the language adduced in its support, may now 
be decided by the reader. I ought not, however, 



* Reden, pp. 117, 118. 

6 



42 



to omit the explanatory Note of Schleiermacher 
himself. 

" This whole discussion, I hope, will gain new light from 
what I have said on the subject in the 1 Christian Faith,' and 
in like manner the exposition there made must find its com- 
pletion here. And since any one can compare the two pas- 
sages for himself, it is hardly necessary for me to vindicate 
myself against the conjecture, for I will not call it the accu- 
sation which has been brought against me, on account of this 
Discourse, by some highly honored individuals, — a part of 
whom are now in their graves, — as if I preferred for myself 
to conceive of the Supreme Being under the impersonal form ; 
and this has been sometimes called my Atheism and some- 
times my Spinozism. But I thought that it was in the gen- 
uine spirit of Christianity to look for piety wherever it could 
be found, and to recognise it under whatever form it might 
appear. At least, I find that Christ enjoined this upon his 
disciples, and that Paul also, not only among the Jews and 
their associates, but at Athens, in the company of the heathen, 
pursued the same course. But while I expressed the con- 
viction with the most unsuspecting frankness, that it was very 
far from being the same thing, whether one could not adopt 
for himself a specific mode of representing the Supreme 
Being, or whether he actually denied his existence, and re- 
jected all piety, I did not think to protest against all the con- 
sequences which might be drawn from it. I entirely forgot 
how often it is the case that he who is going in a straight- 
forward direction, seems to be inclining towards the left hand, 
by one who himself is going towards the right. But whoever 
will consider at least the few words concerning Pantheism 
which may be found in the passage referred to in my 
' Christian Faith,' will free me from all suspicion of material 



43 



Pantheism, and with a tolerable degree of candor will also find 
how an individual can regard it, on the one hand, as almost 
indispensable to the highest degree of piety, for him to adopt 
the conception of a personal God, — at all times, for instance, 
when it is required to interpret his immediate religious emo- 
tions to himself, or to others, — or when the heart is absorbed 
in intimate communion with the Supreme Being, — and how 
the same individual, on the other hand, can acknowledge the 
essential imperfections of this conception, nay, can point out 
the doubtful elements, which it involves, unless it has been 
purified by the most exact and thorough scrutiny. The most 
profound thinkers among the Fathers of the Church were 
always intent on this purification. If we bring together 
their declarations intended to destroy whatever was human 
and limited in the form of personality, it will appear, that, 
all things considered, we may as well assert that they denied 
personality to God, as that they ascribed it to him ; and that, 
moreover, since it is so difficult to conceive of a personality 
as strictly infinite and impassible, it behoves us to make a 
great distinction between a personal and a Living God. It is 
the latter conception alone which properly distinguishes from 
material Pantheism, and from blind, atheistic necessity. But 
the manner, in which one wavers within this limit, in relation 
to personality, must be left to the creative power of his imag- 
ination and to his dialectic conscience ; and if a sense of 
religion be united, they will mutually guard each other. If 
the imagination inclines to the formation of a too human per- 
sonality, the dialectic conscience will sound the alarm, and 
prevent the hazardous consequences ; and if this, on the 
other hand, attempts to limit conception within too narrow 
bounds, by its negative formulas, the former will assert the 
validity of its own peculiar claims. I was called upon, in 
this connexion, to remind the reader, that if one form of con- 



44 



ception in and for itself does not exclude all piety, neither 
any more does the other form, in and for itself, necessarily 
imply it. For how many individuals there are, in whose life 
piety has little weight or influence, yet to whom this con- 
ception is indispensable, as the universal supplement of their 
series of causality which is broken off in both directions. 
And how many, on the other hand, exhibit the deepest piety, 
who in their expressions concerning the Supreme Being do 
not always correctly develop the conception of personality." * 

The statements of Schleiermacher, it will now be 
seen, do not call in question the fact that " he was 
a believer in the living God ;" on the contrary, they 
confirm it ; they do not, indeed, give us an account 
of the conceptions which he entertained in regard to 
the mysteries of the divine nature ; but they aim to 
show that a religious faith in God may be cherished, 
independent of the human, personal form, in which 
he has been commonly represented. 

Before proceeding to the quotation of passages 
which express the positive ideas entertained by 
Schleiermacher concerning the Deity, I must notice 
a misapprehension in one of your " Notes," of too 
serious a character to be overlooked. You assert, 
(Discourse, p. 44,) that according to Schleiermacher, 
" the idea of a personal God is pure mythology." 
The passage, to which you refer without quoting it, 
contains no authority for this assertion. I need only 
bring it forward, to set aside the charge. 

Reden, pp. 137—139. 



45 



After declaring that it is the one and all of religion 
to consider our whole being and life, " as a being 
and life in God and through God," Schleiermacher 
continues, " To represent the Godhead as a separate 
and insulated object, so that the appearance can 
scarcely be avoided of making him susceptible of 
passive impressions like other objects, — this is only 
a designation, and although one indispensable to 
many and welcome to all, yet it must ever be view- 
ed with suspicion as fruitful in difficulties, from 
which our usual phraseology, perhaps, will never be 
entirely free. To treat this objective conception of 
the Godhead as actual knowledge, and accordingly 
to represent the Being of God, — separated from its 
effects upon us through the medium of the uni- 
verse — before the world and beyond the world, al- 
though for the world, as a science to be formed 
through religion or in religion, — this is certainly, for 
the sphere of religion, only a barren mythology, a 
more complete development too easily misunder- 
stood of that which is only an aid to conception and 
description, as if it w^ere in fact, the essential ele- 
ment itself, a mature product of the genuine soil." * 

The meaning of Schleiermacher may be illustra- 
ted, if necessary, by his own explanatory Note. 

" By mythology, I understand, in general, the exhibition of 
a purely ideal object in an historical form. In this sense it 

* Reden, p. 59. 



46 



appears to me that in strict analogy with the polytheistic, we 
have also a monotheistic and Christian mythology. It is not 
essential to this that the dialogues of Divine Persons should 
be set forth, as is done in the poetry of Klopstock, and else- 
where. It may be found even in the most rigid forms of doc- 
trine, where changes are represented as taking place in the 
Divine Being, — as for instance, the adoption of decrees, in 
reference to some past event or to some earlier decree ; to say 
nothing of the peculiar divine decrees which are at the ground 
of the common conceptions of the efficacy of prayer. The 
representations of many of the divine attributes have this his- 
torical form and are accordingly mythological. Take the at- 
tribute of divine mercy. According to the usual conception, 
it is exercised only, when we separate the divine volition 
which alleviates evil from that which ordained it; for if we 
regard both of these volitions as identical, the one will not be 
the limit of the other, but the divine will which appoints evil, 
appointing it only in a certain proportion ; and then the con- 
ception of mercy is entirely destroyed. In the conception of 
the veracity of God, in like manner, a separation is made be- 
tween the idea of promise and of fulfilment ; and both taken 
together compose an historical transaction. For if we regard 
the act of promise as the same with that of fulfilment, the con- 
ception of the divine veracity is reduced to the agreement of 
several divine properties with one of their manifestations ; and 
thus an historical element comes in. But if we regard the 
active property and its manifestation as one and the same, the 
distinct conception of the divine veracity can scarcely be 
maintained. This train of thought might be pursued to a 
much greater length. Now I do not find fault with such re- 
presentations on account of the names which are applied to 
them, in themselves considered. I admit that they are indis- 
pensable, for without their aid, we could not speak on the 



47 



subject, with any reference to the investigation of more or less 
correct views. If there is no danger from their use in the de- 
partment of scientific theology, which has for its great pro- 
blem to resolve religion into its everlasting principles, divest- 
ed of all historical and temporary forms, they are equally in- 
dispensable in the sphere of religious poetry and eloquence. 
We then unite with those who are of kindred feelings with 
ourselves, and who value such representations chiefly for their 
fitness to embody and communicate religious sentiments, 
which contain within themselves the correction for all defi- 
ciencies of expression. I speak of them in the way of censure 
as barren mythology, only when they are considered as im- 
parting exact knowledge, and are held up as the essence of 
religion, when in truth, they are only a necessary aid to our 
infirmities." * 

I will now adduce some passages from other 
writings of Schleiermacher, w r hich explain his own 
conceptions of the Deity, and may help the reader 
to decide whether he is justly liable to the charge 
of Atheism or of Pantheism. 

In regard to the power of the human mind to 
form an idea of the Divine nature, and the views in 
which we may at last repose, he speaks as follows. 
The passage explains the character of the diffi- 
culties, which were felt by Schleiermacher, in as- 
cribing human attributes to God. 

" We can think and speak of God, only in a human man- 
ner. Whatever our reason presents as the necessary attributes 

* Reden, pp. 126, 127. 



48 



of the Infinite Being, can be derived by it only from a com- 
parison with our own being ; whatever we discover of his 
mode of action, in the course of the world, we can express 
only in those words which we use also to designate human 
excellence ; and even, in like manner, the Scriptures can 
speak to us of the Eternal only in comparisons and images. 
We acknowledge with humility, that in this way, all our 
knowledge of God must be very limited and imperfect ; but if, 
notwithstanding this, we would maintain the holy privilege of 
gaining purer and more living conceptions of the Eternal 
Being, we are so much the more obliged to use the most 
earnest endeavors, that this knowledge should not, by our 
own fault, be left in unnecessary obscurity, and thus the abuse 
of the privilege deprive us of its enjoyment. Let us take 
heed, that we do not transfer to God every thing which 
belongs to human excellence ; because much of this pertains 
merely to the relations of men with one another ; and these are 
very different from the relation which God sustains towards his 
creatures. Let us be careful not to combine with the essential 
attributes of the Supreme Being, that which clearly springs 
from human imperfection. It is easy to give these directions, 
but it is difficult to apply them, even with all the means at our 
command. The mistakes, which we thus fall into, are the 
source of the most dangerous errors in religion ; of those, 
namely, which exert an immediate, injurious influence on our 
practical relations with God. How much that is human and 
unworthy, do we find in the conceptions of most Christians 
in regard to the wisdom and love, the long-suffering and pla- 
cability of God, his delight in what is good, and his displeasure 
at evil ! What mournful consequences, what perversion of 
heart and life is produced, as soon as we neglect to measure 
the correctness and value of these conceptions by the infal- 
lible standard of our moral nature ! And if we are preserved 



49 



from such consequences, there still remains a great evil, 
namely, that an incorrect view of the world is formed from 
false conceptions of God. God and the world, his attributes 
and dispensations, — these are ideas, which are inseparably 
united, which materially correct and elucidate, or perplex and 
obscure each other." * 

The views of Schleiermacher concerning the re- 
lation of man to God may be understood from the 
passage which I now quote. Whether these views 
are to be regarded as a substitute for Christianity, 
or as an expressive commentary on the doctrine of 
Jesus, must be determined by the good judgment 
of the reader. 

" Why is it that the sight of a pious man makes such a 
deep and peculiar impression on all who are in a quiet and 
sober frame of mind ? They cannot refrain from an emotion 
of reverence in the presence of one whom, in every other 
respect, they may regard as far beneath them ; they are hum- 
bled before his elevated feelings, and deem themselves hon- 
ored and exalted by such humiliation ; they are penetrated 
with the sense of a happy and enviable condition, even when 
they feel that they are incapable, and perhaps, unworthy of it 
themselves. This effect is exhibited at all times, and under 
all circumstances ; both when we find a pure and reasonable 
religion, and when the knowledge of the Eternal is mingled 
with many errors, and the essential principles of piety are 
combined with superstitious opinions; every where, even the 
rudest minds, in their better moments, give their testimony to 
the dignity and elevation of the pious sentiment. — 

* Sammtliche Werke, Predigten, (Berlin, 1834,) vol. i. pp. 97, 98. 
7 



50 



"This effect is produced by that which constitutes the in- 
ward essence of piety. The thought of God ever accompanies 
the pious man; and not only the thought; every where he 
sees and feels the Eternal Being; and because all which he 
thinks or does is referred immediately to this one great thought, 
nothing around or in him can be trivial and insignificant ; and 
with the earthly life which he has in common with others, he 
leads also another life which is heavenly and divine. Every 
thing is a proof of this. His fidelity and probity bear a pecu- 
liar form, because all the desires which could tempt him are 
brought to silence by this divine sentiment. His tranquillity 
is not disturbed by hope, or by the need of hope ; for it is 
founded on the consciousness that the chief business of his 
life is continued uninterruptedly through all circumstances. 
His love needs no outward impulse, no confirmation ; for it 
is the natural reflection of the love of God which is ever pre- 
sent to his soul. It is this, the intercourse and walk with 
God, which makes such a man the object of holy reverence. 
What then is the inward essence of this piety? — 

" The pious man is one, who has found the Lord, in so far 
as he is not far from any one of us. This does not mean, 
that he has gained peculiar knowledge of what we are accus- 
tomed to call the essence or the nature of the Godhead; or 
that he has received a revelation of mysteries on this subject, 
which lie beyond the ordinary reach of the human under- 
standing. Do not envy those who by familiarity with sys- 
tematic reflection, by the employment of the intellect with the 
grounds and the connexion of our common knowledge, have 
carried it so far that they can express their opinion on this 
point, in manifold and regular words, and can propose, dis- 
pute, and decide a thousand questions, one more perplexed 
and subtile than the other. These are all words, and nothing 
more. Not only the common understanding, but every hu- 



51 



man understanding is here impotent ; in this respect, God 
dwells for us in a light, to which no man can approach- We 
have no eye to see him, no sense to feel him ; he is at an in- 
finite distance from all of us ; between the limited under- 
standing, and such an infinite object, there is fixed an eternal 
and impassable chasm. But could even a few select individ- 
uals attain to certain knowledge on these mysteries, it would, 
strictly speaking, form no part of piety. For where Paul ut- 
tered the words of oar text, human wisdom, more than any 
where else, had sought to attain a summit, which is too high 
for man to breathe in ; many investigations had there been 
instituted on the nature and attributes of the Divine Being ; 
but Paul did not regard them as a useful preparation for his 
hearers. He speaks to them of the times of ignorance, in 
which they had lived, and which God would overlook ; but it 
is an ignorance, which is to be expelled, not by a change of 
opinions, but by a change of heart. These useless gropings, 
these barren words have never led a man into the way of piety ; 
though at all times, many sunk in earthly feelings, have thus 
made the Godhead an object of their consideration. But this 
is dangerous to piety. Your heart does not share in the dry 
and cold investigations of the understanding ; and though I 
will not say, that you would thereby become unfitted for sal- 
utary intercourse with the Godhead, you might yet have given 
place, instead of these vain endeavors, to other thoughts 
which would have nourished your religious sense. No bet- 
ter do they succeed, who, in this way, seek Christ, and 
desire to penetrate with their understanding into all the 
mysteries of his relation as mediator between God and man. 
They have no leader, and the Scripture, in which they should 
search for totally different things, abandons them. On the 
point to which piety elevates men, and on which we now 
regard it, you will find few of those who have the most earn- 



52 



estly pursued such investigations, and they surely, at least have 
not been helped upward by them. — 

To have found the Lord is rather to have found his Will, — 
the Will which is a law to us, and which we are to accom- 
plish. This is the relation, in which the Lord is not far from 
any one of us. — But how, you will say, to have found the 
Will of God, which we should accomplish — is this to find the 
Lord ? This the essence of piety ? This the communion of 
man with God 1 Does not our conscience announce this to 
us'? Does it not speak to all men, without distinction? What 
then becomes of the distinction between the pious man, and 
the righteous man 1 It is in this way. Conscience announces 
to you the will of God, and the living knowledge of this, is 
the essential and peculiar element of our communion with 
God ; conscience announces it to all men ; and yet there is 
herein a difference between the righteous man who is pious, 
and him who is riot ; it depends on this, whether we regard 
our conscience as the voice of God, or only as the voice of 
our human wisdom. He who only does the last endeavors to 
bring the conscience, like every thing which belongs to the 
natural endowments of the understanding, under certain rules, 
and thus to cultivate and perfect it ; conscience with its de- 
cisions becomes the object of a peculiars cience. — He, on the 
contrary, who regards his conscience as the voice of God, 
instead of observing it only here and there, will deem it holy; 
instead of artfully getting the better of it, he will devoutly 
inquire into its decisions ; instead of frittering it away, he 
will only strive to exercise it. 

" Thus the pious man goes on every day of his life, seeking 
and finding the Lord. It is not a work which he completes 
at once ; but one which is constantly renewed ; and in which 
he always advances to a greater degree of perfection. His 
sense of what the will of God is concerning him in all the 



53 



relations of life, ever becomes more correct and refined ; his 
delight in the wise government of the Supreme ever grows 
purer and more confident; his immediate experience of the 
existence of a divine kingdom on earth becomes more varied 
and joyful ; and the peculiar peace of his heart, which rests 
on this, is more and more firmly grounded." * 

I will give one more extract of a similar import, 
and close the quotations which have immediate 
reference to the views of Schleiermacher con- 
cerning the Deity. 

" There can hardly be a greater or more noble description 
of the high calling of the Christian, than that given by the 
Apostle Peter, in the commencement of his second Epistle, 
where he says, that ' we might become partakers of the divine 
nature.' 

" This is, certainly, something to which man in the con- 
sciousness of his weakness and his transitory being can 
scarcely elevate himself. If then we would answer the 
question, What is the divine nature of which we may become 
partakers, can we do other than refer to the declaration of 
John, God is love, and also consider, at the same time, how 
the nature and essence of God is described to us by the Apostle 
Paul, as an Eternal and Unchangeable Power. Both of these 
ideas are combined by Peter, when he says, we may become 
partakers of the Divine Nature. His meaning is, first, that 
we may become partakers of the love, which composes the 
essence of God, and then of the eternal and unchangeable 
power, or omnipotence of God, which distinguishes the Cre- 
ator from all creatures. A love, which were not omnipotent, 
could not be the eternal and unchangeable power, and could 

* Predigten, vol. i. pp. 154—160, 163. 



54 



not belong to the divine nature ; and omnipotence, which 
were any thing other than love in its whole essence, could 
not be the eternal and beneficent fountain, from which alone 
all good gifts proceed. Is omnipotent love then the Divine 
Nature? we know what the Apostle justly calls ' this exceeding 
great and precious promise.' — 

" The eternal and unchangeable power of love in the Divine 
Being is resisted by nothing from without or from within ; 
nothing can resist it ; because it is this only by which the 
whole world was brought into being and still subsists. But 
for us, much, nay the most, lies beyond the limits of our 
power ; hence our partaking of the divine nature can consist 
only in this, that within the sphere which is produced and 
which subsists by the communication of our power, the living 
energy of our love should manifest itself as omnipotent and 
irresistible." * 

I have now brought forward every thing which I 
deem important, — so far as the limits of this Letter 
will permit, — that has immediate reference to the 
opinions of Schleiermacher concerning the Divine 
Nature and the relations of man with God. They 
will be still further elucidated, however, by many of 
the passages which I shall produce in another con- 
nexion. 

The views of Schleiermacher on the doctrine of 
immortality will form the next topic of the present 
discussion. 



* Prcdigten, vol. iv. pp. 473 — 476. 



55 



You assert (Remarks, p. 39.) that "according to 
him, religion consisting in the renouncing of person- 
ality, and the blending of the individual with the 
One and All, the pious man, in his union with the 
Infinite and Eternal, enjoys while on earth everlast- 
ing life, and this notion of everlasting life, he puts in 
direct contrast with that commonly entertained." 
" It would be idle to inquire," you also remark, 
(p. 41.) "what hopes and what immortality Schlei- 
ermacher would hold out to a being whose personal 
existence is to cease with death." 

The inference would be drawn from this state- 
ment by those who relied on your authority, that in 
the opinion of Schleiermacher, the everlasting life of 
the soul is limited to the present state of being, and 
does not involve the continuance of personal ex- 
istence in a higher world. The real opinions of 
Schleiermacher on this subject will appear from his 
own declarations, which I am about to produce. 

The promise of immortality, according to the 
views which he cherished, relates to the condition 
of the soul, rather than to the place of its existence. 
Its enjoyment is guarantied to the children of God, 
as soon as they are in a state of reconciliation with 
their Father in heaven. He who dwelleth in love, 
dwelleth in God, and God in him ; he has passed 
from death unto life ; his fellowship is with the spirits 
of the just made perfect ; he is no longer a stranger 



56 



and a foreigner, but a fellow-citizen with the saints ; 
he is a member of the household of God, of which 
the whole family, whether in heaven or on earth, is 
composed ; he is conscious that he lives in the bosom 
of Eternity ; he has commenced the enjoyment of 
an immortal existence, which no change in time, nor 
suffering, nor death can interrupt. 

The attainment of this state depends on rigid and 
unyielding conditions. He that would gain the 
spiritual life, thus described, must renounce his at- 
tachment to the earthly, selfish, and sensual life, 
which is led by the sinner ; he must live, not after 
the flesh, but after the spirit ; nay, he must cease 
to live, that Christ may live in him. 

The carnal man makes himself the centre, not 
God; his own individuality is more important to 
him than the universe ; his own will is in conflict 
with the divine and everlasting law ; he regards his 
own interests, more than the infinite goodness, truth, 
and beauty, to which the soul aspires ; his faith in 
immortality is founded on principles of selfishness ; 
and he values the loftiest hope of the spirit, from 
considerations of personal advantage. This faith is 
not of a religious character. It interferes with the 
true aim of religion, and must be renounced. 

Not so the genuine hope of immortality. That 
is built on an act of self-surrendry. We must 
become dead to the world, and alive to God, before 



57 



we can cherish it, in its deep and vital power. But 
the self-renunciation, on which Schleiermacher in- 
sists, by no means, implies the renunciation of our 
individual being. When Paul was crucified with 
Christ, he was not annihilated. The "old man which 
was corrupt " was slain, but the " new man " was 
created in true holiness. This change did not 
destroy the conscious identity of Paul. The ideas 
of Schleiermacher on this point will be understood 
from a brief summary of the general principles, 
which were at the foundation of his views of the 
universe and of life. 

According to these, every form of existence is 
under the dominion of two antagonist powers. The 
most general laws of the material universe are those 
of attraction and expansion. Life consists in an 
unceasing play of opposite forces. The human 
soul is not free from this great law. It has its pe- 
culiar subsistence in the action of two opposing im- 
pulses. In obedience to the one, it seeks to estab- 
lish a separate, individual existence, to draw within 
its own sphere every thing which surrounds it, and 
to weave every foreign element into the texture of 
its own peculiar being. The other impulse, on the 
contrary, produces a dread of opposing the vast 
Whole, the desire of self-annihilation, in devotion 
to a superior being. Every thing which is done or 
felt, in relation to our individual existence, every 
8 



58 



thing which we speak of as enjoyment or possession, 
is the product of the first tendency. Every thing 
on the other hand which does not concern individual 
life, which is common to all being, is the product of 
the second. We are under the influence of this, 
whenever we recognise in our course of thought 
and action the existence of order and law, necessity 
and system, fitness and duty, and surrender our- 
selves to their power. 

No material object can subsist by means of one 
of the two forces of physical nature. Neither can 
the soul subsist by means of one of the original 
functions of the spiritual nature. The perfection of 
the soul depends on the maintenance of a just har- 
mony between these tendencies. Every personal 
and individual endeavor, unless balanced by the 
opposite direction, takes the form of an insatiable 
devotion to sense ; is intent only on the selfish 
interests of life ; strives to crown it with earthly 
gratifications; and to preserve and exercise it in 
freshness and vigor. The persons, therefore, in 
whom this tendency is predominant, constantly vi- 
brating between desire and enjoyment, do not pass 
beyond the perception of what is individual ; they 
are absorbed in self-seeking endeavors ; and they 
cannot attain to a sense of the primitive and uni- 
versal character of Humanity. The opposite class 
are impelled too strongly in the contrary direction ; 



59 



they attain no firm and decided individuality ; they 
exercise no inward creative power ; their activity is 
wasted in barren contemplation, and, accordingly, 
they have no perception of the genuine life of the 
world. 

The reconciliation of these extremes is the office 
of the wise teacher. He strives to unite these ten- 
dencies in the complete circle which is the emblem 
of eternity and perfection. Such a teacher is most 
needed by the earthly and sensual. He would make 
them comprehend the inconsistency of their desires 
and pursuits with the highest elements of Humanity. 
He would set in opposition to their degraded, ani- 
mal enjoyments, an enjoyment of another character, 
the object of which is not separate and finite, but 
the One in All, and the All in One, and which 
knows no limit but that of the universe, so far as it 
is brought within the grasp of the spirit. He would 
point out to their blind and restless self-love a 
higher principle, by means of which, in the midst of 
earthly interests and cares, they may place their af- 
fections on the Supreme and Eternal, and thus he 
would reveal to their fickle and passionate desires, a 
tranquil and secure possession.* 

This state of mind, according to Schleiermacher, 
is the commencement of Eternal Life ; it may be 
obtained, to a certain extent, by the truly religious 

* See Reden, pp. 4-G. 



60 



man on earth ; but its complete enjoyment is to be 
realized in a future world. 

I will now quote the passage from the " Dis- 
courses," which has been relied on to prove that he 
regarded " the belief and desire of personal immor- 
tality as wholly irreligious." 

" I come now to the second point, which I was to consider 
in this relation, namely, immortality. And here I cannot 
conceal my opinion, that there is even more in the usual mode 
of employing this doctrine, which is not consistent with the 
essential nature of piety. The manner, in which every re- 
ligious man maintains an unchangeable and eternal existence 
in himself, I have already explained to you. For when our 
feeling no longer clings to what is individual, but is absorbed 
in the consciousness of our relation to God, in which all that 
is individual and transitory disappears, it is then composed, 
not of the Temporal, but of the Eternal ; and it may justly 
be said, that the religious life is that condition of the soul, in 
which we have discarded and sacrificed whatever is mortal, 
and have actually commenced the enjoyment of immortality.* 

* This idea is admirably expressed by one of our most distin- 
guished writers, in a passage which I cannot forbear transcribing. 

" Death is not the momentous change we imagine ; it is neither 
the close of life, nor the beginning of immortal existence. The 
change w T hich makes man religious, should date the time when the 
' corruptible puts on incorruption and the mortal immortality.' — 
The heaven of the blest begins, when they begin to feel the peace, 
which religion gives ; death will only place them where the shadows 
of earth shall no longer surround them ; they will go on in the same 
path which they trod below; or rather in the same direction, for 
they shall ascend with ' wings as eagles,' and go on rejoicing in 



61 



But the conception, which is entertained of immortality by 
the generality of men and their aspirations with regard to it, 
appear to me to be irreligious, and directly opposed to the 
spirit of piety ; nay even their wish for immortal life has no 
other ground than a disinclination towards that which is the 
peculiar object of religion. You have seen that religion 
always aims to enlarge the narrow limits of our personality, 
until they are gradually lost in the Infinite; so that, while we 
cherish our consciousness of the universe, we should also, as 
far as possible, become one with it ; they, on the contrary, 
strive against this ; they would not be freed from their present 
limitation ; they wish for nothing more than to manifest it 
forever; and are anxious to secure the claims of their per- 
sonality. Hence, it is far from their wish to seize the only 
occasion, which death presents to them, to escape from its 
shackles ; but are rather solicitous how this will be continued 
beyond the present life; and at the best, their hopes are di- 
rected to more wide-reaching eyes, and an improved organi- 
zation. But God speaks to them as it is written, ' He that 
will lose his life for my sake shall find it, and he that will 
save his life shall lose it.' The life which they wish to save 
is not one which is to be saved ; for if the eternity of their 
individual person ought to concern them, why are they not 
as solicitous in regard to that which it has been, as with regard 
to that which it shall be 1 And what avails to them the future, 
when they have no power over the past? The more they long 
after an immortality, which in fact is no immortality, and of 
which they are not capable even of forming a conception, — 
for who can succeed in the attempt to imagine a temporal 
form of existence enlarged to Infinity, — the more do they 

their glorious flight through the boundless heavens." — W. B. 0. 
Peabody, in Offering of Sympathy, by F. Parkman, p. 86. 



62 



surrender of the immortality, which they might always pos- 
sess ; and in addition to this, they lose their mortal life, by 
the indulgence of thoughts which agitate and torment them 
in vain. Would they but endeavor to renounce their life from 
love to God! Would they but strive even here to annihilate 
their personality, in order to live in the One and All ! He 
who has learned to be more than himself, knows that he 
should lose but little, were he to lose himself. He only who, 
by this self-renunciation, has attained as far as possible, to a 
living harmony with the universe, and whose soul is filled 
with a grander and holier longing, has a right to speak of 
the hopes which are presented to us by death and of the in- 
finity to which it will infallibly elevate us." * 

It is evident from this very passage, — which has 
been referred to in proof of the contrary suppo- 
sition, — that the state of union with God, which 
Schleiermacher regarded as the characteristic of 
Everlasting Life, implies the continuance of our 
conscious existence in another world. The idea 
may be further illustrated by the explanatory Note, 
a part of which was quoted in my first Letter. 

"This passage has met with a fate very similar to that of 
my remarks on the personality of God. It was directed, like 
them, against a limited conception, and one which upon a 
strict analysis, displays many impure elements, and like 
them, it has excited great misunderstanding. For here also 
it has been thought that I would degrade the hope of immor- 
tality in the prevalent sense of the word, and by representing 
it as a weakness, would oppose its influence. But this was 



* Reden, pp. 118—120. 



63 



not the place to discuss the truth of the matter, or to set forth 
the peculiar views which, as a Christian, I cherish in regard to 
it. These are exhibited in the Second Part of my ' Christian 
Faith,' and the representations given in both places should 
serve as the completion of each other. It was only requisite 
here to answer the question, whether this hope was so closely 
connected with a religious disposition, that they stand or fall 
together. But how could I avoid answering this in the nega- 
tive, since it is admitted by almost every one, at the present 
day, that even the ancient covenant people were unacquainted 
with this hope, in the earlier periods of their history, and 
since it can easily be shown that in a state of deep religious 
emotion, the soul is more absorbed in the present moment, 
than concerned with the future. But it is too severe, it is 
thought, that the hope, which has prevailed to so wide an extent 
among the most elevated characters, of renewing their indi- 
vidual existence in a permanent form, should be ascribed by 
this Discourse to the lowest degree of self-love, when it was 
so easy to derive it from the love of objects, in which the 
heart is deeply interested. I can only say, that while the 
various forms, in which the hope of immortality, as the 
highest self-consciousness of the Spirit, has appeared, were 
floating before my eyes, it seemed natural and unavoidable, 
in this place also, to warn the adversaries of the faith, against 
confounding with the subject-matter itself, any of the modes 
of conception, in which it has been clothed, and especially 
those which betray the most evident signs of a concealed, 
subordinate interest. At the same time, I wished to show, 
that the problem should not be stated in the manner that 
would most readily occur to one whose consciousness was lim- 
ited to his own personality, and shackled by individual affini- 
ties, but to one, in whom personal interest is refined and pu- 
rified by being made subordinate to the self-consciousness. 



64 



which has been elevated to the perception of the universal 
and everlasting elements of human nature. But it was ne- 
cessary on the other hand, — in order to avoid interminable 
discussions, which, the more they are spun out, become more 
foreign to the main subject in question, — to point out to the 
adversaries of the faith, that there could be no religious interest 
in the discussion of the matter, except with those, who have 
already built up in their own souls that higher life, which is 
inspired by genuine piety, and which is the only true victory 
over death. If I have expressed with too much severity, my 
aversion to the self-deception growing out of a petty and ex- 
clusive turn of mind, which prides itself on embracing the 
doctrine of immortality and on being governed by the hopes 
and fears which it involves, I can only answer in defence, 
that this was not said, as a rhetorical flourish, but has always 
been one of the strongest feelings of my heart. I have no 
more earnest wish than that every man when he undertakes an 
estimate of his piety, could see himself, — not only as Plato 
expresses it, that the soul should appear before the judges of 
the invisible world, divested of all the artificial apparel, which 
has been thrown around it by the outward relations of life, — 
but also, after he has renounced such claims to an endless 
duration that he may determine, when he has contemplated 
himself as he is, whether these claims are any thing more 
than the titles, with which the potentates of the earth often 
deem it necessary to decorate themselves, to countries which 
they never have possessed, and never will possess. Whoever 
finds the eternal life which I have indicated in his own soul, 
after this divesture of its temporary costume, will experience 
no difficulty in adopting the views which are presented at the 
close of the Discourse, as well as in my exposition of the 
subject in my ' Christian Faith.' — Finally, the parallel here 
pointed out between the two ideas, God and immortality, 



65 



ought not to be overlooked in considering the different modes 
of conception. For as the conception of the human person- 
ality of God usually presupposes a consciousness that is not 
morally pure, the same thing may be assumed in the concep- 
tion of immortality, which represents it after the manner of 
the Elysian fields, only as a new earth of greater beauty and 
extent. And as we must admit an essential difference be- 
tween the inability to form such a human and personal 
conception of God and the denial of the existence of a 
Living God, — which last alone can be designated as Atheism ; 
in like manner, he who does not incline to such a material 
conception of immortality is very far from discarding the 
genuine hope of immortality. And as we may call every 
man religious who believes in a Living God, we may also call 
every one religious who believes in the Everlasting Life of the 
soul, without wishing to define the way or the manner in 
which it must be conceived." * 

The belief of Schleiermacher in the doctrine of 
immortality, is set forth in a manner, one would 
suppose, to prevent any dispute, in the portion of 
his work on the " Christian Faith," referred to in 
the last extract.- 

"As faith in the continuance of human personality is 
involved in the belief of the unchangeable union of the Divine 
Being with human nature in the person of Christ, the Christ- 
ian is thus inclined to form a definite conception of the con- 
dition after death. — 

" Faith in the continuance of personal existence is involved 
in our faith in the Redeemer. For if he ascribes such a 



* Reden, pp. 140, 141. 

9 



66 



continuance to himself, in every thing which he declares 
concerning his return, or his reunion with his disciples, it 
follows, — since he could declare this of himself, only as a 
human person, for as such only could he have communion 
with his disciples, — that, by virtue of the identity of human 
nature in him and in ourselves, — the same thing is true in 
regard also to us. Clearly as this appears, we are still bound 
to inquire, whether objections to this view are not possible, 
and if so what they are, — whether against the correctness of 
the supposition, or the legitimacy of the consequence. 

" Objections of the first kind can relate only to a differ- 
ence in the explanation of the sayings of Christ ; and so far 
could not be examined here, but belong to the art of inter- 
pretation. Thus much however may be said here, that if 
any one was disposed to assert in good faith, that all the 
declarations of Christ relating to this point are to be under- 
stood in a figurative, and not a literal sense, and that he 
ascribed no personal duration to himself, a faith in Christ, as 
it has been here set forth, would indeed remain possible, — 
for though the renunciation of personal duration were, in 
that case, something in common between Christ and our- 
selves, the peculiar distinction between Christ and us would 
not necessarily be taken away on that account, — yet an entire 
transformation of Christianity would be the effect, if such a 
mode of interpretation should ever become prevalent in the 
Church, and lie at the ground of Christian faith. And hence 
we may suppose, that such an interpretation cannot be made 
with good faith. 

" The case would not vary much, if any one should doubt 
the legitimacy of the consequence on the ground, that, 
although Christ ascribes personal duration to himself, he only 
appropriated this to himself from the prevailing faith, without 
a decided conviction of his own, and only in this way, as in 



67 



other similar cases, made use of the opinion; so that his 
disclosures on this point are not to be reckoned among those 
which are so connected with his certainty in regard to his 
dignity and destination, that unless they are accepted, the 
latter could not be believed. Moreover, it could hardly be 
sincerely alleged by any body, that Christ, in this way only, 
without his own conviction, rejected the view of the Saddu- 
cees, and that his faith in the invincible progress of his word 
was independent of his faith in the continuance of his per- 
sonality. 

" If then, it cannot be denied that Christ was firmly con- 
vinced of this, the only remaining objection that can be 
advanced is, that from the continuance of his personality, 
which we must believe with him, no inference can be drawn 
concerning our own, since his depended only on what was 
peculiar to himself, on that which exclusively constituted his 
human person, namely, the union of the Divine Being with 
human nature ; and therefore, so far as the Redeemer is 
immortal, all other men are not mortal. But this explanation 
would savor strongly of the heresy of the Docetoe. For the 
difference between an immortal and a mortal soul cannot 
consist alone in the fact that one dies ; but in every relation 
must the operations and state of the one be different from 
those of the other. Hence if the soul of the Redeemer 
were imperishable and our souls were perishable, it could not 
justly be said, that as a man, he was in all respects like unto 
us, sin only excepted. For if it should be said, that it was 
without doubt the original nature of the human soul to be 
immortal, but that it had become mortal by the introduction 
of sin, — this would imply, that the whole original work of 
God was destroyed by sin, and another substituted in its 
place. Hence also we must reject the division which some 
would assume, that indeed all souls have become mortal by 



68 



sin, and suffer death with the body, but that the believing, 
through communion of life with Christ, share in immor- 
tality, and with him pass through death into life. For either 
this rests on a Manichean supposition, that those who do not 
attain to a communion of life with Christ cannot be immor- 
tal ; or if others are similar to them by nature, yet their 
nature must become entirely different by regeneration. 

" Nothing therefore remains, but that if we ascribe perfect 
truth, as the disciples undoubtedly did, to the expression of 
the Redeemer concerning his own personal duration, then 
also all of the human race may expect this duration. But in 
this case, accordingly, the Redeemer certainly remains the 
mediator of immortality, not only for those who shall here 
believe in him, but for all, without exception. That is, if 
personal immortality did not belong to human nature, then 
the union of the Divine Being with human nature in such a 
personality as that of the Redeemer would not have been 
possible ; and on the other hand, since God has determined 
to redeem and perfect human nature through such a union, 
the individuals of the human race must bear the same immor- 
tality in themselves^ as that of which the Redeemer was 
conscious. 

" Such is the true, Christian guaranty of this faith. Every 
other assurance of it, even if it were more convincing than 
can be expected after the attempts hitherto made, remains 
foreign to the Christian as such, until this faith shall be num- 
bered among those conceptions, which constitute the com- 
plete and universal conviction of humanity." * 

It is unnecessary to bring forward additional evi- 
dence concerning the point to be proved ; but it 



* Christliche Glaube, vol. ii. pp. 517—520. 



69 



may not be without interest to dwell a little more 
at length on the opinions of Schleiermacher on the 
condition of the soul in the future world. If objec- 
tions should be presented to his views, it will not 
be, I suppose, on account of a deficiency of his 
faith in the doctrine of immortality ; but because 
he expresses a too confident hope in the prospects 
of the future. 

" We may expect of the divine justice in regard to every 
future condition, that it will be adapted to the greatest need 
of every individual, whether that be the transition from evil 
to good, or a nearer approach to perfection. But whether 
this is to be attained by happiness or suffering, must be left 
entirely to the Supreme Wisdom. We may, however, per- 
ceive how the goodness of God which grants what is best to 
every one, will be most freely shown towards him, who is 
the most confirmed in goodness. We may conclude from 
the analogy of the present life, that the deprivation of what 
is agreeable and adverse circumstances of all kinds, may be 
an effectual means to bring man to reflection on the fact that 
the prosperity and enjoyment to which he has sacrificed his 
conscience cannot be securely attained, — a means to make 
him sensible of the magnitude of the sacrifice, and thus to 
restore him to reason, and to obedience to God. We may 
suppose, that he who has arrived at a certain degree of 
goodness, will be the soonest freed from the various evils 
which in the present life are applied to the righteous as trials 
and proofs, and that he will be fitted to obtain advantages for 
the attainment of holiness, from all that he experiences, even 
if it should be unmingled joy." * 

* Predigten, vol. i. p. 107. 



70 



" If the question be asked, How and in what manner, we 
remain united with those who have shared this life with us, 
but who are now among us no more, I answer, in the words 
of the Apostle, " Our conversation is in heaven." This is 
said to us all in the same manner. They, whom the Lord 
has taken from us, can be regarded as having gone before us, 
only in so far as their conversation here was in heaven ; 
otherwise they have rather been left behind us in a mournful 
sense of the terms. What therefore has actually united us 
with them, while they were yet among us, and by which we 
remain united with them now that they are no more, is only 
the fact, that our conversation also is in heaven. 

6< But what is meant by this expression 1 We know very 
well, that when we speak of heaven, we understand no spe- 
cific placet Heaven to us is no more the solid arch stretched 
forth over our heads, in which the shining points that give 
light by night are fixed ; neither is it the place in which the 
Supreme and Eternal Being has his peculiar abode. Those 
points of light have increased, in the sight of man, to an 
illimitable host of bodies, like that on which we dwell. With 
this enlarged conception of the stars, the vault in which they 
appear, has fallen into an unknown and immeasurable space. 
We only know that the Supreme and Eternal Being can no 
more dwell in one than in another specific place, for then if 
he were not indeed limited to that place, he would bear a 
different relation to it from that to every other. But we 
cannot suppose this ; for God is alike present to us every 
where ; and his dwelling is every where. But since the time 
that man arose to the perception of this truth, he must needs 
gain another point of support for his spirit, or he would lose 
himself, and his better life. Would not our whole race 
appear infinitely small and insignificant in the creation, com- 
pared with the vast multitude of worlds ; and still more so, 



71 



every individual for himself? When we ascend to the 
thought of an illimitable number of worlds, all inhabited by 
the living and intelligent creatures of God, might we not 
almost despair, as if we, who perhaps hold one of the lowest 
degrees in the scale of being, were scarce the objects of his 
fatherly care and protection ? And since we can no more 
look up into the blue heavens as the special dwelling-place of 
God, but acknowledge him as present every where; how 
much more easily can man, who never rises entirely above 
the influence of material things, lose all sense of the Omni- 
present Being; for he is always surrounded by earthly objects, 
but no longer believes that he must turn away from them, in 
order to draw near to God. This is the knowledge which 
puffs up ; and, with the increased acquaintance with the 
world, has crept in a great indifference towards its Author. 

" Hence, in the progress of the human mind, the eternal 
counsel of God for the redemption of man must be fulfilled. 
He must appear, who could show us a new heaven as the 
dwelling-place of God on earth ; he in whom, since the 
fulness of the Godhead dwelt in him, was to be seen the 
glory of the Father and his divine essence. He must appear, 
so that like the ancient generations in the childhood of the 
world, we might again have a tabernacle of God, a peculiar 
sanctuary among us, in which the Eternal Being should be 
enthroned. So therefore did he dwell in him, who has 
brought life and immortality to light, not contained within 
him exclusively ; but spreading himself from him to the 
multitude of the faithful, as the Spirit that dwelleth in them ; 
so that we need not seek the Supreme Being, in a specific 
place at a wide distance from us ; nor possess him every 
where, it is true, but yet always out of ourselves ; but should 
be able to find and enjoy him within ourselves. 

" This is the heaven of which the Apostle speaks. The 



72 



Redeemer, filled with the power of God, his spiritual presence 
and nearness in the church, by the spirit which he promised 
and obtained in prayer from his Father, — this is the heaven, 
in which we should have our conversation. What the Apos- 
tle understands by our conversation in this heaven is of a 
twofold character. First, the general laws which bind a soci- 
ety of men in their life and conduct, are called their conver- 
sation, as the word is here used ; and secondly, the whole 
course of their life, their thoughts, feelings, and actions, as 
they may be related to those laws. This then is the testimony 
which the Apostle gives of it, in the name of the whole 
church, when he says, Our conversation is in heaven. The 
laws of our life and conduct, the constitution of this commu- 
nity of faith and love in which we are united, — all this is from 
the heaven, which Christ, the Son of the Highest, has here 
set forth before us. That we should refer every thing which 
may form a law of our life, to the Supreme and Eternal, as he 
has revealed himself to us in his Son ; that the heaven, to 
which we would devote our whole existence, is nothing else, 
than the uninterrupted spiritual communion with God through 
his Son ; and that we are governed by these holy laws, and 
renouncing all earthly striving and enjoying, which relates 
only to our perishable existence in this world, do nothing but 
build up the kingdom of God on earth, the holy temple in 
which the Supreme will dwell, since it is no earthly house 
made with hands, but the spiritual abode of the Eternal spirit 
in created Spirits ; — this life and action, this endeavor and 
aim, — this is our conversation in heaven. 

" Now, when in those infinite regions, we would seek those 
who have gone before us, if we conceive of them as again in 
a world, gloriously decorated as it may be, which is given to 
them as a habitation, and their life refers merely to their out- 
ward existence in that world, — this life would still be— how- 



73 



ever nobler and Jess perishable their happiness would then be 
than now, — it would still be not a conversation in heaven, 
but on earth. For every thing connected with matter and 
with space, is perishable and earthly by its nature; and every 
thing of this kind which draws the soul to itself, may also de- 
tach it from what is eternal, and the only genuine and worthy 
object of its joy and love. For them also, accordingly, there 
is a conversation in heaven, like our own, which is distin- 
guished from all temporal and earthly life ; and this conver- 
sation in heaven cannot be maintained by them otherwise 
than by us ; their highest elevation can only be to know the 
Lord as he is, and to resemble him so far, that they manifest 
him in their being and action. 

"In this way, we remain united with them, provided that 
we seek the same end, and live after the same law. For 
there cannot be another or a higher knowledge of God for 
the human spirit, — of this we are all as certain, as we share 
with each other from the heart the Christian faith, — than that 
which dwelt in the Son of God, who could give the testimony 
as he closed his earthly course, that he had declared to his 
disciples, every thing which the Father had given him, and 
which he had learned of the Father. Hence their knowledge 
and ours can be only one and the same; they, like ourselves, 
can know nothing higher of the Eternal Creator and Father 
of all beings, than what the disciple of the Lord has taught 
us, ' God is Love.' And the love of God, which always and 
every where must be the heaven in our hearts, cannot be there 
another thing from what it is here ; but it is one and the 
same. 

l< Since then they who have gone before us, and we who 
remain behind live in this love of God, and since this is the 
essential distinction of the only true conversation in heaven, 
they are united with us, and we are united with them ; it is 
10 



74 



one and the same spirit which prevails in them and in us ; 
one and the same kingdom of love, to which they and we 
belong ; one and the same heaven, in which they and we 
live." * f 

The following extract will be read with interest, 
I am persuaded, not merely as a proof of the 
opinions of Schleiermacher, but on account of the 
beauty and elevation of the views which it presents. 
It is taken from a Discourse on these words : " And 
this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of 
all which he hath given me, I should lose nothing, 
but should raise it up again at the last day. And 
this is the will of him that sent me, that every one 

# Predigten, vol. ii. pp. 587 — 591. 

f The simple pathos, with which this strictly Christian con- 
ception is expressed by Charles Wesley, is probably familiar to the 
reader. 

" The saints on earth and those above 

But one communion make ; 
Joined to their Lord in bonds of love, 

All of his grace partake. 

One family, we dwell in him ; 

One church above, beneath ; 
Though now divided by the stream, 

The narrow stream of death. 

One army of the living God, 

To his command we bow, 
Part of the host have crossed the flood, 

And part are crossing now." 



75 



which seeth the Son and believeth on him, may have 
everlasting life ; and I will raise him up at the last 
day." 

" Among the declarations of our Redeemer on this subject, 
there are many of which we are uncertain, whether he speaks 
of the resurrection of the body, or of the awaking from 
spiritual death to the new spiritual life of which he is the 
author. These words, however, are perfectly clear ; for our 
Lord makes an evident distinction between the two ; speaking 
first of the eternal life, which is enjoyed by those who see the 
Son and believe in him, and secondly, of the resurrection at 
the last day, to which he had before alluded, and which he 
promises to his disciples as something future. — 

" He distinguishes between those souls which believe on 
him in the highest and strictest sense of the words, and who 
have given themselves to him, and those whom the Father has 
given to him ; and his first promise, accordingly, is a ground 
for general joy in relation to all our departed ones ; while the 
second occasions a peculiar joy in respect to those who have 
cherished a living faith in him on earth, and here according 
to his saying have enjoyed eternal life. 

" As regards the first, it is our common faith that they who 
are received into the church, by the holy rite of baptism, are 
given, as it were, by the Father to the Son. In a peculiar 
manner, this may be said of our children, who are thus ad- 
mitted from their infancy into the community of Christians. 
We consecrate them to the Lord, in this sacred ordinance, as 
his property, by Christian prayer and supplication, and from 
that moment regard them as his. Is it now asked, in what 
sense they are given to the Son, who are thus received only 
into the external communion of the faithful, I answer, they 
are given to him, in order that he may begin his work in them 
and carry it on unto perfection. — 



76 



" Of all who in the lapse of one year depart from this 
earthly life, a great proportion are the young, whose minds 
are not unfolded, and who, therefore, cannot possess a living 
faith in the Redeemer. Before their spiritual eye is so far 
opened, that they can behold in him the glory of the only 
begotten of the Father, their bodily eye is closed on the light 
and life of earth. But the Lord giv es us the promise that the 
spiritual eye, which is destined to behold him, will not remain 
forever sealed ; that the heart which is intended to beat in 
faith and love towards him will not continue forever cold ; 
but that it is the will of the Father, that even by the great 
ordinance of nature which numbers the days of man, not one 
of the souls given him should be lost. 

" When we welcome to this earthly life a new visitant, en- 
trusted especially to our fidelity and our love, what means the 
rapture of our hearts ? What produces this deep and strange 
emotion? What but the fact, that here is a soul, which we 
are to aid in unfolding the divine germ which yet slumbers 
within it ; which we are to guard against the temptations of 
life ; and which we are to bring as early as may be to the 
knowledge of him, through whom alone it can attain the 
eternal life to which it is destined. To this end, from the 
first, we direct our love ; our joy and gratitude are called 
forth as we see this work advancing ; we are filled with 
anxiety and sorrow, when it appears to go back. Now if a 
great proportion of these infant souls, in the very dawn of 
their being, when parents and friends can do little more than 
protect the bodily and earthly life, and cherish the first germ 
of love, in which the sensual is yet largely combined with the 
spiritual, and predominant over it, — in the hope that a more 
pleasing life will show itself in them, with the gradual un- 
folding of their spiritual nature; — if a great proportion of 
these, I say, are snatched from our care and love, before this 



77 



delightful hope can begin to be fulfilled — how rich the con* 
solation, that the Lord has said, he should lose none whom 
the Father has given him ; not even the smallest, not even 
that which had not begun, which could not yet begin to walk 
in the path of his salvation. 

"But not in all whose lives are longer preserved are these 
cheering hopes fulfilled. We see many in the fulness of life 
and strength, concerning whom we do not know, whether we 
can apply to them the words of the Lord, ' that whoso be- 
lieveth on him hath everlasting life;' nay, many go through 
the greatest part of their earthly career in such a manner, 
that though they cannot wholly escape the influence of the 
divine Spirit and Word upon their souls, nor that of the 
Christian life and morality, since they belong to the outward 
community of Christians, — yet, as they do not appropriate 
this to themselves, and exhibit no fruits from it, their confes- 
sion of Christ, if they confess him at all, seems something 
altogether external ; because, to say nothing worse, we see so 
little of his spirit, so few traces of a lively intercourse with 
him. When such, therefore, to whom time has been granted, 
and to whom the fountain of salvation has not been closed, 
but who have not become partakers of eternal life, are sum- 
moned from this world, can we apply to them also the words 
of the Redeemer? When we consider the subject more 
closely, we cannot fail to perceive a certain resemblance 
between them, and those who have been called from the 
earth, at the commencement of their lives; and in this way, 
we cannot doubt of the applicability of the promise to those 
brothers of ours also. 

" We distinguish in man a variety of powers, both of mind 
and body, which each person, in a different degree, but yet 
which each possesses. Each of these powers has its own his- 
tory, its own development ; we distinguish in each the first 



78 



awaking, as it were, the age of childhood, — then, the time of 
growth and blossoming, — and then, the time when it should 
bring forth fruit, in the whole sphere of human life. As these 
powers are unfolded only one after another, the difference 
which God, according to his unsearchable wisdom has estab- 
lished among men, depends on this circumstance, that in one 
the unfolding of these various powers takes place in rapid 
succession, in another, one remains behind the other, and in 
all, many never attain their complete development. But 
among all these gifts, the greatest is that, with which alone the 
salvation given us in the Redeemer is directly connected, — 
namely, the self-consciousness of the human soul, which 
once awakened can never be destroyed, that it is destined to 
something higher ; but which by itself alone, and without 
the aid, which God has given us in the Redeemer, it cannot 
attain. When this at first awakes, it is manifested as a 
longing after something above the usual aims and the usual 
enjoyments of men. With this longing, the soul often wanders 
restlessly, before it finds repose in him, who has been near it so 
long, but whom it often knows not until late. Now do we see 
so many men unfolding all the powers of the spirit, exhibiting 
its blossoms and its fruit; but in whom this longing has not 
yet come to fruit or blossom, — what can we say, but that in 
this sense they are yet children? They are in the same 
unconsciousness with regard to this, which they once were 
in, with regard to their other powers ; the earthly life has not 
yet been able to unfold in them this highest and noblest 
germ. Children, accordingly, have they yet remained in this 
higher self-consciousness which leads all men as repentant 
sinners to the feet of the Divine Son, and causes them 
when they see him to believe ; children have they remained 
in this knowledge of themselves, in this endeavor after the 
end which God has prescribed to them ; and as such children 



79 



have they left this earthly life. Neither, therefore, will the 
Lord lose them, for the Father has given them to him; and 
he will raise them up at the last day, then to resume and 
continue the work which was here advanced no further, 
according to the divine purpose in regard to every individual 
soul. — 

" But, moreover, there is a peculiar joy in the second 
promise, expressed in the words, ' This is the will of him 
who hath sent me, that whoso seeth the Son and believeth 
in him, hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up at the 
last day. 5 It has been already said that eternal life, as 
actually present here, is to be distinguished from the summons 
at the last day, considered as yet to come. But that the 
Redeemer has not only promised but actually given to us 
eternal life; that he not only directed the hopes of his disci- 
ples to a future state after death, but pointed out the present 
and actual enjoyment of eternal life, — this needs not to be 
proved to those who have known him, and believed in him, 
and seen in him the glory of the only begotten of the Father. 
We might even say that as the Redeemer bore an eternal life 
on earth, through the fulness of the Godhead which dwelt in 
him ; so do all likewise bear an eternal life, who have become 
one with him, as he was one with the Father, and to whose 
hearts he has returned, in order with the Father, to make his 
abode with them. For they are no longer impelled by what 
is sensual and corruptible ; it is an imperishable power, an 
unchangeable love from which every thing proceeds, which 
guides their whole life, fills their whole soul, and subjects 
every thing in it to its eternal order. As it is no injury to 
the eternal life of God, that his eternal decrees are fulfilled 
in a temporal form, and that the world which he has created 
moves in the sphere of time, so it is not inconsistent with 
our eternal life, that our thoughts and feelings which proceed 



80 



from the inner man are temporal and transient, and that for 
time we act on temporal things. Even when by divine grace, 
with our growth in holiness, our faith becomes stronger to 
endure and to overcome, and our love is manifested in a 
purer form, — this is not to be regarded properly as a new gift, 
or a change in the inner man, but it is the same inner man, 
exhibited with greater decision and vigor. — Are then our 
love and attention given alone to eternal things, — do these 
perpetually fill our minds, and predominate over all else ; 
then is our life no longer a temporal, but an eternal one. 

" Now if our beloved ones are called away in the enjoy- 
ment of this eternal life, what can disquiet us on their ac- 
count; since we know that the Lord will raise them up at 
the last day. For otherwise can he not raise them up and 
present them to his Father, than as they are, and therefore, 
in possession of eternal life. Grace for grace have they 
received from his fulness; and what is theirs, can no man 
take from them. The freedom of God's children have they 
attained through him who alone can truly make us free ; and 
this must remain to them secure. Although it is written, 
( It doth not yet appear what we shall be,' we still know 
that nothing essentially new can be given to them and to us. 
It is surely the same blessedness of faith and love, the same 
spiritual presence of the Redeemer in the soul, which is far 
higher and nobler than any bodily connexion with him can 
have ever been, the same living knowledge of the Son, and 
of the Father in the Son ; for this knowledge and this love, 
since they are no fragment of human and corruptible origin, 
must remain immortal. Do we then know this, — and we have 
the firm persuasion that the connexion which we sustain with 
our departed ones, through the Redeemer, who is in them as 
in us, who for them as well as for us, is the fountain of the 
same eternal life, remains uninterruptedly the same, — what 



81 



should hinder us from cherishing the pure joy, which the 
Lord awakens in us through his word, concerning all the 
departed who while they remained on earth, gave light 
and strength to our souls? Or what tidings in regard to 
them do we desire ? The essential portion of the treasures 
of heaven we share with them in the same faith and the 
same love ; the most precious gem in the crown of the 
departed is not unknown and foreign to us ; but we possess 
it likewise ourselves. Whatever may be the theatre, on 
which they continue their eternal life, — whether it will com- 
mence in our temporal manner, — whether it will involve 
eternal and temporal relations, — and whether we know much 
or little concerning these questions, — may be regarded by 
us with as great indifference as the same questions relating 
to ourselves in the present state. 

"There can then properly be no pain and no tears over 
those of our brethren who are taken from us, according to 
the will of God. We follow after them, and the blessing of 
their memory remains with us. We follow after them ; 
serene in faith and love, — with joyful gratitude that the Lord 
permitted them here to find eternal things. Their remem- 
brance continues among us, as a benediction ; for it ever 
calls us back to that which was their highest good in this 
life, and which will satisfy them also in the other. 

" But sooner or later shall we too be joined to those whom 
we now remember in peace. If then the tranquillity and joy 
be so much greater, with which we think of those whose 
faith we have known, and from whose temporal life the eter- 
nal life has shone out upon us, let us also leave no doubt to 
the devoted love of those with whom and for whom we live, 
whether we huve found and possess that eternal life ; no 
anxiety, lest we have remained children, in whom the highest 
element of human existence was not yet unfolded ; or dis- 
11 



82 



eased children who could obtain no taste of the pure milk of 
the Gospel, nor apply it to the nourishment of spiritual life. 
May our whole life be adapted to give the pure and perfect 
joy to all connected with us, which every one must feel in 
the contemplation of that eternal life. By this alone, can we 
not only be raised above all earthly change, and assured of 
blessedness, while we yet wander on the earth ; but this 
alone, when we go hence, can remove all earthly grief from 
those whom we leave behind." * 

The reader is now able to determine how far the 
statement is to be relied on, that "it would be 
idle to inquire what hopes and what immortality 
Schleiermacher would hold out to a being whose 
personal existence is to cease with death." I trust 
that the inquiry will tend not only to correct erro- 
neous impressions in regard to the opinions of 
Schleiermacher, but to quicken and elevate the 
mind in the indulgence of its immortal hopes. 

We will now consider the views of Schleier- 
macher, concerning the Christian revelation. You 
represent him as denying " the divine authority of 
our religion," and in this respect, as having " as little 
belief as the Rationalist," " who rejecting revelation 
founds his faith in natural religion." 

The Rationalist, it will be remembered, "using 
the word in its widest acceptation," denies the su- 



* Predigten, vol. iv. pp. 353—364. 



83 



pernatural origin of Christianity ; explains away the 
miracles of the New Testament into merely natural 
events, or calls in question their historical credi- 
bility ; and admits no peculiar and essential Divinity 
in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ. 

These views, so far from being adopted by 
Schleiermacher, as you strangely enough suppose, 
found in him a vigorous and successful opponent. 
He believed in the supernatural origin of Christian- 
ity. He maintained that Christ wrought miracles, 
by the power of God. He contended for the in- 
trinsic Divinity of the Redeemer, as manifested in 
his word and his works. 

You assert that he differed from the Rationalists, 
in founding religion on the feelings, rather than on 
the understanding ; that " this was the point at issue 
between them but that " the authority of revela- 
tion, as teaching the fundamental facts of religion, 
is equally rejected" by both. 

This is altogether incorrect. He admitted, as 
we have seen, a rational and natural element in 
revelation ; so far, he agreed with the Rationalists ; 
but on the great dividing question, concerning the 
supernatural origin of Christianity, and the Divinity 
of the Redeemer, he was directly opposed to them ; 
and this will be evident from the passages, which I 
shall now produce. The first quotation expresses 
his general views in regard to the essential character 
of the Christian faith. 



84 



"It is well known, how much controversy there has always 
been, and still is, in the Christian world, on the meaning of 
the declaration that Jesus is the Son of God, and on the 
manner, in which the human and divine are united in him. 
Now, if it were a matter of universal importance for all 
Christians to obtain the most correct knowledge on this sub- 
ject, it might be supposed that before the Lord pronounced 
the blessing on Peter, he would have asked, ' In what way, 
do you call me the Son of God ? How do you regard the 
union of the divine and human in my person?' But this he 
did not do. — He avoided the question because he did not 
deem it important, although he could foresee what strife it 
would occasion the Church ; and in order, that none of those, 
who, in an unchristian manner condemn others for such 
differences of opinion, should be able to appeal to him, as 
having proposed such intricate and subtile questions. — 

"Accordingly, when Peter said that Jesus is the Christ, 
every one understood him as declaring that Jesus was not 
sent like John the Baptist, to announce the approach of the 
kingdom of God, but to establish it himself and in his own 
name ; not like Elijah and others, to hold the forgotten law 
before the eye of its transgressor, but to institute the perfect 
in the place of the imperfect, and to judge the whole earth 
according to the revealed standard of God; not merely, like 
the former prophets, a comforter promising a better future in 
times of distress and repentance, but the one, in whom all 
prophecy is fulfilled; so that every future prediction can only 
repeat him, who is the source of all inspiration, and in whom 
all spiritual comfort is so given, that none can be needed 
which may not be drawn from his fulness. 

" As regards the confession of Peter, that Jesus is the Son 
of the living God, we must bear in mind the words of the 
Redeemer, when his hearers called him in question, because 



85 



he had made God his Father, in a peculiar sense. He re- 
ferred them to the Scriptures of the Old Testament, in which 
also common men were called children of God, sons of God ; 
and if those, to whom the word of God came, were called 
sons of God, how much more should he be called ' the Son 
of God.' He thus distinguishes himself from those to whom 
the word of God was declared, as the one, who indeed did 
nothing from himself, from human counsel and will, but to 
whom the word of God needed not to come for special cases, 
since he knew all things, and understood what the Father 
did, and commanded ; as the one in whom the word of God 
was made flesh, so that, on the one hand, all his acts were 
divine life, and all his words divine truth, and on the other 
hand, he was our brother, in all human infirmity, yet without 
sin. This is the faith which Peter confessed ; for which he 
was blessed by the Redeemer ; which cannot be revealed by 
flesh and blood, but by our Father who is in heaven." * 

With regard to the views of Schleiermacher 
himself, concerning the union of the divine and 
human in the person of Jesus Christ, I present the 
following passages from his posthumous Discourses 
on the Gospel of John.f 

* Predigten, vol. iv. pp. 92, 93. 

t The remaks of the editor of this delightful volume may not be 
without interest in this connexion. 

" Like the disciple whose Gospel he explains, he here leans on 
the bosom of Jesus ; what he has there seen and felt, he announces 
to us ; and declares in ever new relations the glory of the Word 
made flesh, of the Word eternally becoming flesh. How the whole 
being of Schleiermacher was rooted in the believing contemplation 
of this glory ; how this alone to his profound and penetrating spirit, 
solved and reconciled the deepest mysteries of our existence; how 



86 



" When I read the Introduction to the Gospel of John, 1 
cannot avoid the thought, that this Gospel should not stand 
after the others, but should be the first book in the New 
Testament, since its commencement has such a clear and 
decided reference to the commencement of the Scriptures of 
the Old Testament. For as it is said there, 1 In the begin- 

it secured to him, for an indestructible possession, a tranquil sim- 
plicity, a perennial peace of mind, in the midst of the most varied 
activity ; how it elevated him above every perplexity, and converted 
the world for him into a serene and glorious theatre of divine 
wisdom and love ; and how it called forth that freedom from pas- 
sion, that calm and gentle equanimity, as well as that noble, free, 
and vigorous use of life, which accords with such a lofty point of 
contemplation, — this will be evident to the apprehensive mind from 
the present work. The profound speculative ideas, on which the 
Christology of John is founded, are laid open with singular skill to 
the general mind ; with rare freedom from pretension, the treasures 
of a rich, scientific knowledge of the Scriptures are applied in a 
manner universally intelligible ; and all this in such lucid, sincere, 
and trustful language, that we feel, that nothing but the power of 
a master could attain to such complete and attractive simplicity. 

" Schleiermacher, moreover, has been the means of saving many 
from bondage or from emptiness, who were unwilling to forego a 
thorough explanation, concerning their religious life. The revolu- 
tion, which with powerful impulse, he at first gave to theology, has 
since unloosed many a centrifugal element; he himself, however, 
never lost the true, central point, but perceived it with increasing 
clearness ; and thus, accordingly, he will be the man, who has found 
the word for the new epoch of theology which he commenced. 
This word around which all theological parties will more and more 
gather, which only acknowledge with him a peculiar place in 
human nature, and a peculiar life for the religious consciousness, 
and which desire to borrow faith neither from philosophy, nor from 
a letter esteemed sacred, — this word is Schleiermacher's Christology, 
(doctrine concerning Christ.) Predigten, vol. viii. preface, pp. ix. x* 



87 



ning God created the heavens and the earth,' it is said here, 
1 In the beginning was the Word.' As it was the principal 
purpose of that book to describe the history of the patriarchs, 
and of the chosen people, and the sacred writer goes back to 
the commencement of the human race, and the creation of 
the whole world ; so also John, whose purpose was to de- 
scribe the history of the Word made flesh, of the mission of 
the Redeemer, by whom a new kingdom of God was to be 
founded, and man thus made a new creature, and the spirit- 
ual life more widely diffused ; he too goes back to the com- 
mencement of all things; nay, we might say, still further 
back ; and we cannot understand what he says, unless we 
bear in mind this reference to the commencement of the first 
book of Moses, and the object which he had in view, namely, 
to show that the Word which he declares was in the begin- 
ning with God, was made flesh. 

" Now as it is said, ' In the beginning, God created the 
heavens and the earth,' and afterwards, 'God said, Let there 
be light and there was light ;' and as the whole work of 
creation is described by the expression, ' God spoke ;' so 
John goes back to the word which God spoke, and says, ' In 
the beginning,' (in the beginning when God created the 
hoavens and the earth) 'was the Word,' that is, the divine 
Word, by which all things were created." * 

" ' And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and 
we beheld his glory, the glory of the only begotten of the 
Father, full of grace and truth.' This has always been 
regarded as the most living and delightful expression of the 
genuine faith of Christians. We also who have not seen the 
Redeemer dwelling among men, may unite in these words of 
the Apostle with the strongest conviction. For all our 



* Predigten, vol. viii. pp. 4, 5. 



88 



knowledge of the Redeemer, and the faith by which we 
behold in him the glory of the only begotten of the Father, 
rest upon the fact that he has dwelt among men in the world ; 
this is involved in all testimony concerning him, in all the 
effects which have proceeded from him ; and we cannot con- 
ceive that there should have been such a faith and community 
of Christians, that such an indescribable and salutary effect 
should have proceeded from a single point, and should ever 
act with increased influence on men, if ' the Word had not 
been made flesh and dwelt among us.' 

"By this expression, moreover, the Apostle at the same 
time indicates the great difference between the Redeemer, 
and all who are declared in the Scriptures to be messengers 
of God, and as such, have been received in the history of 
man. When the Apostle previously said, ' In the Word was 
life, and that life was the light of men, and the light shined 
in darkness,' he meant, that all the enlightening of men, who 
walked in darkness and in the shadow of death, had pro- 
ceeded from the same fulness of the Divine Being which 
dwelt in Christ; but in such a manner, that the light every 
where only shined in darkness. And this was true, not only 
of those who saw this light, but of those from whom it came. 
Even a prophet, the greatest as well as the least, was one in 
whom the light only shined in darkness ; it was only at par- 
ticular moments that the Spirit of God came on the soul, and 
enlightened it with light from above; but, in general, even 
these men of God shared in the darkness which could not 
comprehend the light. 

" But with the Redeemer the case was different. The 
Word was made flesh. The same divine and everlasting 
Word, which from the beginning was the light of men, this 
fulness of the Godhead became flesh, that is, became man in 
a man. This was the only condition, on which we could 



89 



behold in him the glory of the only-begotten of the Father ; 
and only in the Son could we see the Father, because else- 
where darkness universally prevailed. 

" We are also to notice how decidedly the Apostle here 
ascribes the union of the divine fulness with human nature 
to the commencement of the human life of Christ, when he 
says, ' The Word was made flesh.' The man Jesus did not 
first exist, and then, at a subsequent period, the Word of the 
Lord come upon him, although in a far higher degree than 
on other prophets ; but the Word was made flesh ; the man 
Jesus only thereby became the Redeemer of the world ; from 
the very beginning, the union of the fulness of the Godhead 
with human nature existed in him. — 

"As in the expression, 'the Word was made flesh,' the 
Apostle assures us of the true and perfect humanity of the 
Redeemer, so in the expression, ' that we beheld his glory 
as of the only-begotten of the Father/ he assures us of his 
absolute peculiarity, to which nothing else is like; and that 
in a totally different manner, and in the divine sense of the 
word, he is a Son of the Father, to whom no other is equal ; 
but in a way which has no parallel, the only-begotten of the 
Father, by whom all others obtain the power to become the 
children of God. 

" There is a difference between the expressions ' children 
of God,' and ' Son of God,' which is always observed in 
Scripture, but which we often overlook. That is, all of us, 
so far as we have obtained the power from Christ, are called 
children of God ; but he is the Son of God. According to 
the general use of language, the term ' child ' refers to a 
state of imperfection and inequality with the Father; but the 
word ' Son ' designates a state of maturity and independence 
which implies a certain equality between Father and Son ; 
and 1 the Son,' as the Scripture says, ' abides in the house 

12 



90 



of the Father forever.' This is the permanent relation 
between the Redeemer, and those who through him have ob- 
tained the power to become children of God. He is the Son, 
to whom, as he says himself, * all power is given in heaven 
and in earth :' who, as the Scripture says, ■ abides in the 
house of the Father forever and as the Scripture says, 
' the servant abideth not in the house of his Master ;' so it is 
the Son, who forever administers its affairs ; and so therefore 
is he equal with the Father, endowed with his power, clothed 
with his glory, entrusted with a knowledge of his counsels 
and his will, the brightness of his perfections. We all obtain 
from him the power to become children of God ; we remain, 
in ourselves considered, in the infancy and imperfection of 
spiritual life; we shall never become equal to him who dwells 
forever as the only-begotten Son in the house of the Father."* 
" ' No man hath seen God at any time ; the only-begotten 
Son who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared 
him.' So says the Son himself. ' Not that any man hath 
seen the Father, save he who is of God, he hath seen the 
Father.' Clearly and decidedly the Redeemer here speaks 
of himself, as of a peculiar person, who has not his equal. 
For though the law given by Moses is a divine law ; though 
the Spirit of God came upon the prophets ; though before 
Moses, Abraham received divine promises of a sublime char- 
acter, from which all the dealings of God with the Jewish 
people proceeded ; yet none of these ever saw God. Only 
from him who had seen God, who came down from the 
bosom of the Father, can the kingdom of grace and truth 
among men proceed: all else, in comparison, must vanish 
away; it has no essential being ; but only the shadow and 
type of good things to come. All grace and all knowledge 



* Predigten, vol. viii. pp. 31 — 36. 



91 



of God has begun with Christ, with him who was in the 
bosom of the Father, and from him has descended into this 
human world. Only in him and through him can man know 
God the Father and receive from his fulness grace and truth. 
The law was given by Moses as a divine law ; the prophets 
brought the divine word to the people ; but the true revela* 
tion of God, the living, inward consciousness of him, the 
experience that we have power to become children of God, — 
this we can obtain only through the Son, who has come down 
to us from the bosom of the Father, — and this also is our 
assurance, that no one has ever seen God ; that hence no 
such union between man and God as he founded, had ever 
taken place ; that no one like him had opened the spiritual 
eye of man to light from above; that the human heart which 
had grown cold and dead, had never been prepared for the 
heavenly influence of truth, as by him, who has declared to 
us all that the Father revealed to him, and has shown us all 
his works."* 

Such are the views of Schleiermacher concern- 
ing the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. They 
may differ, in many respects, from those which have 
been usually presented in English theology ; they 
may not coincide with the general opinions of 
liberal Christians in our own country ; but, few, I 
think, would employ language so loosely, as to 
designate them by the w T ord " infidelity ;" on the 
contrary, if they are objected to at all, it will be, I 
presume, on account of their exhibiting higher 

* Predigten, vol. viii. pp. 41, 42. 



92 



conceptions in regard to the connexion between 
Jesus Christ and God, than many are prepared to 
admit. 

I will now bring forward some passages which 
represent the value and importance of miracles, in 
the theology of Schleiermacher. It will be seen from 
them that he embraced the historical truth of the 
miracles of Jesus, as recorded in the New Testa- 
ment ; that he considered them to be peculiar mani- 
festations of divine power, above the ordinary course 
of nature ; that, to a certain degree, in his opinion, 
they are proofs of the divine mission of the Re- 
deemer ; but that so far from being the only proofs, 
they are not the primary, nor the principal proofs ; 
and that the faith of the Christian in the Divinity 
of Jesus rests on a far deeper and more permanent 
support. 

" No small portion of the biography of our Lord consists 
in the narration of individual acts of mercy, by which he 
manifested his glory in sufferers of various descriptions ; and 
which the narrator represents not as works of ordinary human 
skill ; still less as the effect of chance ; but as the out-flowing 
of his higher, divine power. If many at the present day can 
do nothing with these narratives, but renounce, as far as 
possible, all that is miraculous and supernatural in them, and 
reduce that which is represented as one act of a higher 
power, to a number of small, separate events, to a happy 
coincidence of many circumstances, — I will not say precisely 
that this indicates a disposition foreign to the faith of Christ- 



93 



ians, and without any perception of its essential character ; 
but yet such a procedure does show a state of mind, that 
has not considered how much the heart would suffer, if the 
understanding only can always perceive its office to solve 
difficult problems, so far as the means for this are not wanting. 
But it was not for this purpose, that the first disciples of Jesus, 
or their successors, recorded these narratives : but, as one of 
them expressly says, that we might believe 1 that Jesus is the 
Christ.' Neither from the consequence alone, nor from the 
miraculous manner alone in which it was introduced, but 
from the whole of such narratives, must the spirit of a divine 
messenger appeal to every one, by whom they may be heard 
or read. We certainly are not referred with our faith, to 
these narratives, in the same way, as those, for whom they 
were first verbally communicated, and afterwards, preserved 
in many forms, in writing. For too often and too richly, for 
us to be obliged to strengthen our faith by individual, mi- 
raculous acts, has the great miracle been renewed among us, 
to which Christ himself expressly refers the faithful, namely, 
that divine light has taken the place of darkness, that the 
children of this world are transformed by the word and the 
power of Jesus into children of Cod, who know from experi- 
ence that his doctrine is from God ; too richly has the greatest 
of his prophecies been fulfilled through the lapse of centuries, 
that his Church should not be overcome by the powers of 
hell. Neither can these narratives produce the same lively 
impression on us, as on those who knew the Redeemer per- 
sonally; or who at least had received from the accounts of 
his friends, a distinct image of his personal relations, and 
which was completed or revived by each of these histories. 
Still we also may have a similar enjoyment, when we contem- 
plate them devoutly. For these demonstrations of the benev- 
olence and mercy of our Lord are connected with his great 



94 



mission as the Redeemer of men ; the power as well as the 
spirit of him who claimed to be the first-born among the sons 
of God, is displayed in them, in various modes ; and thus his 
image is revived in our hearts, and our love and veneration 
towards him are elevated and strengthened." * 

The intrinsic probability that the manifestation of 
God in the person of Christ would be attended by 
miracles is set forth in the following passage. 

" If we would seek a miracle, in all its fulness, in the 
kingdom of nature, we must go back to the time of the 
creation. Strictly speaking, this is the time of miracles. 
The essential character of the miraculous is contained in the 
fact that what we see was called forth from nothing by the 
Lord. That the original powers of nature, in forms entirely 
strange to us, should have raged and fermented in apparent 
confusion, until the durable production came forth, whose 
regular order and harmonious motions display the divine 
omnipotence and wisdom, — this is the miracle, in which all 
others are lost. If an event seemingly miraculous now 
appears, we regard it either as always belonging to the nature 
of things, and having remained hidden to us, or as a new 
development, a later portion, as it were, of the creation. 
The season of preservation, on the other hand, is the time, 
in which miracles cease, and the regular order of nature 
goes on. A miracle creates ; but that which is preserved, that 
which subsists, is nature, is the kingdom of laws, which we 
suppose universal, and which alone assures us of the estab- 
lished connexion of things, and which, if the eye of our 
spirit reached to a sufficiently wide and deep extent, we 
should every where understand. 

* Predigten, vol. i. pp. 414, 415. 



95 



4< Now in that event, which is the most affecting of any in 
the whole kingdom of nature, — the beginning of a new life, — 
how clearly do we see the operation of a productive power, 
what a striking resemblance does it present to a new creation ! 
Let us apply this to our present subject. What is the great 
work, for which first, the Prince of Life appeared, and then, 
the Spirit of God was poured out on all flesh ? It is nothing 
less than a new creation. There was to be, what had not yet 
been. Eternal life was to take the place of transitory and 
sensual life; a communion with God was to be established, 
which the prevailing terrors of man before an unknown 
power could not produce. The certainty of salvation by a 
sure prophetic word could not arise from manifold wanderings 
in a wrong path ; or from fruitless searchings into the depths 
of the human spirit. This time, therefore, was justly the 
time of miracles. Then moved the creative power of the 
Spirit. The Lord, therefore, as he, through whom and to 
whom every thing in the spiritual world is made, was endowed 
with those miraculous powers, which attested his higher, 
creative might; therefore, in his first manifestations, the 
Spirit operated as the power producing a higher nature and a 
higher life." * 

The next passage which I shall quote, relates to 
the divine power, by which the miracles of Jesus 
were performed. 

" When we consider every thing which the disciples have 
related concerning the miracles of our Lord, it is natural to 
ask, Whence did he obtain this power? Not as unbelievers 
do we put this question ; but in order as far as possible to 



* Predigten, vol. ii. pp. 535, 536. 



96 



give ourselves a clear and correct account of our faith. Our 
answer to this question will be in evident accordance with 
the faith of the primitive disciples; on which faith their 
preaching was founded; and from which preaching, the faith 
of all Christians afterwards proceeded and still proceeds ; 
our answer, I say, will agree with that original faith which 
arose from an immediate view of the facts, only when we 
reply in the words of Peter, ' God anointed Jesus of Naza- 
reth with the Holy Ghost and with power.' 

" We can give no other explanation than this, when we 
compare the history of these works of our Lord, with similar 
effects, — whether of ordinary human science and skill, or of 
wonderful and inexplicable exhibitions of human power. In 
the first place, the acts of our Lord, by which diseases were 
cured, did not proceed from the human science and skill of 
the physician ; for he performed them, — without investiga- 
ting the nature and origin of the malady, and using means 
accordingly, — merely through the power of his word and his 
will ; and therefore, we can seek the ground of these effects 
only in an immediate, operative power, independent of all 
artificial skill. Still we ought not to assert, that the miracles of 
healing have no analogy with any thing purely human. The 
greater the power of the spirit in any individual, the greater 
is the force which he employs, — immediately on the minds of 
others, for that is the peculiar sphere of spiritual power, — 
but besides this through the mind on the physical nature ; 
so that sometimes by the mere presence of such a man 
others are sensibly affected. We ought not then to deny that 
we may have experience of remarkable effects, which, as it 
seems, the will of one man produces on another ; — and though 
some hidden change in the soul be the first cause, yet what 
we see, is the change which takes place in physical nature. 

*' I certainly do not allude to these phenomena as if they 



• 



97 



were a measure for the miraculous effects, which were pro- 
duced by our Lord during his ministry on earth, so that we 
would reduce him to an equality with such men ; but they 
may serve for a point of transition from our every-day experi- 
ence to what was peculiar in Christ ; and help us to compre- 
hend how physical effects could proceed from the anointing 
of his soul with the Holy Ghost ; and thus to perceive the 
connexion between the spiritual miracle of his person, and 
the physical miracles of his deeds. Whatever may be inex- 
plicable in human operations of this kind, they still remain 
something that is natural ; for the most remarkable effects of 
the spirit and of the power of will always lie within the 
compass of human nature. If we must here admit such a 
difference that one person can often do what a thousand 
others cannot do, how much more when we look at human 
nature in the person of our Redeemer. As, on the one 
hand, he partook of this nature, and as a man was like unto 
us all, on the other hand, he was so far exalted, that no one 
can be compared with him, since from the commencement of 
his earthly life, as the Apostle declares, he was anointed with 
the Holy Spirit and with power, or as the Scripture elsewhere 
expresses it, — for all are different words for the same thing, — 
the fulness of the Godhead dwelt in him from the beginning, 
so must the effects which he produced by the mere exercise 
of his will, with these divine endowments, far surpass the 
limits which bound the power of human nature in every 
other mortal. This was the opinion of the Apostle when he 
uttered the words which I have quoted ; this has always been 
the faith of Christians ; of those at least among us of a later 
day, to whom it is given with simple sense and unperverted 
eye, to receive these narratives of our evangelical books. 
And why should we not delight in these manifestations of his 
higher nature, and recognise in them the favor of God which 

13 



98 



has visited us in Christ, with the same joy, as we reverence, 
in the doctrine of the Lord and in the words of wisdom 
which proceeded from his mouth, the pure, but natural and 
necessary manifestation of his anointing with the Divine 
Spirit and with the power of God t It is only a petty 
and trivial understanding which voluntarily binds itself by 
the rules of the most ordinary experience, and loves to 
explain the greatest effects from the smallest causes, — it is 
only this which has often lamentably perverted the faith of 
Christians, — lamentably, I say, — because thus the pure image 
of the Redeemer is inevitably clouded, and though they are 
not willing to confess it, exposed to manifold corruptions." * 

Having thus shown the views of Schleiermacher 
in regard to the historical truth and the divine char- 
acter of the miracles of Jesus, I proceed to exhibit 
his opinions concerning their connexion with the 
Christian faith. 

" What is the miracle on which we all take our stand? 
The miracle which is inseparable from our faith, as its 
deepest and most interior ground, and without which every 
thing natural within the sphere of the spirit, however admira- 
ble it may be, would lose its true value in our sight? It is 
the miracle of Christ himself. It is the miracle, that the 
Word was made flesh, — the miracle, that the glory of the 
only begotten Son was displayed in a human form, while all 
others, without exception had sinned and come short of the 
glory of God. It is the miracle, that Christ not only pos- 
sessed the glory of the only begotten Son, but from the 
beginning has given, and still gives to all who believe on him 

* Predigten, vol. iv. pp. 55S— 561. 



99 



the power to become the children of God. To this miracle, 
we cannot cleave too fast ; into this, we cannot go too deep. 
Every new glimpse which we obtain of it, must increase our 
wisdom and power ; the more we look into it, the greater 
will be our power to become children of God ; for just in 
that proportion, do we gain in the faith which is the foun- 
tain of blessedness. 

" But what shall we say concerning those miraculous deeds 
of Christ, of which so many are described at length in the 
history of his life, and still more, mentioned in general, 
without a detailed account? These miracles are connected 
in Christ with that great miracle ; but, manifested in history 
among the phenomena of human life, they were early sepa- 
rated from that, and have never been completely united. 
Ten lepers were healed by the Redeemer ; only one returned 
to give glory to God ; the others, — they remained cleansed ; 
they were free from their bodily disease, but they obtained 
no share in the spiritual miracle. Many paralytics were 
cured; many blind made to see; many deaf again heard; 
but only those who listened to another word than that, ' Thy 
faith hath saved thee,' only those, who because they desired 
it from the heart, heard also another word, ' Thy sins are 
forgiven thee,' obtained a part in the great spiritual miracle 
of God." * 

" Do we ask, What was the glory which was manifested to 
those who were told of this miraculous deed [the conversion 
of water into wine] of the Redeemer? We must admit that 
in a miracle, there is no difference between great and small ; 
when the known limits of nature are once exceeded, we have 
no standard of comparison ; there is no miracle that can be 
called greater or smaller ; but all is one and the same which 
passes the bounds of the natural order. It was deemed ne- 

# Predigten, vol. iii. 419. 



100 



cessary that he who wished to produce any uncommon effect, 
should be able to pass the bounds of the natural order ; this 
we know from the records of the Old Testament, concerning 
most of those, whom the Lord used as his special instruments ; 
nay, it was a general rule, that he who presented himself as 
a prophet should authenticate his claims to being such an 
instrument, by a transgression of the laws of nature. The 
act of our Lord, therefore, could manifest to the disciples 
the glory of a prophet, but not the Divinity of his nature. 
For since we cannot comprehend the miraculous, neither 
can we comprehend what is necessary to the production of a 
miracle. Now as we are acquainted with miracles from the 
times of the ancient prophets, concerning whom we yet 
know that they did not possess the Divinity which dwelt in 
the Redeemer; we cannot believe, that John intended to 
assert in these words, that it was from this and other mirac- 
ulous deeds of the Redeemer, that he had obtained the 
knowledge of the Divinity in his nature. No, the glory of 
the Lord shone forth upon the disciples, not from his indi- 
vidual miracles, but from his whole and entire being, from 
the immediate impression which that made upon them, and 
which was produced, in the most glorious manner, by the 
words of life which he spoke. And this glory they had found, 
when they joyfully said to each other, ' We have found the 
Messiah.' For that this was the Son of God, destined to 
redeem the human race, — this was the faith of all who with 
true zeal and inward sincerity clung to this hope. In what 
the Lord here did, it could not, therefore, be revealed to them 
that he was the Son of God. And when John adds, 'And 
his disciples believed on him,' this was not their first ex- 
ercise of faith ; but in the full power of faith, that he was 
the Lamb of God, who should take away the sins of the 
world, as John the Baptist had designated him, that he was 



101 



the one, who should come after him, — only from this faith 
had they become his disciples ; and only when they acknow- 
ledged him, as the one, through whom all the hopes of man 
were to be fulfilled, could they say to each other, 1 We have 
found the Messiah.' The miracle, therefore, was not the 
ground of their faith, neither this, nor any other, which the 
Lord afterwards wrought." * 

" ' But I have greater witness than that of John ; for the 
works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same 
works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent 
me.' What are we to understand by the works, which the 
Lord here refers to as the divine testimony to himself? Every 
one certainly is reminded of the miraculous acts of the Re- 
deemer, which he often calls his works in a special sense ; 
but, upon closer examination, we shall see that we are not to 
give our exclusive attention to them. For we may ask, What 
could these works testify of Christ ? Certainly, that Cod had 
sent him, as Nicodemus also says, ( We know that thou art a 
teacher come from God; for no man can do these miracles 
that thou doest, except Cod be with him.' The nation from 
remote antiquity, and through its earlier history, was accus- 
tomed to regard miracles as the signs of a divine mission, and 
to consider one who performed miracles and who taught at 
the same time, as a teacher sent from God. But by this, the 
mission of the Redeemer was not distinguished from the mis- 
sion of other prophets of the Lord; and hence those works 
could give no other testimony for him, than that he was sent 
by the Father, as others had been sent before him ; accord- 
ingly, they did not give the testimony that he was sent by the 
Father as the Son of the Living God, but by the Lord and 
King of the people, as one of his servants and bondmen, like 



* Predigten, vol. viii. pp. 123 — 125. 



102 



each of those extraordinary men under the old covenant. 
Other testimony than this could the Lord not receive from his 
works; but this would have satisfied him as little as the hu- 
man testimony of John. 

" But if we further ask, Were then the miracles of the Lord 
the works of which he could say, ' the works which the Fa- 
ther hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear 
witness of me ? ' But how ? If the miracles taken together, 
had been the works which his Father had given him to finish, 
we must then believe, that the purpose of his mission would 
have been accomplished with the performance of these works. 
But this be far from us. For let us remember the words 
which we read in another passage of Scripture, ' What shall it 
profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and lose his own 
soul V They, whom the Lord delivered from earthly suffering, 
even they, whom he awoke from the dead, or saved from death, 
— what did they gain except an earthly advantage for a short 
time, until the end of human life again arrived? Nay, even 
those, to whom he gave the power that even spirits were sub- 
ject unto them, — -did those gain, except in a subordinate sense, 
what is heavenly and spiritual ? But injury in the soul, there- 
fore, could they all suffer, — both those, who were helped by 
the miracles of the Lord, and those in whom his miraculous 
power was continued. 

" But the work, which the Father had given him to finish, 
was to seek and to save them who were lost; that is, to cure 
every injury to the soul, and to guard it, for the future ; and 
this then was what he meant by the works, which the Father 
had given him to finish. For what was the purpose of all his 
actions and all his teachings but to seek and to save them who 
were lost? For what did he work all his life through, but that 
the soul of man might be helped, that it might be secured 
against all harm, and its salvation firmly established ? — 



103 



"What does the Redeemer refer to as the true ground of 
all living faith in him? To nothing else than the inward ex- 
perience of the heart. It is precisely the same, which he 
expresses in another place, ' If any man will do the will of God, 
he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be from God, or 
whether I speak of myself.' To such a man, the witness of 
the Redeemer is a heavenly witness, because he feels and is 
conscious, that it is a truly divine doctrine, which in its power 
brings salvation to the lost, peace to the perturbed spirit, repose 
to those involved in ceaseless conflict ; it is a divine doctrine 
which the Redeemer utters, because he experiences this doc- 
trine only as a divine work from him ; because he knows, that 
the doctrine which testifies of him, that is, the doctrine which 
sounds forth from the words, ' Come unto me all ye who are 
weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest,' — that this 
doctrine, when we act upon it, appears a divine doctrine, and 
that we perceive its divinity in the testimony which the Father 
gives of the Son, and by which he draws the heart of man to 
him, and that the works which the Redeemer performs are 
works wrought in God, and effects of the power and fulness 
of the Godhead dwelling in him." * 

" Many Christians remain in the error of ascribing too 
great importance to what is merely external in the life and 
manifestation of Christ ; whereas its importance properly con- 
sists in the fact, that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt in him ; 
that he came down from heaven, in the sense which he early ex- 
pressed, that he had no will but that of his Father; and as he 
afterwards said, that he had come to show the Father, and to 
make it possible for men to be taught of God. But so long as 
we seek the ground of faith in him, in any thing external, in 
the mode in which his earthly being began, in the miracles 
which accompanied his activity among men, or in other out- 

# Predigtcn, vol. viii. pp. 370—374. 



104 



ward things, by which he was distinguished from other men, — 
we are not in the true way of believing, and are yet subject to 
many doubts, which we ought long since to have got over. 
For a true and living faith will say to itself, 'These things in- 
deed are so, as related in the Holy Scriptures; but it might 
have been otherwise ; and this fact can establish no essential 
difference between Christ and other men. The redemption 
which he brings depends alone on the fact, that the fulness of 
the Godhead dwelt in him; that he came down from above to 
reveal to us the divine will and to receive us into communion 
with his heavenly Father ; that with the fulness of the God- 
head in him was manifested the true and living image of the 
Eternal Being ; and that he has shown us by what he was, 
and what was in him, the brightness of the divine glory. To 
look alone on this inward character, to cling to this union of 
the divine and human in him, to regard him as the true and 
exhaustless source of all the divine communications through 
grace to men, — this is the genuine, living faith." * 

" What was the connexion between the miraculous powers 
of our Lord, and his peculiar mission to announce the king- 
dom of God and to draw men to faith ? Not, we may all 
thank God, such a connexion, as if the miracles of the Lord 
were the proper ground of our faith, that to him a name is 
given above every name, a name in which all may find salva- 
tion. The Apostle connects the preaching of peace by our 
Lord with the testimony of John. But John did not preach 
peace, as any thing which he could give himself; he merely 
summoned men to repentance ; still he proclaimed the king- 
dom of God, and peace, accordingly, through him who should 
come after him. Not the less, however, did he demand faith 
in his message; and our Lord himself always represents him 
as sent of God, and jointly demanding faith. But the Evan- 

* Predigten, vol, viii. pp. 438, 439. 



105 



gelist John expressly tells us, that John the Baptist wrought 
no miracles. The performance of signs and wonders was not 
given to him ; but yet they who did not believe on him, were 
held as accountable as they who withheld their faith from 
the Lord. Therefore faith in the Redeemer must proceed 
from something else than his miracles. It must not take root 
in the outward acts of Christ, not in the desire of men for ex- 
ternal help which exceeds ordinary powers ; for such needs, 
we must look rather to the usual powers of nature ; but faith 
must proceed from the needs of men who seek peace, because 
they neither have it in themselves, nor can give it to them- 
selves ; who seek the kingdom of God, while they find in 
themselves nought but unconquered and too often victorious 
earthly desires ; and hence can establish no other kingdom 
than that of an external peace, in the midst of constant in- 
ward strife. Where such a desire exists, there also, it is soon 
said, 1 Lord I believe, help thou mine unbelief.' 

" Let us consider, moreover, how unstable would be the 
ground of our faith, if it rested only on the miracles of Christ. 
This is equally true in regard to us, and to the contemporaries 
of our Lord. It was surely not the effect of chance, but of 
the disposing wisdom of God, that, at the time of the Re- 
deemer, there were others who went about doing good, and 
healing those who were said to be possessed of devils, and for 
whom there was no certain remedy in the usual skill and sci- 
ence of the physician. By what means, and in what man- 
ner, these effects were produced, we do not know ; perhaps, we 
might have known, if those who lived at the time and from 
whom we receive the histories, had known themselves ; but 
they were ignorant, and no more able than ourselves, as we 
perceive from many indications, to draw a distinct line be- 
tween the miracles of our Lord, and the works which re- 
sembled them. Nay, the Redeemer plainly admits a certain 

14 



106 



similarity and agreement between his signs and wonders, and 
the extraordinary cures which others performed. Only on 
this supposition, could he have put the question to those who 
said, ' that he cast out devils through the prince of devils/ 
' By whom then do your children cast them out?' How much 
less then, can such distinctions be established by us, who are 
so far removed from those times, that even the more detailed 
accounts of those extraordinary manifestations of his power 
only seldom enable us to form a clear and distinct conception 
of the actual occurrence ? And if we cannot distinguish be- 
tween the miracles of our Lord and those of his unbelieving 
contemporaries, what would be the ground of our faith, if we 
were directed only to those miracles? We, who are sur- 
rounded on all sides by the mysteries of nature ; whose eye 
is enabled only by long practice to see much which once 
escaped the notice of men ; who have learned after a course 
of centuries, by a vast treasure of human experiences, to reve- 
rence the divine wisdom, because for it, all is ever one and 
the same, which we are so often inclined to divide; who find 
much that is incomprehensible and mysterious, but yet true 
and certain, since it is confirmed by experience ; who know 
the difficulty of defining the limits of the natural and the su- 
pernatural, since often, we might say, generally, what is 
higher and supernatural, though obvious, on one side, and 
what is mysterious, on the other, run into each other in an 
uncomprehensible manner ; — could we, I say, be justified 
in our own sight, if we believed in the Lord, on no other 
ground, than that he wrought miracles while he lived on 
earth? No. And our Lord himself — though he often ap- 
peals to his works, and among those works his miraculous 
acts are certainly to be included, — yet, appeals above any 
thing else when he most urgently insists on faith, to the testi- 
mony of the Father. But what is this testimony? It is that 



107 



Vvhich he expressly promises, when he says, ' Whoso shall do 
his will, shall know of the doctrine whether it be from God, 
or whether I speak of myself.' It is the testimony which his 
Father gave him, that the doctrine vvhich he preached was not 
his own, bat his who sent him; that if man, — though he can 
do nothing without divine aid, — with this attempts and desires 
to do his will, he will gain the conviction in the depths of his 
soul, that the doctrine is of God. This must be the ground 
of faith in the Redeemer, — that his word is able to awaken 
the desire of that divine peace, of that supremacy of the Di- 
vine Spirit, of which the sinful heart is destitute ; and to satisfy 
it, when awakened. But this power belongs to his word in 
and for itself, only in connexion with the complete image of 
Christ which we form in our souls ; this gives us a secret 
foreboding, which is soon changed into an ever-growing cer- 
tainty, that Jesus, though actually bearing human nature, 
though found in fashion as a man, was not, like all of us, sub^ 
ject to sin, but had the fulness of the Godhead dwelling in 
him. 

"But although the miracles of the Lord cannot be the 
ground of our faith, ought we on that account to say that 
there is no connexion between his miraculous endowments 
and his spiritual mission 1 The Apostle certainly indicates 
a connexion when he speaks at the same time, of his being 
' anointed with the Holy Ghost, and with power.' But what 
connexion ? The purpose of this declaration was to impress 
the conscience with a sense of the guilt, incurred by those 
who slew the Prince of Life. But this was called forth, not 
primarily in view of the superhuman powers of the Lord, but 
of the holy will that made use of them ; and only so far in 
view of those supernatural powers, as their exercise by the 
Lord was always benevolence and love. And such was, and 
still is their connexion. He, who beholds in the Lord, the 



108 



only begotten son of God, the image of the Supreme, full of 
grace and truth, independently of his miraculous deeds, — he 
will also perceive that his supernatural powers proceeded from 
the same source, as his redeeming power, from the anointing 
with the Holy Ghost and with power from above ; he will 
also perceive the distinction, as well as the connexion, be- 
tween the self-sacrificing love of the Lord for the salvation of 
the world, and the treasure of external benefits which accom- 
panied and glorified the earthly life of the Redeemer. The 
redeeming love and the beneficent love, which were proffered 
to all, who wished for help, were one and the same. But he 
whose heart was so obdurate towards the faith which God set 
forth to all men, as to suppose that Jesus of Nazareth, with 
this doctrine, with this wisdom, with this love, was nothing 
but a deceiver of the people, — he only could be so blinded as 
to believe that Christ performed the miracles which he wrought 
by means of the prince of evil spirits. Our faith, therefore, 
in the Redeemer himself, and in his divine mission and dig- 
nity, should not depend on our faith in his miracles ; but our 
faith in his miracles must be the natural fruit of our faith in 
his divine power, and in his mission of redemption." * 

"It is one thing to consider the individual narratives of 
Christ. The mode of the Redeemer's intercourse with men, 
is then prominent above every thing else. It is another thing 
to consider the miracles in general, as they appear to con- 
tradict or to exceed all the laws and order of nature. But we 
have to regard this as an important element in the life of the 
Redeemer. This, moreover, has always been, and still is, an 
object of controversy among Christians. The value, which 
should be attached to them, is differently estimated by differ- 
ent minds. The light, which they reflect on the Redeemer, 

* Predigten, vol. iv. pp. 565 — 570. 



109 



appears more favorably to one than to another. It is, therefore, 
important as far as possible, — and each can contribute to this 
purpose only according to his proportion of faith and insight, — 
to obtain a view of the miracles of the Redeemer, adapted to 
produce a general and joyful harmony. In regard to the 
various views which prevail among Christians, I will first ex- 
hibit what, according to my best and conscientious convic- 
tions, the miracles are not and cannot be for us; and then 
what they are, and should continue to be. 

" First, the miracles of the Redeemer cannot be the ground 
and the source of our saving faith in him. For how can we 
obtain a certain conviction, a clear insight, in regard to the 
connexion between objects so totally diverse 1 The miracles 
of the Redeemer, when we view them as his actions, and con- 
sider them in their effects, as every one must confess, present 
the evidence of powers, dwelling in him which surpass the 
measure of all human powers. But what kind of powers are 
they ? To revive the decayed senses, to make the crippled 
limbs again active, to expel diseases from the human body, 
to satisfy the wants of man relating to physical life, in an ex- 
traordinary and unprecedented manner, — these are all effects 
in the kingdom of nature. Can we infer from them what the 
same man has power and commission to accomplish in the 
kingdom of grace ? — 

" Do we ask, Whence a true and living faith in the Re- 
deemer must proceed ? Can it arise in man, before he 
becomes conscious of the wretched state in which his spirit- 
ual nature is found without communion with the Redeemer? 
Can he obtain a living faith in him, unless at the same time, 
he feels the power of sin, its effects to separate man from 
God, and combines them both together ? Contemplate a 
soul in this state ; suppose that all the miracles of the Re- 
deemer were set forth before it ; would these be able to give 



110 



it satisfaction and repose? Would it not rather say, ' Gladly 
would I bear all these bodily evils, if I could be freed from 
every thing which oppresses me within, which beats down 
the spiritual man, and threatens to deprive it of life.' He 
then must be impelled to seek a Redeemer by another need ; 
in him must prevail another desire than that from which we 
proceed, namely, to be rescued from the power of sin, and to 
be brought near to God ; this, I say, must be the case with 
him, who can ground his faith in the Redeemer, and hope to 
find peace with him, on the fact that he performed such mi- 
racles and signs. — 

" But, though we cannot regard the miracles of the Re- 
deemer as the peculiar foundation of our faith in him, I 
observe, in the second place, they ought never to be a stum- 
bling-block and hinderance to faith. But this, alas ! not seldom 
is the case. From the very beginning, have the adversaries 
of the Gospel, who fought against this new way of salvation, 
and especially those who were most conversant with the 
wisdom of this world, — from the very beginning, have they 
attacked the signs and miracles of our Lord. They have 
objected to them on account of the manner in which they 
are related, the composition of the narratives which have 
come down to us, the contradiction they present to experi- 
ence and to the general, known laws of nature; and hence 
they conclude that a history, whose substance, though tenable 
in itself, is surrounded with such narratives, cannot command 
our faith. And even at the present day, — and we cannot 
ascribe it to hostility against the dealings of God with the 
human race through Christ, — there are many well-disposed 
persons anxious for the salvation of their souls to whom the 
miracles of the Lord area stumbling-block. They say, 'If 
only these histories were not there,' which always give them 
a new puzzle, concerning which they can scarcely avoid the 



Ill 



thought that they owe their origin to the credulity of the 
multitude; if only these histories were not there, and the 
form of the Redeemer, separated from all this, stood before 
them, in the purity of his love, in the power of his word, in 
the sublimity of his thoughts, in the certainty with which he 
spoke of his relation to the Father, and told to man what he 
had learned from God ; * if this alone had been presented to 
us, divested of all that is miraculous, how easy then,' say 
they, ' would have been our faith. But now we are always 
repelled anew by these things ; we must suspect the whole 
narrative, because it is combined with so much that contra- 
dicts universal experience and its laws. 5 

" This, certainly, is a great unhappiness for a time like 
our own, — that so many should be attracted on the one side 
by the needs of their inward experience, and repelled on the 
other, by their judgment on a subject which falls entirely 
within the province of the understanding. But if this need 
be only genuine and deeply felt, — may not a soul to which 
the wished for salvation is presented overcome these merely 
apparent difficulties? ' Have you not,' I would say to such 
souls, ' have you not another history which you can set against 
this? Have you not the historical testimony of the effects 
which a living communion with the Redeemer has produced 
on those who lived with him and gave themselves to him ? 
Have you not the wonderful history of the founding of a 
community through him, by means of such men, — almost 
without exception uncultivated in the ordinary sense of the 
word, familiar with no art or science, — as were the disciples 
of our Lord ? Are you not compelled to believe this history, 
because it is connected with your present experience, because 
it stands before your eyes, because the whole condition of 
the world has been decided by its influence? Well, then, if 
you must believe this, see that you cleave to it. If even 



112 



now, so far as you open your spiritual eye in love, you can 
obtain the testimony of those who were rescued from the 
deepest distress of mind, as soon as they entered into a living 
relation with the Redeemer of the world; if you can daily 
repeat this experience ; then unlock your hearts, I pray, 
forget all the blind whose eyes he has opened, the lame 
whom he has made to walk, the deaf whose ears he has un- 
sealed, the dumb, the bands of whose tongue he has loosed, 
forget all the sick whom he has healed ; and keep only to 
these separate histories of his unchangeable influence on the 
inner nature of man, keep only to this one history, that the 
office of preaching reconciliation proceeded from him, — and 
then will you also be able to believe in the words of the 
Apostle, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world to 
himself.' 

" Having now disposed of this point, let us resume our 
own position, as those who have found salvation in the Re- 
deemer, independently of his signs and miracles, through the 
spiritual power which he exerts on the inner nature of man, 
and to which we have opened our souls. Let us inquire, 
since the miracles, — though we need them not for the foun- 
dation of our faith, — stand in connexion with his saving 
words, with his great and ever-progressive work of estab- 
lishing a community of the faithful, — what they can be to us? 

" I answer, they are a sign of the pleasure of God in the 
Redeemer. They are the sensible expression of the voice 
from heaven, ' This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well 
pleased.' Conceive of all the signs and miracles of the Re- 
deemer, and if possible, of still greater, and more numerous; 
but suppose that the love by which he was the image of the 
Divine Being was banished from the soul of him who wrought 
them ; suppose that they had been performed by one, whose 
soul was filled with earthly ambition, elated with his power, 



113 



and triumphing over man, — what could his signs and miracles 
be to us ? I answer, nothing ; nothing, but a mournful proof 
how the most glorious gifts of God can be thrown away, when 
they are bestowed upon a mind which is not filled with his 
essence, because the spirit of love does not dwell therein. 
But that dwelt in the Redeemer, by which he commends 
himself to men; the love which said to them, ' Come unto 
me all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you 
rest this must take possession of their hearts, and bow 
them in devotion before his feet. But this required, that he 
should take the form of a servant, that he should not desire 
to act a conspicuous part among men ; in this form, the spirit 
of love could have free course and signal manifestation. 
Therefore, God placed these powers in the earthly appearance 
of the Redeemer, so that by the benefits which he conferred 
upon men, the works of compassion which he wrought in the 
form of a servant, the manner in which he condescended to 
the wretched and oppressed, he might display the spirit which 
dwelt in him. When we contemplate the subject in this point 
of view, how can we avoid regarding him in his miracles as 
the one in whom God was well-pleased? The Redeemer, 
whose mission on earth was of a purely spiritual nature, could 
not have any other earthly calling; should we not expect 
then, as he must have sustained some connexion with the 
actual life of men, that he would show himself in the calls of 
common life as one whom the Father had sent? It was 
almost unavoidable, therefore, that such powers should have 
been imparted to him, and that by means of such signs and 
miracles, as God wrought through him, lie should show him- 
self to be a man sent from God. And hence the believing 
mind turns so gladly to the contemplation of these acts of 
the Redeemer, of which we have an account. As they are 
related, in one of their aspects, to indicate the spiritual need 

15 



114 



which always finds its counterpart in some bodily evil, we 
always discover in them the same love with which the Re- 
deemer came to the spiritual aid of man. Wherever this is 
displayed, we are invited to a feast of spiritual joy, which 
nothing can disturb; we oppose our ignorance to every doubt 
which the understanding may suggest ; doubt is thus ban- 
ished ; and only that remains, to which the desire of our 
faith is directed, namely, that herein also, we know and honor 
the Redeemer, the same in every relation of his life, the same 
yesterday, to-day, and forever." * 

I have now brought forward sufficient evidence, 
I trust, to show the incorrectness of your classifi- 
cation of Schleiermacher with the unbelievers in 
a "miraculous revelation of God through Christ." 
Whether his views relating to Christianity are in 
accordance with the popular theology of any of our 
prevailing sects, or whether they may serve to give 
higher and more satisfactory conceptions of the 
whole subject, I gladly leave to the decision of those 
who are impelled to theological inquiry by the con- 
sciousness of their religious nature. 

There is nothing further in your pamphlet con- 
cerning Schleiermacher that need detain us long, 
with the exception of the quotation (p. 44.) and 
your remarks on it, in relation to the true idea of a 
miracle. 

* Predigien, vol. iii. pp. 448 — 457. 



115 



The quotation as given by you is as follows. 

" 1 What is a miracle' ? 'A miracle is but the religious name 
for an event. Every one, the most natural and the most com- 
mon, if it be of such a character, that it may be prevailingly 
viewed under a religious aspect, is a miracle. To me, all is 
miracle; and in your sense, as meaning something inexpli- 
cable and strange, only that is a miracle which is none in 
mine.' * 

M In his note on this passage,! added in the third edition, 
he says : 

' The expression, that a miracle is but the religious name 
for an event in general, and thus, that all that happens is a 
miracle, may readily fall under the suspicion of being in- 
tended for a direct denial of any thing miraculous ; for, to 
be sure, if every thing is a miracle, then, on the other hand, 
nothing is a miracle.' " J 

You proceed to comment on this passage in the 
following language. 

" The explanation of Schleiermacher is, that the distinction 
between the events which we call, and those which we do not 
call, miracles, is founded not on any intrinsic difference, but 
solely on the manner in which they are regarded by the human 
mind; that is, if we regard an event in immediate relation to 
the power of God, by which it is produced, that event is to us 
a miracle ; that, if we regard it as occurring in the ordinary 
course of nature, it is not a miracle. With these views, he 
says, that in his ' Doctrines of Faith,' notwithstanding the 
denial of absolute [proper] miracles, the religious interest in 
the miraculous is regarded and protected." § 



* Reden, p. 105. 
t Remarks, p. 44 



t Ibid., p. 135. 

$ Remarks, pp. 44, 45. 



116 



This statement would lead an unwary reader to 
the suspicion, that Schleiermacher, like the Rational- 
ists, Paulus, Rohr, Wegocheider, and so forth, at- 
tempted to resolve the miracles of the New Testa- 
ment into ordinary occurrences, and discarded the 
belief in every thing that was not explicable by 
the familiar and regular laws of nature. We have 
already seen that this is not the case. Nor do the 
passages before quoted contradict the true meaning 
of the language, a part of which you have produced. 
It was the opinion of Schleiermacher that the mira- 
cles of Jesus w T ere wrought by the power of God ; 
that they were manifestations and effects of the Di- 
vine Spirit which dwelt in him ; but he did not sup- 
pose that they differed from other events in proceed- 
ing exclusively from the immediate causality of God ; 
since, according to his views, the whole universe is 
constantly dependent on the Creator, and not an 
event can take place, which is not the product of 
the divine, omnipresent agency. He rejected the 
idea that the Creator ceased from his works, after 
the formation of the world, until his activity was 
again called forth in the performance of a miracle. 
But this idea is essential to the supposition, that the 
distinction between a miracle and a common event 
consists in the fact, that the one is to be referred to 
the causality of God, and the other to the causality 
of nature. I will own that I supposed, that this doc- 



117 



trine would find few advocates among any theolo- 
gians at the present day. That its denial is not 
peculiar to Schleiermacher, I shall soon show by an 
appeal to the opinions of English writers on the- 
ology. 

I will now present the whole passage relating to 
the subject ; and this will place the matter in a some- 
what different light, from that in which it appears in 
your "Remarks." 

" The controversy as to what event is properly a miracle, 
and wherein the true criterion of a miracle consists, how 
many different revelations there have been, and wherefore and 
to what degree we are bound to believe in them, and the 
manifest endeavor, so far as this can be done with any color of 
decency, to deny and set them aside, in the foolish hope of 
thus rendering a service to philosophy and reason, — this is 
one of the most puerile operations, in which metaphysicians 
and moralists have engaged in connexion with religion. They 
throw all points of view into confusion together, and bring 
religion into the discredit of interfering with the general 
validity of physical and scientific judgments. I entreat you, 
not to be deluded into any prejudice against religion, by their 
sophistical disputations, or as may sometimes be the case, by 
their hypocritical concealment of that which they would too 
gladly make public. Religion, however loudly it may call 
back those ideas which have fallen into such bad repute, leaves 
you your physics, and please God, your psychology also, un- 
touched. What then is a miracle? Are you not aware, that 
what we call a miracle in its reference to religion, is the same, 
in other respects as a sign, a token, and that our appellation, 
which concerns merely the mental condition of the spectator, 



118 



is only so far appropriate, inasmuch as that which is intended 
for a sign, especially if it is at the same time something be- 
side this, must possess such qualities, as will direct attention 
both to its presence and its peculiar significance. But every 
thing finite is in this sense a sign of the Infinite; and conse- 
quently all those expressions are intended only to point out 
the immediate relation of a phenomenon to the Infinite and to 
the universe; but does this prevent it from also bearing an 
equally immediate relation to the finite and to nature? The 
word miracle is only the religious name for an event; and 
every event, even the most natural and common, as soon as it 
is of a character to make the religious view of it predominant, 
becomes a miracle. To me, everything is a miracle ; and in 
your sense, only that is a miracle to me, namely something inex- 
plicable and strange, which is none in mine. The more your 
hearts are penetrated with the spirit of religion, the greater 
will be the number of miracles which you would every where 
behold, and every dispute with regard to particular events, 
whether or not they are entitled to the name of miracle, pro- 
duces in me only the painful impression of the poverty and 
barrenness of the religious feelings of the disputants. One 
party indicates this defect by a universal protestation against 
miracles; but this protestation shews only that they are not 
disposed to perceive the immediate relation to the Infinite 
and to the Godhead ; and the other exhibits the same defect 
by attaching the principal importance to specific effects, and 
by assuming that no phenomenon can be a miracle, unless it 
appears in a wonderful form." * 

The whole of the explanatory Note on this pas- 
sage, of which but a few lines only are quoted in 
the " Remarks," is as follows. 



* Reden, pp. 104, 105. 



119 



" The expression here used, that the word 1 miracle ' is only 
the religious name for an event in general, and that hence 
every thing which takes place is a miracle, may easily incur 
the suspicion of leading to the denial of the miraculous 
altogether ; for certainly, if every thing is a miracle, then 
again, nothing is a miracle. But this expression is closely 
connected with the explanations which I have given in the 
' Christian Faith.' For if the reference of an event to the 
divine cooperation and efficiency, and the contemplation of 
the natural circumstances which conspired in its production 
do not exclude each other, it follows that the peculiar view 
which is first embraced must depend altogether on the direc- 
tion of the attention ; as in general, when the connexion of 
an event with our own purposes interests us the most, but the 
investigation of the natural circumstances would lead us into 
too trivial details, we are most strongly disposed to observe 
the divine interposition, — and in the contrary case, the usual 
order of nature. But which of these two views will afford 
us the greatest satisfaction depends, in the first place, on our 
certainty of having comprehended the event in its intrinsic 
character, so that we can say with some degree of confi- 
dence, that it proceeded from the appointment of God, and 
in the second place, on the extent of our knowledge concern- 
ing the order of nature. Now all these differences are 
merely subjective, and would retain that character, even if 
the views of all men in every case of the kind were in entire 
accordance. Hence it remains absolutely true, that all events 
which awaken the strongest religious attention, and in which, 
at the same time, the order of nature is the least visible, will 
be, the most generally regarded by all men as miracles ; but 
it remains equally true, that considered in themselves, and as 
it were, from the divine causality, all other events are no less 
miracles than they. As then in discussing this subject in my 



120 



'Christian Faith,' the religious interest in the miraculous is 
recognised and secured, notwithstanding the denial of abso- 
lute miracles, it was here, likewise, my purpose, to represent 
this interest in its purity, and to free it from all foreign ad- 
mixtures, which testify rather to a blind and senseless aston- 
ishment, than to the joyful recognition of a higher signifi- 
cance." * 

It is unnecessary for me, I presume, to enter into 
an argument for the purpose of showing that the 
divine causality is not concentrated in miracles, but 
is also at the foundation of the most common occur- 
rences in nature. If the view which Schleierma- 
cher rejects be insisted on, the evidences of Christ- 
ianity will indeed be exhibited in a new light ; but 
whether Christianity itself will be made to rest on 
stronger ground, the scrupulous theologian will 
hesitate to affirm. That this view has been op- 
posed with no less earnestness by English philoso- 
phers and divines than by Schleiermacher, is well 
known to those conversant with the history of 
opinions ; and I hardly feel called on to bring for- 
ward any proof of the fact. I will content myself 
with referring to two writers, who have perhaps 
never been grouped together before, but whose 
coincidence with each other on this point, as well 
as with Schleiermacher, affords a pleasing example 
of identity of opinion, with great diversity in cha- 



* Reden, pp. 135, 136. 



121 



racter and circumstances. The resemblance both 
in thought and expression between the three 
writers must be striking even to the inattentive 
reader. 

"It is not therefore a right distinction," says Dr. Samuel 
Clarke, '* to define or distinguish a miracle by any absolute 
difficulty in the nature of the thing itself to be done ; as if 
the things we call natural, were absolutely and in their own 
nature easier to be effected, than those that we look upon as 
miraculous; on the contrary, it is evident and undeniable that 
it is at least as great an act of power, to cause the sun or a 
planet to move at all, as to cause it to stand still at any time, 
yet this latter we call a miracle ; the former not. And to 
restore the dead to life, which is an instance of an extraordi- 
nary miracle, is in itself plainly altogether as easy as to dispose 
matter at first into such order, as to form a human body in 
that which we commonly call a natural way. So that, abso- 
lutely speaking, in this strict and philosophical sense, either 
nothing is miraculous, namely, if we have respect to the 
power of God; or, if we regard our own power and under- 
standing, then almost every thing, as well what we call natu- 
ral, as what we call supernatural, is in this sense really 
miraculous ; and it is only usualness or unusualness that 
makes the distinction." * 

" Natural and supernatural are nothing at all different with 
regard to God, but distinctions merely in our conceptions of 
things. To cause the sun (or earth) to move regularly, is a 
thing we call natural ; to stop its motion for a day, we call 
supernatural ; but the one is the effect of no greater power, 

* Clarke's Works, Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, 
vol. ii. pp. 696, 697. 

16 



122 



than the other : nor is the one with respect to God, more or 
less natural or supernatural than the other." * 

" I affirmed, that with regard to God, no one possible thing 
is more miraculous than another ; and that therefore a miracle 
does not consist in any difficulty in the nature of the thing 
to be done, but merely in the unusualness of God's doing it. 
The terms, nature, and powers of nature and course of 
nature, and the like, are nothing but empty words ; and signify 
merely, that a thing usually or frequently comes to pass. 
The raising a human body out of the dust of the earth we 
call a miracle ; the generation of a human body in the ordi- 
nary way, we call natural ; for no other reason, but because 
the power of God effects one usually, the other unusually. 
The sudden stopping of the sun (or earth,) we call a miracle; 
the continual motion of the sun (or earth,) we call natural ; 
for the very same reason only, of the one's being usual, the 
other unusual. Did men usually arise out of the grave, as 
corn grows out of seed sown, we should certainly call that 
also natural ; and did the sun (or earth) constantly stand still, 
we should then think that to be natural, and its motion at 
any time would be miraculous. Against these evident rea- 
sons, this learned writer [Leibnitz] offers nothing at all ; but 
continues barely to refer us to the vulgar forms of speaking 
of certain philosophers and divines ; which (as I before 
observed) is not the matter in question. 

f< It is here very surprising that, in a point of reason and 
not of authority, we are still again remitted to the opinions 
of certain philosophers and divines. But, to omit this, what 
does this learned writer mean by a real internal difference 
between what is miraculous, and not miraculous ; or between 
operations natural, and not natural, absolutely, and with rer 
gard to God? " f 

* Clarke's Correspondence with Leibnitz, vol. iv, p. 600. 
\ Ibid., vol. iv. pp. 693, 694. 



123 



" It is not, indeed," says Rev. James Martineau, " that God's 
agency is either more powerful or more immediate in a mir- 
acle than in an event of nature. To the eye of pure reason, 
God is glorified as much by the serenest sun of summer, as 
by the darkness that was ' on the land from the sixth to the 
ninth hour by the bestowment as by the restoration of life ; 
by the uninterrupted play of the healthy intellect, as by the 
reestablishment of order amid its most terrible confusion. 
If we could see in their true light, what are called second 
causes, God would be glorified supremely in the eternal me- 
chanism of nature, whose order is the order of his infinite 
mind, and whose energies are but the movements of his will. 
He would be glorified even in the laws of suffering, which, 
though seeming to desolate his works, would yet appear to be 
but the instruments of love, developing from creation some 
greater good. But our minds slumber on the regularity of 
the universe. The repetition of an act blunts our perception 
of power in its production : with the discovery of order in 
the succession of events, arises the association of cause and 
effect, and takes to itself all the ideas of power which had 
been connected with the unseen hand of Deity. So strong 
is this unreasoning tendency of our minds to relinquish, in 
the frequency of an event, all questionings respecting its 
spiritual source, that even of natural phenomena, the more 
rare strike into the mind of the coolest philosopher an im- 
pression of power, which the ordinary changes of moons and 
seasons do not awaken. If an inland lake under a serene 
sky should rise from its bed, break up its vast sheet into all 
the riot of tempest, and come rolling over fields that never 
drank of its waters before, there are few, whose hearts would 
not be startled by an emotion of natural religion ; whose 
astonishment would not be mingled with obscure notions of 
omnipotence ; who, to say the least, would not be nearer to 



124 



the conception of divine power, than when gazing on the ebb 

and flow of the ocean. Yet less power is adequate to raise 
a tide upon a lake, than to move the masses of the deep that 
forever lash a thousand shores. The tempest, the volcano, 
the eclipse, carry men's thoughts to God more readily than 
the breezes of summer, or the vegetation that crowns the 
mountain, or the uninterrupted light that is forever reaching 
us from other worlds. Yet God's power is not greater in the 
storm, than in a calm ; in the fiery torrents that bury fields 
and cities, than in the new creation that restores the verdure 
to the waste ; in the passage of a satellite across the sun, than 
in its motion through the unmarked spaces of its orbit. This 
effect of repetition on our minds, is not reason : it is not 
philosophy ; it is our infirmity. If it be a mark of barbarian 
ignorance and superstition, to feel the terrors of Deity in the 
rolling of the thunder, and to tremble at the spirit that whis- 
pers in the breeze, the ignorance, the superstition, consists, 
not in discovering the traces of heaven here, but in seeing 
them here only. The man requires, not to get rid of these 
emotions, but to diffuse them over all the changes of the out- 
ward world. His feelings are juster and truer than those of 
the philosopher who, while he had lost the devotional impulses 
of uncultivated nature, has failed to learn from his science to 
see God in every thing, and every thing in God. 

*f Now a miracle is no more than a single and unrepeated 
effect : it has no frequency to bind up the feelings in sleep ; 
it is to all mankind what the convulsions and surprises of 
nature are to the barbarian ; and hence it irresistibly awakens 
the sense of power. Insulate any natural fact, and it becomes 
a miracle ; repeat any miracle, and it becomes a natural fact. 
If the sun had appeared stationary since the fall of Adam, 
its rising on the gardens of Paradise would have stood on 
record as the greatest miracle of Holy Writ, while its 



125 



standing still in the valley of Ascalon would have awakened 
neither wonder nor doubt. Beautifully does God's benignity 
accommodate his revelations even to the weaknesses of our 
minds. It signifies not that his power is gloriously exerted 
in every change of the outward world ; it signifies not that 
perfected reason would see in the universe a temple pervaded 
by the living energies of Deity. If man discerns not these 
manifestations, God is not glorified : if man slumbers on 
these evidences, it is worthy of Divine love to awake him 
with the thunder-clap of power, to gratify his yearnings after 
the supernatural, and thus feed the sentiments of piety which 
are lulled to rest by the harmonies of creation. God, then, 
was glorified in the miracles of Jesus, because they enkindled 
in men's hearts a reverential sense of his sovereignty." * 

It remains to notice your assertion that " Schleier- 
macher partook of the sacrament on his death-bed 
as a Christian." (Discourse, p. 44.) The only 
proper answer to be made to this statement, and to 
whatever it may imply, is an account of the last 
hours of the dying Christian. I give it in the 
words of Liicke. 

"The death of Schleiermacher, in common with that of 
many great and noble individuals, possessed a powerful and 
quickening influence. It was the bright completion, the glo- 
rified image of his whole life. 

" When the intelligence of his death was made known, not 
only in Berlin, but throughout Germany, nay, as far as the 

* Martineatj's Discourse on the Father's Name glorified in Jesus 
Christ, in Beard's Family Sermons. Vol. ii. pp. 268 — 271. 



126 



German name extends, every voice was raised in lamentation 
at the great and irreparable loss. His friends and pupils, his 
admirers, his adversaries, and even strangers, his audience in 
the church and the Academy, the whole city in which he had 
lived, the court and the people, vied with each other in paying 
the most imposing funeral honors to his remains. This was 
certainly not merely an external testimony to his elevated 
character. It was a great and beautiful tribute to his name. 
But this is not what I have in view. I speak of the inward 
history of his death. I have read what those who were near- 
est to him in life, and who did not leave him for a moment 
during his last days, have written for their friends. I am per- 
mitted to copy from it that which is suitable for a wider circle. 
' His frame of mind, during the whole of his illness, was calm 
and bright. With the utmost gentleness he complied with all 
our arrangements. Not a sound of complaint or dissatisfac- 
tion was heard ; always friendly and patient, though thought- 
ful and inclined to reflection. One day, as he awoke from 
slumber, that had been produced by an opiate, he called his 
wife to him and remarked : " I am really in a state which wa- 
vers between consciousness and unconsciousness, but within 
my own mind I experience the most delightful moments. I 
cannot avoid engaging in the deepest speculations, but they 
are always in accordance with the strongest religious feelings." 5 
" I see in this a beautiful illustration of his whole life. The 
man, whose life had been devoted to the attainment of a per- 
fect unity between religion and speculation, but who modestly 
and cautiously regarded it, not as the beginning, but as the 
ultimate end of his contemplations, receives it as his reward 
and direction to heaven, in those moments when the outward 
man was perishing, in order that the inward man might ascend 
in freedom and purity, to the full enjoyment of eternal life in 
God. His last days and hours were pervaded and illu- 



127 



mined by the influence of religion. Even his dreams were 
the image of his religious life and course of action. 

" * I have had/ said he at one time, ■ such a beautiful 
dream, — it has left me with the most agreeable feelings. I 
thought I was in a vast assembly, with a great number both of 
acquaintances and of strangers. They all turned their eyes 
upon me, and wished to hear from me something on religion. 
It was the hour of instruction, and with what delight did I 
give it ! ' 

" As the awful moment drew near, he seemed to be more 
and more absorbed in love, as the innermost fountain of his 
being. He indulged in the most affectionate expressions con- 
cerning his children and friends. To the former he said : ? I 
leave you for a legacy the words of John, " My children, love 
one another." ' ' I enjoin it upon you,' said he to his wife, 
* to remember me to all my friends, and tell them how dear 
they have been to my heart.' 

" He had for some time been certain of his approaching 
death. He could wish to have been spared longer to his 
family. He felt that he had still many difficult tasks to per- 
form before his entrance upon eternal rest. But he went forth 
to the last struggle with calmness and submission to the holy 
will of Everlasting Love. 

" * The last morning of his life, his sufferings evidently in- 
creased. He complained of violent internal burnings, and the 
cry of pain, for the first and the last time, was forced from his 
lips : ' Ah Lord, my sufferings are great ! ' In the most af- 
fecting manner, he then said to his family : ' My dear child- 
ren, you must now all retire and leave me to myself. I would 
spare you the sight of so much misery.' The traces of death 
were now apparent in his countenance, his eye grew dim, and 
the death-struggle was ended. Laying his two fore fingers on 
his left eye, as he often did when engaged in deep reflection, 



128 



he began to speak : - We have the reconciling death of Jesus 
Christ, his body and his blood — .' While saying this he 
raised himself up, his features became more animated, his 
voice grew clear and strong, and with priestly solemnity he 
continued : ■ Are you one with me in this faith 1 ' His fami- 
ly assenting aloud, he went on : ' Let us then receive the sup- 
per of the Lord. There can be no need of the sexton. — 
Quick, quick, for it is not the time to think of forms.' While 
the service was preparing, his friends waited with him in sol- 
emn stillness. When everything was ready, his countenance 
lighted up with an indescribable brilliancy : his eye beaming 
upon them with a higher glow of love, he commenced the 
words of invocation for the introduction of the holy ordinance. 
Then, repeating the form of consecration in a loud and dis- 
tinct voice, he administered the bread and the wine, first to 
his family and then to himself, with the remark : ' I abide by 
these words of Scripture ; they are the foundation of my faith. 5 
After he had pronounced the blessing, his eye turned once 
more with an expression of perfect love, first to his wife, and 
then to every individual present, and, in those deep and ear- 
nest tones which penetrate the heart, he continued : ' In this 
fellowship and faith we are then one, and will remain so.' 

" c He now reclined on the pillow, the brightness still rest- 
ing on his features. In a few minutes he said : ' I can re- 
main here no longer.' And soon after : 4 Give me another 
position.' They turned him on his side ; he breathed a few 
times, and life stood still. In the mean time his children had 
come in and were kneeling round the bed. His eye gradually 
closed.' 

"In the pangs of sorrow and the feeling of elevation I can 
add nothing but the words of Scripture : ' Blessed are the 
dead who die in the Lord.' 1 Remember them which have the 
rule over you, who have spoken unto you the word of God ; 



129 



whose faith follow, considering the end of their conver- 
sation.' " * 

Such were the opinions, such the life, and such 
the death of a man, whom you could prevail on 
yourself to designate as " one of the most noted of 
the modern German school of infidelity/' The 
question might arise, If infidelity produces fruits 
like these, what value can we attach to faith ? This 
question must be answered by those who regard as 
infidelity the opinions which have been described. 
Others, on the contrary, whose soul testifies to their 
truth, and their accordance with the teachings of 
Jesus, will see in the example of Schleiermacher, 
the power of faith in the Redeemer to overcome 
the world. It will speak to their own experience, 
reassure them in their convictions, and supply them 
with fresh evidence of the superiority of a living 
spiritual faith, to the bondage of the letter, or a 
blind adherence to tradition. 



I have already occupied so much space with my 
account of Schleiermacher, that I should not feel jus- 
tified in entering at equal length upon a discussion 
of the theological opinions of De Wette. Nor is it 

* Lucre's Erinnerungen, translated in the Christian Examiner, 
vol. xx. pp. 44 — 46. 

17 



130 



necessary. They coincide, to a great degree, with 
those of Schleiermacher ; and many of the statements 
which have now been made concerning them, are 
applicable to the views of his fellow-laborer and 
friend. The points at issue, moreover, are contained 
within a narrower compass ; those which involve 
general principles may be despatched in a few words ; 
and those which may be deemed of a personal 
character, I freely leave, in their present state, to the 
decision of the reader. Your elaborate defence of 
your translations from De Wette, though somewhat 
ambiguous, does not, as far as I can perceive, main- 
tain their verbal correctness ; if it does, any further 
controversy in regard to them, though it might be 
amusing, w r ould be hopeless ; and as to the degree 
of misrepresentation, which you endeavor to abate, 
the German scholar must judge for himself. 

The principal question which now concerns us, 
relates to the opinions of De Wette on the divine 
authority of the Christian revelation. You class him 
among the German Naturalists by whom " the au- 
thority of revelation as teaching the fundamental facts 
of religion is rejected," and assert that " according 
to his views, what we regard as the miraculous evi- 
dence of Christianity, is of no value." How far this 
statement does justice to his conceptions, may be seen 
from the passages which I now produce. 



131 



I. Concerning diVine revelation. — "Although we can 
conceive of nothing relative or limited in what is divine, we 
must yet admit degrees in the manner of its revelation. Men 
cannot bear the full splendor of the divine light at once, and 
therefore it is gradually displayed. — But there must be a point 
in the development of the religious life, when the appearance 
of the perfect takes place; I do not say, when the develop- 
ment has attained its object, and is brought to an end, for in 
that case, history itself must cease; but when this object is 
clearly perceived, and its attainment actually anticipated ; 
when men are directed to the only true path, and shone upon 
by the light of unerring truth. This is realized, when a man 
reaches the highest degree, in knowledge and action, for which 
God has created us ; and when he exhibits this as the rule and 
example for all others, and attracts them to its pursuit and 
reception. In such a revelation, since it completes the cul- 
ture of human intelligence, the divine intelligence is mani- 
fested in the flesh; God is seen as the mediator in the form of 
man, and divine honor is paid to the Son of Man, in whom he 
appears. By this revelation all longing is satisfied ; all doubts 
are hushed ; and it will be received by all who are prepared for it, 
because they find in it what they seek ; because it expresses the 
inmost forebodings of their soul. No new revelation follows this, 
since every new revelation could be only a repetition of its 
all-comprehending character. The reception and appropria- 
tion of this revelation, the observance of its rules, the imita- 
tion of the example which it exhibits, now form the only 
object of endeavor in the culture of man. The aid of the 
Divine Spirit is required for this, which conducts individuals 
to the true path, and subordinates the varieties of human na- 
ture to the eternal unity. Men with the Spirit of God, will 
arise from time to time; but no new mediator or divine mes- 



132 



senger, no herald of the divine will, which has been already 
revealed and proclaimed." * 

tl The knowledge of God, which may be called the central 
point in the history of intellectual culture, is imparted to man 
only through the medium of revelation. By this, we under- 
stand, in genera], an immediate knowledge, an actual obser- 
vation, as it were, of divine things. We know nothing of 
the objects of our experience, except by means of actual 
observation ; we should have no conception, for instance, of 
an animal or plant, except by observation ; and where our 
personal observation is wanting, we must have recourse to 
that of others ; and this we appropriate to ourselves, as a 
secondary, historical knowledge. This secondary knowledge 
is true for us, so far only as it agrees with the results of our 
previous, actual observation. The description of an animal, 
contrary to all analogy, like a bird with four wings, would 
hardly find credit. Now religious knowledge is not to be 
obtained by experience, for no mortal eye has ever seen God ; 
but this also in its origin must be immediate. You may say, 
that it is the product of reflection. But you forget that re- 
flection produces nothing, gives nothing new to the mind, but 
merely clears up, brings to distinct consciousness, what was 
there before. Now, there is certainly in the human mind, 
implanted by nature, an immediate knowledge of divine 
things, which can be brought to consciousness, by outward 
excitement in the contemplation of nature. ' Because that 
which may be known of God is manifest in them ; for God 
hath shown it to them. For the invisible things of him from 
the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood 
by the things that are made, even his eternal power and God- 
head.' We have accordingly pointed out a divine instinct in 



Religion und Theologie, pp. 97 — 99. 



133 



man, directed to eternal things. We may call this the eter- 
nal or inward revelation, because it is the same unchangeably 
in all men. And although it is given to man by the constitu- 
tion of his spiritual nature, and in that respect is natural, it 
is yet more correct to call it supernatural, because the whole 
nature of the spirit depends on it, because it is the ground 
and support of all spiritual manifestations. Hence the Scrip- 
tures justly regard the Spirit of God as the source of this 
revelation. '' It is the divine spirit in man, even the inspira- 
tion of the Almighty, that giveth him understanding.' * This 
inner revelation is the ground and subject of all reflection on 
divine things. The understanding brings clearness to its im- 
mediate teachings, but contributes nothing towards them. It 
possesses the faculty of voluntary reflection ; this it may 
apply to the inward revelation ; but it can no more give the 
revelation to itself, than it can produce the perceptions of the 
senses. 

" But this revelation alone does not impart the knowledge 
of God to the human race in general. Only scattered rays of 
light shine transiently upon the darkness ; but the clear and 
permanent light of day, by which the darkness is expelled, 
cannot thus arise. This is given only by the revelation in 
history, the external revelation, when the divine is manifested 
in the human, in a peculiar and extraordinary manner. Such 
a revelation is made, when the Divine Spirit acts on the 
intelligence of a man with such fulness and power, and the 
original, immediate knowledge of God appears with such 
clearness and purity in its secondary manifestations, that even 
these are regarded by the beholder as an original product, 
since they reflect, as in a mirror, his own deepest conscious- 
ness, and this manifestation, like the inner revelation in his own 



* Job xxxii. 8. (Noyes's Translation.) 



134 



breast, becomes the source of divine knowledge, and com- 
mences a new epoch in human development. A necessary 
characteristic of revelation is truth. Its teachings must co- 
incide with the eternal revelation in every human breast. But 
all truth cannot claim to be revealed. The essential character 
of revealed truth is its freedom and originality. It cannot 
be a product of the progress of the mind ; but it must ad- 
vance and elevate the mind, in an extraordinary manner, by 
its own independent power. But since in the phenomenal 
world, nothing can be regarded as the absolutely first and 
independent, but every thing is connected with some previous 
event, it is evident, that all which claims to be revelation, 
may be regarded also in such a natural, historical connexion ; 
and no definite limits can be placed to this mode of contem- 
plation ; since no point can be imagined in the phenomenal 
world, where the connexion of things is broken. A connex- 
ion between revelation and previous events is always exhibit- 
ed at least in this, — that it shows a progress in the same 
line of cultivation, though many intermediate steps are passed 
over. And in this way, it is true, a view of the history of 
religion and of cultivation may be embraced, in which every 
thing appears as the work of the free development of the 
human spirit ; and this view is by no means to be rejected ; 
on the contrary, it is both necessary, and in the highest 
degree instructive and quickening. But it ought not to be 
the only and the highest view ; nor does it claim to be this. 
For it is incomplete and unsatisfactory ; since the difference 
always remains between what is original and what is a mere 
copy; and the first can never be explained from any connex- 
ion of circumstances ; and we are obliged therefore to have 
recourse to a higher causality. This natural view accordingly 
must yield to the supernatural view, which in every process of 
development regards the original manifestation as divine rev- 



135 



elation. Since the primitive element of the soul must be con- 
ceived as supernatural and divine, as the breath of the divine 
spirit, the original manifestations in history can be consid- 
ered not otherwise than divine ; and this in two respects, 
first as the work of the Divine Spirit, and secondly, of the 
divine government. In the first respect, revelation is regarded 
as something separate, the breaking forth of a distinct, indi- 
vidual light ; but in the second respect, it is interwoven with 
the whole course of the world's history, designed, as a star, 
arising in heaven according to the eternal order, to enlighten 
the world." * 

"We must recognise in Christianity the most perfect man- 
ifestation of religion. It comprises the whole circle of 
religious emotions ; and brings to distinct consciousness all 
the ideas of God, immortality, the eternal destiny of man and 
order of the world. In reason, we acknowledge a divine 
revelation, that is, the primitive, natural revelation ; and in 
Christianity, which gives us a clear insight into this original 
revelation, we perceive a second, historical revelation. The 
Old Testament also contains a divine revelation ; but only so 
far as it refers to the New Testament ; for that revelation 
does not possess an independent, unconditional value. What 
then is it, which gives Christianity the character of a divine 
revelation ? Men usually find this in its miraculous history, 
and in the extraordinary endowments and powers of its au- 
thor ; but these do not constitute its essence ; they are only 
the outward splendor which radiates from it. Its divine 
impress consists in its intrinsic character, and the power by 
which it arose. This inward characteristic is the complete 
development and formation of all the religious elements of 
the reason, or the most perfect reason ; that by which the 



Christliche Siltcnlchrc, vol. i. pp. 150 — 155. 



136 



reason is completely satisfied, both as regards feeling, know- 
ledge, and morality. The assertion that Christianity is above 
reason, according to our present use of language, is an 
absurdity. It arose, in the first place, from using the word 
' reason ' in the sense of ' understanding and in this view, 
there is truth in the assertion ; for certainly the understand- 
ing must acknowledge its limits in matters of religion. In 
this sense also, the assertion is correct, that the reason of 
individuals must recognise something higher in the Christian 
revelation, to which it is bound to submit, not indeed slavishly, 
but with self-surrendering confidence. But Christianity can- 
not be above reason, considered in itself ; for in that case we 
could not embrace it ; and Cod, if he had manifested what 
was altogether new to the human reason, would have contra- 
dicted himself, and transformed his original creation, by 
means of which we have received certain endowments. 
Christianity, indeed, is a new spiritual creation ; but only so 
far, as the pure reason originally placed in every man is fully 
completed and brought to consciousness. We can say 
nothing higher of Christianity, than that its intrinsic charac- 
ter is the most perfect reason ; we do not thus deny its divin- 
ity, but acknowledge it ; for reason itself is something divine. 
The controversy between the Rationalists and Supernatural- 
ists, as they are called, proceeds from mere misapprehensions; 
as is evident from the fact, that neither the words 1 Rational- 
ism ' and 1 Supernaturalism, 5 nor the ideas attached to them, 
are justly opposed to each other. Rationalism, or the view 
embraced by reason, is not opposed to Supernaturalism, or 
the doctrine that Christianity is of supernatural origin ; for 
the reason acknowledges the supernatural, and includes it in 
itself ; but Naturalism, or the doctrine that the highest in 
human life, and hence also reason, is the effect of necessary, 
natural causes, is the only true antithesis to that system. 



137 



Super-rationalism is the opposite of Rationalism ; but a the- 
ological system which should assume that name, would thus 
brand itself with absurdity; for what is above reason, is by 
that very fact unreasonable. 

" But though we call Christianity the highest reason, we 
do not mean that it is the product of human inquiry and 
reflection, or attained by study and learning, like other, hu- 
man doctrines. It sprung, by divine power, from the original 
fountain of truth; it contains immediate, not derivative truth; 
it is animated by an inspiration far surpassing the knowledge 
of the understanding; and therefore it affects the soul more 
powerfully than any other doctrine ; and deserves a confidence 
which we can give only to the immediate truth itself. Christ, 
certainly, made use of the doctrine of the Old Testament, and 
even of that of the sects of his time ; all that he set forth was 
not mere novelty; but he used every thing with the original 
power of the Spirit, and impressed it with the seal of his 
own individuality ; every thing in him was free creation, the 
effect of an independent divine power, which needed not the 
usual resources of human wisdom. A faith in the revelation 
in Christ is connected with the faith in his Godhead ; one 
depends upon the other. Because we find in him this orig- 
inality of knowledge, we believe that God was in him ; and 
because God was in him, he received his profound insight, 
not in a human manner, but from divine inspiration." * 

" In England, where the torpidity and coldness of the es- 
tablished Church impelled the mind to revolt, there arose, 
towards the end of the last century, together with the secta- 
rian spirit, that irreligious and presumptious struggle for 
freedom, in the so-called Deism, a doctrine which directed 
the reason of the individual man to itself, regarded the 



* Ueber die Religion, pp. 448—456. 

18 



138 



guidance and revelation of God in history as superfluous, and 
committed itself only to nature. The usual mode of proving 
the Christian revelation by miracles and prophecies was con- 
tested ; and nothing but reason admitted to confirm the truth 
of Christianity. Nay, many went so far as to doubt of the 
reasonableness, soundness, and purity of the Christian doc- 
trine, especially in a moral point of view. — In Germany, the 
bands which united the teachers of the Church with the es- 
tablished creeds were gradually loosened, or wholly destroyed. 
Frederick II. allowed perfect freedom of the press, in his 
dominions; and every superficial spirit made use of it to 
attack religion. The tendency of the English and Germans to 
thorough investigation, introduced historical and critical 
researches into theology, which was thus sustained by the 
increasing knowledge of antiquity. But these researches 
were not always favorable to the Church. Since men re- 
garded and treated the Bible and the Christian history in a 
natural light, and destroyed the miraculous brightness which 
had hitherto surrounded them ; since they saw many preju- 
dices disappear, found many points of the doctrine of the 
Church untenable, discovered human and temporal elements 
in what had claimed to be divine, and in this process of 
examination were not elevated by a firm faith, nor guided by 
a comprehensive idea, it followed that scarcely any thing was 
protected from doubt, and the whole fabric of Christianity 
tottered. The finishing stroke was put to this movement by 
the philosophy of Kant, which subjected the whole system of 
human knowledge to a rigid criticism, established human 
reason on itself alone, made it the supreme judge in matters of 
faith, and thus favored presumption, but, at the same time, 
by its speculative direction prepared the way for truth. Un- 
der its influence, a kind of philosophic theology was formed, 
which regarded the Christian religion as a human and natural 



139 



phenomenon, although the best means for the education of 
humanity, submitted its truth to the decision of reason, and 
undertook to purify it from all the local and temporary opin- 
ions, with which it had been combined. As the Kantian 
philosophy directed the attention especially to morality, this 
theological Rationalism regarded the moral element in Christ- 
ianity as every thing, — the rest merely as an external support. 
Much as this theology was employed with the interpretation 
of Scripture and the history of the Church, it never obtained 
a living conception of history, nor did it deserve the noble 
name of Rationalism. The view, that Christ was to be 
regarded only as a teacher, not as a Redeemer, that it was to 
be wished that his person might have remained unknown 
to us, designates the spirit of this theology, and its monstrous 
confusion. This Rationalism was a necessary phenomenon; 
it manifested the extreme of the one-sided direction to specu- 
lative knowledge, which hitherto had often changed its forms, 
but was still essentially the old Scholasticism." * 

II. Concerning Jesus Christ. — " We find, in the Scrip- 
tures, that the men by whom revelations were made, are 
represented as inspired, full of the Holy Ghost ; but, at the 
same time, they are called and sent by God ; and in this 
respect they hold a definite place in the series of revelations 
ordained by Divine Providence ; and are the instruments of 
God for the accomplishment of his purpose in regard to the 
human race. Christ also is filled with the Holy Spirit, but in 
an infinite degree ; because he is infinitely exalted above all 
prophets. On the other hand, he is not merely one of the 
divine messengers, like the prophets ; but he is the represen- 
tative of the Godhead revealing himself ; his image, the 
reflection of his glory, the Divine Word or the Divine Wis- 



* Christlichc Sittcnlchrc, vol. ii. part ii. pp. 313 — 316. 



140 



dom. — Christ is the Divine Wisdom, because all the light of 
the knowledge of God, which had before appeared to men, 
was concentrated in him, the light of the world, so that all 
former light appears not so much as a preparation, as the 
out-flowing of the light in Christ.* He has completed the 
revelation of God, because he knew what was in man in its 
immediate fulness and depth, and announced it to the under- 
standing in words; because he declared to us what he 1 had 
seen and heard,' and what ' the Father had taught him,' as he 
brought to light faith and love, or all the ideas of truth and 
good ; and thus displayed in himself the unity of the divine 
and the human, as an eternal image and model. This unity 
can now be merely striven after, and introduced into human 
life ; but beyond it, nothing new or better can be found." t 
" Jesus called his doctrine, the doctrine of God ; his work, 
the work of God ; and himself, the messenger and Son of God. 
The prophets also of the old covenant were regarded as 
messengers of God, and the kings, as servants of the theo- 
cracy and representatives of God, were called the sons of 
God. But all this was only an indication of the perfect re- 
ality which appeared in Jesus. In the same sense, no man 
had ever been the messenger or the Son of God ; for no man 
had announced divine truth in such purity, and so perfectly 
fulfilled the word of God on earth as Jesus. All former 
messengers and representatives of God had been imperfect, 
erring, and sinful men ; but Jesus was free from error and 
sin ; and God dwelt in him with his wisdom and holiness, 
with the fulness and power of his Spirit. They who saw and 
heard him, who yielded to his enlightening and saving influ- 
ence, felt the elevating and saving presence of God ; the 

* " The spirit of the prophets was the spirit of Christ." 1 Peter 
i. 11. 

t Christliche Sittenlehre, vol. i. pp. 155, 156. 



141 



glory of God was manifested to them ; they beheld, as it 
were, God himself." * 

" 1 The Word, ' says the Apostle, ' was in the beginning 
with God.' The revelation of God, which is perpetually un- 
folding in nature and history, has its origin in the beginning 
of things, is not the work of a finite power, but of the agency 
of God. 'And the Word was God,' says the Apostle. God 
has wholly manifested himself in his Word, in his revela- 
tion ; he is to be known in all that he has done, and all that 
he imparts to man, because he wholly acts therein not only 
in himself, in his concealed, unfathomable being, but also in 
the creation and government of the world, and in the mani- 
festation of himself ; and hence also is he to be known wholly 
in Christ, in whom he personally appeared ; Christ and the 
Father are one. 

" There is a profound significance in the words, ' the Word 
was God.' There is no man, no people, to whom some word, 
some revelation of God has not been granted ; but not every 
revelation of God is God himself, or wholly adequate to his 
nature. Even the heathen had conceptions of God, though 
impure ; their idolatry represented certain powers or attributes 
of God ; but they worshipped the creature instead of the 
Creator, and turned the glory of the incorruptible God into 
the image of corruptible man ; to them the Word was not 
God. To the Israelites, God spoke in divers manners by the 
prophets ; and they had purer knowledge of the Supreme 
Being. But they did not know God completely as he is, in 
his word and revelation. The Old Testament revelation was 
purer and more perfect than that of the heathen ; still, God 
himself was not in it, but only portrayed in laws, constitutions, 
and images. Christ was first the Word of God, which was 



* Ueber die Religion, p. 442. 



142 



God himself; whoever saw him, saw the Father. But among 
those who believe in him are many, who do not know him, 
as he is one with the Father, to whom the Word is not God. 
We will not speak of those who, with Arius, fall into the 
error of regarding Christ as a created being, elevated, it is 
true, above all other creatures, but still not equal with God, 
or of the same essence with him ; for this error has long 
since been rooted out of the Christian Church. Neither will 
we here introduce those who deny the Godhead of Christ, 
and regard him as a mere man ; for their error is too remote 
from the sense of this passage. We will here speak directly 
of those only who admit the Godhead of Christ, but who do 
not so conceive of him, that his Word is to them God him- 
self, that they immediately perceive and honor God therein. 
This is .the case with those Christians, who do not believe 
in the Christian revelation, because divine truth itself has 
appeared in it, but demand for it other proof, than it contains 
within itself ; who are not drawn to it, by purely spiritual 
attractions, who do not receive the spirit of Christ in itself, 
nor recognise God in his glorified form ; but who cling, with 
idolatrous service, to the letter of his doctrine, to the external 
circumstances in his appearance ; and who are rather drawn 
from God than to him, by his person which they blindly 
honor. The personal elements in Christ are of infinite im- 
portance for faith : but only so far as God is manifested in 
them ; he who loves them for other reasons, to him the Word 
is not God. ' It is the spirit which quickeneth, the flesh 
profiteth nothing. 5 " * 



III. Concerning miracles. — "Jesus converted water into 
wine in an extraordinary, and wonderful manner. The spec- 



* Die Heilige Schrift ausgelegt, vol. i. pp. 13 — 15. 



143 



tators perceived in this action, a sign or a manifestation of 
the glory of Jesus, and therefore believed in him, that is, they 
acknowledged him as the messenger and Son of God, en- 
dowed with the divine spirit and the power. — 

" This act may be regarded by us also, as a sign of the 
spirit of Jesus ; and it is so important, that we may contem- 
plate it, under all its aspects, with astonishment and admira- 
tion. It is wonderful and mysterious. Jesus transformed 
the water into wine, by the power over nature, which was 
imparted to him, and which we cannot comprehend. As he 
possessed the divine power of will in freedom, and the in- 
fallible power of knowledge, so that he was without sin 
and error, so likewise he exhibited from time to time the 
divine omnipotence which lay hid within him, and produced 
extraordinary effects in the sphere of nature. As he intro- 
duced a new creative movement into the spiritual world, he 
also acted on external, corporeal nature ; and this felt the 
movement, as it were, in sympathy. The extraordinary 
supremacy of Jesus over nature is to us a sign of his divine 
mission, as proof that a higher spirit dwelt within him ; and 
we contemplate it with humble reverence, since it so far 
surpasses our knowledge and power. On the other hand, it 
is not without encouragement for us. The spirit of wisdom 
and holiness, which was in Christ, may be imparted to us, if 
we believe in him, although in a less degree ; the exercise 
of wisdom and a firm will gives us a power, to a certain 
extent, over external nature ; and herein is Christ a model 
for us. Though we cannot act so marvellously, as Christ 
did, though we must use instruments and second causes to 
subject nature to our service, still, it is always the power and 
freedom of the spirit, which we employ, and which give us 
a mastery over nature." * 

* Die Heilige Schrift ansgelegt, vol. i. pp. 48, 49. 



144 



" In the case of Nicodemus, we see one who was led to Je- 
sus merely by faith in his miracles. But although his faith 
was first awakened by admiration of the acts of Jesus, he still 
deserved the confidence of our Lord, who entered into conver- 
sation with him, and pointed out to him the requisites for a 
true faith. We perceive from the manner in which Nicode- 
mus addressed Jesus, that his faith in miracles was not a bar- 
ren astonishment, not a mere outward excitement ; for he ac- 
knowledged, from the signs which Jesus had wrought, that 
God was with him ; he recognised in him, a higher and divine 
spiritual power. We hence see that a faith in miracles is not 
always to be slighted ; we should esteem and use it as a prepa- 
ration for the true faith ; and treat with forbearance those who 
need its excitement. But a faith in miracles is never more 
than an introduction to the true faith, as Jesus here makes 
use of it only as a means of transition to higher knowledge." * 

I might multiply extracts of a similar import, to a 
great extent, from the various writings of De Wette ; 
but 1 need not continue the labor; the general 
character of his theology may be understood from 
what has now been brought forward ; and on a' fu- 
ture occasion I hope to give a more complete dis- 
cussion of the subject. I presume no one will be 
disposed to class De Wette with any school of infi- 
delity, after reading the passages adduced ; for, as 
in the case of Schleiermacher, the question may be 
presented, If such views be infidelity, what is Chris- 
tianity ? It has been seen that he holds to the su- 



* Die Heilige Schrift ausgelegt, vol. i. pp. 65, 66. 



145 



pernatural origin of the Christian revelation ; that he 
regards Jesus as possessing the fulness of the Divine 
Spirit ; and that he recognises in the miracles which 
he wrought the signs and illustrations of his Divinity. 
The history and experience of this theologian afford 
a cheering support to the believer, in a skeptical age. 
His life has been devoted, for the most part, to criti- 
cal inquiries ; he was early thrown into the great 
conflict of modern times ; no man has shrunk less 
from difficulties ; he has faced every objection that 
learned research has suggested ; he has never failed 
to be true to his own doubts ; he has followed them 
to their last results ; tradition and authority have 
never bound his free spirit ; and admitting the full 
force of scientific conclusions, he clings to Christ- 
ianity as the revelation of God ; faith and reason, 
feeling and philosophy, Supernaturalism and Ration- 
alism, have found in him their mutual completion 
and reconciliation. 

In thus presenting the views of the distinguished 
theologians who have formed the subject of this 
Letter, I would not be understood to cherish any 
anxiety in regard to their introduction among our- 
selves. I have no doubt that, sooner or later, they 
will attract the attention to which they are entitled ; 
they will be examined, discussed, and justly appre- 
ciated ; they will be sifted by clear and unpreju- 
19 



146 



diced minds ; the chaff will be separated from the 
wheat ; and whatever noble and quickening truth 
they may be found to contain, will be welcomed 
with love and joy. 

If they can aid us in our endeavors to attain a 
thorough comprehension of Christian truth, to build 
up a sound and living theology, which shall recon- 
cile all differences, satisfy the intellect, win the 
heart, and bless society, we shall avail ourselves of 
their aid ; if not, we shall cease to look for help to a 
source whence help cannot come ; we shall remain 
contented in the exercise of our own thoughts, 
seek out wiser and safer guides, go back to the old 
paths in peace, or strike out others which promise 
to be still more straight and excellent than any that 
have yet been opened to our choice. 

For my own part, I am persuaded, that the the- 
ology which we have considered, contains the germs 
of many pure and vital truths ; more than this can 
scarce ever be claimed for any system ; that it com- 
poses a perfect whole, finished in all its parts, doing 
justice to every attribute of God, or every faculty 
of the soul, and incapable of further illustration and 
improvement, will not be pretended by those who 
believe that the law of gradual progress is the 
great law of the Universe ; but I cannot conceal 
from myself, that the essential principles of this 
school are already hailed by many devoted lovers of 



147 



religion and science, " as the vital* profound, and 
ennobling theology which they have earnestly sought 
for, but hitherto sought in vain." 

It is not to be supposed, however, that the pro- 
duct of a foreign soil can be completely natural- 
ized in another clime ; or, that, without important 
changes in its form, it can be made to take deep 
root at all, and produce fruit. Nor is this desirable. 
The efforts of great minds abroad, at best, can be 
only an imperfect assistance to our own thoughts ; 
our opinions must proceed from our own inquiries ; 
for, like religion, no conviction is of any value, 
unless it be personal. The form, which philosophy 
and theology, — the highest philosophy, — will at 
last assume among our thinking men, cannot now 
be predicted ; but we may be sure that it will be 
no imitation of an obsolete model ; it will not be 
cast in foreign moulds ; it will possess the freshness 
and originality of genuine life; but, at the same 
time, its intrinsic vigor will prevent the dread of 
increasing light, though from strange and remote 
sources. 

I cannot close this Letter, without adding a few 
words, in regard to the character of the theology 
which is presented in your " Discourse " and " Re- 
marks." Its radical defect, in my opinion, proceeds 
from the influence of the material philosophy on 



148 



which it is founded. The error, with which it 
starts, that there is no faculty in human nature for 
perceiving spiritual truth, must needs give rise to 
the other errors which I have formerly pointed out, 
and which will be rejected, one would hope, as soon 
as their character and tendency are understood. 

You maintain that "there can be no intuition, 
no direct perception of the truth of Christianity," 
(Discourse, p. 32.) and that " the feeling or direct 
perception of religious truth/' is an "imaginary 
faculty." (Remarks, p. 56.) Revolting as this 
statement appears, when presented in its naked 
form, it is the legitimate and unavoidable conse- 
quence of the philosophical system which grounds 
all possible certainty on the testimony of the senses, 
and allows no distinct and independent reality 
to the testimony of the soul. I honor the mental 
consistency which accepts and asserts this con- 
sequence, far more than the effeminate timidity 
which shrinks from it, and would fain keep it out of 
sight. Truth is usually promoted, by following out 
every path to its ultimate limit. We thus learn to 
what it leads, or that it leads to nothing ; and in 
either case, we may be induced to retrace our 
steps. 

The principle, that the soul has no faculty to 
perceive spiritual truth, is contradicted, I believe, 
by the universal consciousness of man. God has 



149 



never left himself without witness in the human 
heart. The true light has shone, more or less 
brightly, on every man that cometh into the world. 
This Divine Spirit has never ceased to strive with 
the children of earth ; it has helped their infirmi- 
ties, given them just and elevated conceptions, 
touched their eyes with celestial light, and enabled 
them to see the beauty and glory of divine things. 
God has ever manifested himself to his intelligent 
creatures ; but have they had no faculty to behold 
this manifestation ? Did the ray from above fall on 
sightless eye-balls ? Not so. There has always 
been truth in the world ; man has never been 
quite shut out from intercourse with his Maker ; the 
early patriarchs communed with the unseen Father, 
as they wandered over the verdant plains of the 
East ; the meek spirits that yearned after divine 
knowledge, among oriental bards and Grecian sages, 
w r ere not blind to the heavenly vision ; " the igno- 
rant savage has believed in God without the aid of 
metaphysics ;" and when the full-orbed Sun of 
Righteousness and Truth arose upon the world, in 
the soul of Jesus of Nazareth, it was hailed by the 
unlettered fishermen of Galilee, and has been reve- 
renced by the most faithful spirits in every succeed- 
ing age, as the visible manifestation of the Eternal 
glory. Must there not have been an eye for this ? 
Does the body see, and is the spirit blind ? No. 



150 



Man has the faculty for " feeling and perceiving 
religious truth." So far from being imaginary, it is 
the highest reality, of which the pure soul is con- 
scious. Can I be more certain, that I am capable 
of looking out, and admiring the forms of external 
beauty, " the frail and weary weed in which God 
dresses the soul that he has called into time," than 
that I can also look within, and commune with the 
fairer forms of truth and holiness, which plead for 
my love, as visitants from Heaven 1 

In the exercise of this faculty, man is able to be- 
hold the presence of God in the phenomena of the 
universe. The glory of the invisible Spirit beams 
from the visible creation, and is recognised as such, 
by those " whose eye is single, and whose whole 
body is full of light." The same faculty reveals to 
them the sacredness of their moral nature, invests 
conscience with divine authority, shows them the 
baseness, as well as the guilt of sin, makes them 
meekly grateful in view of their affinity with the Su- 
preme Power, and enables them to read the law of 
God, which is written on the heart. This percep- 
tion, moreover, gives them " the knowledge of the 
glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." They see 
the Father in the. person of the Son. They feel that 
God was with him who displayed such divine grace 
and truth. They perceive the express image of his 
perfections, in the character of Jesus, and embrace 



151 



him as the Saviour of their souls, and the light of the 
world. 

The denial of this faculty in the higher nature of 
man, of course, leads to the endeavor to make truth 
dependent on external support. It will thus be 
valued, not for what it is in itself, but for the cir- 
cumstances in which it appears. Its intrinsic au- 
thority will fail to be recognised ; its affinity with 
the soul, if admitted at all, will be only as a barren 
formula ; and all inward feeling of its reality, " the 
tasting that the Lord is gracious," "the judging for 
ourselves what is right," will be rejected as vision- 
ary or presumptious. Religion is thus removed from 
the sphere of consciousness, and subjected to his- 
torical conditions. The certainty of faith must pro- 
ceed from reliance on others ; not from a spiritual 
witness in ourselves. The humble Christian can 
put no trust in his Redeemer, till he is assured of its 
safety from the lips of the learned. The researches 
of the critic are deemed of greater importance than 
the experience of the believer. The royal priest- 
. hood of faith is dishonored, and a hierarchy of scho- 
lars installed. The wise after the flesh must sit 
in judgment on the teachings of the spirit. The 
character of a revelation is no proof of its divinity ; 
the signatures of an heavenly origin borne on its 
front are unworthy of account ; nothing is valid but 
the evidence of miracles ; the prophets and divine 



152 



messengers of old who uttered the burden of the 
Lord, without external attestation had no claims to 
inspiration ; and even " the glorious Gospel of the 
blessed God," which, in every word of its promises, 
every tone of its rebuke, every expression of its 
truth, exhibits " the power of God, and the wisdom 
of God to salvation," must rely for its support on 
the fact, that " it was authenticated by miracles as 
coming from God." 

A faith, thus founded on historical testimony, with 
no reliance on the inward feeling or perception of 
truth, can never attain to positive certainty. I do 
not see how any mind can derive from it the repose 
which our nature craves. Without a higher faith 
than this, I know, that to many, life would be a bur- 
den, duty but a name, and religion a dream. The 
serene assurance of the reality of immortal truth, 
which is imparted by the contrary doctrine, cannot 
rest on such a basis. Hence the confession, that 
f there is no absolute certainty, beyond the limit of 
momentary consciousness, a certainty that vanishes 
the instant it exists, and is lost in the region of meta- 
physical doubt." (Discourse, p. 30.) 

The soul of the Christian, as I understand Chris- 
tianity, seeks a higher boon than this. He de- 
mands a certainty of a different character, from that 
which can be enjoyed in the unstable affairs of this 
life, in the transactions of earthly business, " in the 



153 



establishment of a manufactory, or the building of a 
railroad." " The things which are seen," he knows, 
" are temporal ;" subject to manifold fluctuations ; 
perpetually eluding the firmest grasp ; incapable of 
giving assurance or repose to the immortal soul. 
" But the things which are not seen," he is equally 
certain, "are eternal;" when every thing earthly 
has passed away, they will remain; and in the 
worship of undying truth, of spiritual beauty and 
goodness, he finds a source of sustaining convic- 
tions, and a perpetual and "exceeding great re- 
ward." 

The enlightened believer, it seems to me, cannot 
rest satisfied with a mere balance of probability, 
decided by intellectual researches. This would 
leave his heart dry and impoverished. It is the 
nature of faith to cling to its objects with earnest 
grasp, to throw around them the warm light of the 
affections, and to incorporate them with the deepest 
and most sincere experiences of life. Its tone is that 
of confidence ; in its best moments, of triumph ; 
habitually, of serene and joyful trust. It discards 
negations ; it will accept nothing but truth ; it ac- 
knowledges the efficacy of the Divine Spirit to 
inform the soul, not as a theological phrase, but as 
a daily reality. Its language is, "I know in whom 
I have believed ; I know that my Redeemer liv- 
eth ;" and in perpetual communion with the spirit 
20 



154 



of holiness and love, it beholds the presence of 
God. 

With such views of the character of the Chris- 
tian faith, it is not surprising, that the ground as- 
sumed in your recent publications, should call forth 
my strong and earnest opposition. I do not regret, 
however, that you have attempted to maintain it. 
The question is now before our religious community. 
It will not be settled without thorough, and I trust 
also, candid discussion. The results cannot but be 
favorable to the interests of truth. That they may 
be equally favorable to the interests of charity and 
peace, is the sincere wish of 

Yours, &c, 

George Ripley. 

Boston, February 22, 1840. 



THE END. 



W 128 8 2 











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